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Abstract
Most contemporary literary theories are either explicitly or implicitly atheistic. 
This thesis describes a literary theory whose principles are derived from or 
consistent with Christian theology. It argues against modern objections to such a 
theory that this is a rationally and ethically legitimate mode of contemporary literary
theory.
The first half of the thesis constitutes an analysis of deconstruction, of Marxism 
and of psychoanalysis. These are three of the most influential discourses in modern 
literary theory, each of which constitutes a significant argument against the 
existence of God, as this has traditionally been understood in Christian theology. In 
a chapter devoted to each theory, I examine its relation to Christian theology, and 
argue that it does not constitute a conclusive argument against the truth-content of 
such theology. I go on to assess which of its principles can be used in modem 
Christian literary theory, and which cannot.
The second half of the thesis constitutes an analysis of a Christian tradition of 
thought that pertains to literary theory. In the fourth chapter, I examine the concepts 
of language and of art expressed or implied in the Bible, St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas, and assess which of these concepts could be used in Christian 
literary theory today. In the fifth chapter, I examine certain twentieth-century 
Christian philosophers and literary critics, and assess how their thought could be 
used in contemporary Christian literary theory.
iii
In the final chapter, I synthesize the conclusions to these arguments into the 
outline of a literary theory that both derives from Christian theology and takes 
account of the objections to such theology posed by contemporary literary theories.
t
Declarations
(i) I, Luke Ferretter, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 
100,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work 
carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous 
application for a higher degree.
Date.. Signature of candidate..................................................................
(ii) I was admitted as a research student in October 1994 and as a candidate for 
the degree of Ph.D. in October 1994; the higher study for which this is a 
record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1994 and
1998.
Date. Signature of candidate.
(iii) I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the 
Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Ph.D. in the
University of St. Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this 
thesis in application for that degree.
Date>/%7. Signature of supervisor.
'2 7 4 64 .
Date..... Signature of supervisor.
VIn submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews, I understand that I am 
giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the 
regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any 
copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the 
title and abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and 
supplied to any bona fide library or research worker.
Date.2.1 /. 1?. Signature of candidate............  ....... . .... ............ . ......... . ....................
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr. Ian Johnson, the late Mr. Stephen Boyd,
and Mr. Anthony Ashe, for their help in reading and commenting on the several
versions of this work.
I would like to thank those members of the English department at St. Andrews 
who gave generously of their time and expertise, especially Prof. Susan Sellers, 
Prof. Robert Crawford, Prof. Michael Alexander and Prof. Nicholas Roe. Prof. 
Douglas Dunn chaired a department in which every aspect of writing a doctoral 
thesis was facilitated. Dr. James Alexander of St. Mary's College, and Dr. Anthony 
Meredith, S.J., of Heythrop College, gave valuable suggestions on St. Augustine. 
Prof. David Jasper of Glasgow University helped with biographical details.
I would like to thank my parents for their support throughout the years in which 
this thesis was conceived and written. Most of all I would like to thank my wife Jen, 
to whom this thesis is dedicated, for her constant love and belief in me.
Contents
vu
Introduction 1
1. On Deconstruction 8
(i) An Outline of Deconstructive Criticism 8
1. Derrida’s Reading of Husserl 9
2. Deconstruction 19
3. Derrida’s Reading of Literary Texts 22
4. Deconstructive Literary Criticism 27
(ii) Deconstruction and Christianity 31
1. Derrida and the Concept of Theology 31
2. Derrida and Negative Theology 41
(iii) A Critique of Deconstruction 51
1. The Marxist Critique 53
2. The Hermeneutic Critique 59
2. On Marxism 63
(i) An Outline of Marxist Literary Theories 63
1. Karl Marx 64
2. Louis Althusser 69
3. Pierre Macherey 74
4. Terry Eagleton 78
5. Fredric Jameson 83
(ii) Marxism and Christianity 88
vm
1. Marx, Engels and Lenin on Religion 89
2. An Assessment of Marxist Atheism 93
3. Liberation Theology 96
4. Catholic Social Thought 102
(iii) A Critique of Marxist Literary Theories 112
1. The Concept of Ideology 112
2. Intra-Marxist Critique 119
3. On Psychoanalysis 125
(i) An Outline of Psychoanalytic Literary Theories 125
1. Sigmund Freud 126
2. Freudian Literary Criticism 137
3. Jacques Lacan 139
4. Lacanian Literary Criticism 145
5. Julia Kristeva 148
(ii) Psychoanalysis and Christianity 155
1. Freud on Religion 155
2. An Assessment ofFreud's Atheism 160
3. Jung and Fromm on Religion 166
4. Psychoanalysis and Christian Tradition 173
(iii) A Critique of Psychoanalytic Literary Theories 180
1. The Empirical Critique 180
2. The Feminist Critique 188
IX
4. Christian Tradition and Literary Theory 197
(i) The Bible 197
1. The Logos 198
2. Adam’s Names 203
3. The Tower of Babel 204
4. Pentecost 208
5. Art in the Bible 211
(ii) St. Augussine 216
1. St, Auggistmn’s Theory of Signs 217
2. St Augussme’s TheooyofBeauSy 227
3. St Ausgissnis’s Theooy of 3At 233
(iii) St. Thomas Aquinas 239
1. Theological Language 240
2. St Thomas’ Thhory ooTBearUy 246
3. St Thomas’ Theory oo yAl 251
5. Modern Christian Literary Theories 263
(i) 263
1. Gadamer’s Theory of Authority and Tradition 264
2. The Gadamer-Habermas Debate 268
3. Gadamer’s Poetics 275
(ii) Neo-Thhmism 280
1. Jaccque Masttain 281
2. Eii<c Gill 295
3. David Jones 298
(Ill) Religion and Literature 302
1. T.S. Elion and the New Criticism 302
2. Nathan Scott and Exittenaial Theology 308
3. Contemporary Christian Theories 313
6. Conclusion 326
Bibliography 337
Introduction
Most contemporary literary theories are atheistic. In ‘The Death of the Author’ 
(1968), Roland Barthes describes the emphasis on textuality characteristic of 
post-structuralism as ‘an anti-theological activity..., since to refuse to fix 
meaning is, in the end, to refuse God and his hypostases - reason, science, law’. 
The philosophers to whom modem literary theory is most indebted - Marx, 
Nietzsche and Freud - have argued that the truth-content of religious beliefs is 
negated by their social and psychological determinants. Post-structuralist 
theories emphasise that the language in which such beliefs are expressed cannot 
support the tmth-claim that they imply. It seems that contemporary literary study 
is incompatible as such with Christian faith. This thesis argues that this is not the
case.
In his book: Justifying Language (1995), Kevin Mills writes that his goal is
to affirm the viability of a critical belief which is cognisant of the array of 
philosophico-linguistic objections to its existence, and yet understands 
why faith, hope and love are able to remain in the face of this onslaught.2
One of the reasons why Mills can assert that it is possible consistently to hold a 
Christian faith after understanding the modern objections to it is that there is no 
system of thought that does not at some point involve an act of faith. In Does 
God Exist? An Answer for Today (1978), the Catholic theologian Flans Kung 
argues this point in his study of Nietzschean nihilism. He asserts that each of us 
makes a ‘fundamental decision’ about reality as a whole, a choice of what self, 
others and the world mean to us, which grounds all our subsequent actions and
1 Roland Bartlies. Image Music Text, tr. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977) p. 147.
" Kevin Mills, Justifying Language: Paul and Contemporary Literary Theory (London, 
Macmillan, 1995) p. 2.
2convictions. Nietzsche has made clear that reality is not solf-ovidont, Kung
argues, and so this decision is ultimately a matter of trust. Ho writot:
The fundamental alternative is a (considered or uncontidorod) Yes or No 
to reality in principle; an unforcable and unprovable trust or mistrust in 
the reality of the world and of my own self.* 3
In the end, I either believe that reality has identity, meaning and value or I do 
not. Kung argues that the former choice, which he calls ‘fundamental trust’ in 
reality, is the basis both of science and of ethics. Citing philosophers of science 
from Karl Popper to Thomas Kuhn, Kiing argues that ‘all rational thinking rests 
on a choice, a resolution, a decision, an attitude; in a word, on a “faith in 
reason’”.4 A rationalism which attempts to base every proposition on arguments 
or experience cannot itself be based on argument’ or experience, but must be 
believed to be a valid way of understanding reality. Kung adds that a similar act 
of faith is the precondition of ethics:
Any acceptance of meaning, truth and rationality, of values and ideals, 
priorities and preferences, models and norms, presupposes a fundamental 
trust in uncertain reality. 5
Every positive system of thought at some point involves an act of faith, a 
decision simply to commit oneself to something that cannot be proved. Even 
nihilism is based on such a decision. If this is true, then Christian theology and 
modern literary theory are not incommensurate discourses. It is not the case that
whereas ieo latter is based on critical reason and ethics, the former derives from 
an irrational faith that results in unethical values. On tlie contrary, Christians 
share with modem literary theorists an understanding of reality whose most
3 Hans Kiing, Does God Exist? An Answer For Today, tr. Edward Quinn (London; Collins, 1980) 
p. 439.
“ Ibid. p. 461.
3 Ibid. p. 470.
3fundamental axioms are neither proved nor provable, but in the end simply
believed.
Granted that literary theory and Christian faith are not in principle
incompatible, it may be asked whether it is meaningful or valuable in practice to
associate them. It may be objected that criticism should be practised according to
strictly critical norms, and Christian faith should be reserved for theology and
ethics, to which it properly pertains. This objection ignores the most fundamental
insight of modem literary theory, however, that there is no critical discourse that
does not derive from some theory or theories, however unconscious or ill-
assorted. As Catherine Belsey writes, in Critical Practice (1980):
There is no practice without theory, however much that theory is 
suppressed, unformulated or perceived as ‘obvious’. [Reading] 
presupposes a whole theoretical discourse...about the relationships 
between meaning and the world, meaning and people, and finally about 
people themselves and their place in the world.6
Whether I write about what John Donne’s imagery tells me about his particular 
way of perceiving of the world, or about the political significance of his 
representations of women, I cannot but derive my interpretations and judgements 
from a more or less conscious system of opinions about the way the world is and 
about what should be done in it. Since Christian theology constitutes the basis of 
such a world-view, it is reasonable to imagine a critical discourse whose 
interpretations and judgements derive from it or from principles consistent with 
it. My aim in this thesis is to describe such a discourse.
I will begin with some working definitions. In The Nature of Doctrine (1984), 
George Lindbeck argues that Christian doctrines are
6 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London and New York: Routledge, 1980) p. 4. After 
Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory), Alisdair MacIntyre makes a similar point about facts: ‘What 
each observer takes himself or herself to perceive is identified and has to be identified by theory­
laden concepts’ (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981 p. 79).
4communally authoritative teachings regarding beliefs and practices that 
are considered essential to the identity or welfare of the group in 
question.7
This statement makes clear that any definition of Christian doctrine is 
determined by the community in which it is formulated. My definition is no 
exception, and is determined by the Roman Catholic community within which I 
write. I will mean by ‘Christian’ doctrines those Catholic doctrines from which 
the major Protestant confessions and the Eastern Orthodox communions do not 
dissent. There is no brief summary of Catholic doctrines, like the Church of 
England’s Thirty-Nine Articles or the Presbyterian Westminster Confession. 
Even lengthy volumes like Denzinger’s Enchiridion Symbolorum and the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church do not represent the complete doctrinal 
content of the Catholic faith. This is partly because, as Vatican II asserts, the 
primary object of revelation is ‘God...Himself, in Christ, whose meaning 
cannot be exhausted in dogmatic propositions.8 Furthermore, as Catholic 
theologian Karl Rahner argues in ‘The Development of Dogma’ (1954), the 
development of these propositions is a necessity of the church’s historical
existence:
The real understanding of what is revealed and its existential 
appropriation by men is wholly dependent on the transformations of the 
propositions of faith, as they were originally heard, into propositions 
which relate what is heard to the historical situation of the men who 
hear.9
In Foundations of Christian Faith (1976), Rahner argues that Scripture, as ‘the 
objectification of the original church’s consciousness of the faith’, is the norm of 
Catholic doctrine. The church’s teaching office, he writes, has the task of
7 George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984) p. 74
8 Dei Verbum no. 2, in Walter M. Abbott and Joseph Gallagher, tr. and ed., The Documents of
Vatican II (New York: Association Press, 1966) p. 112.
3‘always interpreting it anew in historically changing horizons of understanding 
as the one truth which always remains the same’.10 Vatican IPs decree on 
ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio (1964), asserts that ‘in Catholic teaching 
there exists an order or “hierarchy” of truths, since they vary in their relationship 
to the foundation of the Christian faith’.11 The structure of this hierarchy has not 
been specified. For the purpose of this thesis, I will take those doctrines that are 
shared by the major Protestant and Orthodox confessions as its fundamental 
level, and will refer to them as ‘Christian’ doctrines.
I will mean by ‘literary’ texts, fictional texts which are found valuable. In 
Literary Theory (1983), Terry Eagleton argues that fictionality cannot be used as 
a criterion for defining literature, pointing out that much prose intended 
accurately to describe the author’s understanding of reality is studied in literature 
courses. 12 The logic of his argument that literature is constituted by readers’ 
relations to texts, however, suggests that the same text can be read both as fiction 
or in a different way. If I read John’s Donne’s sermons for advice on my spiritual 
life, or The Cloud of Unknowing to learn how to contemplate, then I am reading 
them as something like science. If on the other hand I read these texts without 
expecting them directly to describe some aspect of reality, then I am reading 
them as fiction, in the sense of that term that denotes a text or part of a text that 
is not understood as an accurate description of reality. In defining literature as 
texts read in this way and ‘found valuable’, I am accepting the modem axiom 
that, since values are determined by the social and historical context of the
® Karl Rainier, Theological Investigations Vol. 1: God, Christ, Mary and Grace, tr. Cornelius 
Ernst (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1961) p. 47.
10 Karl Rainier, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, tr. 
William V. Dycli (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1976) p. 377.
11 Unitatis Redintegratio no. 11, in Abbott and Gallagher, Vatican II p. 354.
12 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) pp. 1-2.
6ditcourtet ia which they are formulated, literature it a historically variable 
category. I take ‘literary theory' tn deante ditcnurte concerned with textt ia 
general, and ia particular with the nature and function nf literary textt. By 
‘Christian literary theory', I will mean a theory nf the nature and function nf 
fictional textt found valuable, which it derived from thnte fundamental dnctrinet 
nf the Catholic faith thared by the major Protettant and the Orthodox 
confettiont, or from principlet contittent with them.
I will ute two methodt of conttructiag tuch a theory in thit thetit. In the firtt 
three chaptert, I will examine what I take to be the fundamental discourset of 
modern literary theory, deconttruction, Marxitm and ptychoanalysis. Each of 
thete theoriet constitutes a tignificaat argument agaiatt the exittence of God, at 
thit hag been traditionally underttood in Chrittian theology. In each chapter, I 
will examine the relationt between the modern theory and Chri8tian theology, 
and detcribe the tignificance of thit relation for Chrittian literary theory. I will 
attett what I take to be the value of each ditcourte, and tuggett which of itt 
intightt could be uted in Chrittian literary theory and how. I will alto offer a 
critique of each theory, to tuggett that it thould not be taken at authoritative or 
at a modem orthodoxy. In thit firtt half of the thetit, I aim to thow that the 
concept of Chrittian literary theory it a legitimate one, and to have begun to 
elaborate tome of the principlet in which it might contitt. In the next two 
chaptert, I will expound thete principlet in greater detail. In the fourth chapter, I 
will examine tome of the fundamental textt of Chrittian tradition, namely thote 
of the Bible, Ct. Auguttine and Ct. Thomat Aquiaat, in order to ettablith what 
they contribute to what we now call literary theory. In the fifth chapter, I will 
examine thote twentieth-century literary theoriet that either explicitly derive
7from or are consistent with Christian theology, and will assess the value of these 
texts for contemporary theory. In this second half of the thesis, I aim to show 
both that a Christian tradition of thought pertaining to literary theory exists, and 
to suggest how it might be used today.
81. On Deconstruction
I will begin with an examination of deconstruction, and of the literary theory 
and criticism that can or has been called deconstructive. I will have two concerns 
in this chapter. Firstly, I will examine the effect of deconstruction on Christian 
theology and vice versa. I shall be particularly concerned with the concept of 
theology in Derrida’s thought, and with the relation between deconstruction and 
negative theology. Secondly, I will offer a critique of deconstruction, in order to 
show that, whilst there are certain principles which a Christian literary theory 
could learn from it, Derrida’s work should not be taken as a final authority in 
literary theory. I will begin this analysis with an introduction to this work and to 
the deconstructive literary criticism that derives from it.
(i) An Outline of Deconstructive Criticism
Jacques Derrida (b. 1930) came to develop the practice which has become 
known as deconstruction as a result of his study of the phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Based at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, 
he also spent time at Louvain and Harvard during the 1950s, and translated 
Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry (1936) with a long introduction in 1962, for 
which he won the Jean Cavailles prize.1 After two further articles, Derrida 
finalised his reading of Husserl in his first monograph, Speech and Phenomena
1 See Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, Jacques Derrida, tr. Geoffrey Bennington 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993) pp. 325-336 for biographical 
information.
9(1967), in which he undertook a reading of the first of Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations (1900-1).2
1. Demda’s Readmg ofHusserl
Derrida reads Husserl in terms of his relation to metaphysics. It is difficult to 
give a single definition of this term, since it has been taken to mean many 
different things, but it generally denotes the branch of philosophy concerned 
with being.3 Metaphysics is a fundamental inquiry whose object is what there is 
in the world and the nature and modes of its being. In Metaphysics (1983), 
George Schlesinger writes:
Metaphysical statements refer to features of our world that are present in 
all the worlds which have so far seemed sufficiently similar to ours for 
the question of their existence to have arisen...Metaphysicians may 
therefore be said to be dealing with the essential features of the universe.4
The essence of metaphysics for Derrida is what he calls presence. He uses this 
term in several senses. Firstly it indicates ‘the absolute proximity of self­
identity’, that is, a subject’s guarantee of identity by as it were coinciding with 
himself, being in the same place and at the same time as himself.5 Secondly it 
indicates ‘the being-in-ffont of the object’, that is, the immediate relation a 
subject has with his perception of an object^ Thirdly it indicates ‘the 
maintenance of the temporal present’, that is the non-durational point in time at
2 See “‘Genesis and Structure” and Phenomenology' (1959), in Writing and Difference, tr. Alan 
Bass (London: Routledge, 1978) pp. 154-168, and ‘La phenomenologie et la cloture de la 
metaphysique’, published in Greek in Epoches 7 (1966) pp. 181-200.
2 See George N. Schlesmger. Metaphysics: Methods and Problems (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) 
pp. 9-13.
“ Ibid. p. 23.
2 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, tr. 
David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) p. 99.
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which a tubject it contciout of or, in Hutterl’t termt, ‘intendt’ an object.6 7 * * *Thete 
termt tound complex becaute they are to fundamental to common tente that it it 
initially difficult to conceive of alternativet to them. Ettentially Derrida utet the 
term ‘pretence' to mean that the concept which I am currently thinking it pretent 
to me, and that I am thinking it now, in the pretent. Thit compritet what Hutterl 
callt the ‘living’ pretent, in which one it abtolutely pretent to onetelf in an 
abtolutely ideal or trantcendental ‘life’? A ditcourte that can be thown to 
depend on pretence thut defined Derrida callt ‘metaphytical'.
In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida findt thit metaphytict of pretence at work 
in Hutterl’t theory of tignt. In an earlier article, ‘La phenomenologie et la 
cloture de la metaphytique’ (1966), he had thown that whiltt Hutterl wat 
overtly oppoted to metaphytical tpeculation, it wat in fact a ‘degenerate’ vertion 
of the latter rather than the ditcourte ittelf that he criticited. In fact, Derrida 
writet, he withed to rettore an authentic metaphytict? Metaphytical 
pretuppotitiont were among thote that Hutterl wanted to ditcount or ‘bracket’ 
from contcioutnett in the tearch for abtolutely grounded knowledge which wat 
the motivation of hit phenomenology. In Derrida’t view, however, the 
trantcendental contcioutnett in which Hutterl locatet thit knowledge it an 
appeal to the kind of living pretent that it the ettence of metaphytict. Thit 
meant that ‘the phenomenological critique of metaphytict betray[t] ittelf at a
6 Ibid. The idea of being-in-front is made clearer by the etymology of the German term for 
object, gegen-stand, something which ‘stands opposite’ a subject. See also Derrida, Speech and 
Phenomena p. 9.
7 Ibid. pp. 99, 9.
6 Ibid. p. 6. Hie term ‘ideality’ signifies pure mentality, consciousness of a concept tint owes 
notlnng to tire senses or to materiality in general. ‘Transcendence’, with reference to Husserl, has
a similar meaning, signifying absolute non-worldliness. As Derrida says, the tenns occupy the 
traditional position of soul as opposed to body (Ibid. p. 81).
6 Ibid. p. 5.
11
moment within the history of metaphysical assurance’.10 For Husserl, ‘blindness 
to the authentic mode of ideality’ is the error of degenerate metaphysics.11 For 
Derrida, Husserl’s description of this mode is metaphysical: ideality will mean 
the living present. This is the first of two movements of Derrida’s reading of 
Husserl that will be more or less repeated in future ‘deconstructive’ readings, the 
identification of an ultimate appeal to presence as the organising factor of a
discourse.
The second movement of the reading is a demonstration that the discourse in 
question does not rigorously maintain a complete or consistent description of the 
presence around which it is nevertheless organised. In certain key descriptions of 
phenomenological consciousness Derrida discerns ‘an irreducible nonpresence 
as having a constituting value’.12 We will not go into the details of Husserl’s 
descriptions here; it is sufficient to understand Derrida’s point to see that he 
finds this non-presence in the ‘re-presentation’ (yergegenwartigung) by which 
Husserl describes the mediation of a temporal object to consciousness, and in the 
‘ap-presentation’ (fapprasentatiori) by which he describes intersubjective 
relationship.13
In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida’s point of entry in this double reading of 
Husserl is the latter’s theory of the sign. The Logical Investigations are an early 
work in the development of Husserl’s phenomenology, exhibiting, in Derrida’s 
view, the ‘germinal structure’ of the whole of the former’s thought, in particular 
of the phenomenological reduction.14 The first investigation begins with some
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid. p. 6.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. p. 7.
14 Ibid. p. 3. The phenomenological reduction is a later formulation of Husserl’s that, like his 
distinction of expression from indication, aims at absolutely transcendental self-consciousness.
12
‘essential distinctions’ which underwrite the subsequent analyses, the first of 
which is a distinction between two senses of the word ‘sign’ (Zeichen), namely 
‘expression’ (Ausdruck) and ‘indication’ (Anzeichen). The coherence of the 
chapter, Derrida writes, is founded on this distinction.15 In his reading of 
Husserl, Derrida finds that the theory of the sign elaborated in the first chapter of 
the first investigation occupies a paradigmatic position with regard to Husserl’s 
relationship to metaphysics.
Husserl privileges expression over indication. In the latter, there is no meaning, 
in the sense that there is no consciousness intending to communicate something 
to another. Signification is an accidental property of the indicative sign, 
examples of which are fossils indicating the existence of prediluvian animals. 15 6 
Husserl calls these signs ‘meaningless’. Expression, on the contrary, is a sign 
animated by voluntary intention, a ‘meaningful sign’, as Husserl says. The 
French term for meaning, vouloir-dire, ‘wanting to say’, describes the kind of 
meaning inherent in an expressive sign. 17 It is, as Derrida shows with careful 
quotation from Husserl, a live sign, one animated by spirit and will.18 He writes, 
‘Everything that escapes the pure spiritual intention, the pure animation by 
Gm/...is excluded from meaning...and thus from expression’.19 JE^^^ry^hiing 
physical is excluded from expression as meaning, in order that Husserl can 
locate meaning in the presence to consciousness of an ideal object. The vehicle 
of expression therefore is speech, since a speaking subject’s meaning is what he
See Ideas: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, where Husserl describes tlie 
reduction as ‘the necessary operation which renders “pure” consciousness accessible to us' (tr. 
W.R. Boyce-Gibson, London: Allen and Unwin, 1931, p. 114).
15 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations Vol. I. tr. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge andKegan 
Paul, 1970) pp. 269-298. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena p. 4.
16 Husserl, Logical Investigations p. 270.
17 Ibid. p. 275.
18 See Derrida, Speech and Phenomena p. 35.
19 Ibid.
13
‘wantt to tay’. Ia tpeech, one it ex-pretting the interior ideality of an act of 
coatcioutness.77 Now the difference between iadicatioat and exprettioat, 
Hutterl writet, it functional rather than tubttantial; the tame teriet of tigat can 
be taken at exprettive or at indicative. Indeed tpeech ittelf containt a good deal 
of indication. Iatofar at it it engaged in communication or manifettatioa, 
Hutterl writet, tpeech operatet indicatively, tince the animation of the tignt by 
the coatciousnett of the tpeaker mutt patt through a phytical vehicle to be 
received in the contclousnets of the hearer?7 In thort, exprettion, for Hutterl, 
that it, pretence to contcloutnets of an act of contcioutnett, occurt only ia 
interior monologue, only when one ‘tpeakt’ to onetelf in pure ideality, without 
any detour through the material realm. In ‘tolitary mental life’ one hat no need 
to communicate or indicate anything to onetelf and the ideal object of one’t 
meaning it timply pretent to onetelf.
Thit it the firtt arm of Derrida’t twofold reading of Hutterl, hit itolatioa of 
the function of pretence at an organiting principle of the latter't thought. The 
dittinction between exprettion and indication, he thowt, dependt on an 
axiological dittinction between intide and outtide. Meaning, Derrida thowt 
Hutterl to have taid, it ideal; it occurt in the abtolutely mental, or 
trantcendental, realm. Everything outtide thit realm, all thingt phytical and 
phenomenal, are attigned to meaninglettnett at a retult of their mediation and 
interruption of the pretence of an object to contcioutnett. Ia a getture that he 
will repeat many timet, Derrida thowt that Hutterl’t ditcourte it organited 
around a dittinction between a chain of potitive termt bated on pretence and a 
chain of negative termt bated on difference. On the one hand, there it pretence, * *
20 Ibid. p. 18.
21 Ibid. p. 38.
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ideality, the inside, meaning and life (expression); and on the other hand there is 
mediation, physicality, the outside, meaninglessness, and death (indication).
The second arm of the reading shows that this governing distinction of the text 
is not completely or consistently maintained by the text, and that it would be 
impossible for this to be the case. The principles by which the discourse has been 
shown to be constructed are in this second movement also de-constructed. The 
essence of an ideal object, Derrida argues, is that it is repeatable. He writes, 
‘Independent of the here-and-now acts and events of the empirical subjectivity 
which intends it, it can be repeated infinitely while remaining the same'. In 
order to remain the same in these representative repetitions, Derrida argues, an 
ideal object must be expressed in a medium that does not interrupt the presence 
of the acts that intend it, that is, a transcendental medium. This medium, Derrida 
writes, is the voice, ‘an element whose phenomenality has no worldly form’. 
Derrida is referring to the ‘phenomenological voice’ here, that is, to the heard 
sound as an object of consciousness (Saussure’s ‘acoustic image’), as opposed to 
the ‘worldly’ or material element of speeeh.24 He is thinking of the interior 
monologue to which alone Husserl restricted meaningful utterance. The voice so 
considered, Derrida writes, is heard and understood at the same time as it is 
uttered by the subject. (The French verb entendre, which means both to hear and 
to understand, and so connotes hearing-and-therefore-understanding, helps to 
convey the point). The intentional acts of solitary mental life, the self-presence 
of transcendental consciousness, upon which phenomenology is entirely staked, 
depends for its self-presence on the immediacy of the voice, Derrida argues. The 22 23
22 Ibid. p. 75.
23 Ibid. p. 76.
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meaningfulness (along with all the other terms in that chain, including Tife’) of 
the interior monologue, depends on the fact that I hear myself speak (je m 'entend 
parler) at the same time that I speak. The living act which animates the signifier 
into a meaningful expression is in this case not separated from itself. Derrida 
writes, ‘The signifier, animated by my breath and...meaning-intention...is in 
absolute proximity to me’The voice, he adds, can ‘show the ideal object or 
ideal Bedeutung [HusserTs term for meaning as wanting-to-say] connected to it 
without venturing outside ideality, outside the interiority of self-present life’. In 
short, he writes, ‘the ideality of the object seems to depend on the voice’, and 
along with it so do all the positive terms Husserl has marshalled on its side of the 
division between inside and outside.^
In Derrida’s reading, this transcendence of the voice is ‘only apparent’. 
S'entendre parler, an absolutely non-worldly self-communication, he writes, 
‘would in fact be the absolute reduction of space in genere!.29 The absolute 
proximity of the signifier to the signified is the condition for Husserl’s notion of 
expressive language and of the pre-expressive stratum of meaning that 
expression expresses. The liveliness or spirituality of the living present, which is 
what Husserl’s project aims to isolate, needs no signifier to be itself. Derrida 
questions the role of signification at the place in a system where it is not needed. 
He writes, ‘The word is a body that means something only if an actual intention 
animates it and makes it pass from a state of inert sonority...to that of an 
animated body...Only the Geistigkeit [spirituality] ovLebendigkeit [alive-ness] is 24 25 26
24 Ibid. Here the reader will also find Derrida’s argument against the objection tlrat interiority 
belongs to the ideal or transcendental aspect of every signifier, and not shnply to those that are
spoken, as he asserts.
25 Ibid. p. 77.
26 Ibid. p. 78.
27 Ibid.
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independent and primordial’.28 29 30 Huteerl it concerned with the living intention that 
animatet the tign rather than with the animated tign. But thit intention, Derrida 
pointt out, ‘aeedt no tignifier to be pretent to ittelf. Indeed it it at much ia tpite 
of itt ulgnlftert at thaakt to them that it it awakened or maintained in life’.31 32The 
mediatory nature of the tignifier in fact threateat the telf-pretence of 
trantcendental life. Derrida writet that the privilege of the voice in 
trantcendental contcioutnett it an attempt to reduce the difference at work in the 
ettence of the concept of the tign. He tuggettt that at Hutterl attigned 
difference and mediation (all that iaterruptt the pretence of an ideal object to 
contcioutnett) to the exteriority of the tignifier, he could not fail to be aware of 
itt nperatinn within the interiority from which he exiled it. The voice it the 
medium that allowt auto-affectinn, that it, uninterrupted and immediate telf- 
relatinnthip, but the very concept of autn-affectioa, Derrida arguet, impliet 
difffeence.ce ‘Auto-affectinn tuppotet that a pure difference comet to divide 
telf-pretence’, he writet. If I affect mytelf, however trantceadentally, there are 
two termt involved, the I who affect and the I who am affected. The difference 
between them will ant be reduced, detpite Hutterl’t lengthy and intricate 
attemptt to do to. It it worth quoting Derrida at length here, tince we are clote to
the crux of hit ideat;
In thit pure difference [between the affecting and the affected telf] it 
rooted the pnttibility of everything we think we can exclude from autn- 
affection: tpace, the outtide, the world, the body, etc. At toon at it it 
admitted that auto-affection it the condition fnr telf-pretence, no pure 
trantcendental reduction it pottible.33
28 Ibid. p. 77.
29 Ibid. p. 79.
30 Ibid. p. 81.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. p. 82.
33 Ibid.
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Derrida’s point is that if, as in Husserl, self-presence is constituted by auto­
affection, then what has been conceived as presence is fact constituted by 
difference. Auto-affection, he writes, is not a mode of being that characterises an 
entity (the self, autos), as Husserl would like to say, but it ‘produces sameness as 
self-relation within self-difference; it produces sameness as the non-identical’ ,34 35
Derrida’s technical-sounding but far-reaching conclusion is that difference is 
prior to presence and constitutes it, rather than vice versa, as Husserl wants to 
assert, and as common sense would seem to make obvious. Difference, Derrida 
concludes, is not a function of two or more presences, but presence is a function 
of a kind of primordial difference. I have described this conclusion particularly 
with reference to the ‘spatial’ sense of presence, the presence of an ideal object 
to consciousness. In Derrida’s reading of Husserl, this is not to be distinguished 
from the ‘temporal’ sense of presence, the present moment in which 
transcendental consciousness occurs. Temporal presence, Derrida argues, is also 
constituted by a prior difference. The pure meaning of expressive signs in 
interior monologue, Husserl writes, is mediated not by real words but by 
representations or imaginations thereof Derrida shows that the structure of re­
presentation (i.e. making present again: the etymology is the same in Husserl’s 
term yer-gegenwart-igung) disturbs the instantaneous nature of the present that 
he also shows is necessary for Husserl to maintain as the time of transcendental 
subjectivity?? Husserl’s later series of lectures on The Phenomenology of 
Internal Time-Consciousness, Derrida writes, ‘demonstrates • and confirms 
throughout the irreducibility of...the re-produced now to the perceived or
34Ibid.
35 See Ibid. p. 60: 'Self-presence must be produced in the undivided unity of the temporal present 
so as to have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs’.
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retained actual now’.36 In short, ‘the presence of the perceived present can 
appear only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence’, 
namely that of the remembered or represented past or of the expected future.37 
Derrida quotes Husserl’s assertion that in the last instance, the ‘ideal now is not 
something...different from the not-now, but continually accommodates itself 
thereto’.38 Derrida comments, ‘As soon as we admit this continuity of the now 
and the not-now...we admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick 
[instant]’.39 Perception, which for Husserl constitutes the now, occurs in a 
duration, since it is constituted by its relation to what is not perceived now.
Derrida thus finds that presence in both its spatial and temporal senses is a 
production of a difference that precedes it. He calls this difference differance,40 
This well-known neologism, which I will render in English simply as 
‘differance’, incorporates both senses of the French verb differer, ‘to differ’ and 
‘to defer’. The ‘-ance’ ending adds a more dynamic sense to the existing 
participle ‘difference’. In his 1968 lecture, ‘Differance’, Derrida writes that the 
ending indicates the middle voice, since the movement denoted is ‘neither 
simply active nor simply passive..., saying an operation...that cannot be 
conceived either as the passion or as the action of a subject on an object’.41 In 
Speech and Phenomena he calls this differance a ‘protowriting’ (archi-ecriture) 
at the origin of meaning, since it is the articulation of all that Husserl attempted
36 Ibid. p. 64.
37 Ibid.
38 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, tr. James S. Churchill 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1964) p. 63. Cited in Derrida. Speech and Phenomena 
p. 65.
39 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena p. 65.
40 Ibid. p. 82.
41 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, tr. Alan Bass (New York and London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1982) p. 9.
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to exteriorise from speech as self-presence.42 Presence, Derrida concludes, is 
never itself, but ‘always already a trace’ of something else. He writes, ‘The 
living present springs forth out of its non-identity with itself and from the 
possibility of a retentional trace’.43
Derrida’s purpose in this reading, which establishes the structure of many of 
his future readings, is not to valorise the difference which Husserl has effaced in 
order to privilege presence. Derrida’s point is that Husserl’s text is organised by 
both elements that his reading has brought out. That is, Husserl both appeals to 
presence as a ground and shows that presence cannot function as a ground. He 
both affirms and denies presence, which Derrida concludes both is and is not. 
The point of Derrida’s reading is that the text is generated by the undecidability 
between these two conflicting elements. This undecidability, he writes, is the 
condition of possibility of Husserl’s phenomenology, preceding and generating 
the division of inside and outside or presence and difference, upon which 
phenomenology is structured. Differance, the trace, and the other synonymous 
terms Derrida develops, describe the coexistence of presence and non-presence 
as the condition of possibility for the conceptual division of the two, which 
generates metaphysics.
2, Deconstruction
I have examined Derrida’s reading ofHusserl in some detail because it is from 
this reading that Derrida derives the notion of presence as the essence of 
metaphysics and of the difference of which presence is a function. It is difficult
42 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena p. 85.
43 Ibid.
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to understand the motivation or provenance of Derrida’s subsequent work 
without an awareness of how its fundamental motifs developed from his reading 
of Husserl.4? I will not linger over an exposition of fundamental early works such 
as Of Grammatology (1967), ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ (1968), or ‘White Mythology’ 
(1971), since many adequate introductions to these works already exist4? I will 
briefly sketch some of the crucial points of these texts before passing on to the 
significance of Derrida’s thought for literary criticism.
Of Grammatology is the closest to a systematic work in Derrida’s oeuvre. It 
‘economises [the] development’ of Speech and Phenomena, as Derrida put it in a 
contemporary interview.?? In it Derrida develops his understanding of the 
privilege of speech as the condition for presence and therefore for metaphysics. 
In anthropology, which in Claude Levi-Strauss’ structuralist version was the 
dominant mode of discourse in the ‘human sciences’ in France at the time, the
term ‘ethnocentrism’ referred to the kind of discourse that used the writer’s own
society as a standard by which to judge the societies that were the object of his 
study.44 45 46 7 Derrida coins the term ‘logocentrism’ to describe the history of Western 
metaphysics, insofar as it uses the Greek concept of logos as a standard by which 
to judge lanngage.48 We will discuss this concept in greater detail in Chapter 4, 
but for now we can note that the term logos has the following chain of meanings:
44 If t^iis were not already plain to the attentive reader, Derrida suggests as much in Richard 
Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester. 
Manchester University Press, 1984) p. 109, md^vpPosit^(^ns^, tr. Alan Bass (London: The Athlone 
Press, 1981) pp. 4-5.
45 See Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, rev. ed. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991); Derrida (London: Fontana, 1987); Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: 
Theory and Criticism After Structuralism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
46 Derrida, Positions p. 5.
47 hi ie Geste et la Parole, of which the first part of Of Grammatology began in part as a review, 
Andre Leroi-Gourhan defines etluiocentrism as Tassimilation de l’etluiie a une sorte de “moi” 
ideal, reunissant les qualites du bien et du beau’ (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1965, p. 
12).
48 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press , 1976) p. 3 passim.
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word, speech, reason, universal order represented in the mind of man, the 
incarnation of the purely transcendental, and hence the relation of these 
concepts. The Stoics linked logos endiathetos, reason present in the human mind, 
with logos prophorikos, reason expressed by the faculty of speech.49 This link 
between consciousness and speech is the essence of the logos that Derrida sees 
as the basis of the history of Western thought on both language and
consciousness.
In Of Grammatology, Derrida focuses on certain texts particularly 
representative of the tradition of logocentrism insofar as they describe the 
secondarity or exteriority of writing to the logos. In each case he follows the 
pattern of reading that he used in Speech and Phenomena, isolating the function 
of presence as the organising factor of the discourse under examination and at 
the same time showing that presence, contrary to the intention of the writer, is 
described as a function of differance. Focussing on the Essay on the Origin of 
Languages (c. 1754-1763), Derrida reads Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), 
whom he regards as representative of metaphysics from Descartes to Hegel, to 
show that he ‘valorises and disqualifies writing at the same time’.50 On the one 
hand Rousseau ‘condemns writing as destruction of presence’ and on the other 
‘rehabilitates it to the extent that it promises the reappropriation of that of which 
speech allowed itself to be dispossessed’.51 Rousseau describes writing as a 
‘supplement’ of speech, which as Derrida shows, can mean both an addition to a 
speech already complete or a filling up of a lack within speech.52 With great 
rigour, Derrida traces the structure of the double meaning of this term throughout
49 See J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 5th ed. (London: A. & C. Black, 1977) pp. 17-19.
50 Derrida, Of Grammatology p. 141.
51 Ibid. p. 142.
52 Ibid. p. 145.
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Rousseau's corpus, showing that what Rousseau declares to be exterior (for
example, to nature) he also describes as interior (to it). He holds writing to be
exterior to consciousness, and yet describes speech, which he holds to be present
to consciousness, in the terms of writing and exteriority. Derrida writes:
He declares what he wishes to 5oy..that articulation and writing are a 
post-originary malady of language; he says or describes what he does not 
wish to say. articulation and therefore the space of writing operates at the 
origin of language.53
Similarly, in his reading of Ferdinand de Saussure's Course In General
Linguistics (1915), Derrida finds that
the alleged derivativeness of writing... was possible only on one 
condition: that the ‘original', ‘natural' etc. language had never existed, 
never been... untouched by writing.54
Derrida's conclusion in both cases is the same that he reached in his reading of 
Husserl, that the presence whose condition is speech is a function of the prior 
differential movement whose model is writing, which Derrida calls differance
and arche-writing.
3. Derriida'sJ^cadd^in^ ofLLLerary Texts
Derrida's attention to the difference between what an author wants to say and
what he says in fact makes his ideas a productive source for literary criticism. 
The concept of originary differance makes it impossible to maintain a rigorous 
distinction between philosophy and literature. An early response to Derrida, at its 
best in the work of Richard Rorty and of Geoffrey Hartman, made much of the 
deconstruction of the boundary between philosophy and literature to be found in
53 Ibid. p. 229. ‘Il declare ce qu’il vent dire...: il dit ou decrit ce qu'il ne veutpas dire '.
54 Ibid. p. 56.
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Derrida’s work.55 Nevertheless, there is a ‘distinctive nature’ to Derrida’s 
readings of‘literary’ texts, to which he increasingly turned during the 1980s, that 
merits examination here.56 When asked by Richard Kearney in his interview 
‘Deconstruction and the Other’ (1981), whether he conceived literature as a non­
site of philosophy, Derrida replied, ‘When I speak of literature (litterature) it
is...an allusion to certain movements which have worked around the limits of
our logical concepts, certain texts which make the limits of our language 
tremble’.57 He referred there to the works of Blanchot, Bataille and Beckett, and 
with the exception of an essay on Flaubert and a short piece on Romeo and 
Juliet, the literary texts Derrida has treated have tended to be modem or post­
modern works in which textual play is a prominent feature, such as those of 
Joyce, Kafka, Ponge, Celan and Artaud. In his interview with Derek Attridge, 
‘This Strange Institution Called Literature’ (1989), Derrida characterises these 
works as those that ‘bear within themselves...a question’ concerning the 
essence, origin and function of literature. He says, ‘These texts... are themselves 
a sort of turning back on the literary institution’.58 These modem and post­
modern literary texts, in Derrida’s reading, enact their own deconstruction, that 
is, they display the differance by which they are constituted, with much less 
resistance or repression than the more overtly ‘metaphysical’ texts of 
philosophical tradition.
55 See Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida’, in Consequences 
of Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980 (Brighton: Harvester, 1982), ‘Deconstruction and
Circumvention’, Critical Inquiry 11 (1984) pp. 1-23. and Geoffrey Hartman, Saving the Text: 
Literature/Derrida/Philosophv (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
36 See Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot: Sources of Derrida's Notion and Practice 
of Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 110.
57 Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers p. 112.
58 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (New York and London: Routledge, 
1992) p. 41.
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In his lecture ‘Before the Law’ (1982), Derrida reads Kafka’s short text of that 
name, originally published as an independent piece and later incorporated in The 
Trial (1925). Derrida first describes a series of axioms that are commonly taken 
for granted in a reading of a literary work, that the text has a unity, an author, 
that its events are logically related in the form of a story {il y a du recit) and that 
it is named by its title. These axioms could be said to describe the laws of 
literature, he writes, in the sense that they guarantee the object that will be 
designated literary. Derrida poses two questions of such a designation, which is 
implicit in any work of ‘literary’ criticism: by what criteria is the text under 
discussion judged to be ‘literature’, and with what authority is that judgement to 
be made?59 He writes that in order to conduct a reading of a literary work, the 
question of the relation between literature and law has to be asked. Since Kafka’s 
text, which concerns a subject’s relation to the law, describes this relation,
Derrida asks whether the law and literature have ‘shared...conditions of 
possibility’.60 Derrida draws out a series of differences within the identity of the 
Law as it is represented in the story. It is guarded by a series of doorkeepers, 
each more powerful than the last, the end of which series is not described: we are 
only told that the third doorkeeper is so terrible that the first cannot bear to look 
at him. The place ‘before the Law’, where both the first doorkeeper and the 
countryman who approaches him are found, Derrida finds to be structured by 
difference. The doorkeeper is described as ‘before’ the Law, but at the same time 
stands with his back to it. The countryman is described as before the Law but is 
prevented from seeing it. To be ‘before’ {devant) the Law, Derrida writes, is to 
be in its presence and at the same time not to be in its presence. The opposition
59 Ibid, p. 187,
60 Ibid. p. 191.
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described in the position of the protagonists, Derrida adds, is also described in 
the structure of the text. Its title, ‘Before the Law', is identical with its first 
words, ‘Before the Law [stands a doorkeeper]’. What must remain separate in 
the laws of literature, the title and the text, Derrida writes, here are also the same. 
The text articulates difference in the law in at least three senses, that of the law 
as its referent, that of the axioms by which a literary text is given an identity, and 
that of the legal rights attaching to the title of an author's work. The division of 
title and work, Derrida also points out, serves not only to lend an identity to a 
work but also serves a legal purpose, the title of a work allowing rights of 
authorship to be aStribuSaa to it, its classification in a library, and so on.
In the story, entry into the presence of the law is also deferred: the doorkeeper, 
speaking in the name of the law, tells the countryman that he may be granted 
admittance to it but not now. The latter accepts this prohibition, as it were 
forbidding himself from entering as he wishes. The Law, in short, orders the 
countryman not to come into its presence, but it is paradoxically present to him 
in the force of this order. Derrida calls this ‘the originary division of the law'. He 
writes that, ‘It is itself prohibited, a prohibited place. It forbids itself and 
contradicts itself by placing the man in his own contradiction: one cannot reach 
the law, and in order to have a rapport... with it, one must not have a rapport 
with the law’.61 62The essence of the law thus represented, Derrida writes, is that it 
has no essence. Instead it is structured by difference and deferral, which Derrida 
describes as its ‘differential topology’.
Returning to his question about the shared conditions of possibility of literature 
and the law, Derrida writes that the differance of the Law represented in Kafka's
61 Ibid. pp. 203-204.
62 Ibid. pp, 206. 208.
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text also describes the constitution of the text itself. It does so by its 
‘unreadability’, that is, ‘the impossibility of acceding to its proper significance’. 
It is an enigmatic text, not yielding up its point of organisation, the Law, to 
which neither the countryman nor the reader ever gains access. The text ‘say[s] 
nothing definite and presents] no identifiable content beyond the story itself,63 
The reference and the sense of the story alike are as ‘inaccessible to contact’ as 
the Law in the story. Just as the Law as legal force is present to the countryman 
in denying its presence to him, so the Law as the referent of the text is present in 
the text by its non-presence. Derrida suggests that this structure of non- 
referential reference is the literary element of the text, which would remain after 
the registers of other discourses were subtracted. He writes that the concept of 
literature belongs to a certain period of legal history, since it is only in the 
modern period of that history that a work becomes ‘literature’ in the sense 
defined by the axioms of criticism with which Derrida began the essay. These 
axioms, according to Derrida, are guaranteed by means of a legal system that 
establishes property-rights to a work, the means of identifying it, the value of the 
author’s signature and so on. Kafka’s text, however, whilst constituted as a 
literary text by these laws, describes the absence at the heart of the presence of 
the law, describes the law as a non-entity. Derrida writes, therefore, that it 
occupies a position of ‘subversive juridicity’.64 The concept of literarity is 
defined by at least two sets of laws and yet this text describes the non-identity of 
the concept and structure of law by which it is conceivable as literary. Although 
Kafka’s text is particularly self-referential in this regard, Derrida writes that it 
nevertheless describes the non-essential essence of literature, which is also that
63 Ibid, p. 211.
64 Ibid. p. 216.
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of law. He writes that literature is related to the law in its capability to ‘play the 
law, repeating it while diverting or circumventing it’.65
Derrida also addresses the relation of literature and law in his lecture ‘The Law 
of Genre’ (1979), where he describes the ‘re-mark’ {re-marque), that is the trait 
that identifies a work as a member of a particular genre, whilst not itself 
belonging to any genre. A work both belongs and does not belong to a genre, 
Derrida argues, since its condition for membership of a genre is fulfilled by 
elements of it that are not a part of that genre. Derrida describes this identifying 
trait as an ‘axiom of non-closure’, constituting ‘the condition for the possibility 
and the impossibility of taxnomy’.66 In both essays, Derrida finds literature to 
describe a ‘supplementary’ relation to law, that is, that it is both an external
addition to and an internal substitution of the law. It can be described as the
former insofar as it is constituted by a series of laws and therefore the concept of 
law, and as the latter insofar as its essence comprises a transgression of the laws 
and the concept of law by which it is constituted. Derrida offers the axiomatic 
definition that, ‘The law of literature tends, in principle, to defy... the law’.5?
4. PeconstinctrveLiierair Criiiciim
Derrida’s work has been appropriated by literary critics in a variety of ways 
and for a variety of purposes, such as in feminist and post-colonial 
methodologies. His thought was first introduced into the Anglo-American 
academy by comparative literary critics in the late 1970s, particularly by Paul de 
Man (1919-1983), who had been developing a related critical methodology since
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid. p. 231.
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his doctoral dissertation in the 1950s, as he recognised with hindsight in the 
preface to The Rhetoric of Romanticism (1983). He writes, T was apparently 
doing rhetorical analysis before I knew that such a thing existed by name...The 
methodological trend is unmistakable'.De Man divided his time between 
European and American universities during the 1950s and 1960s, and was 
acquainted with contemporary French thought and with the phenomenological
tradition from which Derrida’s work derives.
In a section of Of Grammatology subtitled ‘Question of Method’, Derrida
describes his reading method as one which ‘aim[s] at a certain relationship, 
unperceived by the writer, between what he commands and what he does not 
command of the patterns of the language that he uses. This relationship was 
also the goal of the method that de Man had been developing since the 1950s, 
which he referred to as rhetorical analysis. In fact, whilst it is customary to 
discuss de Man's ideas as a derivative of Derrida’s, it is probable that Derrida 
had read de Man before vice versa. De Man's essay ‘Heidegger's Exegeses of 
Holderlm' first appeared in the Paris journal Critique in 1955, seven years before 
Derrida's first publication, and it is likely that Derrida read the essay, since 
Heidegger and literature were two of his main concerns at the time. De Man 
argues in the essay that ‘Holderlin says exactly the opposite of what Heidegger 
makes him say', concerning the relation of Being as presence to representation.67 68 69 70 
He discusses a Darridean theme, that is, in a proSo-Derriaean form. De Man 
came to see the reading method described in Of Grammatology as a necessity of
67 Ibid. p. 36.
68 Paul de Man, The Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1198-4) p. 
viii.
69 Derrida, Of Grammatology p. 158.
70 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed. 
(London: Routledge, 1983) p. 254.
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literary criticism, and he used Derrida’s term ‘deconstruction’ to describe such 
criticism. For de Man, it was the only adequate mode of literary criticism, given 
the nature of language and in particular of literary language.
In ‘The Resistance to Theory’ (1982), de Man describes literature as the place
where the freedom of language from referentiality that derives from the
conventional relationship between a word and a thing, and results in a lack of
epistemological validity, can be analysed. He writes:
Whenever [the] autonomous potential of language can be revealed by 
analysis, we are dealing with literariness, and...with literature as the 
place where this negative knowledge about the reliability of linguistic 
utterance is made available.71
He emphasises that this is not a denial of the referential function of language but 
only of its authority as a model for cognition. There is no means of knowing, for 
de Man, whether language’s mode of reference accurately describes the external 
world. He writes that ‘it is.. .not a priori certain that literature is a reliable source 
of information about anything but its own language’.72 Deconstruct^ criticism, 
as practised by de Man, describes the way in which a literary text describes 
primarily its own rhetorical structure.
In ‘Semiology and Rhetoric’ (1973), de Man applies this method to passages 
by Yeats and Proust. Of Yeats’ line, ‘How can we know the dancer from the 
dance?’ and the quartet which it concludes, he writes that there are two possible 
readings. On one hand, if taken as a rhetorical question, the line can signify the 
unity between a sign (the dancer) and its meaning (the dance). On the other hand, 
if taken more literally, it functions as a question as to how the two essentially 
different elements of sign and meaning, which are apparently identical, can be 
known individually in order to avoid the error of assuming that they are the same
71 Paul de Man, ‘Hie Resistance to Theory’, Yale French Studies 63 (1982) p. 10.
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thing.73 * * * * * *De Man writes that the scheme of the first sense, which describes a 
moment of presence, is ‘deconstructed’ by that of the second.7™ These two senses 
represent the possibility of two conflicting ideologies (of unity and of conflict) 
expressed in the quartet. They cannot be understood simply to co-exist in the 
poem, according to de Man, since ‘the one reading is precisely the error 
denounced by the other’.7™ Nor is there any means of deciding which is to be 
preferred, he writes. The work of criticism is to make clear that a device of 
syntax (the question) opens an undecidable antinomy between the operation of 
grammar (the question taken literally) and rhetoric (the question taken as a figure 
of speech, a ‘rhetorical question’) in the text.7™ The work of criticism is to 
recognise that ‘rhetoric...suspends logic and opens up vertiginous possibilities of 
referential aberration’.7™ De Man conducts a similar reading of a passage from 
Proust’s Swann’s Way (1913), and shows that in the passage, ‘the assertion of 
the mastery of metaphor over metonymy owes its persuasive power to the use of 
metonymic structures’, where metaphor stands for presence.7™ A ‘rhetorically 
conscious’ reading of this kind, de Man writes, serves to bring out the authentic 
nature of the text’s constitution, namely that it ‘simultaneously asserts and denies 
the authority of its own rhetorical mode’.^ Deconstructive criticism, therefore, 
‘reveals the presence of this delusion [the authority of reference] and affirms it 
as the irreversible mode of [the test’s] truth’.80 For de Man, such criticism
72 Ibid.
73 Paul 
Proust
74 Ibid. 
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79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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describes the ‘state of suspended ignorance’ with regard to truth in which a 
literary text is written.81
(ii) Deconstruction and Christianity
Clearly deconstruction poses a challenge to Christian hermeneutics. If 
Derrida’s arguments are valid, they mean that the texts which express the 
intelligible content of the Christian faith do not convey a simple or stable 
quantity of meaning. In this section, I will examine the implications of 
deconstruction for Christian theology, and will suggest how, after Derrida, we 
can understand such discourse. I will also examine the implications of certain 
Christian theories of language, particularly that of negative theology, for the 
practice of deconstruction.
1, Derrida and the Concept of Theology
First, I will address the role of the term ‘theology’ in Derrida’s thought. He 
takes from Heidegger the term ‘onto-theology’ as a description of metaphysics. 
Heidegger used the term to refer to the ‘epoch’ of metaphysics (from Plato to 
Nietzsche) in which Being is conceived as the ground (theion) of entities. In 
what Kant calls ‘onto-theology’, God is conceived as the highest being, the 
original being and the being of beings.82 For Heidegger, onto-theology is the 
kind of thought in which Being is conceived as God is in metaphysics, as the
81 Ibid. p. 19.
32
foundation of beings?3 Derrida uses the term ‘theology’ to signify the
metaphysical definition of God as a being of the most perfect kind - highest,
original and the ground of entities - as the paradigm of metaphysics. He writes:
The difference between the signifier and the signified belongs... to...the 
history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and more systematically 
articulated way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and 
infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptua^y.^
Derrida’s critique of structuralism, which was based on the linguistics of 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), is that the latter’s conception of the sign’s 
composition by a concept (signified) and a sound-pattern (signifier) rests on the 
kind of distinction between the intelligible and sensible realms that Derrida had 
criticised in Husserl. He writes that this distinction is fundamental to Christianity 
insofar as its theology has followed such Hellenic distinctions. Thus Christian 
distinctions between God’s infinity and temporal worldly existence, and between 
God’s spirituality and the material world of his creation, are, in Derrida’s view, 
particularly powerful means of attempting to establish the meaning of being as 
presence. He writes that metaphysics continued to be conceived along the axes 
of this Greek theology, where some kind of non-spatial, non-temporal ‘living 
present’ is distinguished from all worldly phenomena as their ground. Structural 
linguistics, with its appeal to the ‘pure intelligibility’ of the signified, was for 
Derrida (in 1967) the latest example of this tradition. He writes of the concept of 
the signified:
As the face of pure intelligibility, it refers to an absolute logos to which it 
is immediately united. This absolute logos was an infinite creative 82 83 84
82 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A 629/B 657-A 639/B 667, tr. and ed. Vasilis Politis, 
(London: J.M. Dent, 1993) pp. 427-433.
83 See the section ‘Onto-theology’ in Kevin Hart, The Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, 
Theology and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) pp. 75-96.
84 Derrida, Of Grammatology p. 13.
33
subjectivity in medieval theology: the intelligible face of the sign remains 
turned towards the word [verhe] and the face of God.85 86 87
Hence his oft-quoted propositions, ‘The sign and divinity have the same place 
86and time of birth. The age of the sign is essentially theological’.
Most of the theological responses to Derrida have tended to agree that his
attack on Greek theology is more or less justified, and that he teaches Christian 
theology to rethink its task, particularly in terms of its relation to its own 
representative function. In his essay on ‘Hebraic and Christian Thinking in the 
Wake of Deconstruction’ (1983), G. Douglas Atkins writes that Christian 
theology has ‘moved beyond and indeed counter to the notion of religion created 
in the mode of Greek metaphysics’?7 For Atkins, Derrida’s thought parallels and 
supports the direction in which late twentieth-century theology was already 
moving, and he cites with approval the work of ‘death-of-God’ theologians like 
Thomas J.J. Altizer and Mark C. Taylor, who take as their point of departure the 
acceptance that ‘a narrow Hellenic understanding of God has now been 
exploded’.88 89Similarly, in his book Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory 
(1996), Graham Ward writes that Derrida is ‘attacking a certain form of 
theology: the use of God within classical rationalism and Enlightenment 
Deism’?9 He cites Derrida’s mention of Leibniz and of Hegel as particularly 
paradigmatic examples of metaphysical theology, whose essence for Ward is a 
lack of reflection on the representative or referential function of its own 
language. He writes:
85IbiiL
86 Ibid. p. 14.
87 G. Douglas'Atkins. ‘Partial Stories: Hebraic and Christian Tliinkmg in tlie Wake of 
Deconstruction’, Religion and Literature 15 (1983) p. 7.
88 Ibid. p. 10.
89 Graham Ward, Theology and Contemporary Critical Theory (London: Macmillan, 1996) p. 24.
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God is not an object like other objects in the world, and therefore 
attention to proper nouns and predicates falsifies our representations of 
God as it distorts our understanding of language.90
For Ward, Derrida’s concept of theology and its deconstruction, like the work of 
other critical theorists of Derrida’s milieu, allows theology to remember that 
"existence is not simply compositions on the basis of the periodic table’, and to 
think of itself as a ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, conceived as ‘multiple 
worlds...constantly in process’.91
There is much to be said in favour of this kind of response to Derrida, which
asserts that it is only a certain kind of metaphysical theology and not discourse
on God per se that is open to deconstruction. It reminds us of the provisional
nature of theological language with respect to its referents. God is not an object
like other objects in the world, and Christian discourse does not refer to him as
such. As John Macquarrie writes, in Principles of Christian Theology (1977),
theological reflection soon leads to an awareness of the inadequacy of language
for such reflection.92 Macquarrie, who identifies God with Being, continues:
Being is not a being, but since our language is adapted to talking about 
beings, then we must talk of Being in the language appropriate to 
beings.93
This does not mean that theological language refers to nothing, or is 
meaningless, however. Derrida distances himself from those of his interpreters 
who assert that ‘there is nothing beyond language... and other stupidities of that 
sort’.94 The implication of Derrida’s thought for Christian theology is that it must 
use the existing structure of language whilst at the same time pointing out the 
limits of that structure. As we saw in discussing Derrida’s reading of Husserl, a
90 Ibid. p. 40.
91 Ibid. p. 132.
92 John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, rev. ed. (London: SCM Press, 1977) p.
123.
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deconstructed text is not simply assigned to meaninglessness. The conclusion is
not that the text is metaphysical and therefore not true. This approach Derrida
describes as ‘turning the page of philosophy (which usually amounts to
philosophising badly)’, by which he means that there is no question of a non-
metaphysical language in which one could dismiss or falsify metaphysics.Ib Ke 95
Concerning theology as the paradigm of metaphysics, he writes, ‘It is not a
question of ‘rejecting’ these notions; they are necessary and...nothing is
conceivable for us without them’.96 That is to say that despite the fact that a
discourse might be organised around a notion of pure intelligibility or other point
of presence that tt- oW describes in the terms of all that it intends to keep from
presence, this is still the only kind of discourse there is. It would make no sense
to claim that it was false or even outdated in precisely the same kind of discourse
at which one levelled those criticisms. Even metaphysical theology, therefore, in
which God is conceived as a transcendental ground, is not simply false,
according to Derrida. What is necessary, he writes, is:
to surround the critical [metaphysical-theological] concepts with 
a... discourse... to mark the conditions, the medium and the limits of their 
effectiveness...and, in the same process, designate the crevice through 
which the yet unnameable glimmer beyond the closure can be 
glimpsed.97
Theology, that is, must be aware of the limits and conditions of its language at 
the same time as it continues to use it. If it is to tell us anything, it must do so in 
metaphysical language, since that is the only kind of language available. On the 
other hand, the most informative thing it can tell us is that the referential
93
94
95
96
97
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function of its language is limited. It signifies neither nothing nor completely, 
and its referent is to be glimpsed most clearly at the limits of its reference.
The necessity of using language to emphasise its own limits Derrida describes
as a result of the ‘closure’ {cloture} of metaphysics. In his book The Ethics of
Deconstruction (1992), Simon Critchley examines the role of the concept of
cloture in Derrida’s thought. He points out that in addition to the fundamental
spatial and temporal senses of the term (an enclosed space, the process of
bringing to an end), it also refers to the space of a monastery or convent, and is
etymologically related to cloitre or ‘cloister’.98 99Critchley is not concerned with
this sense, but we can use it as a way of illustrating the significance of Derrida’s
thought for Christian discourse. A cloister is a place enclosed for contemplation,
in which metaphysical categories are said not to apply. As Richard of Saint-
Victor writes, in Benjamin Minor (c. 1153-1162):
When the mind is carried away in contemplation it experiences how 
inadequate is human reason...Let no-one think he can penetrate the 
divine light by argument, or think that he may understand it by human 
reasonings. If that divine light might be approached by any discussions it 
would not be inaccessible.95
A cloister has an outside in the world of beings, but the contemplative 
experience inside it is indescribable in the language of beings. One of the most 
fundamental deconstructive methods is to trace the multiple senses of key terms 
in a discourse. So, when Derrida tells us that Christian theology operates within 
the cloture of metaphysics, that it uses the existing language despite its
98 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992) p. 62. Le Robert cites, from Martin du Gard: ‘Il lui semblait qu’elle avait jusqu’alors vecu 
cloitree, et que les limites de sa cloture, reculant soudain, lui decouvraient un horizon 
insoupconee’.
99 Richard of Saint-Victor, Selected Writings on Contemplation, tr. Clare Kirchberger (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1957) p. 112. For a more contemporary account, see Thomas Merton, Seeds of 
Contemplation (Wheathampstead: Anthony Clarke, 1961) p. 220: ‘Would you call this 
experience?... It seems wrong to speak of it even as something that happens. Because things that
37
inadequacy, we can, on his own terms, detect the sense of ‘cloister’ at work in 
this concept of ‘closure’.™ That is to say that, whilst theological language 
operates within the necessarily metaphysical structure of language, it also 
obliquely indicates the God who cannot be named or conceived in such 
language. Thinking of differance, Derrida calls this referent la lueur de Toutre- 
cloture, the glimmer from beyond the closure. 100 01 We can take this phrase also to 
refer to God as the referent of theology. The significance of Derrida’s thought
for Christian discourse is that the limits of its referential function allow us to
understand most about the God to whom it aims to refer.
This is not a new understanding of the nature of theological language. Its locus 
classicus is St. Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of analogy. I will examine Aquinas’ 
theory of language in more detail in Chapter 4, but for now we can note the 
following. Aquinas asks in Summa Theologiae la 13, 2, whether a word can be 
spoken of God ‘substantialiter’, that is, name His substance. Words for God, he 
answers, ‘do say what God is [significant substantiam divinamf, they are 
predicated of him in the category of substance [praedicantur de Deo 
substantialiter], but fail to represent adequately what he is [deficiunt a 
repraesentatione ipsius'Y ,102 Aquinas is a metaphysical theologian. He argues in 
the first question of the Summa that sciences do not argue to prove their premises 
but argue from their premises to prove questions within their field of inquiry. 
Theology is therefore a science, because it argues from its first principles, 
namely the articles of faith. The highest (supremd) science, Aquinas writes, is
happen have to happen to some subject, and experiences have to be experienced by someone. But 
here the subject of any divided or limited or creature experience seems to have vanished’.
100 In the same way Kevin Hart traces the sense of ‘Scripture’ at work in Derrida’s term ecriture 
(The Trespass of the Sign pp. 47-64).
101 Derrida. De la Grammatologie (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967) p. 25.
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metaphysics (metaphysica) because it concerns the first principles of the regional 
sciences, including theology.™ The five ways in which Aquinas asserts that it 
can be deduced that God exists, which he expounds in the next question, are all 
based on the concept of God as a transcendental ground. Nevertheless, when he 
comes to discuss the language in which God so conceived is represented, he 
asserts that its referential capacity is strictly limited. God, who for Aquinas is 
purely intelligible, nevertheless cannot be immediately understood through the 
language of theology. Theology can be said to refer, for Aquinas, but its signs 
are related to its referents ‘in a higher way than we can understand or signify 
[eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significaturY ,102 103 04 On one hand, that is, 
Aquinas writes an edifice of metaphysical theology, in which the capacity of 
language to inform us about God is exploited to the full. On the other, when he 
considers the nature of this capacity, he recognises that it is extremely limited. 
Whilst theological language can indeed describe things that are true of God, for 
Aquinas, they are true in a way that cannot be known, and of which it cannot 
inform us. In the previous question, Aquinas compared our knowledge of God 
(in this life) to a bat’s vision of the sun, which is invisible to it because it is too 
bright.105 So with the conceptual language of theology, it is only around the 
limits of the metaphysics of reference, that its referent can be guessed at. In his 
lecture ‘Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’ 
(1966), Derrida writes that ‘language bears within itself the necessity of its own 
critique’, and he describes Levi-Strauss’ procedure of ‘conserving all the...old
102 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae la 13,2, tr. Herbert McCabe (London: Blackfriars,
1964) p. 55.
103 Ibid. la 1. 8.
104 Ibid. la 13, 2.
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concepts within the domain of empirical discovery while here and there 
denouncing their limits’.105 06 in article la 13, 2 of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas 
has done precisely this. He recognises the limits of the only possible mode of 
theology, and suggests that these limits are the point of its greatest capacity for
reference.
The contemporary philosopher of religion most fully to develop this concept of 
theological language has been Jean-Luc Marion. 107 In his book God Withoiut 
Being (1982), he sketches the possibility of a non-metaphysical theology, in 
which God is conceived in another way than as the highest being. He denies that, 
with respect to God, it is ‘self-evident that the first question comes down to 
asking...whether he is’.108 He writes that ‘under the conceptual names of ‘God’ 
only metaphysical ‘idols’ emerge, imposed on a God who is still to be 
encountered’.109 Marion argues that God is to be conceived ‘according to the 
horizon of the gifT rather than according to the horizon of being, which is to say 
that God is to be known not insofar as he is but insofar as he gives himself.. 110 
Marion writes that the concept of Being, when applied to God as his primary 
attribute, functions as an ‘idol’. He defines an idol as a god whose limits are 
measured by the human capacity for vision.111 Since a concept is also limited by 
the mind’s grasp of its object, Marion writes, when a concept is predicated of
105 Ibid. Ia 12,1. ’Sicut sol, qui est maxime visibihs, videri non potest a vespertUione propter 
excessum luminis’. See la 12, 7: ‘sicut aUquis probaliter scire potest aiiquam propositionem esse 
demonstrabilem, licet ipse earn demonstrative non cognoscat’.
106 Derrida, ’Writ ng and Difference p. 284.
107 See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte, tr. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago and 
London; University of Chicago Press, 1991) pp. xxii-xxiv, for Marion’s contention that hiis 
argument does not do violence to tlie thought of St. Thomas.
108 Ibid. p. XX’
109 Ibid. p. xxi.
110 Ibid. p. xxiv.
111 Ibid. p. 14.
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God, ‘this concept functions... as an idol’.112 The concept of God, in short, limits 
God to the mind’s capacity to conceive, just as an idol limits God to the eyes’ 
capacity to see. This is the essence of the metaphysical denomination of God, for 
Marion, and it cannot adequately represent God who is so conceived. He writes, 
‘To reach a nonidolatrous thought of God, which...releases ‘God’ from his 
quotation marks...one would have to manage to think God outside of 
metaphysics’.113 This means thinking of God in another way than as Being. 114 115 116 117
Marion writes that he must be conceived as radically unthinkable, ‘an 
unthinkable that exceeds as much what we cannot think as what we can’.n5 To 
denote God as unthinkable Marion borrows the technique Heidegger used in The 
Question of Being (1952) of crossing through a word so that it remains legible, in 
order to denote its inadequacy and at the same time its necessity. Heidegger had 
written and Derrida had borrowed this usage to describe the being of
differance.1 Marion writes DSecT, ‘with a cross...which demonstrates the limit 
of the temptation... to blaspheme the unthinkable in an idol’.m For Marion the 
unthinkableJ&eCcan be thought of as love, since love, unlike the concept, has no 
limits, not even its own, but ‘gives itself only in abandoning itself, ceaselessly 
transgressing the limits of its own gift, so as to be transplanted outside of 
itself.118
112 Ibid. p. 16.
113 Ibid. p. 37.
114 Ibid. p. 44.
115 Ibid. p. 46.
116 Derrida, Of Grammatology pp. 19, 44; Margins p. 6.
117 Marion, God Without Being p. 46.
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2. Derrida and Negative Theology
Marion’s argument that God cannot be thought in terms of Being is 
reminiscent of negative theology. It can be asked whether Derrida’s critique of 
metaphysical language is a kind of negative theology. There are certainly 
similarities between the two discourses. As we have seen, Derrida’s concept of 
differance as the movement that precedes and produces substance cannot be 
described in the language of substance. If differance produces Being, it cannot be 
said to be. In negative theology, since God produces Being, He too cannot be 
said to be. In his book Cliffs of Fall (1980), John Dominic Crossan writes that 
Derrida’s thought ‘leads straight into a contemporary retrieval of negative 
theology’. 119 Both Derrida and the negative theologians assert the inadequacy of 
the metaphysical structure of language to describe the most fundamental realities 
accessible to knowledge. Both force language to its internal limit in order to 
focus on the epistemological value of its external limit. I will now turn to an 
examination of the relationship between these apparently similar concepts and 
practices.
Negative theology is something of a renegade term, whose precise definition 
has been given comparatively little attention, mainly I suspect because it is 
difficult to distinguish rigorously from its opposite, ‘positive’ theology. Neither 
the 16-volume Encyclopaedia of Religion (1987) nor the 18-volume New 
Catholic Encyclopaedia (1967) has an entry under ‘Negative Theology’ or under 
‘Apophatic Theology’. Nor for that matter do the older Encyclopaedia of 
Religion and Ethics or the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious 118
118 Ibid. p. 48.
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Knowledge, or the smaller Sacramentum Mundi. Only one of the five has an 
entry under ‘Via Negativa’. Nevertheless, we need a working definition of the 
term, and I will elaborate an elementary one here. I will use the term to describe 
the attitude towards discourse on God that can be found in Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 
500), John Scotus Eriugena (c.810-880), Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) and 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). Broadly speaking, this constitutes a denial of the 
value of analogy in speaking of God, which is the basis of positive or 
‘affirmative’ theology. As we have seen, according to this doctrine, terms that 
apply to entities and that function according the limits of human conceptuality, 
can nevertheless be applied to God who is an entity beyond the human capacity 
to conceive. Although God’s paternity, for example, is not paternity in the sense 
in which we conceive of it, we can say truly that he is a father in a sense 
analogous to our conception of the term’s meaning. Negative theology denies 
that this is true. It denies the adequacy of conceptual language to impart any 
knowledge whatever of God, since God simply cannot be conceived by the
human mind.
Negative theology is a method of denial and so called ‘apophatic’, from the 
Greek apophasis, or ‘denial’. The nature of this denial varies among the writers 
in question. Nicholas of Cusa writes that to deny rather than affirm propositions 
of God is to speak more truly of Him. Although affirmative statements are 
necessary for worship, for Nicholas, nevertheless to deny conceptual predicates
of God is truer than to affirm them. He writes that ‘all affirmations that are made
of God...are anthropomorphic’ and therefore ‘diminutives that fall infinitely *
119 Jolm Dominic Crossan, Cliffs of Fall: Paradox and Polyvalence in the Parables of Jesus 
(New York; Seabury, 1980) p. 11.
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short of His real name’.^0 Since God is infinitely greater than can be conceived, 
Nicholas writes, ‘it is by the process of elimination and the use of negative 
propositions that we come nearer the truth about Him’.m He concludes that ‘in 
theology negative propositions are true and affirmative ones inadequate’.120 121 22 
Pseudo-Dionysius, on the other hand, does not go so far as to say that negative 
propositions of God are true. He employs a dialectical procedure of affirmation 
and negation, in which, whilst he finds negative propositions on the whole to be 
truer, he also finds it necessary to negate these negations. He concludes the 
Mystical Theology with a long list of what God is not, including the propositions 
that, ‘It does not live, nor is it life. It is not a substance, nor is it eternity or 
time... There is no speaking of it, nor name nor knowledge of it’. Given this last, 
Dionysius writes:
We make assertions and denials of what is next to it, but never of it, for it 
is both beyond every assertion... [and] beyond every denial.123
For Dionysius, God cannot be adequately described either by positive or by 
negative propositions, because He is unknowable as an object by a subject. 
Dionysius writes that God can be related to only in another mode than 
conceptually, which cannot begin until one ceases to attempt to conceive of Him.
The most apparent similarity between this and Derrida’s thought is the mutual 
attempt to think and describe something previous to being, which therefore is 
not, nor is it exactly previous, nor can it be described in the structure of language 
which is based on the priority of being. Derrida writes, ‘The trace is nothing...it 
exceeds the question What isl and constitutes the condition of its possibility {la
120 Nicholas of Cusa, Of Learned Ignorance, tr. Germaine Heron (London; Routledge andKegan 
Paul, 1954) pp. 56, 55.
121 Ibid. p. 60.
122 Ibid. p. 61.
123 Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, tr. Colm Luibheid (London; SPCK, 1987) p. 141.
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rend eventuellement possible]' 124 125The same can be said of God by negative 
theology. Derrida has been aware of this topological similarity from his earliest 
writings. In ‘Differance’ (1968), he writes:
The detours, locutions and syntax in which I will often have to take
recourse will resemble those of negative theology, occasionally even to 
125the point of being indistinguishable from negative theology.
He writes that describing differance is a question of delineating that ‘differance 
is not, does not exist, is not a present-being’ and also of delineating ‘everything 
that it is not, that is, everything,’ which amounts to saying that ‘it has neither 
essence nor existence’.126 127Pseudo-Dionysius adopts precisely the same approach 
with regard to the description of God. In the final chapter of the Mystical 
Theology, to which we alluded above, he writes of the Godhead, ‘It is not a 
sub stance... It falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being’, and 
lists many predicates that cannot be attributed to this non-entity.
Derrida is at pains to assert, nevertheless, that despite this grammatical 
similarity, differance does not name God, not even in the manner of negative 
theology. His fundamental reason for this has not changed. According to 
Derrida, whilst negative theology denies the predicate of being to God, it does so 
in order to attribute him a superior mode of being. Referring apparently to 
Pseudo-Dionysius, Derrida writes that negative theologies are ‘concerned with 
disengaging a superessentiality beyond the finite categories of essence and 
existence’ and that in them ‘God is refused the predicate of existence only in
124 Derrida, Of Grammatology p. 75.
125 Derrida, Margins p. 6. The concept of differance is also related to that of energy in particle 
physics, hi which matter and non-matter are considered functions of the movement of energy.
126 Ibid.
127 Pseudo-Dionysius p. 141.
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order to acknowledge his superior...mode of being’.128 Deirida is concerned 
with naming something of which onto-theology is a production, and finds that 
negative theology remains within the category of onto-theology. Whereas it 
names only a superior manner of being, Derrida is concerned with something 
altogether anterior to Being. In his essay ‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’ 
(1986), Derrida explicitly addresses the question of the relation between his 
work and negative theology, which by that time had been pointed out several 
times. He repeats his earlier assertion, insisting that ‘what I write is not “negative 
theology’”?29 He writes that this is true ‘in the measure to which negative 
theology seems to reserve beyond all positive predication, beyond all 
negation... some hyperessentiality, a being beyond Being’.130 He writes, ‘I would 
hesitate to inscribe what I put forward under the.. .heading of negative theology’, 
because of the ‘ontological wager of hyperessentiality’ by which he finds 
negative theology to be characterised.131
Derrida cites Dionysius and Meister Eckhart by name as examples of this
‘ontological wager’. He had long been aware of the passage in Eckhart’s sermon
Quasi Stella matutina, on the nature of God, in which Eckhart writes:
In saying that God is not a being and that God is above being, I have not 
denied being to God; rather, I have elevated it in him.132 133
Derrida had cited this passage in a footnote to his essay on Bataille, ‘From 
Restricted to General Economy’ (1967), and had written, ‘The negative moment 
of the discourse on God is only a phase of positive ontotheology’.m In ‘How to
129 Harold Coward and Toby Foshay, eds., Derrida and Negative Theology (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1992) p. 77.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid. p. 78.
132 Bernard McGinn, Frank Tobin and Elvira Borgstadt, eds., Meister Eckhart: Teacher and 
Preacher (New York: Paulist Press, 1986) p. 154.
133 Derrida, Writing and Difference p. 337.
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Avoid Speaking’, he quotes the passage at greater length in order to establish the 
same point. Clearly it is just when applied to the sentence Derrida cites. It seems 
more questionable, however, whether it is a just description of negative theology 
in general, as Derrida uses it. It would be hard to show that Dionysius, for 
example, thought that God was a superior being. Indeed the only passage in 
‘How to Avoid Speaking’ that indicates this rests on a mistranslation. Derrida 
cites from the Mystical Theology a passage on the goal of the negative way as 
follows: to ‘know unveiled...this unknowing which conceals in every being the 
knowledge one can have of this Being’.134 It appears that God is named as Being. 
Dionysius’ text, however, reads, hina aperikaluptos gnomen ekeinen ten 
agnosian, ten hupo panton ton gnoston en pasi tois ousi perikekalummenen,135 
Colm Luibheid (1987) translates the passage as follows: ‘that unknowing which 
itself is hidden from all those possessed of knowing amid all beings’.136 John D. 
Jones (1980) renders it, ‘the unknowing which is covered round about by every 
knowledge in beings’.137 There is no phrase in Dionysius’ Greek that 
corresponds to the words ‘of this Being [de cet etre^ in Derrida’s translation, nor 
does the Mystical Theology ever describe God as Being. Derrida is not pressing 
the point about onto-theology when he cites this passage, but discussing the 
presence of God into which the negative way leads. Nevertheless, he cites 
Dionysius as well as Eckhart when he makes the claim that negative theology is 
a phase of onto-theology, and this is the only citation in his essay that could 
support that claim when applied to Dionysius.
134 Coward and Foshav, Derrida and Negative Theology p. 80. Derrida’s translation reads: 
‘connaitre sans voile cette inconnaissance que dissimule en tout etre la comiaissance qu’on peut 
avoir de cet etre’ {Psyche: Inventions de I'autre, Paris: Galilee, 1987 p. 543).
135 J.-Migne, ed., Patrologia Graeca III 1025 A94.
136 Pseudo-Dionvsius: The Complete Works, tr. Colm Luibheid (London: SPCK, 1987) p. 138.
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In fact it is by no means clear that Dionysius’ terms hyperousios (beyond 
being) and hyperousios (in a manner beyond being) refer to a mode of being that 
is simply being as we conceive it but in greater measure. In the introduction to 
his translation of the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology, John D. Jones 
writes of ‘the negative character of [the prefix] hypee’ in Dionysius. The 
Greek hyper means over, above, beyond. According to Jones, Dionysius’ use of 
the term in the locutions ‘beyond being’, ‘beyond having’, ‘beyond unity’ and so 
on, refers to a non-entity on the far side of being, as it were, beyond and 
therefore no longer thinkable within the terms of being. This is certainly borne 
out by Dionysius’ texts. He writes that God is kata rneden ton onton ousa...auto 
de me on, ‘being according to no manner of being...and itself not being’. 
Dionysius also writes, hyperkeitai ton ousion he hyperousios aoristia, ‘The 
unboundedness beyond entity lies beyond entities’. 137 * 139 40 For Dionysius, that is, God 
is neither an entity nor does He have a mode of being, as Derrida suggests that 
Dionysius says He does. He ‘is’ not, in any sense, for Dionysius (me on). In the 
fifth chapter of the Divine Names, on being, Dionysius describes God as 
hyperousios hyperon, ‘beyond being in a manner beyond being’.141 Ths last 
construction seems to me decisive. For Dionysius, God is not only not a being, 
but nor is it true that he ‘is’ not a being, because he cannot be thought within the 
limits of the verb ‘to be’. He ‘is’, in short, in a manner ‘otherwise than being’.142
137 Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite: The Divine Names and Mystical Theology, tr. Jolm D. Jones 
(Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 1980) p. 215.
13,8 Ibid. p. 31.
139 Divine Names 1.1 588B.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid. V.8 824B.
142 Kevin Hart's suggestion {The Trespass of the Sign p. 193) that ‘Derrida assumes the Thomist 
reading of Pseudo-Dionysius' is well founded. St. Thomas writes, ‘Tire reason why Dionysius 
says that. ..words are better denied of God is that what they signify does not belong to God m tlie 
way that they signify it but m a liigher way' {Summa Theologiae la 13, 3). Eckliart takes a smiilar 
view: ‘Wliat Dionysius says... [i.e.] “Negations about God are true but affinnations are
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As Derrida’s response develops, we can observe a lack of certainty concerning
the onto-theological nature of negative theology developing along with the
fundamental assertion that this is the case. From his earliest remarks Derrida was
aware that negative theology was a plural discourse. In ‘Differance’ he referred
to the ‘order of the most negative of negative theologies’; in the Bataille essay he
cited Eckhart as an ‘example’; and in ‘How to Avoid Speaking’ he explicitly
addresses the question of the ‘dissimilar corpuses,... proceedings and languages’
which comprise what is loosely called negative theology. In his letter to John P.
Leavey, Jr., concerning the issue of Semeia on ‘Derrida and Biblical Studies’
(1981), Derrida writes of this plural discourse:
I believe that what is called ‘negative theology’... does not let itself easily 
be assembled under the general category of ‘onto-theology-to-be- 
deconstructed’.143 *
This assertion, whilst qualified with the phrases, ‘I believe that...’ and ‘does not 
easily...’, is nevertheless in striking contrast to the main burden of Derrida’s 
remarks on negative theology. Similarly, in ‘From Restricted to General 
Economy’, he had written and repeated that negative theology ‘perhaps’ reserved 
a being beyond Being as the object of its discourse. He writes, ‘Perhaps: for here 
we are touching upon the limits and the greatest audacities of discourse in 
Western thought’..a And in ‘How to Avoid Speaking’, he writes that just as 
deconstruction remains within the closure of metaphysics, so his perception of
unsuitable”... is true about the mode of signifying in such sentences’, and not about the tilings 
signified (‘Commentary on Exodus’ 78, Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher p. 70). The 
problem seems to me larger than Hart suggests, however, that St. Thomas simply misrepresents 
Dionysius. Although tins is true, it is doubtful whether the difference between their views on this 
point is of practical significance. If, as St. Thomas says, words represent God but m a higher way 
than we can luiderstand, this means that they represent Him in a way that we do not understand. 
Our knowledge of the meaning of a tenn when applied to God, therefore, is nothing, as with 
Dionysius. Althougli St. Thomas says that we can know that words for God do mean something, 
both assert that there is no question of knowing what it is.
143 Jacques Derrida, ‘Letter to Jolm P. Leavey, Jr.’, Semeia 23 (1982) p. 61.
144 Derrida, Writing and Difference p. 271.
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the ontotheological reappropriation of hyperessentiality in negative theology
describes an equally inevitable closure. He writes:
If the movement of this reappropriation appears in fact irrepressible, its 
ultimate failure is no less necessary.145
This is to say that his charge that the apophatic description of God beyond being 
describes only a superior kind of being is the same kind of charge by which 
deconstruction could be called metaphysical. In both cases, the charge is not 
exactly false; it is simply that there could be no other state of affairs given the 
nature of language. Derrida concedes that whilst negative theology can do no 
other than describe being, because description cannot describe anything else, it 
can nevertheless be considered to draw attention to the limits of its necessarily 
metaphysical language in the manner of deconstruction.
Despite his partially justified assertions that negative theology remains within 
the metaphysics of substance, then, Derrida is also aware that this does not 
adequately describe all the modes of negative theology. Presumably it is as a 
result of this that he concedes an essential similarity between a certain moment 
of negative theology and his own thought with regard to the closure of 
metaphysics, namely that both internally question the metaphysical structure of 
language. Nevertheless, it would be going too far to say that Derrida writes 
negative theology. The negative way in theology is usually combined with a 
negative way of life, a form of ascetic practice integrated with the conceptual 
asceticism we have described. The term ‘via negativa’ is best understood as the 
combination of the two as a way of life whose goal is authentic relationship to 
God. Clearly Derrida is not concerned with modes of relationship to differance, 
but simply with opening a space in which it can be thought. Nevertheless, if we
145 Coward and Foshay, Derrida and Negative Theology p. 79.
50
consider the aspect of negative theology that is concerned only with discourse on 
God, it seems clear that its similarities to Derrida’s work are more than accidents 
of grammar and syntax. We cannot simply say that differance names God, 
because neither can be named as such and because negative theology is 
concerned with non-conceptual relationship to God, but we can say that 
Derrida’s thought opens up a space in which God can be thought, in the way that 
negative theology does. The space of differance, anterior to metaphysics and the 
language of metaphysics, is also the space of God in negative theology. By 
attending to the limits of the metaphysics of language, so that what is beyond its 
limits can be inarticulately gestured towards, Derrida elaborates a method in 
which God can be so gestured towards. In The Trespass of the Sign (1989), 
Kevin Hart argues that negative theology is a kind of deconstruction, of positive 
theology. I would add that in opening up a space to UcUcXte the inconceivable in 
conceptual language, deconstruction provides negative theology with a 
significant methodological resource.
In this section, then, I have argued that deconstruction reminds us that 
Christian theology has a provisional nature. Its object cannot be denoted in the 
metaphysical structure of language, but since there is no other kind, it must 
express the experience of the community of faith in discourse determined by that 
structure. It is therefore most truly referential at the points where it displays the 
limits of its referential function. I have argued that Aquinas knew this before 
Derrida, and that Marion thinks it through most fully after him. This means that 
Christian criticism cannot be conceived as the application of doctrinal principles 
whose meaning is certain to literary texts whose meaning is not. Christian
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doctrine and literary texts share a common language, whose referential capacity 
both question in different ways. After deconstruction, Christian criticism must be 
thought of as a practice of faith rather than of knowledge. It will constitute an 
interpretation of literary texts from within a specific community of faith, whose 
own texts teach its members most where they display how problematically they
teach. It must also be said that deconstruction tells us that this is true of all
criticism.
I have also argued that deconstruction has the same effect, although not the 
same intent, as negative theology, inasmuch as it opens up a space in which the 
unthinkable God can be thought. This means that there is no reason why 
Christian criticism should not pursue the tension between intention and rhetoric 
in a literary text in the way that deconstruction does. We can follow Derrida in 
asserting that such texts indicate the limits of the structure of language and the 
mystery beyond these limits particularly clearly. We will depart from 
deconstruction in taking this mystery to be divine. Insofar as Christian criticism 
can deconstruct a text, that is, we can assert that the author’s exploration of 
experience in the text has led him or her to the mystery of such experience that is
a result of its divine creation.
(iii) A Critique of Deconstruction
Having described some of the implications of deconstruction for Christian 
literary theory, we should not go on to take it as the authority or critical 
orthodoxy it is sometimes presented to be. All but the most able and rigorous of
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deconstructive critics fall more or less frequently into the trap of taking 
Derridean conclusions as self-evident truths that do not need to be reached by 
argument. In this section, I will examine some of the more significant critiques 
of deconstruction, in order to show firstly that this is not the case, and secondly 
to expand on the position that Christian criticism should take with regard to
deconstruction.
We should note first of all that there can be no question of making a charlatan 
of Derrida, as some critics have attempted to do. Few philosophers and fewer 
literary critics have contested his ideas with convincing counter-arguments. As 
deconstruction became a widely popular term in American literary criticism in 
the 1980s, invoked to describe a wide variety of first principles and critical 
methods, many critics responded polemically in the name of humanism or of the 
analytical tradition. Works such as John R. Searle’s essay, ‘Reiterating the 
Differences: A Reply to Derrida’ (1977) and John M, Ellis’ book, Against 
Deconstruction (1989) are examples of this. Both charge Derrida with sophistry 
and intellectual sleight-of-hand but argue out of a distinct lack of acquaintance 
with and sensitive reading of Derrida’s wide and difficult oeuvre. In the second 
chapter of Against Deconstruction, for example, entitled ‘Deconstruction and the 
Nature of Language’, Ellis attempts to controvert Derrida’s fundamental position 
on the differantial nature of language. He argues that ‘speech quite clearly 
existed long before the invention of writing’, against Derrida’s assertion in Of 
Grammatology that speech has always already been writing. 146 But in Of 
Grammatology Derrida repeatedly distinguishes between writing in the ‘narrow’ 
and ‘general’ senses, that is between inscription and the interruption of self-
146 John M. Ellis. Against Deconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) p. 21.
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presence that inscription represents. He argues that the latter ‘precedes’ (that is, 
produces) speech considered as the mode of presence. The suggestion that 
Derrida asserts that historically inscription developed before enunciation misses 
the most fundamental point of his carefully-argued essay. Ellis’ quarrels with 
over-enthusiastic importations of Derrida’s ideas into literary criticism, that 
substitute assertion for argument in making extravagant claims, are often quite 
justified. But we should be clear that he does not engage with Derrida himself in 
any meaningful counter-argument, but rather proceeds by attributing to Derrida a 
sophistry and lack of argumentative rigour that simply cannot be found in his 
work.147
1. The Marxist Critique
The Marxist critique of deconstruction should be taken more seriously, it 
seems to me, since it rests on the issue of the moral status of criticism. The 
essence of this critique is that the attention devoted in deconstructive criticism to 
the rhetorical constitution of a text prevents a proper attention to the social and 
historical situation in which the text was produced and in which it is read. 
Further, that as soon as one starts to understand these relations themselves as a 
kind of text, as deconstructive criticism does, and asserts their necessary failure 
to mean, one takes a conservative attitude towards them and the possibility of 
altering them for the better. We will examine the question of Marxist morality in 
more detail in the next chapter, but for now we can note that since Christian
147 Clmstopher Norris’ review of Ellis’ book, ‘Limited Tlimk: How Not to Read Derrida. 
Diacritics 20 (1990) pp. 17-36, presses this point at length.
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morality must involve a commitment to justice in social relations, then Christian 
literary theory cannot imply that this is not possible.
This kind of critique applies most closely to the work of Paul de Man. In his 
book Criticism and Social Change (1983), Frank Lentricchia writes that de Man, 
despite being thought of as a radical by humanist critics, is in fact ‘the theorist 
who elaborated the cagiest argument for the political defusion of writing and the 
intellectual life’.148 The effect of de Man’s work, Lentricchia writes, is to 
demonstrate that the link between the literary and the political realms is 
insignificant, that ‘intervention...can make no difference’, and to effect ‘the 
paralysis of praxis’.149 He describes the ‘epistemology of failure’ that has 
underwritten de Man’s work since his doctoral thesis, according to which the 
clearest self-knowledge is that self-knowledge is not possible. The ‘aporia’ 
which results, in de Man’s thought, means that action cannot be based on 
knowledge, according to Lentricchia. Of de Man’s use of the term ‘paralysis’ to 
describe the irreducible contradiction between intention and rhetoric, Lentricchia
writes:
He means the paralysis of action, which will deny lucidity to the intellect 
and guarantee in the end that no mind knows what it is doing.150 151
He describes the ‘political allegory’ of de Man’s reading of Nietzsche in his 
essay ‘Literary History and Literary Modernity’ (1969), in which the attempt to 
break from history is seen always to be assimilated back into history. Lentricchia 
describes this view of history as ‘fatalistic’, in which action and modernity are 
‘naive illusions’.1 t hhe last sentence of de Man’s essay reads, ‘If we extend
148 Frank Lentriccliia. Criticism and Social Change (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1983) p. 39.
149 Ibid. p. 40.
150 Ibid. p. 43.
151 Ibid. pp. 48, 45.
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[the] notion [of literary history] beyond literature, it merely confirms that the 
bases for historical knowledge are not empirical facts but written texts, even if 
these texts masquerade in the guise of wars and revolutions’.152 Lentricchia 
comments, ‘De Man...is saying that...history is an imitation of what he has 
defined as the literary’, namely the place of the paradoxical mutual implication 
of history and modernity.153 Lentricchia calls this ‘the most genuine meaning of 
political conservatism’.154 He concludes that deconstruction successfully 
criticises the epistemology of representation, but fails to describe the real issue, 
the politics or ‘social work’ of representation. For Lentricchia this is to confuse 
‘the act of exposing epistemological fraud with the neutralisation of political 
force’.155 He writes:
Politically, deconstruction translates into that passive kind of 
conservatism called quietism....In Paul de Man it teaches the many ways 
to say that there is nothing to be done.156
In his essay ‘Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism’ (1985) Terry 
Eagleton pursues a similar criticism of de Man’s essay. He describes de Man’s 
view of literature, fairly enough, as ‘the ceaseless incapacity ever quite to 
awaken from the nightmare of history’.157 He paraphrases de Man’s assertion 
that his view of literary history could be paradigmatic for history in general as an 
assertion that ‘though we will never abandon our radical political illusions...such 
actions will always prove self-defeating’.158 Eagleton points out that de Man is at 
odds with the Marxist view of history, in which actions may be based on 
knowledge and history may be emancipatory. He writes:
152 De Man, Blindness and Insight p. 165.
153 Lentricchia. Criticism and Social Change p. 49.
154 Ibid. p. 50.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid. p. 51.
157 Terrv Eagleton, Against the Grain: Essavs 1975-1985 (London: Verso, 1986) p. 136.
158 Ibid. p. 137.
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It is only by virtue of an initial Nietzschean dogmatism - practice is 
necessarily self-blinded, tradition necessarily impeding - that de Man is 
able to arrive at his politically quietistic aporias.159
In his essay ‘The Critic as Clown’ (1986), Eagleton discusses the ‘political 
implications of de Man’s misreading of Empson’ in ‘The Dead-End of Formalist 
Criticism’, in which de Man had written that ‘Marxism is ultimately a poetic 
thought that lacks the patience to pursue its own conclusions to their end’.160 
Eagleton writes:
If the ironies of pastoral are allegorical of the critic’s relation to 
society., .then it is the uncrossable gulf between them that de Man wishes 
to reaffirm.161
He translates the disjunction in de Man’s thought between consciousness and 
being into the position that ‘the intellectual...should really have nothing to 
say’.162
The most extreme form of this kind of criticism of de Man came after the
disclosure of his wartime journalism in 1987, in which it was discovered that de 
Man had written for collaborationist newspapers in his native Belgium up to 
1942. In a fulminating essay entitled ‘Paul de Man and the Politics of 
Deconstruction’ (1988), David H. Hirsch took the view that ‘the connection 
between Paul de Man’s deconstructive criticism and his Nazi past...starts to 
make a great deal of sense’.163 In his analysis of de Man’s essay ‘Literary 
History and Literary Modernity’, Hirsch writes that ‘de Man attacks the concept 
of ‘the past”, in order to assuage the guilt of his participation in European 
history.164 Concerning de Man’s position on the absolute uncertainty of a text’s
159 Ibid. p. 138.
160 De Man, Blindness and Insight p. 241.
161 Eagleton. Against the Grain p. 158.
162 Ibid. p. 161.
163 David H. Hirsch, ‘Paul de Man and the Politics of Deconstruction’. Sewanee Review 96 
(1988) p. 331.
164 Ibid. p. 333.
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reference, Hirsch writes, ‘If one accepts this assumption, then history itself, and 
with it de Man’s own Nazi past, has been obliterated’.'n
Clearly there is little to be gained in using emotionally-loaded terms like 
‘Nazi’ of deconstruction. When Eagleton describes de Man’s work as ‘post­
fascist’, he refers to the post-war climate of anti-ideological scepticism in which 
he locates de Man’s thought, rather than implicating deconstruction in a form of 
government.165 66 The substance of Hirsch’s argument, once one subtracts his 
psychological speculations about de Man’s sense of guilt and mode of assuaging 
it, is that with which we are now familiar, that deconstruction does not allow for 
the possibility of reliable knowledge of history or of action based thereon. This is 
a justified criticism. Eagleton and Lentricchia do no violence to the thought of de 
Man as they expound his essays, and we should take their critique to qualify our 
conclusions on the potential use of deconstruction for Christian criticism. We 
should bear in mind Anthony Thiselton’s point in New Horizons in 
Hermeneutics (1992) on the evaluation of deconstruction, that
the use of a hermeneutic of suspicion as a method is an entirely different 
matter from the transformation of the principle of suspicion into a world­
view.167
Whilst deconstructive criticism can yield some significant insights which 
Christian literary can use, that is, we should not take it to be the only authentic 
relation possible to a literary text. Since it is unacceptable to Christian morality, 
as to Marxist, to suggest that it is useless to attempt to improve the configuration 
of social relations, we cannot fully subscribe to a critical method such as de 
Man’s, which derives from a world-view in which this is implied.
165 Ibid. p. 334.
166 Eagleton,?! gainst the Grain p. 165.
167 Anthony C. Tliiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London; Harper Collins, 1992) p. 126.
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Eagleton tends to exempt Derrida from this kind of critique, writing that 
‘whatever his practice, he is quite evidently some kind of Marxist sympathiser’. 
In his essay ‘Frere Jacques: The Politics of Deconstruction’ (1984), Eagleton 
evinces certain reservations about Derridean deconstruction, but on the whole 
recognises the genuinely Derridean position that ‘deconstruction...insists not 
that truth is illusory but that it is institutional’.168 Derrida’s main political crime, 
for Eagleton, is his lack of lasting protest at the appropriation and domestication 
of his thought by the rhetorical analysis of the Yale critics. In ‘Deconstruction 
and the Other’, Derrida himself says, ‘I have never succeeded in directly relating 
deconstruction to existing political codes and programmes’.169 These codes, he 
writes, are not commensurate with deconstruction, since they are formulated on 
the basis of a metaphysics of substance. Derrida acknowledges that this can give 
the impression that deconstruction is apolitical, but he writes that such an 
impression prevails only because ‘all of our political codes and terminologies 
still remain fundamentally metaphysical’.170 This leaves him in a position he 
describes as a ‘dual allegiance’:
I try where I can to act politically while recognising that such action 
remains incommensurate with my intellectual project of 
deconstruction.171
168 Eagleton, Against the Grain p. 85.
169 Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers p. 119.
170 Ibid. p. 120.
171 Ibid. Critchley (The Ethics of Deconstruction pp. 188 ff.) discusses tlie ‘impasse of the 
political’ he finds in Derrida’s work, which ‘fails to navigate the treacherous passage from ethics 
to politics, or...from responsibility to questioning’ (p. 189). He means that tlie undecidability 
produced by deconstructive reading does not translate into tlie political necessity for decisive 
action.
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2. The Hermeneutic Critique
At the 1981 symposium ‘Text and Interpretation’, at Paris’ Goethe Institute, 
Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900) met in order that a debate between 
deconstruction and Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics might develop. In fact 
this did not occur, but, as Fred Dallmayr puts it in his essay on the encounter, 
‘the two spokesmen seemed more intent on reiterating firmly held positions than 
on exposing them to mutual testing and scrutiny’.172 as Gadamer
sought to defend his position against Derrida’s charge that hermeneutics remains 
within the metaphysics of presence, some important criticisms of deconstruction 
emerged.
In the essay he contributed to the symposium, ‘Text and Interpretation’ (1981), 
Gadamer outlines his view of language and of understanding, with Derrida’s 
critique of the latent logocentrism of hermeneutics in mind. The essence of his 
response is that Derrida ignores that the ftmdamental condition of any linguistic 
act is the will to understand and to be understood by an interlocutor. We will 
examine Gadamer’s thought more closely in Chapter 5, but for now we can note 
that he sees the essence of language as dialogue, ‘the living dialogue in which 
the Socratic-Platonic movement of thought took place’.173 por Gadamer, that is, 
understanding is not to be conceived as the decoding of a quantum of meaning 
encoded in a statement, but as a developing product of interpersonal relationship 
that unfolds in the process of dialogue. The model for this view is Platonic 
dialectic, in which Socrates and an interlocutor develop their mutual
172 Diane P. Miciielfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds.. Dialogue and Deconstniction: The 
Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989) p. 77.
173 Ibid. p. 23.
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understanding of a question through the exchange of questions and answers.
Gadamer writes:
What we find happening in speaking is not a mere reification of intended 
meaning, but...a continually recurring temptation to engage oneself in 
something or to become involved with someone.174 175
Most of his essays on Derrida are concerned with defending the position that this
understanding of language does not relapse into a metaphysics of substance. His
criticism of Derrida’s own position is primarily that the latter’s assertion of the
dispersal or ‘dissemination’ of meaning produced by differance forgets the
dialogical situation of language. In order to engage in dialogue at all, Gadamer
writes, ‘both partners must have the good will to try to understand each other’.
For Gadamer, Derrida places too much emphasis on the semantic aspect of
language, that is, on the relation between signs and meanings. What he forgets,
Gadamer writes, is the hermeneutic dimension, the will to communicate, upon
which the semantic relation is contingent. Gadamer accepts Derrida’s critique of
the metaphysical structure of language (it derives from Heidegger, to whose
thought Gadamer is also deeply indebted), and denies that texts, conversations or
even inner monologue employ signifiers that immediately convey signifieds. In
his reply to Derrida’s questions on his paper, he writes:
I would not want to say that the solidarities that...make [people] partners 
in a dialogue.. .are sufficient to enable them to achieve understanding and 
total mutual agreement...The same would apply with regard to the inner 
dialogue the soul has with itself.176
He does not criticise the concept of differance in the name of the clarity of 
meaning, but because he finds a prior agreement and will to understand another 
underlying all language-use, which allows an authentic progression through the
174 Ibid. p. 26.
175 Ibi<i p. 33.
176 Ibid. p. 57.
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conceptual instabilities of language as a sign-system. This is what he means in 
his essay ‘Hermeneutics and Logocentrism' (1987), when he writes of Derrida's 
improper ‘dependence on the semantic starting-point... in his view of language', 
and that ‘the unavoidability of the hermeneutic standpoint' is the essence of his 
critique of Derrida.177
In his response to Gadamer's initial paper, ‘Good Will to Power (A Reply to 
Hans-Georg Gadamer)' (1981), Derrida asked whether ‘the precondition of 
Verstehen [understanding], far from being the continuity of rapport [as Gadamer 
suggests]...is not rather the interruption of rapporf. In his response, 
‘Nevertheless: The Power of Good Will' (1981), Gadamer replied that ‘whoever 
opens his mouth wants to be understood; otherwise, one would neither speak nor 
write'. He points out that this occurred even in what limited dialogue took place 
between Derrida and himself: ‘Derrida directs questions to me and therefore he 
must assume that I am willing to understand them'. 178 He writes of Derrida and 
Nietzsche, whom Derrida invokes against Gadamer's conception of will, ‘Both 
of them are mistaken about themselves. Actually, both speak and write in order 
to be understood'.179
One does not have to accept Gadamer's Heideggerian view of understanding as 
a fundamental category of human existence in order to recognise that his concept 
of the prior will to understand functions as a serious criticism of deconstruction. 
We should learn from it not to accept the authority with which deconstructive 
criticism often asserts that the rhetorical aporias it discovers in texts function as 
proofs that the text fails to mean or to refer to anything beyond these aporias.
Christian criticism should be attentive to the hermeneutic as well as to the
177 Ibid. p. 125.
178 Ibid. p. 55.
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semantic dimension of a text, that is, to the part it plays in a dialogic or 
communicative relation with past texts, its history of readings and our own 
reading of it. We will discuss the use of Gadamer’s thought for Christian literary 
theory in Chapter 5. Here we can note that his critique of Derrida reminds us that 
where we use deconstructi^ methodology, we should be aware that it treats the 
text in isolation from the human dimension of communication. Christian literary 
theory should be attentive to the communal nature of human existence and attend 
to the function of the text as an utterance in and for the sake of community, or 
‘solidarity’, as Gadamer puts it. We should be attentive to the mutually 
transformative dialogue enacted between the text and criticism, of which 
rhetorical analysis forms only a part.
179 Ibid. p. 57.
2. On Marxism
I will now move on to an analysis of some of the more influential Marxist 
literary theories and critical practices. As in the previous chapter, I shall have
two main concerns. Firstly, I will examine the some of the relations between 
Marxism and Christianity, in order to assess the degree to which Christian 
literary theory can and should use some of its insights. Secondly, I will offer a 
critique of certain Marxist theories, in order to establish that, whilst there is 
much that Christian criticism can and should learn from them, like 
deconstruction they cannot be taken as finally authoritative for literary theory. 
As before, I will begin this study with an introduction to the Marxist literary
theories with which I will be concerned.
(i) An Outline of Marxist Literary Theories
The term ‘Marxist literary theory’ encompasses a wide and heterogeneous 
body of works. These works have almost nothing in common except their 
attempt to understand literary texts from a Marxist perspective. One reason for 
this is that Marxism is a developing tradition of thought, and as its fundamental 
socio-economic principles evolve, so does the literary criticism contingent upon 
these principles. I do not have space here to represent this tradition fully, so I 
have selected for exposition those critics whose work bears most relevance to the 
contemporary literary-critical scene. Despite the profundity of the work of Georg 
Lukacs, for example, it is not represented here, since few readers are likely at
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present to encounter criticism that is substantially indebted to it. In this section, I 
will focus on those critics who maintain a clear allegiance to the thought of 
Marx, and whose theories are relatively current.
1, Karl Marx
Marxist literary theory describes the consequences of the thought of Karl 
Marx (1818-1883) for our understanding of literary texts. Although there are 
many fragments of literary criticism in Marx’s works, some of which are 
occasionally defended by contemporary critics, most Marxist criticism 
constitutes an application of Marx’s philosophy of history to such texts.1 I will 
begin with an introduction to some of the main points in this philosophy. The 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (first published in 1932) 
represent the first draft of the major work on economics that occupied Marx for 
most of his life.2 They were written while Marx was still influenced by the 
humanism of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872). There are three main divisions in 
the subject-matter of the manuscripts: a critique of political economy, 
particularly that of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, a discussion of communism 
and of private property, and a critique of Hegel’s dialectic. The essence of 
Marx’s critique of the political economy of Smith and Ricardo is that it does not 
account for men as living human beings, but as abstract elements of the
1 See Marx and Engels, On Literature and Art, ed. Stefan Baxandall and Lee Morawski, (St. 
Louis: International General, 1973) for Marx’s own writings on literature. Terry Eagleton 
defends his argument for tlie enduring value of Greek art in Marxism and Literary Criticsm 
(London: Routledge, 1976) pp. 9-16.
“ See David McLellan. Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (London: Macmillan, 1973) pp. 104- 
128.
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economic system. He is critical that they cannot explain the origins of the system 
they describe. He writes:
Political economy [i.e. economics] starts with the fact of private property, 
it does not explain it to us.3
For Marx, the present economic system has a history, which needs to be 
accounted for rather than presupposed. Marx describes the human reality of 
labour in industrial capitalist society as alienated labour. By this he means that 
‘the object that labour produces, its product, confronts it as an alien being, as a 
power independent of the producer’.4 As a result, the worker is alienated not 
only from the product of his labour but also from himself, since he does not 
confirm or fulfil himself in any way in this kind of work. He is not ‘at home’, as 
Marx puts it, in his work'.5 Marx writes of these and other alienations, that 
political economy hides them, ‘by not considering the immediate relationship 
between the worker...and production’/ For Marx, man should be his own 
creator, developing himself by transforming nature; but in capitalist society the 
product of his labour, properly his own, has become set over against him, as if an 
independent object. This objectification allows for the appropriation of the 
products of labour in the form of private property. Marx’s solution to the 
problem of alienation, described in the second section of the manuscripts, is 
communism. He describes this as ‘the positive abolition of private property and 
thus of human self-alienation and therefore the real reappropriation of the human 
essence by and for man’.5
3 Karl Marx, Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) 
p. 77.
" Ibid. p. 78.
3 Ibid. p. 80.
® Ibid. p. 79.
' Ibid. p. 89.
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By the time he and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) wrote The German Ideology
(1846), Marx had abandoned the concept of ‘the human essence’, which he had
taken from Feuerbach, and was concerned to distinguish his ‘materialist
conception of history’ from Feuerbach’s ‘objective’ mode of materialism.8 The
first premises of this conception, Marx and Engels write, are not abstractions
from concrete existence but ‘real individuals, their activity and the material
conditions under which they live’.9 The first fact of history is ‘the physical
organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of
nature’.10 Men become men, according to Marx and Engels, by producing their
means of subsistence, or ‘indirectly producing their actual material life’.11 The
way in which they are able to do this depends upon the natural resources at their
disposal and on the way in which they organise themselves. Marx and Engels
write, ‘The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions
determining their production’.12 After a brief history of the development of
social forms, Marx and Engels conclude:
The fact is...that definite individuals who are productively active in a 
definite way enter into these definite social and political relations.13
Social and political structure, for Marx and Engels, is determined by the sum of 
production relations in a society. Ideas are produced in the same way. Marx and 
Engels write:
Men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, 
alter, along with this, their real existence, their thinking and the products
8 See ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ I, in ibid. p. 156.
9 Ibid. p. 160.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. p. 161.
13 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. Lewis S. 
Feuer (New York and London: Doubleday, 1989 p. 246.
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of their tTinking...Lifr is not determined by consciousness but 
consciousness by life."5
This is the basis of Marx’s and Engels’ ‘materialist conception of history’, 
according to which historical analysis must first establish the history of the 
production relations of a given society, and then demonstrate how its various 
forms of consciousness - religion, philosophy, art and so on - have developed 
from those production relations.14 5
The point of this kind of history is to recognise that, as Marx and Engels write 
in the Communist Manifesto (1848), ‘The history of all hitherto existing society 
is the history of class stmugles’.16 In the Manifesto, drawn up as an embodiment 
of the ideas of the Communist League, Marx and Engels give a brief history of 
social forms since the feudalism of the Middle Ages, and describe the present 
opposition of the bourgeois and proletarian classes. Engels adds this note to the 
1888 English edition:
By ‘bourgeoisie’ is meant the class of modem capitalists, owners of the 
means of social production and employers of wage labour. By 
‘proletariat’, the class of modern wage labourers who, having no means 
of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour power in 
order to live.17
The bourgeois class, Marx and Engels write, has revolutionised the feudal means 
of production, to mankind’s immense potential benefit. They write, ‘The 
bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more 
massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations 
together’. 18 Unlike previous dominant classes, Marx and Engels continue, the
14 Ibid. p. 247.
15 Ibid. p. 257.
16 Ibid. p. 7.
17 Ibid. The term ‘bourgeois’ originally applied to tlie middle class of citizens in a French city or 
burgli, neither peasants nor gentry. Tlie tenn ‘proletarian’ comes from tlie Lathi proletaHus, a 
member of tlie lowest class of Roman citizen, who contributed only his offspring (proles) to tlie 
state.
18 Ibid. p. 12.
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bourgeoisie needs constantly to revolutionise its own means of production. 
Greater productivity and expanding markets are constant necessities for the 
industrial merchant class to maintain its profits. Where one or the other cannot 
immediately be produced, bourgeois profits are endangered. Marx and Engels 
write, ‘The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the 
wealth created by them’. 19 They compare the class to a sorcerer no longer able to 
control the spells he has called up. Most significantly, in Marx and Engels’ view, 
the bourgeoisie has called into existence the proletarian class, ‘who live only so 
long as they find work and who work only so long as their labour increases 
capital’20 Enslaved at work by industrial machinery and by the bourgeois 
manufacturer, whose ownership of the means of production is legalised by the 
state, the industrial labourer becomes a pauper, totally dependent for his means
of subsistence on the fluctuations of the market to which his labour contributes.
As Marx and Engels put it, the bourgeoisie is ‘incompetent to assure an existence 
to its slave within his slavvry’.21 The aim of the Communists is to organise the 
proletariat into a class in order to abolish the bourgeois system of property- 
relations and to make common property the capital that is in fact, although not 
by law, already common property. They intend to abolish ‘the miserable 
character of this [bourgeois] appropriation [of the products of labour] under 
which the labourer lives merely to increase capital’, and to bring about ‘an 
association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all’.22 This revolution will take place by means of a seizure of 
political power by the proletariat. For Marx and Engels, the bourgeois mode of
19 Ibid. p. 13.
20 Ibid. p. 14.
Ibid. p. 19.
22 Ibid. pp. 22, 29.
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production has both necessitated such a revolution and made it possible. As
Marx puts it in Capital (1867), it is a question of ‘[shortening].. .the birth pangs' 
of the natural development of society.23
2. Louis Althusser
After Marx's death, Engels' interpretation of his thought determined the 
orthodoxy of European socialist parties until the First World War. He argued that 
the universe was governed by objective and predictable dialectical laws, and that 
historical materialism was the law governing society.24 In 1923, Georg Lukacs' 
History and Class Consciousness revived the Hegelian dimension of Marxism, 
arguing that reality can only be understood as a developing totality, and that only 
a total subject can so understand it, namely the proletariat as a class. Revolution 
is the stage in this process by which the proletariat transcends its alienated state 
and becomes both the subject and object of hissory.25 This kind of Hegelian 
Marxism was criticised both by the Frankfurt school of Critical Theory and by 
Louis Althusser (1918-1990). Althusser saw himself as returning to an 
authentically Marxist philosophy. His abiding question was in what precisely 
this consists. The answer, he thought, could not be found by simply reading 
Marxist philosophy out of Marx. This was firstly because Marx had laid down 
only the cornerstones of the science of historical materialism, and secondly 
because his early works were written in terms of the ideology of humanism26
23 Marx, Selected Writings-). 417.
24 See Alex Callinicos. Marxism and Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983) pp. 61-95.
25 See David McLellan, Marxism AfterMatx: An Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1979) pp. 
157-164.
26 Louis Althusser, For Marx, tr. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1969) pp. 30-31.
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This is the first premise of Althusser’s Marxism, that Marx’s early humanist 
works are not authentically Marxist. Moreover, even in his later works, 
ideological concepts and theoretical weaknesses still survive. In order to specify 
the nature of Marxist science, according to Althusser, it is necessary to read 
Marx critically.
In Reading Capital (1965), Althusser finds the example, indeed the discovery,
of this kind of reading in Marx’s Capital. The readings of Smith, Ricardo and
others that Marx offers there, Althusser writes, ‘involve two radically different
reading principles’.27 28They could be called ‘double’ readings. On one hand,
Marx reads previous economists’ discourse through his own discourse, balancing
what Smith (for example) saw and what he did not see. Although certain facts
were potentially obvious, Smith simply failed to see them, and Marx points them
out. On the other hand, Marx’s reading often concludes that ‘what classical
political economy does not see is not what it does not see, it is what it sees’
Smith, on this reading, has not simply failed to see a certain socio-economic fact
but, having seen it, he has not understood it. As Althusser writes, ‘the oversight
no longer concerns the object...but the sight itself 29 In order to explain this
integral relation of vision and non-vision, Althusser refers us to one of Marx’s
readings of classical economy concerning the value of labour. Marx writes:
The result the analysis led to... was not a resolution of the problem as it 
emerged at the beginning, but a complete change in the terms of the 
problem.
He points out that the classical text is silent about the very question it has asked. 
It answers the question (correctly enough) of the value of labour-power, but it
27 Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar. Reading Capital, tr. Ben Brewster (London: Verso. 1970) 
p. 18.
28 Ibid. p. 121.
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presents this answer as if it were the answer to the question of the value of
labour, which it is not.30 Without knowing it, political economy has produced a
new question. Marx’s reading has brought out that what political economy has
missed is not a pre-existent object but an object which it has itself produced in
the process of its inquiry. This is the relation of sight and oversight in Marx’s
reading, and it leads Althusser to conclude:
We must completely reorganise the idea we have of knowledge, we must 
abandon the mirror myths of immediate vision... and conceive knowledge 
as a production.31 32
Marx’s reading leads to the emergence of what Althusser calls a new 
‘problematic’. By this he means a conceptual system in which problems can be 
raised, ‘the system of questions commanding the answers given’ by a 
discourse.55 A problematic is
the horizon of a definite theoretical structure...wTlcT constitutes.. .the 
absolute determinations of the forms in which all problems must be 
posed 33
Marx has perceived that a new object (labour-power), which is invisible in the 
problematic of the existing theory (political economy), is overlooked by that 
theory. The object is not outside the field of vision of the theory; it is right in 
front of its eyes, as it were. It is an object that cannot be registered in the terms 
of the theory’s problematic. Political economy can no more see labour-power 
than one could see a sound. In order describe this object, an entirely new set of 
terms is necessary. Marx’s ‘informed gaze’ has hypothesised this new set of 
terms, in what Althusser calls a ‘symptomatic reading’.34 By this he means that
30 For Marx’s distinction between labour and labour-power see Capital Vol. I, Part II, Chapter V, 
in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works Vol. 35 (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
1996) pp. 166-177.
31 Altliusser and Balibar, op. cit. p. 24.
32 Altliusser. For Marx p. 67.
33 Altliusser and Balibar. Reading Capital p. 25.
34 I^^<d p. 28.
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Marx managed to read the illegible in Smith, by measuring the 
problematic initially visible in his writings against the invisible 
problematic contained in the paradox of an answer that does not 
correspond to any question posed.35
Just as Freud detected the unconscious determinants of a symptom in the 
symptom itself, so Marx detected the problematic of which his object-text was 
unconscious in the lacunae of its own problematic. Althusser calls this kind of 
analysis an ‘epistemological break'.
He argues that this kind of break begins in Marx's work in 1845, when, in The
German Ideology, he abandons the humanist view in which history and politics
are based on an ‘essence of man', or human nature. In For Marx (1965),
Althusser argues that in 1845 Marx broke from his early humanism and opened
up the new problematic of historical materialism. In this view, history and
politics are based on the concepts of social formation, forces and relations of
production, superstructure and final determination by the economy. 36 Marx
replaces his previously central concepts of the subject and of essence with a
‘theory of the different specific levels of human practice'.37 38he subject of
history is no longer the individual but a society. These societies do not have
essences (as in Hegel's thought), but are determined by a specific complexity. A
social formation is made up of a series of distinct levels, the economic, the
political, the ideological and the scientific levels, each of which constitutes a
‘practice'. By a practice Althusser means
any process of transformation of a determinate given raw material into a 
determinate product, a transformation effected by a determinate human 
labour, using determinate means (of ‘production')^
35 Ibid.
36 Althusser, For Marx p. 227.
37 Ibid. p. 229.
38 Ibid. p. 167.
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The social formation, which is the ‘subject’ of history, is thus a complex totality 
of relatively autonomous but mutually effective processes of production. For 
Althusser, establishing these concepts as a framework within which to ask 
questions was Marx’s ‘scientific discovery’.
This discovery means that the specificity of Marxist philosophy is the 
conception of knowledge as the production of its object. Althusser calls this 
knowledge ‘science’, in opposition to the empiricist use of the term to denote the 
vision of pre-existent objects. A science arises from an ideology, of which it is 
the science. In ‘Marxism and Humanism’ (1963) Althusser defines ideology as a 
system of representations that imposes a structure on most people, ‘not at all as a 
form of consciousness, but as an object of their ‘world’ - as their ‘world’ 
itself .39 40 Ideology is the ‘lived’ relationship between people and the world, that 
is, people’s Active representation to themselves of their real relation to the social 
formation. This representation Althusser calls ‘imaginary’, by which he means 
that it expresses some kind of will, or reason to invest in the misrepresentation. 
In ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ (1969), he emphasises that the 
essence of ideology is that it ‘hails or interpellates individuals as subjects’.41 It is 
a specific kind of misrepresentation of individuals’ relation to the reality of the 
social formation, according to which they are autonomous subjects, stable, 
complete and the origin of their thoughts and actions, whereas in fact they are- 
elements of the complex totality of the sum of social practices. He also 
emphasises the role of national institutions in the reproduction of ideological
39 Ibid. p. 227.
"0 Ibid. p. 233.
41 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophv and Other Essays, tr. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 
0970) p. 160.
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formations.^ I. his ‘Letter on Art’ (1966), Althusser sees the cognitive function 
of art to be neither scientific nor ideological, but as it were midway between the 
two. He writes, ‘I do not rank real art among the ideologies...The peculiarity of 
art is to “make us srr”...something which alludes to reality’.42 3 A novel, for 
example, cannot give us a scientific knowledge of reality. It cannot describe the 
contradictory relation to reality of the ideology in which it is written. 
Nevertheless, it cam make us ‘see’ that ideology. For Althusser, although it 
produces no scientific knowledge of a given ideology, art can mrNeutTrlrss 
represent such an ideology as a lived experience.
3. Pien-e 3^01^67
In his ‘Letter on Art’, Althusser wrote that in order to answer the question of 
art’s relation to knowledge it was necessary to produce a scientific knowledge of 
art44 45 46His student Pierre Mache'ey attempts such a production in his book A 
Theory of Literary Production (1966). He begins by asserting with Althusser that 
‘knowledge is not the discovery of a latent meaning, forgotten or concealed. It is 
something newly raised up, an addition to the reality from which it begins’^ 
Literary criticism, therefore, must have an object that is a product of its activity. 
Macherey writes, ‘Literary criticism is neither the imitation nor the facsimile of 
its objects; it maintains a certain separation or distance between [its] knowledge 
and its object’.^ tt is a discourse of another order than its object, literature, and
42 Ibid. pp. 136-160.
43 Ibid. pp. 203-204.
44 Ibid. p. 206.
45 Pierre Macherey, J Theory of Literary Production, tr. Geoffrey Wall (London and New York; 
Routledge, 1978) p. 6.
46 Ibid. p. 7.
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the distance between the two allows the one to produce a knowledge of the other. 
In order for criticism to do this, Macherey writes, it must reject a series of 
fallacies. Firstly, it must reject the ‘empiricist fallacy’, which treats the work as 
‘factually given, spontaneously isolated for inspection’47 In this kind of 
criticism, the literary work is treated as a pre-existent object, which criticism 
simply describes, tracing the structure of its composition and effect. Viewed this 
way, Macherey writes, the literary work can only be consumed, or ‘move out 
from the provisional container of the book into the minds of possible readers’.48 
No knowledge is produced. The second error to avoid, he continues, is the 
‘normative fallacy’, which judges a work by the standard of a kind of ideal 
model of itself. This type of criticism treats the work as if it ‘should be other 
than it is; its only reality is its relationship to the model which was the very 
condition of its elaboration’.49 It shifts the empirical fallacy (that the object of 
knowledge precedes its activity) to the ideal plane of the work ‘as it ought to be’. 
The ‘interpretive’ fallacy, Macherey continues, replaces the work not with its 
ideal form but with its ‘meaning’. ‘It presupposes the active presence of a single 
meaning around which the work is diversely articulated’.50 It is a ‘purifying 
repetition’, which repeats the essence of the work without its literary clothing.51
To be a science in Althusser’s sense, or to produce its cognitive object, 
Macherey writes that criticism ‘must go beyond the work and explain it, must 
say what it does not and could not say’?2 This means that:
47
48
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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52 Ibid. p.
13.
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the postulated unity of the work which...has always haunted the 
enterprise of criticism, must now be denounced: the work is not created 
by an intention.. .it is produced under certain conditions.53
Rather than taking a literary work to be a given object, perhaps with an ideal 
form and an essence, Macherey proposes to treat it as disparate and 
contradictory. He stresses the ‘determinate insufficiency’ by which ‘the book is 
not the extension of a meaning; it is generated from the incompatibility of 
several meanings’.54 This incompatibility of meanings ‘reveals the inscription of 
an otherness in the work, through which it maintains a relationship with that 
which it is not, that which happens at its margins’.55 56This is the new object 
produced by the science of criticism, as Macherey conceives it, the relation of a 
text to what it does not say. He writes in his essay on structuralism, ‘The work 
exists above all by its determinate absences, by what it does not say, in its 
relation to what it is not’% The relation of a text to its silences, for Macherey, is 
an index of the text’s conditions of production. A work is produced within a 
specific ideological formation, and that ideology provides both the raw materials 
and the methods for its production. The text’s silences are not accidental, but are 
the specific result of the nature of the ideology from which the text is produced. 
The relation between the text’s utterances and its silences is determined by the 
ideology of which the text is a product. More precisely, they are determined by 
the contradictions within that ideology. When thought through or pressed to its 
logical conclusions, it is clear that an ideology does not accurately represent 
reality. For Macherey, a literary work displays this in its internal silences and 
structural conflicts. The work accurately represents an ideology as an apparently
53 Ibid. p. 78.
54 Ibid. pp. 79-80.
55 Ibid. p. 80.
56 Ibid. p. 054.
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unified or coherent discourse that is on closer inspection full of disparities and
incoherence.
In the essay co-authored with Etienne Balibar, ‘On Literature as an Ideological 
Form: Some Marxist Hypotheses’ (1974), Machet^y considers the position of 
literature within what Althusser had called Ideological State Apparatuses. 
Whereas Macherey’s previous work had focused on the literary text’s production 
of ideology, Macherey and Balibar now consider literature as am ideological 
practice in itself. They analyse literature as a concept, arguing that it denotes a 
specific linguistic practice, inserted in the educational apparatus, which 
contributes to the reproduction of bourgeois ideology. The French educational 
system is divided into two types of school, ‘primary-vocational’ \primaire- 
professione] and ‘secondary-higher’ \secondaire-superieiir]. In these schools, 
‘basic French’ [frangais elementaire] and ‘literary French’ [frangais litteraire] 
are taught respectively.57 ‘Literary’ French is constituted by this educational 
system as a special kind of language written in the common language. The 
concept of a language at once common and basic is a product of bourgeois 
ideology. Just as bourgeois ideology cloaks a system of privilege in am 
appearance of equality, so some speak a ‘better’ language, though all speak the 
same language. Literary language dramatises the contradiction in this ideology, 
since it is a special kind of language written within the common language. The 
education system is based on the same ideological contradiction: education for 
all, but better for some than for others. For Mach^ey and Balibar, the concept of 
literature and the education system mutually reinforce each other as means of 
reproducing this bourgeois ideology. They analyse the ways in which literary
57 Terry Eagleton and Drew Milne, eds., Marxist Literary Theory: A Reader (Oxford and 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996) p. 281.
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texts constrain individuals to treat them as ‘literature’. Those uneducated in 
literary French find in it ‘the confirmation of their inferiority’, that their ‘basic’ 
discourse is ‘inadequate for the expression of complex ideas and feelings’.
Macherey and Balibar conclude, ‘The literary text is the agent for the
reproduction of ideology in its ensemble’.58 9
4/TerrvlEagetm
Macherey’s Althusserian theory of literary criticism as the production of 
knowledge of the text’s relation to ideology was taken up and developed in the 
early work of the Oxford critic Terry Eagleton (b. 1943), who played a 
significant role in making continental literary theory familiar in the British 
academy during the 1970s. In his first theoretical work Criticism and Ideology 
(1976), Eagleton develops Macherey’s project of describing the cognitive 
function of literary criticism in Athusserian terms. Eagleton writes that if 
criticism is to be scientific, it must ‘show the text as it cannot know 
itself,...manifest those conditions of making...about which it is necessarily 
silent’60 He elaborates a series of categories by which a materialist criticism 
could produce this cognitive object. Firstly, it could attend to the ‘general mode 
of production’, that is, the sum of a society’s productive forces and relations, in 
which one is normally dominant. Secondly, it could attend to the ‘literary mode 
of production’, which refers to the complex of ways in which literature is 
produced in a given society, of which one again will normally be dominant.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. p. 292.
Terry Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory (London and New 
York: Verso. 1976) p. 43.
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Thirdly, it should analyse ‘general ideology', which Eagleton defines as the set 
of discourses by which individuals' lived relations to social reality are distorted 
in order to perpetuate the dominant class-relations. Fourthly it should take 
account of ‘authorial ideology', that is, an author's specific position vis-a-vis 
general ideology, and fifthly ‘aesthetic ideology', that is, the subset of general 
ideology that deals with literary values, devices, critical norms and methods, the 
meaning of aesthetic experience and so on61 *A given literary text, Eagleton 
writes, can be seen as the ‘product of a specific overdetermined conjuncture' of 
these elements^
Following Macherey, Eagleton writes that the text produces ideology, that is, 
transforms its raw materials into a new object incommensurate with those 
materials.63 This production ‘so constitutes [an] ideology as to reveal something 
of its relations to history’^4 Eagleton conceives ideology as a production of 
historical reality, and so calls a text ‘ideology to the second power’.65 66The text is 
a product of a product. Its immediate object or raw material is not historical 
reality but the ideological production of that reality. Reality is present in the text, 
for Eagleton, through its distorted presence in ideology. ‘History...‘enters’ the 
text...but it enters it precisely as ideology, as a presence determined and 
distorted by its measurable absences'.^ As Eagleton puts it, ‘The imaginary 
London of Bleak House...signifies, not “Victorian England” as such, but certain 
of Victorian England's ways of signifying itself 67 The presence of history in the 
text is thus apparent only to criticism. Criticism can see in the text's production
61 Ibid. pp. 45, 58, 60.
6 Ibid. p. 63.
63 Ibid. p. 68.
64 Ibid. p. 69.
65 Ibid. p. 70.
66 Ibid. p. 72.
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of ideology something of the relation of that ideology to the real histoi^y of which
it is a production. Eagleton writes, ‘The text, through its formal devices,
establishes a transformative relation between itself and ideology which allows us
to perceive the usually concealed contours of the ideology from which it
emerges’/8 He criticises Althusser’s and Macherey’s formulations of this
position insofar as they do not make clear that there is an aesthetic ideology as
well as the ideology which constitutes the text’s raw ^^a^rial.67 68 9 * *That is to say
that the forms by which the text produces ideology are themselves ideologically
determined. Some literary forms and devices are particularly susceptible to the
representation of certain ideological messages, such as narrative to an ideology
of individual progress. Eagleton writes, ‘The form of the ideological
content.. .has a generally determining effect on the form of the text’. Criticism,
for Eagleton, must study the mutual interaction of ideology and aesthetic form in
the text. This interaction appears as a process of conflicts produced, resolved and
reproduced in the text;.7* Eagleton concludes:
In yielding up to criticism the ideologically determined conventionality 
of its modes of constructing sense, the text at the same time obliquely 
illuminates the relation of that ideology to real history.72
Eagleton attempts to elaborate a Marxist account of aesthetic value, that is, of 
the apparently qualitative distinction between literary works. Thinking of Marx’s 
analyses of value in Capital, he writes that value is always transitive or
67 Ibid. p. 77.
68 Ibid. p. 82.
69 Ibid. p. 84.
0 Ibid. p. 85. James H. Kavanagh rightly points out tliat, in this kind of formulation, Eagleton
‘resurrects [tlie] form-content problematic.. .extending rather than superseding Macherey’s 
argument’. ‘Marxism’s Altliusser; Toward a Politics of Literary Theorv’, Diacritics 12 (1982) p. 
40-
'l Eagleton, op. cit. pp. 88-89.
72 Ibid. p. 101.
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relational, that it is, in short, ‘exchange-value’.73 74Literary value is produced, 
Eagleton writes, in the consumptional act of reading. He asserts, ‘The literary 
text is always the text-for-ideology, selected, deemed readable and deciphered by 
certain ideologically governed conventions of critical receptivity’. He writes 
that the text ‘presses its own modes of producibility upon the recipient’.75 76By this 
he means that a text offers itself to a series of possible readings determined by 
the reader’s specific insertion into an ideological formation. The value-relation, 
for Eagleton, lies in the relation between the text’s production of an ideology and 
the reader’s position within an ideology. The aesthetic constitutes the mode by 
which the work produces ideology, and in doing so, makes visible ideology’s 
silences with regard to real history. For Eagleton, the perceptibility of an 
ideology’s relation to reality in the work to a reader is the locus of its value. A 
literary work, that is, is valuable according to the clarity with which it presents 
the relation of the ideology it produces to the history of which that ideology is a 
production.
Eagleton was taken to task by Marxist critics for his attempt to defend the 
canon of literature whose value his opponents saw as determined ultimately by 
bourgeois criteria. He himself later noted the ‘residual academicism’ of the 
work, and in later work, such as The Function of Criticism (1984), was more 
concerned with ‘relevance of cultural studies to revolutionary political 
practice’.77 In The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990), he analyses the history of 
aesthetic thought in relation to its social and political determinants and
3 Ibid. p. 167. See Capital Vol. I, Part I, Chapter I, Section 3, in Marx and Engels, Collected 
Works Vol. 35 pp. 57-79.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. p. 178.
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consequences. He argues that the aesthetic is an ‘eminently contradictory
phenomenon’ with respect to its determination by the class-struggle.77 8 79On one
hand the concept is essentially involved with the dominant ideology of modern
class society, contributing to its reproduction. On the other, it is both a challenge
and an alternative to that bourgeois ideology. Eagleton writes:
The aesthetic is at once... the very secret prototype of human subjectivity
in early capitalist society, and a vision of human energies as radical ends
in themselves...If it offers a generous utopian image of reconciliation
between men and women at present divided from one another, it also
blocks and mystifies the real political movement towards such historical 
• 79community.
The concept of the aesthetic originates in Alexander Baumgarten’s Aestheticci 
(1750), where aesthetics is defined as an inferior analogue of logic at the level of 
the senses. It respects the particularity of sensible entities whilst ordering them 
as reason orders conceptual data. Eagleton relates this definition to the 
Enlightenment ideology of the subject. In Rousseau’s thought, the ideal citizen 
‘retains his unique individuality, but... in the form of a disinterested commitment 
to a common well-being’.80 This fusion of general and particular, Eagleton 
writes, ‘resembles the very form of the aesthetic artefact’, in which each 
autonomous part embodies the law of the whole.81 This means that the concept 
of the aesthetic can be seen as an emancipatory force. The aesthetic object 
displays the individuality of each of its elements at the same as each embodies 
the law of the whole, and so can be seen to represent a ‘community of 
subjects...each safeguarded in its unique particularity while bound at the same
77 James H. Kavanagh and Thomas E. Lewis, ‘Interview: Terry Eagleton’, Diacritics 12 (1982) p. 
54.
78 Terry Eagleton. The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell. 1990) p. 3.
79 Ibid. p. 9.
80 Ibid. p. 25.
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time into social harmony’ ,82 On the other hand, the aesthetic can function as a 
means of ‘inserting social power more deeply into the bodies of those it 
subjugates’. Aesthetics applies the concept of law to the domain of sensible 
objects, where it had previously had no place. This can be seen as a contribution 
to an ideology that legitimates the subjection of material human existence to a 
totalising law.8? Eagleton traces the dual political function of the aesthetic from 
the Enlightenment through Marxist thought to postmodern theory. The latter, for 
Eagleton, represents on one hand ‘the latest iconoclastic upsurge of the avant 
garde’, confounding hierarchical thought and representation, and refusing the 
closure of ideology. On the other hand, it perpetuates late capitalism’s 
‘consumerist hedonism and philistine anti-historicism’, abandoning the 
revolutionary concepts of truth, commitment and histoyy.8* For Eagleton, this 
contradiction is a result of that between capitalist economy and bourgeois 
culture, the latter valuing individuality and distinction whilst the former effaces 
them in the commodity form?.
5. Fredric Jameson
Along with Eagleton, one of the most influential Marxist critics writing in 
English is Fredric Jameson (b. 1934), who teaches comparative literature at 
Duke Umierrsity, Unlike Macherey and Eagleton, Jameson has always 
maintained an allegiance to Hegelian Marxism, with its dialectical categories and 
historical periodisation. His work could best be described as a synthesis of this
82 ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
p. 28.
p. 373. 
pp. 372-377.
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tradition with Althusserian structuralism. In The Political Unconscious (1981),
Jameson devises a narratology in these syncretic terms. He begins with the 
axiom that political interpretation is not one among many methods of literary 
criticism but ‘the absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation’.86 For 
Jameson, only the Marxist philosophy of history can both give a proper account 
of the particularity of the cultural past and interpret its message in an alien 
present.87 88It does so by means of the historical narrative of class-struggle. This 
narrative is not to be taken as the ‘meaning’ of a literary narrative, however.
Jameson aims at a hermeneutics that asks not what a text means but how it
works. He uses Althusser’s concept of structural causality, that is, of the mutual 
effect of the various practices that constitute a social formation, to answer this 
question. Althusser distinguished this concept of causality from ‘mechanical 
causality’, the Newtonian model of cause and effect, and from ‘expressive 
causality’, the Hegelian model in which phenomena are caused by their essence, 
in order to describe a cause immanent in its effects. As Jameson writes, the 
concept of structural causality implies ‘an absent cause...nowhere empirically 
present as an nlemenS’. It is in this way, he asserts, that the historical narrative 
of class-struggle is related to individual literary narratives.
In Althusserian literary criticism, Jameson finds the kind of interpretation that 
interrogates works in terms of their conditions of possibility. For Jameson, the 
Marxist narrative provides the means fully to elaborate the semantic conditions 
of possibility of a work.66 He proposes that the elements of a text can be seen in 
terms of their production in three ‘semantic horizons’, derived from the Marxist
M Fredric Jameson. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London: 
Methuen. 1981) p. 1T.
87 Ibid. p. 19.
88 Ibid.
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narrative of history. The first of these horizons is that of ‘political history", or the 
sequence of events through time. In this horizon the text is seen, as by the earlier 
Macherey and Eagleton, as the formal resolution of social contradictions.®0 The 
second horizon is that of ‘society’, conceived as the mutual opposition of 
antagonistic classes. In this horizon the object of interpretation is no longer the 
individual text but ‘the great collective and class discourses of which a text is 
little more than an individual parole or utterance’.89 90 91 92 93The text is seen as a unit of 
class-discourse, engaged in confrontation with an antagonistic class-discourse. 
Jameson calls this kind of semantic unit an ‘ideologeme’.99 The third horizon is 
that of the ‘mode of production’, or form of social organisation. As these forms 
develop throughout history traces of past forms and anticipations of future forms 
coexist at any given moment. In this semantic horizon, the text is seen in terms 
of these forms of social organisation, as a product of the sign-systems they 
generate. Jameson calls the semantic object at this level of analysis the ‘ideology 
of form’.99
By interpreting a text in terms of its production at these semantic levels, the 
‘political unconscious’ of a text, that is, its place in the history of the class- 
struggle, can be discovered, according to Jameson. The surface unity of the text, 
which ‘represses’ this unconscious narrative, he describes by means of the 
concept of the ‘semiotic rectangle’ of ideology.94 Jameson takes this concept 
from the structural semantics of A.J. Greimas (b. 1917). According to Greimas, 
the elementary structure of meaning can be represented in the form of a
89 Ibid. p. 75.
90 Ibid. p. 77.
91 Ibid. p. 76.
92 Ibid. p. 87.
93 Ibid. p. 98.
94 Ibid. pp. 47-49, 82-83.
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rectangle, whose corners constitute (1) a term in a semiotic system, which can be 
understood only in reference to (2) its opposite and (3) its negative, which also 
has (4) an opposite. The term ‘white’, that is to say, takes on meaning by virtue 
of its contrast with its opposite ‘black’, its negative ‘not-white’, and the opposite 
of that negative ‘not-black’.?? For Jameson this semantic model describes the 
closed and static discourse of ideolooy?6 In a series of chapters on Balzac, 
Gissing and Conrad, he describes the repression of the political unconscious in a 
text by pointing out the inconsistencies in the structure of this ideological 
rectangle by which the text is superficially organised.
In Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), Jameson 
analyses postmodernism as the cultural effect of ‘late’ capitalism. He takes the 
concept of late capitalism from Ernest Mandei who, in his book of that name, 
argues that there have been three phases in the history of capital, corresponding 
to three phases in the history of technology. The first ‘market’ stage of 
capitalism (1840s-1890s), analysed by Marx, was characterised by steam power. 
It grew with the development of electric power into the ‘monopoly’ or 
‘imperialist’ stage (1890s-1940s), analysed by Lenin. The ‘multinational’ or late 
stage, in which we find ourselves at present, began in the 1950s with the 
production of electronic and nuclear powee.r7 For Jameson, it is characterised by 
the ‘vision of a world capitalist system’, in the form of multinational businesses, 
international division of labour, new forms of international banking, media 
inteurrlatiomsTip and computers?? Postmodernism is the ‘cultural dominant’ of
95 See A.J. Greimas and Francois Rastier, ‘The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints’, Yale French 
Studies M (1969) pp. 86-105.
96 Jameson, The Political Unconscious pp. 47-49.
97 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logie of Late Capitalism (London and New 
York; Verso. 1991) p. 35.
98 Ibid. p. xix.
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late capitalism, in which ‘aesthetic production has become integrated into 
commodity production generally’.99 Its primary formal feature, Jameson writes, 
is ‘a new kind of flatness or depthlessness’.100 101 102 103 104In the work of Andy Warhol, for 
example, even human subjects are explicitly commodified, existing primarily at 
the level of their own image. This commodified depthlessness is a characteristic 
not only of postmodern art and architecture, for Jameson, but also of postmodern 
theory, in which ‘depth’ models (for example the older existential contrast 
between authentic and inauthentic) are replaced with the ‘multiple surfaces’ of 
textuality, play, discourse, and so on. The characteristic form of postmodern 
culture Jameson calls ‘pastiche’, whose element is the ‘identical copy for which 
no original has ever existed’.1®1 The essence of postmodern representation, for 
Jameson, is its new constitution of space. Postmodern space, he writes, is a 
‘hyperspace’, in which the individual body can no longer ‘organise its immediate 
surroundings perceptually...[or] map its positions in a mappable external 
world’.*® Postmodern architecture, fiction, video and so on, all describe spaces 
in which we cannot locate ourselves and whose topology defeats our perceptual 
abilities. Jameson sees this as a symbol of ‘the incapacity of our minds... to map 
the great global multinational and decentred communicational network in which 
we find ourselves caught as individual subjects’.^ The ‘new global space’ 
opened by the networks of multinational capital, he writes, is ‘the “moment of 
truth” of postmodernism’.*®4 It is not an ideological representation but a 
historical reality of late capitalism.
" Ibid. p. 4.
100 Ibid. p. 9.
101 Ibid. p. 18.
102 Ibid. p. 44.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid. p. 49.
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Though here and there tempted into denunciations of postmodernism’s erosion 
of the possibility of collective action, Jameson writes that the proper mode of 
analysis of this historical formation is not ethical but dialectical, employing a 
method he describes as ‘cognitive mapping’.1®5 This mode of criticism is
intended
to enable a situational representation on the part of the individual subject 
to that vaster and properly unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble 
of society’s structures as a whole.105 06 107 108
In late capitalism, Jameson writes, the conditions of production of a product, 
whether commodity or artefact (and in postmodern culture the distinction 
collapses) are felt to be ‘beyond anything you can imagine’.409 He looks for an 
aesthetics in which multinational conditions of production of late capitalism are 
described, and its subject, insofar as it is possible, thus re-oriented. He writes, 
‘An aesthetic of cognitive mapping is in this sense an integral part of any 
socialist political project’.*08 Postmodernism represents Jameson’s initial attempt 
to broach this aesthetics, to see whether ‘by systematising something that is 
resolutely unsystematic...one couldn’t outflank it and force a historical way at 
least of thinking about that’.1®
(ii) Marxism and Christianity
In order to assess the implications of these diverse theories for Christian
literary theory, I will turn first to their conceptual foundations, and examine
105 Ibid. p. 51.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid. p. 46.
108 Ibid. p. 416.
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some of the relations between Marxism and Christianity. There is a wide 
spectrum of views on this question, since Marxism has meant different things in 
different situations. As David Lyon writes in his article ‘Evaluating Marxism’
(1982%
The perspective of the Soviet believer, working out his years in a labour
camp for the crime of teaching his children from the Bible, is vastly 
different from the perspective of the Argentinian Christian who may see 
in Marxism an understanding the social injustices of his country and the 
possibility of their removal. “0
The Western intellectual may have a third perspective on it as a valuable and 
revealing method of historical interpretation in contrast to more familiar 
rationalist or empirical models. In this section, I will examine some of the most 
significant mutual implications of Marxism and Christianity, and assess to what 
degree Christian criticism can and should use the methods prescribed by Marxist 
literary theories.
1. Marx. Engels and Lenin on Religion
Although Marx was born a Jew, his family converted to Protestantism. Both 
Marx and Engels were Christians in their youth, but by the time they came to 
write even their earliest works they had abandoned religion in its entirety, as a 
phenomenon outdated by science and philosophy. Marx’s earliest view, 
expressed in his doctoral thesis (1841) and early journalism, was that it is an 
irrational submission to authority. In the foreword to his thesis, he identifies the 
task of philosophy with the words of Aeschylus’ Prometheus. Marx writes: * *
109 Ibid. p. 418.
110 Alan Scarfe and Patrick Sooklideo. Christianity and Marxism (Exeter: Paternoster, 1982) p. 
127.
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Philosophy makes no secret of it. The confession of Prometheus - Tn 
simple words, I hate all gods’ - is its own confession... against all 
heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self­
consciousness as the highest divinity.111 112 113
The foreword opposes human self-determination to submission to the external 
authority of religion. During the middle 1840s, German theological thought was 
being transformed by the critical work of Bruno Bauer, David Strauss and 
Ludwig Feuerbach. The last argued in his book The Essence of Christianity 
(1841) that God is a human projection, whom humans have imagined as a being 
possessed of attributes that are properly their own. Marx takes up a position 
influenced by Feuerbach in his Introduction to the Contribution to a Critique of 
HegeTs Philosophy of Right (1844).7?? He writes, ‘Religion is the self­
consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet found himself or 
has already lost himself again’.in He calls religion an inverted consciousness of 
the world, and ‘the fantastic realisation of the human essence because the human 
essence has no true reality’. 114 Religion is both the expression of and the protest 
against real distress, which is what Marx means when he calls it the ‘opium of 
the people’. He writes, ‘To abolish religion as the illusory happiness of the 
people is to demand their real happiness’. 115 Criticism of religion, for Marx, is in 
essence criticism of the social and economic situation from which it arises.
In Capital, Marx reaffirms the point that ‘the religious world is but a reflex of 
the real world’, and finds that Christianity, ‘with its cultus of abstract man’, is 
the most fitting reflex of a society based on commodity production. 116 Once this
1 Marx and Engels, On Religion (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) pp. 14-15.
112 faMforaism and- Christianity (London: Duckworth, 1968), Alisdair MacIntyre argues tliat 
Marxism is the ‘historical successor’ of Christianity because of its use of terms tliat, through 
Feuerbach and Hegel, derive from Christian theology.
113 Marx and Engels. On Religion p. 38.
114lbid.
,l5Ibid.
116 Ibid. p. 117.
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mode of production has been transformed in communist society, Marx writes, so 
will its religious reflection simply disappear. He writes, ‘The religious reflex of 
the real world can...only then finally vanish, when the practical relations of 
everyday life offer to man none but perfectly intelligible and reasonable relations 
with regard to his fellowmen and nature’.117 Eggels takes the same view. He 
writes in Anti-Diihring (1878) that when the socialist transformation of the mode 
of production occurs, so the ‘alien force’ of religion, the reflection of individual 
alienation from the means of production, will also vanish, ‘for the simple reason 
that then there will be nothing left to reflect’. 118 In Dialectics of Nature (1882), 
he asserts that natural science, despite the religion of many its practitioners, is 
increasingly proving the irrelevance of God in explaining the material world.119
For Marx and Engels, religion is an illusory force, an ideology which impedes 
real change. As change occurs, religion, the expression of real misery, will cease 
to be necessary. Lenin’s atheism is more militant. It is this perspective that has 
largely determined Communist party practice. Lenin writes, ‘Every religious 
idea... is unutterable vileness,... “contagion” of the most abominable kind’.120 He 
calls it ‘one of the most odious things on earth’. 121 In his article ‘The Attitude of 
the Worker’s Party Towards Religion’ (1909), he writes, ‘Marxism is 
materialism. As such, it is relentlessly hostile to religion’. 122 Marxism considers 
religions and churches, he writes, as ‘instruments of bourgeois reaction that 
serve to defend exploitation and to befuddle the working class’.123 Lenin
117 Ibid. p. 118.
118 Ibid. p. 129.
119 Ibid. pp. 165-169.
’20 V. I . Lenin ‘Letters to Maxim Gorkv’, Selected Works Vol. XI (London: Lawrence and 
Wisiiart, 1939) p. 675.
121 V.I. Lenin, ‘Leo Tolstoy as the Mirror of the Russian Revolution’, Collected Works Vol. 15 
(London: Lawrence and Wisliart; Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963) p. 205
122 Lenin, Collected Works Vol. 15. p. 405.
123 Ibid. p. 403.
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redefines Marx’s phrase ‘the opium of the people’. Whereas Marx meant that 
religion was a kind of solace for the working class, for Lenin they are drugged 
with it by the external agency of the ruling class. In ‘Socialism and Religion’ 
(1905), he continues, ‘Religion is a sort of spiritual booze in which the slaves of 
capital drown their human image, their demand for a life more or less worthy of 
man’.994 Like Marx, he considers that Marxism must combat religion at its social 
roots, namely ‘the downtrodden condition of the working masses and their 
apparently complete helplessness in the face of the blind forces of capitalism’. 124 25 
Religion is an expression of the justified fear of the proletariat at the 
consequences of market fluctuation. Their party, Lenin writes, must fight its 
obfuscating veils at its roots, the rule of capital. 126 The state should have no ties 
with the church, and religion, although in general a private matter, cannot be 
tolerated in socialist party members, since ‘the ideological struggle is...the affair 
of the whole party, of the whole proletariat’. 127 This was a significant sentiment 
in determining the anti-religious stance of the Soviet governments. Lenin’s 
materialism, however, like that of Engels, means that he is not primarily 
concerned with atheism as a concept. Whilst the socialist party must educate the 
proletariat with anti-religious propaganda, he writes, its first principle is that the 
‘struggle...for the creation of a paradise on earth is more important...than unity 
of proletarian opinion.. .about a paradise in heaven5.128
124 V.I. Lenin, Collected Works Vol. 10 pp. 82-83.
125 Lenin, Collected Works Vol. 14 pp. 404-406.
126 Ibid. p. 406.
127 Lenin, Collected Works Vol. 10 p. 86.
93
2. An Assersmeht ofMaraist Ath^sm
We should think carefully before we assert that these views make Marxism 
incompatible with Christian thought or practice. Marxism has many goals that 
appear to be in accord with those of Christianity, and this relationship needs to 
be accounted for before we reject Marxism as entirely useless to us because of its
atheism.
We should distinguish at least two of the several meanings that can be
assigned to the word ‘Marxism’. Firstly there is Marx’s thought and that of
subsequent thinkers consciously indebted to his thought. Secondly there are the
political and economic systems established in various countries in Marx’s name,
and the thought and practice that occur in those systems. To begin with Marxism
in the first sense, we need to ask whether Marx says anything true about religion,
and a historical answer must be that he does. As the Argentinian theologian Jose
Miguez Bonino writes, in Christians and Marxists (1976):
A Christian, when confronted with this challenge [Marx’s views on
religion] should not hasten to refute it, but should rather ask himself how
he can understand it, what he is being told about himself and his 
• 129community.
The answer to this question, historically speaking, is that the organised churches 
on the whole opposed movements for workers’ rights during the Industrial 
Revolution. The Catholic Church in particular was smarting from the memory of 
the French Revolution, in which the church lost all its sources of income, tens of
thousands of priests and bishops were killed or deported, and religious buildings 
and monuments were destroyed. After the revolution had ended, the Church * *
128 Ibid. p. 87.
129 Jose Miguez Boiiino. Christians and Marxists: The Mutual Challenge to Revolution (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1976) p. 58.
94
sought protection from the monarchy. ‘The very words “liberty”, “equality” and 
“democracy”, because of their association with the French revolution... carried 
threatening connotations’ to the church in the early nineteenth century.130 During 
the 1848 revolutions, Pope Pius IX’s prime minister was assassinated and 
socialists were blamed for his death. The pope had to flee the Papal States, and 
on his return roundly condemned socialism in his ‘Syllabus of Errors’ of 1864. 
The German Protestant Church was similarly conservative, identifying itself with 
the Prussian state, with increased tenacity after the 1848 revolutions. Whilst 
individual Christians spoke out against capitalism and various societies for the 
relief of the poor were founded during the nineteenth century, the official 
churches allied themselves with the European states and remained distant from 
the conditions of the working class. The hierarchy came mainly from the 
aristocracy and the lower clergy from the peasant class, neither of whom had 
significant contact with the difficulties of the urban proletariat.131 On the whole, 
the Church stood against the working classes when they attempted to make 
demands for the improvement of their conditions. Neither is there any doubt of 
Max Weber’s basic thesis that Protestantism and capitalism mutually stimulated 
and reinforced one another, nor of the relation between capitalist colonial 
expansion and the missionary enterprise. Marx’s and Lenin’s account of religion 
as an instrument of the oppressing classes, useless to the workers, was on the 
whole justified with regard to the churches of their time.
Nevertheless, we cannot accept the views of the Marxist authorities as a final 
diagnosis. They commit the fallacy of equating the socio-economic determinants
130 Arthur F. McGovern. Marxism: An American Christian Perspective. (Marvknoll, NY: Orbis, 
1980) p. 91
131 Ibid. p. 93.
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of religious ideas with their truth-content. As Hans Kung writes, in Does God
Exist? (1980):
From the undeniable influence of economic and social factors on religion 
and the idea of God, we can... draw no conclusion about the existence or 
non-existence of God.n9
Because a religion offers comfort to the materially poor, it does not follow that it 
has no truth except for their poverty. On the contrary, it is possible that the 
comfort it offers is based on reality. Clearly this function of religion, and 
particularly of Christianity, which privileges poverty, can be abused, and has 
been. Nevertheless, the ideological abuse of a doctrine is not to be equated with 
its truth-content. With regard to Marx’s early humanist critique, it should be 
pointed out that Christianity is also a humanism. Many have experienced 
Christianity as an enriching and dignifying system. Faith in the love of God and 
in the redeeming action of Christ can enable a person to act more courageously 
and to live more freely. Christianity properly understood is a call to full 
humanity, as contemporary theology is well aware. 132 33 As for religion as an 
imaginary reflex of the real world, Christian morality is misunderstood as merely 
individualistic and other-worldly. On the contrary, it is profoundly committed to 
the real improvement of the real world. This has been most clearly brought out in 
recent decades by the ‘liberation’ theologians, to whose work we now turn.
132 Hans Kung, Does God Exist? An Answer for Today, tr. Edward Quinn (London: Collins. 
1980) p. 245.
133 See ‘Being Cliristian as Being Radically Human', in Hans Kung, On Being a Christian, tr.
Edward Quinn (London: Collins, 1978) pp. 404-602. ,
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3. Liberaaton ThToiagv
An awareness of the Marxist critique of religion should create a greater 
understanding by Christians of their theology and practice, whose purpose is 
greater fidelity to the will of God. The Biblical witness strongly and repeatedly 
insists on the establishment of just social relations, and of the divine imperative 
to effect these relations when they are absent. The imperative of changing unjust 
social relations did not begin with Marx, but has been a concern of Christian 
ethics since its inception. This is the argument of Mexican theologian Jose 
Porfirio Miranda, in his bodk^nc and the Bible (1971). Western anti-Marxism, 
he argues, is a result not so much of Marx’s inconsistencies, real as the latter are, 
but a rejection of ‘all that in which Marx coincides with the Bible’.134
Miranda begins with some basic economic axioms, which he concludes with 
the proposition, ‘Differentiating ownership could not and cannot come to be 
except by means of violence and spoliation’. 135 If one thinks about ownership or 
wealth in the abstract, if one thinks about the essence of these things or what 
they are ‘in themselves’, clearly they are morally inoffensive. This is why 
Miranda calls Greek ontology, which assumes the primacy of being ‘in itself a 
‘philosophy of oppression’.136 Frr, according to Miranda, the ‘essence’ of 
differentiating ownership does not exist; it is an ideological construct masking 
the specific history of such ownership. Since the majority of the population 
would not freely assent to their own disempowerment by the accumulation of 
capital in the hands of the minority, it is clear that they entered into contracts
’34 Jose Porfirio Miranda. Marx and the Bible: A Critique of the Philosophy of Oppression, tr. 
John Eagleson (Maryknoll. NY; Orbis, 1974) p. 252.
135 Ibid. p. 13.
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with this effect either because they had no choice or because ideology made 
them unaware of other possibilities.136 37 Miranda writes that this view is the 
Biblical view. The word translated by ‘almsgiving’ in many passages, sedakah, 
is the Hebrew word for ‘justice’.138 Ths is because ‘almsgiving for the original 
Bible was a restitution that someone makes for something that is not his’.333 The 
Biblical concept of justice, in Miranda’s exegesis, is concerned with the 
elimination of unjust social relations, particularly as represented by 
differentiating ownership, which makes some rich and some poor within the 
same society. The Hebrew verb saphat, ‘to judge’, does not primarily have our 
sense of a neutral or disinterested opinion of an object, he points out, but rather 
one of restoring justice to someone who is in some way deprived of it.140 He 
draws this conclusion from a study of Septuagint translations of the root, a series 
of texts in which the word clearly makes no sense unless so interpreted (e.g. Ps. 
10:18, 72:4) and with reference to the ‘judges’ (sophetim) of Israel in the book of 
that name.1'31 The latter are not once represented exercising a juridical function, 
but as defenders from the oppression of invading peoples. The gospel passages 
against riches, Miranda continues, are a result of the same presupposition, that 
the wealth in question has necessarily been acquired by means of violence and 
injustice. The attribution by St. Luke to the Virgin Mary of the words, ‘He has 
filled the hungry with good things and sent the rich away empty’ (Lk. 1:53), 
would otherwise be incomprehensible.^ Miranda cites an array of patristic 
commentary to suggest that the Church Fathers before Constantine thought the
136 See Emmanuel Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, tr. Alphonso Lingis
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) p. 46.
137 Miranda. Marx and the Bible p. 14.
138 Ibid. p. 15.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid. p. 111.
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same. John Chrysostom, for example, writes of wealth, ‘Its beginning and root 
have necessarily come out of injustice’. St. Jerome writes, ‘All riches come from 
injustice... The rich person is either an unjust person or the heir of one’.141 142 43
Miranda focuses on the prevalence of the theme of ‘interhuman justice’ in the
Old Testament in particular. He cites Jer. 22: 13-16:
‘Woe to him who builds his palace by unrighteousness, 
his upper rooms by injustice,
Making his countrymen work for nothing, 
not paying them for their labour...
[Your father] did what was right and just, 
so all went well with him.
He defended the cause of the poor and needy, 
and so all went well.
Is that not what it means to know me?’ 
declares the LORD.
Miranda expounds, ‘To know Yahweh is to achieve justice for the poor’.144 No 
cause-effect relationship is spoken of here, and Miranda writes that this is not 
because the Bible is unacquainted with those categories (when it means them, it 
uses them), but because they are not intended.145 Knowledge of Yahweh and 
interhuman justice are synonymous, in Miranda’s exegesis, which conclusion he 
finds expressed also in Hosea, Isaiah and Habbakuk (Hos 4:1-2, 6:4-6, Is. 11:1-9, 
Hab. 2). Commenting on the same passage in^4 Theology of Liberation (1971),
Gustavo Gutierrez writes:
To know Yahweh, which in Biblical language is equivalent to saying to 
love Yahweh, is to establish just relations among persons, it is to 
recognise the rights of the poor.146
141 Ibid. pp. 111-137.
142 Ibid. p. 17.
143 J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologia Graeca LXII 562-563; Patrologia Latina XXII 984.
144 Miranda. Marx and the Bible p. 44.
145 Ibid. p. 45.
146 Gustavo Gutierrez, ,4 Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation, tr. Caridadlnda 
and John Eagleson, (London: SCM, 1988) pp. 110-111.
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The reason for the anticultic tradition, or criticism of worship rites, in the Bible, 
is precisely related to this identification, Miranda continues. He cites Amos 5:21-
25 and Isaiah 1: 10-20.
T have more than enough of burnt offerings,
of rams and the fat of fattened animals;
I have no pleasure
in the blood of bulls and lambs and goats...
Learn to do right!
Seek justice,
encourage the oppressed.
Defend the cause of the fatherless
Plead the case of the widow.’ (Is. 1:11, 17)
Miranda condemns the kind of apologetic exegesis of passages like these which 
holds that ‘the prophets do not condemn cultus as such’.147 148Amos and Isaiah are 
quite clearly not demanding justice in addition to cultus, nor recommending 
spiritual reform leading to a genuine religion. Their message is, ‘I do not want 
cultus but rather interhuman justice’, a Miranda writes, ‘The question is not so 
much whether someone is seeking God or not but whether he is seeking him 
where God himself has said that he is’?49
It seems to me that although Miranda may here and there slightly overstate his 
conclusions, he does so only slightly and errs in the Biblical direction. He 
asserts, for example, that God is knowable ‘exclusively’ in the need of the poor 
and accessible ‘only’ in the act of justice, which seems too absolute to 
incorporate the idea of puevhnient grace and to militate against some of the value 
of prayer and of the experience of forgiveness. However, there can be no doubt 
that his exegesis is faithful to the spirit of the Old Testament, much more so than 
any kind of individualistic soteriology. It is quite clear that imteuTuman justice is
the will of Yahweh, and that he can be said to remain unknown to those who do
147 Miranda, Marx and the Bible p. 55.
148 Ibid. p. 56.
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not practise it or allow injustice to continue. We could adduce many other 
Biblical passages in support of this view. In Lev. 25:23, the provenance of the 
Jubilee arrangements is that natural resources cannot be privately owned. 
Yahweh says, ‘The land must not be sold permanently because the land is mine, 
and you are buL.my tenants’. A systematic programme for a just society is 
outlined around the concept of the Jubilee in Lev. 25. In v. 37, Yahweh forbids 
lending money at interest or selling food at a profit to a poor member of the 
community. Dt. 24:14-15 forbids withholding his wages, which is condemned 
again in Jas. 5:4. I refer the reader also to Num. 35:8, Neh. 5, Ps. 52, Prov. 
14:31, 22:22-23, Is. 5:8 and 11:4 for the identification of God with the poor and 
his condemnation of those in political and economic power who deny them 
justice. There is no doubt that Marx’s diagnosis of financial exploitation by the 
powerful, who influence and control the legislature, of the majority of wage­
earning labourers, and his active call for an end both to this exploitation and the 
system which enables it, is anticipated and affirmed by the Bible.
In his book A Theology of Liberation (1971), the Peruvian priest Gustavo 
Gutierrez sets out to elaborate a ‘new way to do theology’ in the context of the 
Latin American social and political situation, where the majority of exploited 
and oppressed peoples are Christians. Ibi 150 The influence of Marxist thought, he 
writes, ‘helps theology to perceive what its efforts. ..receive from the historical 
praxis of humankind, as well as what its own reflection might mean for the 
transformation of the world’. 151 Development is not an adequate response to the 
Latin American situation, he writes; it is necessary rather to attack the roots of
149
150
Ibid. p. 57.
Gutierrez. 4 Theology of Liberation pp. 12. xiv.
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underdevelopment with the process of the liberation of the exploited peoples of
the Third World. This liberation he sees as the ‘salvation of the whole man’,
encompassing both his spiritual and material qualities. 151 52 He finds this kind of
salvation exemplified in the Biblical history of the Exodus. He writes:
The liberation of Israel is a political action. It is the breaking away from a 
situation of despoliation and misery and the beginning of a construction 
of a just and comradely society.153
Living in a situation of slavery (Ex. 1:1-14) and alienated labour (Ex. 5:6-14), 
Israel is called by Yahweh to liberation, from slavery and from the internalised 
consciousness of slavery that it effects in them (Ex. 14:11-12, 16:3), in a 
movement of self-determination Gutierrez compares to creation. 154 The salvation 
brought about in the Exodus, he writes, is the paradigm for Christian soteriology, 
conceived as ‘the movement of human self-generation initiated by the work of 
creation’.15 Addresimg the hermeneutic question as to whether temporal or 
spiritual redemption is the primary meaning of the Exodus and similar Old 
Testament passages concerning political liberation, Gutierrez writes that such a 
dualistic question is ‘foreign to the Biblical mentality’.156 ’or the latter, he goes 
on, salvation is a matter of total fulfilment, of which social and political 
liberation is a partial but real component. The struggle for a just society, 
Gutierrez writes, is ‘a part of salvation history’. 157 In his opinion, the kingdom of 
peace announced by the prophets ‘presupposes the defence of the rights of the 
poor, punishment of the oppressors, a life free from the fear of being enslaved by 
others’. He cites the eschatology of Isaiah 65:21-22:
151 Ibid. p.
152 Ibid. p.
153 Ibid. p.
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‘They will build houses and dwell in them; 
they will plant vineyards and eat their fruit;
No longer will they build houses and others live in them, 
or plant and others eat...
my chosen ones will long enjoy the works of their hands.’
The struggle for a world in which these just relations obtain, for Gutierrez, is a 
participation in the coming of the Kingdom, which, he writes, is ‘incompatible’ 
with social injustice.158
Whilst he emphasises that this theology is not to be taken as universally valid, 
but as the proper response to the specific socio-economic situation of 
contemporary Latin America, Gutierrez’ holistic soteriology seems faithful to the 
spirit of the Bible. He cannot be charged justly with replacing spiritual with 
political redemption nor with identifying the two, for he does neither. 159 He 
redresses the Western emphasis on individual and interior salvation in the 
genuinely Biblical direction of the salvation of the whole person. He reminds us 
that Christian theology cannot dismiss the Marxist programme as a merely this- 
worldly cfmchrm, since temporal liberation plays a real role in Biblical
soteriology.
4. Caabahc Sociaa Thought
Having recognised that in many ways the Bible agrees with Marx on the evil of 
social injustice, on some of the ways in which it is carried out and on the moral 
imperative to eliminate it, we must add that the Marxist programme of action and 
the historical materialism from which it derives cannot be directly identified with
159 This charge is made against certain liberation theologians by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, in tlie 
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s ‘Instruction on Certain Aspects of the
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Christian moral action. Though any non-Marxist reformism is denounced by 
Marxism as in principle involved with bourgeois dominance, a misguided 
attempt to improve a system that is rotten to the core, nevertheless if one does 
not believe with Lenin that truth is equivalent to proletarian consciousness, such 
a case is not in principle self-evident. Without wishing to deny that, in certain 
situations, revolutionary action may be the most pressing course for a Christian 
to pursue, we must nevertheless assert that the Marxist project cannot be 
identified in its totality with Christian ‘praxis’, and that the Marxist concept of 
revolution is not equivalent to Christian eschatology. Plotting this kind of middle 
course between the Biblical concept of justice and historical materialism as a
world-view has been the characteristic effort of the ‘social doctrine’ of the
Catholic magisterium.
This tradition of discussion of the conditions brought about by industrial 
capitalism, as Well as the Marxist proposals for their remedy begins with Pope 
Leo XHI’s encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891), commissioned after a series of 
bishops intervened on behalf of workers’ movements. Leo condemns the 
‘inhumanity’ and ‘unbridled greed’ of industrial employers, adding that a 
‘devouring usury’ has increased the evil of dispossession for the majority. The 
process of production and trade, he writes, has resulted in a situation in which ‘a 
very few...exceedingly rich men have laid a yoke almost of slavery on the 
unnumbered masses of non-owning workers’.60 Although, like Marx, he begins 
with the fact of unequal distribution of wealth, Leo condemns the Marxist 
contention that the root of the problem is private property. His view is that 
Marx’s proposed socialisation of property ‘actually injures the workers’ whom it
“Theology of Liberation’” IV, 3, tr. Vatican, <http://listserv.american.edu./catholic/churcli/ 
vatican/libtheo.asc>.
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is intended to benefit.160 61 He sees private property as a fact of natural law,
according to which the product of labour should belong to the labourer. He
writes, ‘Would justice permit anyone to own and enjoy that upon which another
has toiled?’162 In this of course, he is in agreement with Marx, who writes in the
Communist Manifesto that since private property is already done away with for
nine-tenths of the population, the communists can hardly be reproached for
proposing to take away something that most do not have. Both agree that the
worker should enjoy the product of his labour; Leo finds that ‘socialism’ denies
him even this just hope. On the contrary, it offers him a false hope. Leo writes:
If they promise the poor in their misery a life free from all sorrow and 
vexation..., they...perpetuate a fraud which will ultimately lead to evils 
greater than the present.163
In fact, he continues, the socialisation of property and its administration by the 
state would result simply in another form of slavery for citizens. He writes, ‘The 
equality conjured up by the Socialist imagination would, in reality, be nothing 
but uniform wretchedness and meanness for one and all, without distinction’. 164 
The Catholic magisterium has continued to affirm that in practice communist 
societies often continue to violate the rights of those they came into being to
protect.
Leo sets out a series of proposals for the situation of the workers, which 
include the employer’s duty to pay a just wage, which will be ‘not less than 
enough to support a worker who is thrifty and upright’. 165 The pope adds, as we 
have seen Miranda do, that if a worker is compelled to accept less than this, even
160 Leo XIII: Rerum Novarum, tr. N.C. W.C. (Boston: St. Paul, 1942) no. 6.
161 Ibid. no. 8.
162 Ibid. no. 16.
163 Ibid. no. 27.
564 Ibid. no. 22.
165 Ibid. no. 63.
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if he gives his consent to the contract, he is the victim of unjust force. Leo 
affirms and encourages the right of association.
In his apostolic letter Octagesimo Adveniens (1971), Pope Paul VI affirms the 
duty of Christians to take part in the political organisation of society. This is 
impossible, he writes, if they adhere to doctrinal systems which contradict their 
faith. The pope calls these systems ‘ideologies’, and asserts that a Christian can 
adhere neither to the Marxist nor to the liberal ideologies. This is the first time 
the popes mention Marxism by name, and Paul here objects to its ‘atheistic 
materialism,...its dialectic of violence amd...tTe way it absorbs individual 
freedom in the collectivity’.166 He objects in the same paragraph to laissez-faire 
liberalism, ‘which believes it exalts individual freedom by withdrawing from it 
every limitation, [and] by stimulating through exclusive seeking of interest and 
power’.167 Paul acknowledges that Marxism means different things to different 
people. He distinguishes the practice of class-struggle, single-party government 
in the name of the collective, historical materialism and a dialectical method of 
analysis that combines theory and practice. 168 M^nugh a Christian may 
legitimately accept one or some of these aspects of Marxism, Paul writes that 
they are ‘intimately’ and ‘radically’ interconnected, and that it is difficult to 
employ methods of Marxist analysis without logically committing oneself to its 
end result, totalitarianism. 169 Liberalism, though, is no better an option, for Paul. 
He describes the latter as an ideology of efficiency and individualism which 
disguises its roots in ‘an erroneous affirmation of the autonomy of the
166 Paul VI, ‘Octagesimo Adveniens’, Michael Walsh and Brian Davies, eds. Proclaiming Justice 
and Peace: Documents from JohnXXHI to John Paul II (London: Collins, 1984) no, 26.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid. no. 33.
169 Ibid. no. 34.
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individual’.170 In short, the pope finds that ‘bureaucratic socialism, technocratic 
capitalism and authoritarian democracy’ alike are incapable of bringing about a 
just society, and he calls for ‘utopian’ thinking that will address the problem
afresh.
Pope John Paul II has written three encyclicals on the ‘social question’, which 
contain the most carefully thought-out responses to Marxism in the magisterium. 
With a clarity of emphasis not found in his predecessors, John Paul’s thought is 
centred on the dignity and rights of the human person, and it is from this 
perspective that he analyses Marxism. In his first encyclical Redemptor Hominis 
(1979), he writes that man is ‘the primary and fundamental way for the church’, 
and in Centesimus Annus (1991), he affirms that ‘the person is the way of the 
church’.171 He introduces Laborem Exercens (1981), his encyclical ‘On Human 
Work’, with the assertion that ‘the Church considers it her task...to call attention 
to the dignity and rights of those who work’.172 This seems to ba fete 
moral and Biblical standard by which to judge Marxism. Like Paul VI, John Paul 
considers both Marxism and capitalism inadequate systems for the fulfilment of 
human dignity and looks for a third way between them. In many things, the pope 
is in agreement with Marx. He looks for the kind of social analysis that works by 
‘not concealing unjust structures but demanding that they be examined and 
transformed on a...universal scale’.173 He is aware that alienated labour is still a 
reality, writing that ‘technology can cease to be man’s ally and become almost 
his enemy, as when the mechanisation of work ‘supplants’ him’.174 He condemns
170 Ibid. no. 35.
171 John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis no. 14, <http://listerv.american.edu/catholic/church/ 
papal/jp.ii/ redeem.asc>; Centesimus Annus, tr. Vatican (Boston: St. Paul, 1991) no. 53.
172 John Paul II. Laborem Exercens, tr. Vatican (Boston: St. Paul, 1981) no. 1.
173 Ibid. no. 2.
174 Ibid. no. 5.
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the commodification of work, in which ‘man is treated as an instrument of
production, whereas he...ought to be treated as the effective subject of work’.175
This danger, he continues, is always present. He writes, ‘The error of early
capitalism can be repeated whenever man is...treated on the same level as
the...material means of production’.176 Indeed the pope describes nineteenth
century reactions to these abuses, in broad terms clearly encompassing Marxism,
as ‘a just social reaction’, an altogether new view from the magisterium. Citing
Dt. 24:15 and Jas. 5:4, the pope writes:
The reaction against the system of injustice and harm that cried to heaven 
for vengeance... in that period of rapid industrialisation was justified 
from the point of view of social morality.177 Ibi
Nevertheless John Paul does not accept Marxism as a conceptually adequate 
remedy to the situation either of the nineteenth or of the twentieth centuries, and 
we must agree with this conclusion. Addressing the issue of the conflict between 
capital and labour, that is, the power of a minority of entrepreneurs and owners 
of the means of production over the majority of non-owning labourers, the pope 
rejects the Marxist theory and practice of class-struggle, as well as the 
collectivisation of the means of production towards which it struggles. The 
Marxist programme, in his view, results from a simply inadequate analysis of the 
problem. The first principle of such analysis, the pope writes, must be the 
‘priority of labour over capital’, which is to recognise that everything available 
for the development of production and profit is the result of work. 577 ‘Everything 
contained in the concept of capital...is only a collection of things’, John Paul 
asserts, and the axiological priority of the human subject, who works upon or
175
176
177
178
Ibid. no.
Ibid.
Ibid. no.
Ibid. no.
7.
8.
12.
108
produces these things, must be affirmed.179 A just labour-system, for John Paul, 
is one that overcomes the opposition between labour and capital by 
acknowledging the priority of the human worker. That is to say, it will fall 
neither into the inhumane errors of capitalism nor into the Marxist error of 
‘economism’, by which the pope means the consideration of labour only from an 
economic perspective, and which results from the kind of materialism that 
‘totally reduces man to... the satisfaction of material needs’.180
Such a system, for John Paul, will reflect the fact that the right to private 
property is not ‘absolute and untouchable’. On the contrary, the pope writes, ‘the 
right to private property is subordinated to the right to common use, to the fact 
that goods are meant for everyone’.181 Not only is the strength of this emphasis 
new to the magisterium, but so also are John Paul’s assertions about right 
ownership of the means of production. The only legitimate title to ownership of 
the means of production, he writes, whether private or public, is that they should 
‘serve labour’, that is, make possible the universal destination of goods and the 
right to their common use.182 The pope thus calls for the ‘socialisation’ of 
property, by which he means joint ownership of certain of the means of 
production in accordance with these principles.183 He affirms the necessity of ‘a 
struggle against an economic system...understood as method of upholding the 
absolute predominance of capital’, but writes that the Marxist concept of this 
struggle turns merely into state capitalism.184 He calls for state intervention to 
achieve labour reform according to the twin principles of ‘subsidiarity’ and
179
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‘solidarity’. By the first he means funding geared towards balanced economic 
growth and full employment, and by the second he means a system of legal
limits to the autonomy of employers and ensuring support for the unemployed. 
The fundamental error of Marxism, John Paul writes in Centesimus Annus
(1991), is anthropological in character, by which it ‘considers the individual 
person simply as an element, a molecule within the social organism’. 185 There is 
no doubt that he is right to say so. Marxist anthropology results in seeing the 
good of the individual as subordinate to the good of the whole socio-economic 
mechanism, and as something that can be realised without the individual’s free 
choice. John Paul considers the historical abuses of the Leninist concept of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, an executive ruling in the name of class-interest, in 
this context. The first principle at stake in this anthropology, John Paul writes, is 
that of theism. For the pope, the ‘apex of [the individual’s] humanity’ is his 
‘response to the call of God contained in the being of things’, by which he 
realises his ‘transcendent dignity’.186 The pope sees the collapse of Eastern 
European communism as a result ultimately of the denial of this vocation. He 
traces the failure of Communism in practice to the violation of workers’ rights 
that it was supposed to protect, and writes that this paradox came about through 
a collectivist anthropology not properly representative of individual human 
dignity. ‘It is not possible’, the pope writes, ‘to understand the human person on 
the basis of economics alone, nor... simply on the basis of class membership’.187 
Human alienation is not only material, for John Paul, which is why communism 
in practice ‘does not do away with alienation but rather increases it’.188 A person
!85 Ibid. no.
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is fundamentally alienated, he writes, if he is not able to ‘transcend himself, and 
a social form that prevents this, either in theory or in practice, will contribute to 
human alienation.189
Whilst the Catholic magisterium has clearly undergone substantial refinements 
since the rather agrarian and patrician views of Leo XIII, its view is on the whole 
a balanced one, with much of which we should agree. Put simply, it amounts to 
the proposition that Marxism provides an accurate diagnosis of the injustice of 
social relations, but does not provide a useful cure for them. This seems to me to 
be true. In fact, we must recognise that Marxism functions more effectively as a 
series of questions rather than of answers. For example, Marxism asks, surely it 
is conceivable that society can be organised in a better way for its members than 
by their present mutual antagonism? We must reply, in my opinion, that it is both 
desirable and really conceivable. We must recognise work for it as a Christian 
moral imperative. But although Marxism asks the right questions, we must also 
recognise that it does not offer an adequate answer to them. It recognises neither 
the dignity of the individual human person, nor his or her capacity for self­
transcendence, in which this dignity can be fully realised. Nor on the other hand 
does Marxism do justice to the internal conflict of the human psyche. Whilst 
Althusserian thought is indebted to the Freudian tradition, it tends to allegorise 
psychological conflict into social conflict at the expense of a useful individual 
psychology. We will discuss our concept of the relation between the spirit-flesh 
conflict and the ego-libido conflict in the next chapter, but for now we can note 
the following. Whether one uses Pauline or Freudian terms, the internal 
contradiction of the individual plays a part in the social injustice both of
189 Ibid.
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capitalist and of socialist societies that Marxism neglects to its conceptual and
practical disadvantage.
What this means for our evaluation of Marxist literary theories is this. First, the 
atheism we may find implicitly or explicitly stated in Marxist literary theory 
need cause us no hesitation in using some of the latter’s methods in practice. 
There is a great deal of justice in the Marxist critique of religion, and the 
Christian critic should respond to it as a useful challenge to his or her potential 
historical or conceptual complacency. The methods of ideology-critique to be 
found in Marxist criticism, even when applied to Christian institutions, 
sentiments or characters, have a valid place in Christian literary theory, and 
should be used where appropriate. If we understand criticism as a kind of 
knowledge, then critique even of the unjust functions of Christianity that can be 
discerned in a given text increases our knowledge. Second, we should take from 
the liberation theologians the principle that social critique, including ideology- 
critique, is an ethical imperative for Christian criticism. Insofar as Marxist theory 
elaborates methods for the description of unjust relations at work in a literary 
text and of the ideologies by which they are maintained, Christian literary can 
and should endorse them. Third, we must remember that despite all the validity 
of its moral critique, we differ from Marxism in our transcendental perspective. 
In terms of critical methodology, sociological analysis is not the last word for 
Christian literary theory. We have a different anthropology to Marxism, and as a 
result, we must be more concerned with the role of individuals in a literary work 
than Marxist criticism. Moreover, we will be concerned not only with the 
Marxist identification of utopian impulses but also with the individual’s capacity
for transcendence.
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(iii) A Critique of Marxist Literary Theories
Despite some of the lessons we can learn from Marxist literary theory, we 
should not take it as a critical orthodoxy. There are problems with, individual 
theories and with the concept of Marxist literary theory itself, of which we 
should be aware before making a final judgement on its value. In this section, I 
will examine some of these problems, in order to show that Marxism should not 
be taken as a final authority in literary theory, and in order to further my 
assessment of the use that Christian literary theory can make of its methods.
1. The Concept of Ideologv
A long-standing difficulty in Marxist theory is its means of establishing criteria 
for the difference between ideology and science. In the Althusserian formulation, 
a science is the science of an ideology, which knows that the ideology’s 
representation of individuals’ relation to reality is imaginary. The question we 
must ask is how one establishes the difference between a true and an imaginary 
representation of these relations. In an early definition, Althusser contrasted 
science and ideology by writing that in the latter ‘the practico-social function is 
more important than the theoretical function’.19() It is a matter of ‘lived’ relations 
rather than of thinking through those relations. But Marxist theory has a 
profound social and practical function. How are we to know that this does not 
render it ideological, that is, an imaginary representation? Moreover, Marxism
190 Althusser, For Marx p. 229.
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holds that many philosophies and conceptual formulations are ideological, 
although these are clearly in-tended to have a theoretical function.
We must recognise that Marxist conceptions of ideology range beyond the idea
of false consciousness. There are two broad strains in the Marxist understanding
of ideology. The wider sense of the term denotes any conjuncture between
discourse and political interests. In this sense, socialism or feminism can be
described as ideologies. The narrower sense, with which we have so far been
concerned, identifies these interests with the dominant social power and its
reproduction. 191 In Ideology (1991), Terry Eagleton is concerned to rescue the
concept of ideology from a definition by false consciousness, because of the
problem of establishing the standard by which it is held to be false. In a
discussion of the falsification of thought by social determinants, he writes:
The trouble with this formulation is that there is no thought which is not 
socially determined. So it must be a question of the kind of social 
determinants under consideration.192
This is true, but it is more a refinement of the problem than a solution to it. The 
question of the position from which these differing kinds of social determinant 
are evaluated remains. Eagleton’s example is that ‘a prisoner is more likely to 
recognise the oppressive nature of a particular juridical system than a judge’.193 
A prisoner and a judge may indeed hold different views on a judicial system, and 
there are many instances in which the prisoner’s will be more accurate 
concerning the moral state of the system. But when Eagleton says that it is ‘more 
likely’ that this will the case, he does so by reference to a system of values 
whose social determination is not in question. He means that it is more likely 
that the prisoner will have the clearer view because judicial systems tend to serve
191 Terry Eagleton. Ideology: An Introduction (London and New York: Verso. 1991) p. 221.
192 Ibid. p. 51.
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the oppressive interests of the bourgeoisie. The position from which he makes 
this evaluation is treated in practice as if free from determinants. A Marxist has 
determining causes for his Marxism as the bourgeois does for his liberalism. 
Why the Marxist’s reasons should be considered the more valuable can only be 
explained in terms whose genesis is not held to affect their value. If Eagleton 
were to follow the logic of his rejection of false consciousness theories of 
ideology, he would have to acknowledge that there are different kinds of 
determinants of the value-systems by which different kinds of determinants of 
thought are judged more valuable, and so on ad infinitum. Whilst trying to 
dissociate ideology from a definition by false consciousness, Eagleton remains 
within the dichotomy of true and false consciousness. The question he attempted 
to avoid, that of the criteria by which the Marxist’s own view is to be judged 
true, remains unanswered. Eagleton gives us no reason to believe in a qualitative 
difference between (socially determined) Marxist thought and (socially 
determined) non-Marxist thought.
The literary critics we have discussed often fall into the same polarisation as 
they use the category of ideology, privileging the position from which they use 
it. Macherey’s Althusserian criticism conceives Marxist criticism to construe a 
new object, the relation of what the text says and does not say. However, the 
Marxist critic’s description of what the text does not say, in this theory, has 
nothing of consequence that it does not say. The Marxist critic is held to be 
undeceived with regard to the identification of the ideology from which the text 
is produced. In his essay on Jules Verne, Macherey finds that the relation 
between Verne’s text and its lacunae is determined by the contradictions in the
193 Ibid.
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nineteenth-century bourgeois ideology of the conquest of nature. What he does 
not say is how he knows that this is an ideology. We have to take it on his own 
authority that Macherey’s text, as well as the Marxist and Althusserian texts 
through which he reads Verne, are themselves free from misrepresentation.
Eagleton highlights the problem as he differs from Macherey over what 
constitute the ideological elements in a literary text. He denies Macherey’s 
assertion that texts are always internally fissured by the conflict of ideology with 
history. Eagleton writes:
It is not invariably true that a text is thrown into grievous internal 
disarray by its relation to ideology, or that such a relation consists simply 
in the text’s forcing ideology up against the history it denies.194
He cites Pope’s Essay on Man as an example, in which internal conflict is not a 
primary feature of the literary product. He calls Macherey’s position ‘dogmatic’, 
and in doing so rightly points out the drift towards authoritarianism visible in the 
practice of ideology-critique. Macherey’s criticism neither establishes how it 
knows an ideology to be an ideology, nor how it knows which elements in a text 
are determined by ideology. In both cases, the distinction is determined on the 
critic’s own authority.
The lack of criteria by which knowledge is validated leads to a further problem 
in the use of the concept of ideology in Marxist criticism. It is often not 
accurately or convincingly established in practice of what a given ideological 
formation actually consists. In Criticism and Ideology, for example, Eagleton 
spends two pages describing ‘bourgeois ideology in nineteenth century England’ 
and a paragraph on the ideology of ‘organicism’. Yet he structures the following 
fifty-seven pages of literary criticism in terms of this ideology. In The Ideology 
of the Aesthetic, he frequently spends only one or two paragraphs, often without
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precise historical references, outlining the conditions of a social and intellectual 
milieu in the broadest of terms. On that basis he proceeds to analyse a text in
terms of that milieu. The result is that the criticism is full of unsubstantiated
generalities. For example Eagleton writes:
Kant speaks up for a generous vision of a community of ends, finding in 
the freedom and autonomy of the aesthetic a prototype of human 
possibility equally at odds with feudal absolutism and possessive 
individualism.194 95
The point is not that such statements like this are in principle untrue, but that 
large concepts like ‘feudal absolutism’ and ‘possessive individualism’ have not 
been shown to be of precise relevance to Kant’s texts. It is paradoxical that 
Marxist critics, who have history so much on their side, in practice largely 
neglect to make adequate use of it. On the whole, Marxist literary criticism talks 
more about history than it actually practises it.
This criticism can be levelled at the work of Fredric Jameson. In a review of
Postmodernism, Reed Way Dasenbrock points out that Jameson makes no effort 
at a concrete historical analysis of the Marxist states in the postmodern period, 
despite the ‘global’ claims of his theory. Nor does he deal with the Third World 
in any detail. Dasenbrock writes, ‘Jameson’s assertion of a period style of 
postmodernism is only possible as long as he walls out and misreads what is 
being produced by the postcolonial cultures of the world’.196 It is one thing to 
distinguish between true and false representations of the ‘social totality’, and 
quite another satisfactorily to produce a true one. In practice, it is by no means 
clear that Jameson has succeeded in the latter attempt, and if he has not, we must 
ask how he knows that the false representations are false. The same question
194 Eagleton, Criticism and Ideology p. 93.
195 Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic p. 100.
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should be asked of his methodological terms in The Political Unconscious. Why 
are we to accept that texts are produced in the horizons of ideology, of class- 
struggle and of mode of production? The texts themselves that Jameson analyses 
do not bear this out with any clarity. 196 97 The only reason we have to accept these 
terms as really representative of textual production within the process of history 
is an implicit appeal to the authority of the Marxist texts.
The conclusion we must draw from this is that there may exist such a thing as 
bourgeois ideology but that a Marxist science of it does not exist. In Marxism 
and Christianity (1983), Denys Turner offers a useful analogy, as he compares 
the relation of Marxist science with ideology to that of self-knowledge with self­
deception. He writes, Tt has to be admitted that no one can ever be sure that he is 
not deceiving himself in some way at any time’.198 It is possible to increase my 
self-knowledge by becoming aware that I was deceived in the past over a certain 
point and am now undeceived over it. But T cannot be sure that in some other 
way I am not deceiving myself now’.m We can know, that is, that ideology is a 
misrepresentation of reality but not that Marxism is an accurate representation. 
In his article ‘Demystifying the Demystifiers’ (1988), Oscar Kenshur makes a 
similar point. He condemns what he calls ‘ideological essentialism’, or the 
Marxist practice of linking an epistemological position with a political one. He 
takes issue with Michael Ryan’s analysis of Hobbes in his book Marxism and 
Deconstruction (1984), where Ryan links Hobbes’ rationalism with political
196 Reed Way Dasenbrock, ‘Fredric Jameson and the Dilemmas of Late Marxism’, Raritan 11 
(1992) p. 129.
197 hi ‘Narrative and Ideology: A Critique of Fredric Jameson’s Uhe Political Unconscious’, J. A. 
Berthoud argues tliat Jameson’s methodology leads him to distort tlie plain sense of the texts he 
analyses. His analyses of Conrad, Berthoud clearly shows, work by wrencliing passages of text 
out of tlieir context both in tlie narrative and in tlie author’s thought as a whole. Jeremy 
Hawthorn, ed., Narrative: From Malory to Motion Pictures (London: Edward Arnold 1985) pp. 
107-115.
198 Denys Turner, Marxism and Christianity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983 p. 121.
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absolutism. Kenshur points out that Hobbes himself is engaged in a structurally 
similar attempt to link the views on inspiration of his enemies the Puritans with 
their politics. Both Hobbes and Ryan claim that their opponents argue for an 
unjustified immediacy to knowledge, but Hobbes links this position with sedition 
and Ryan with oppression. Kenshur’s justified conclusion is that epistemological 
positions can serve quite different political ends: appeals to reason or to intuition 
can be of use both to oppressed and to ruling social groups. This analysis 
reinforces our conclusion that whilst an ideological analysis may be valid in 
itself, it is not so as a result of the scientific position from which it is carried out.
The lack of a means of verifying Marxism’s claim to be a science gives us a 
certain amount of freedom in the use of the concept of ideology. Whilst Christian 
literary theory can and must recognise the presence of dominant interests in a 
literary work, it is not committed thereby to Marxism as the truth distorted by 
those interests. In particular, we can reject Althusser’s definition of humanism as 
an ideology, and of the individual as an effect of the social whole. We need not 
disagree that many aspects of an individual’s life are determined by the mode of 
production, but neither need we accept with Althusser that he or she is entirely 
so determined. Christian criticism can point out the effects of bourgeois ideology 
in a work, without implying that Marxism is the position free of 
misrepresentation from which it does so. Nevertheless we should also remember 
that since ideology-critique implies no superiority in the position from which it is 
carried out, we can assume no superiority in our own position when we use it. 
We must avoid the temptation of assuming a moral or sociological freedom from 
the class-interests we may discover in the texts we analyse. *
199 Ibid.
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2. Intra-Marxist Critique
Because of the incommensurability of Marxism with any other first principles, 
most of the criticism of Marxist literary theory comes from, within the Marxist
community. Unless one has a prior allegiance to Marxism, the literary criticism 
that derives from it will seem unconvincing. Liberal and conservative critics 
have very little common ground from which to begin dialogue with Marxist 
criticism, and as a result, most critiques of Marxist literary theory come from the 
Lfft.200 201We will now assess some of these critiques and their significance.
The strongest criticism of Marxist literary theory is that it is a kind of 
contradiction in terms. The concept of literature, on this account, is not a valid 
category of Marxist thought. We saw that in his later work, Macherey suggested 
that the concept was an ideological product. Left criticism has followed through 
this notion at length. Tony Bennett laid the foundations for this kind of thought 
in Formalism and Marxism (1979). He argues there that literature is a bourgeois 
concept, and that any attempt to analyse it as such or to practise a discourse of 
which it is the proper object fails to make a properly Marxist break with 
bourgeois method. He writes:
Marxist literary criticism..., far from progressing by displacing the 
concerns of bourgeois aesthetics to produce a distinctively new set of 
problems, has been developed chiefly by a series of borrowings from the 
more developed... system of bourgeois criticism.2®1
200 Because of tliis lack of common ground, conservative critics tend to ridicule Marxist criticism 
as a kind of category mistake that should never have been attempted. Roger Kimball’s articles, 
The Contradictions of Terry Eagleton’ and ‘Frednc Jameson’s Laments’, The New Criterion 9 
(1990) pp. 17-23; 10 (1991) pp. 9-17, exemplify this approach.
201 Tony Bennett, Formalism and Marxism (London: Methuen, 1979) p. 100.
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Bennett argues that the trans-historical category of literature presupposes a 
formal essence shared by the texts in that genus, which cannot be thought of in 
materialist terms.202 203This is the basic error of Althusserian criticism, in his view. 
Althusser’s suggestion that art makes us see ideology ‘simply assumes that there 
is some...set of common features’ to art and to its subset literature, which 
criticism can describe.® The theory of literature as a mode of cognition midway 
between science and ideology, Bennett writes, cannot answer the properly 
materialist question of the different historical and material determinants that 
have produced the texts described as literary. 204 *Bennett calls this first principle 
of Althusserian literary criticism a ‘new idealism’, whose ‘epistemological 
ballast’ Marxist criticism must jettison. Literature cannot be conceived as an 
essence by Marxism, he writes, even of a mode of cognition. It does not produce 
ideological forms and reveal them, as Macherey and Eagleton argued; on the 
contrary it is Marxist criticism that makes texts perform that function.® For 
Bennett, the production of knowledge of the contradictions of an ideology, 
which Macherey and Eagleton attribute to literary texts, is a product of Marxist
criticism.
Eagleton’s defence of the concept of aesthetic value in Criticism and Ideology 
is a focal point of this critique. In a 1980 interview, Eagleton acknowledged that
his defence contained an ‘apparent contradiction.’ (between intrinsic and 
extrinsic determinants of aesthetic value) but he denied that it was real. He also
defended the enduring importance of the question of value for Marxist
202 Ibid. p. 105.
203 Ibid. p. 121.
204 Ibid. p. 132.
Ibid. p. 141.
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criticism.206 207 208 209Bennett, however, insists that that ‘there neither is nor can be a 
science of value’, because value is not an attribute of a text but a product of 
criticism.mm7 Whllst Eagleton describes a series of categories for materialist 
analysis, Bennett points out that he does not use them in practice, ‘since he has 
already defined literature in idealist terms’.^ Eagleton vacillates between two 
concepts of literature, Bennett argues, as imaginative writing in general and as a 
particular (valuable) species of that genns.20. He rejects Eagleton’s definition of 
aesthetic value by the degree of a text’s internal distantiation of ideology, writing 
that ‘there is simply no way in which a given text can be said to be valued 
because of the circumstances of its production’.210 211This is true. In fact, 
Eagleton’s definition of the valuable text does not differ from his account of the 
literary text per se. Both the text and the valuable text, in the last analysis, are 
defined by their internal display of the contradictory relation of the ideology of 
which they are products to history. The materialist terms to which he restricts 
himself do not account for the problem of value he sets out to solve.
In ‘Literary Theory, etc.’ (1987), Stephen Heath criticises the concept of 
literature in Eagleton’s work. He notes that while Eagleton is always concerned 
to inscribe an ‘outside’ into his work, that is, to gesture away from literature 
towards social and material reality, he does so from within the field of literary 
studies.2^ This is to say that in practice the bourgeois ideology of literature, into 
which Eagleton is institutionally inserted, debilitates the scientific and political
206 Kavanagh and Lewis, op. cit. p. 62.
207 Bennett, Formalism and Marxism pp. 172-173.
208 Ibid. p. 149.
209 Ibid. pp. 151-152.
210 Ibid. p. 154.
211 StephenHeatli, "Literary Theory, etc.’, Comparative Criticsm 9 (1987) p. 287.
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value of his work. By institutionally complying with the ideology of literature, 
Eagleton’s work remains more or less useless in the reality of the class-struggle.
In Outside Literature (1990), Bennett argues that the concept of Marxist 
literary theory needs to be abandoned altogether. It is hopelessly bound up with 
bourgeois concepts, he asserts. Its goal is an ‘accommodation between the 
historical and materialist bent of Marxist categories and the universalising 
disposition of bourgeois concepts of art, literature and the aesthetic’.212 This kind 
of synthesis is impossible, for Bennett, and the attempt to effect it only results in 
the ‘bourgeoisification’ of Marxist discourse.213 When a system as polysemous 
as Marxism encounters an object as chimerical as literature, he argues, the results 
are so uncertain that a paradigm shift is necessary. For Bennett, this means ‘post- 
Marxism’, or broadly socialist thought indebted to Marxist tradition but that 
definitively breaks with it.214 In his argument for this kind of discourse, Bennett 
attacks Eagleton’s later work. He is critical that Eagleton accepts that the task, of 
revolutionary consciousness-formation, which he outlines for criticism is not 
presently likely to be accomplished. Bennett describes this as a ‘critical 
recidivism’ that produces an ‘antinomial’ way of thinking, removed from present 
concerns.215 In Bennett’s view, Eagleton’s attempt to inscribe a social space for 
criticism will effect in it precisely the same kind of political impotence that it
suffered as it was institutionalised in British universities at the turn of the 
century.216 He writes, Tn recalling criticism to its traditional function, 
Eagleton... recalls it to its traditional dilemma also’217 The essence of this error,
212 Tonv Bennett. Outside Literature, London and New York: Routledge, 1990 p. 31.
213 Ibid. p. 32.
214 Ibid. p. 17.
215 Ibid. p. 223.
216 Ibid. p. 225.
217 Ibid. p. 230.
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for Bennett, is the concept of a single function of criticism, which it more or less 
fulfils at different times and places. He writes that one should ask rather ‘what 
roles might be performed by different types of critical practice given the varied 
institutional domains and the varied publics in which such practices are 
operative’.218 Again Eagleton is too concerned with trans-historical essences, and 
consequently fails to attend to the specific situation of the present and to 
practical means of its redress, which, Bennett argues, must be the first principle 
of socialist cultural study.
Bennett’s post-Marxist critique joins the conservative critique in asserting that 
Marxist literary theory is a kind of category mistake. It constitutes a serious 
criticism. Bennett is right to assert that Marxist theory cannot account for the 
phenomenon of literary value. Where it explicitly or implicitly asserts that there 
is a substantial reality that corresponds to the concept of literary value, it ceases 
to be properly Marxist. We should take this as an index of the incomplete scope 
of Marxist criticism, and remember that as a result it cannot provide a 
comprehensive account of a literary text. I do not agree with Bennett that the 
concept of value should be abandoned altogether, and that literary criticism 
should be transformed into the study of cultural production alone. For one thing, 
we have seen that there are no compelling reasons why we should accept such a 
change (from ideology to science). Although we can agree that value is context- 
determined, we should not conclude from this that it is meaningless or an 
ideological misrepresentation in its context. That is to say that if a certain text is 
valuable to me here and now, that value is neither negated nor shown to be 
illusory because the text may have _ a different value for another person in another
218 Ibid, p. 242.
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time and place. I will develop these arguments further in the fifth chapter. For 
now, we can note that what Bennett makes quite clear is that. Marxist criticism
cannot account for value in literature. We should remember as we use its
methods that they will not provide us with a complete account of a literary text. 
Whilst Christian literary theory should use all the insights it can gain from 
Marxist criticism concerning the cultural production of texts, it should also 
remember that their cultural production does not exhaust the meaning of those
texts.
3. On Psychoanalysis
I will conclude my examination of the fundamental discourses of modern 
literary theory with a study of psychoanalytic theory and criticism. As in my 
analyses of deconstruction and Marxism, I shall have two fundamental concerns. 
Firstly, I will examine the relations between psychoanalysis and Christianity and 
the mutual effects of these discourses on one another, in order to assess the ways 
in which Christian literary theory can or should use psychoanalytic 
methodology. Secondly, I will offer a critique of psychoanalysis, in order to 
suggest that it should not be taken as authoritative for literary theory. As before, 
I will begin with an introduction to those psychoanalytic theories with which I
will be concerned.
(i) An Outline of Psychoanalytic Literary Theories
Psychoanalysis is widely used, in various derivative forms, in literary and 
cultural studies today. Lacanian criticism in particular is used in feminist, gay 
and other approaches that emphasise gender or sexuality. It would require a
whole thesis to describe all the critical uses to which all the varieties of
psychoanalysis have been put, and in this section I will restrict my discussion to
the most fundamental and influential theories and critical methods.
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1. Sigmund Freud
Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) began practice as a neuropathologist in 1886 after 
having achieved modest success in the field during his training at the Vienna 
General Hospital. He was influenced by the work of the neurologist Jean Martin 
Charcot, under whom he spent some months working in Paris in 1885-6. Charcot 
had discovered a relation between hypnosis and hysteria, and had suggested that 
ideas determined hysterical symptoms rather than anatomy. Freud had also been 
impressed by the treatment of hysteria with hypnotism by his colleague Josef 
Breuer. In the late 1880s and early 1890s he began to experiment with Breuer’s 
‘cathartic’ method in the treatment of his own patients?
Freud was always as concerned with knowledge as with therapy. In this 
respect, his ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’(1895) serves as a useful 
introduction to his work. He begins this essay by establishing two first principles 
from which he never departed, namely materialism and mechanism. He writes, 
‘The intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to 
represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable 
material particles’.2 The work attempts to explain the phenomena of psychology 
by means of the data of neuro-physiology. The two principles with which Freud 
undertakes this task are ‘1. What distinguishes activity from rest is to be 
regarded as Q [i.e. quantity], subject to the general laws of motion’. This is the 
mechanistic first principle, according to which mental phenomena are to be 
understood as a determinate distribution of quantities in the mind. ‘2. The
’ See Ernest Jones, Sigmund Freud: Life and Work (London: Hogarth, 1953-1957) Vol. 1 for 
biographical information on the earlier part of Freud’s life.
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neurones are to be taken as the material particles’.3 This is the materialist 
principle, according to which the mind is composed of material units, the 
neurones. The fundamental operational principle of the mind so conceived Freud 
calls the ‘principle of neuronal inertia’, or the ‘principle of constancy’.4 This 
states that neurones tend to divest themselves of the quantity of mental energy or 
excitation Freud calls Q. If the mental system experiences an increase of 
stimulus, it tends to discharge it by means of an expenditure of a proportionate 
quantity of energy. Freud calls this the ‘primary function’ of the mental 
apparatus. There are two sources of mental stimulus, those external and those 
internal to the individual organism. The organism cannot withdraw from internal 
stimuli (such as hunger) as from external ones, and so needs a store of internal 
energy Freud calls Qiq to meet the demand for action such stimuli generate. 
Maintaining this store is the ‘secondary frmction’ of the mind. Although it 
appears to contradict the primary trend to inertia, it follows that trend in keeping 
the amount of Qri as low as possible. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), 
Freud described the structure of these two processes as the relation between the 
death instincts and the sexual instincts. Freud links the hypothesis of stimulus 
and discharge to contemporary histology, according to which the nervous system 
is composed of neurones that have contact with one another through another 
substance, protoplasm. Energy passes from one neurone to another through this 
substance, which offers a greater or lesser degree of resistance to its passage.
2 Tlie Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, tr. and ed. 
James Stracliey et al (London: Hie Hogarth Press and tlie Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953­
1974) Vol. I p. 295. Hiis edition will henceforth be abbreviated as ‘SE’.
2Ibid.
2 Ibid. p. 296.
2 SE XVIII pp. 34-64. ‘One group of instincts rushes forward so as to reach tlie final aim of life 
as swiftly as possible...the other group jerks back to a certain point to make a fresh start and so 
prolong tlie journey’ (ibid. p. 41).
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Because of this resistance Freud describes neurones as linked by ‘contact- 
barriers’.6 This concept allows him to explain the phenomenon of memory, 
which he sees as the ‘capacity [of nervous tissue] for being permanently altered 
by single occurrences’.7 The hypothesis of contact-barriers leads Freud to argue 
that there must be two classes of neurone. There must be those which allow Qrj
to pass through them as if there were no barrier to its passage, and those through 
which it passes only partially or with difficulty. The first, permeable class would 
be the vehicles of perception, and the second resistant class the vehicles of 
memory. Freud calls them <j> and v|/ respectively. In the ‘project’, he asserts that
the passage of energy through the y-neurones’ contact-barriers both permanently 
alters those barriers and in doing so makes the future conduction of energy 
through them easier. The degree of facility of conduction thus effected in the \g- 
neurones Freud calls their degree of ‘facilitation’ [bahnung]. Memory, then, 
which is one of the determinants of the path of energy through the system, is 
‘represented by the differences in the facilitations of the v|/-neurones’.8 The 
preference of one form of action over another that is in psychological terms a 
function of memory is explained in neuro-physiological terms by the greater 
facilitation of one pathway through the \)/-neurones than another.
Like most of Freud’s later work, the ‘Project’ combines bold speculation with 
a desire for empirical precision. This combination characterises his contributions 
to the Studies in Hysteria he and Breuer published in the same year, 1895. The 
most significant of these studies was that of Breuer’s patient ‘Anna O’, whom he 
had treated between 1880 and 1882. Anna O became ill at twenty-one, after
6 Ibid. p. 298.
7 Ibid. p. 299.
8 Ibid. p. 300.
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nursing her dying father. She exhibited a series of hysterical symptoms, 
including paralysis, coughing, and periodic inability to speak her native German. 
She also experienced a worsening condition Breuer calls "(absence" or ‘condition 
seconde", in which she hallucinated, behaved violently and eventually worked 
herself into a kind of auto-hypnotic state 9 During these absences, Anna O would 
mutter a series of words. Breuer found that if he repeated these words to her in 
her hypnotic state and invited her to follow the train of thought they initiated, she 
would relate the thoughts by which she had been occupied during her absence. 
When she did so, she was relieved of its conditions and temporarily restored to 
normal mental life. She called this process the ‘talking-cure’ or ‘chimney­
sweeping’.10 *Breuer further discovered that if she could be brought, under 
hypnosis, to remember and relate the first appearance of her symptoms, she 
would be permanently relieved of them. He established that her inability to drink 
derived from disgust at seeing a companion’s dog drink out of a glass of water 
during the period she was nursing her father. She had not expressed her disgust 
at the time out of politeness. When she related this experience under hypnosis, 
her inability to drink disapp^ai^^d/i Breuer found that almost all of her 
symptoms could be removed in this way. 12 13He also found that they emerged with 
the greatest force during this process. Freud regarded these discoveries as the 
foundations of psychoanalysis?/ In the ‘Preliminary Communication’ (1893) to 
the Studies on Hysteria, he and Breuer write that ‘hysterics suffer mainly from
9 SE II p. 24.
10 Ibid. p. 30.
" Ibid. p. 34.
12 Ibid pp. 34-37.
13 The Penguin Freud Library, ed. Angela Richards and Albert Dickson (London; Penguin, 1973­
1986) Vol. 1 pp. 111, 321; SE XI p. 9; SE XIV pp. 8-12. Tlie Penguin edition will hereafter be 
abbreviated as ‘PEL’.
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reminiscences’.'. Hysterical symptoms, that is, are related to a series of 
emotional experiences, or ‘psychical traumas’, which remain unconscious in the 
patient’s normal mental condition.'. The symptoms display their connection to 
this trauma, and can be described as ‘precipitates’ of them. 14 15 6 When brought to 
consciousness, the memories of these traumatic experiences are discharged of 
their affect, that is, of the emotional states attached to the memory-images. The 
symptoms were precipitated as a result of the lack of this kind of discharge or 
‘abreaction’, and when the memories and their affects are afforded release, the 
symptoms subside.17
Freud became dissatisfied with the efficacy of hypnosis in the treatment of his 
own patients, only a fraction of whom proved susceptible to it. So he decided to 
‘start from the assumption that my patients knew everything that was of any 
pathogenic significance and that it was only a question of obliging them to 
communicate it’.2* The method he found most effective for bringing about this 
communication was that of free association, in which the patient voices the first 
things that come into his mind when considering a given phenomenon. In 
treating hysterical patients this way, it became apparent to Freud that the closer 
the patient’s associations came to the pathogenic ideas, the greater the 
‘resistance’ shown by the patient to bringing them into consciousness. To 
account for this phenomenon, Freud hypothesised a reverse process of 
‘repression’. If a patient resists bringing to consciousness certain unconscious 
mental states, that is, it must be because there is a mental force that keeps them 
unconscious. He writes, ‘A violent opposition must have started against the entry
14 SE II p. 7.
15 Ibid. p. 5.
16 Ibid. p. 4.
17 Ibid. p. 17.
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into consciousness of [a] questionable mental process, and for that reason it 
remained unconscious’.18 9 20 21 22 23Pathogenic ideas, according to Freud, have been 
rejected from consciousness because they tended towards a socially 
impermissible satisfaction. The ego, whose function is to adapt the individual to 
the exigencies of his situation, prevents such an idea turning into action by 
keeping it unconscious. The idea and its affect remain in the individual’s 
‘unconscious’, which Freud conceives as ‘a special region of the mind, shut off 
from the rest’?0
The phenomena that provided Freud with the clearest knowledge of the 
unconscious were dreams. Along with free association, dream-interpretation 
became a fundamental method of psychoanalytic therapy. The biological purpose 
of sleep, according to Freud, is the withdrawal of the organism from the stimuli 
of the external worlds Nevertheless external and internal stimuli continue to 
impinge upon it. Dreams are a reaction to these stimuli, a means of discharging 
them, in order that sleep can continue. Freud writes, ‘Dreams are not disturbers 
of sleep... but guardians of sleep which get rid of disturbances’^ He sees this to 
be clearly demonstrated by children’s dreams, where the instinctual stimulation 
of hunger, for example, can be discharged by a dream of pleasant fcod?9 For 
Freud, dreams deal with disturbing stimuli by producing substitutive 
representations of them, such as a dream of church-bells in response to the sound 
of an alarm clock. When the stimulus derives from the dreamer himself, Freud 
hypothesises, it must be possible to work back from the dream-representation to
18 Ibid. p. 110.
19 Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalyses ¥FL 1 p. 335.
20 Ibid. p. 318.
21 Ibid. p. 117.
22 Ibid. p. 160.
23 Ibid. pp. 157-167.
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the mental event it represented. Freud calls this material the ‘latent dream- 
thoughts’. The remembered images and affects of the dream he calls the 
‘manifest dream-content’.24 25 * 27By applying the law of determinism to mental life, 
Freud hypothesised that the latent thoughts could be brought into consciousness 
by means of free association from the manifest content. The results of this kind 
of experiment along with the data from children’s dreams, in which the 
distortion is less pronounced, led Freud to conclude that ‘whenever a dream has 
been completely intelligible to us, it has turned out to be the hallucinated 
fulfilment of a wish’.?? The occurrence of resistance at certain points in the 
relating of dreams and in associations based on them led Freud to posit a 
censorship function exercised by the sleeper’s ego, which judges these wishes
and distorts beyond recognition those which would not be admitted to waking
• 26 consciousness.
The mind transforms these forbidden wishes into dream-representations in two 
ways, according to Freud. Firstly, it uses an apparently phylogenetic heritage of 
symbols, mostly for sexual objects, genitals, family members, lovers and so on 1 
Secondly it performs what Freud calls the ‘dream-work’.28 This process gives the 
greatest insight into the ‘primary process’, or the way in which the unconscious 
functions. It is inferred from the comparison of dream-interpretations to the 
dreams of which they are judged to be correct interpretations. It consists 
fundamentally of three kinds of labour. The first is ‘condensation’ or
24 Ibid. pp. 150-151.
25 Ibid. p. 168.
Ibid. p. 175.
27 Ibid. ch. 10; Freud describes dream-svmbolism at length in The Interpretation of Dreams, PFL 
4 pp. 466-529.
28 PFL 1 p. 204.
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compression (yerdichtung)29 By this process several latent elements which have 
something in common are fused into one element in the manifest dream. A 
similar process is observable in jokes which condense two thoughts into one 
ambiguous word. The second work is ‘displacement’ or shifting (verschiebung), 
either of an image or of affect.30 31 32 33 34In the first case, a latent thought is represented 
by a manifest image to which it is connected only remotely. In the second case, 
what is most important or urgent in the latent thoughts is represented as a 
relatively unimportant part of the manifest dream. The dream is thus ‘differently 
centred’ from the dream-thoughts.3. The third work Freud calls ‘considerations 
of representabi^y’, by which latent thoughts are transformed into manifest 
images.22 The thought of possessing (besitzen) a thing, for example, could be 
represented by the image of sitting (siizen) on it. A broken marriage might be 
represented by a broken leg?. A significant feature of this aspect of the dream- 
work is that it does not recognise conceptual relations, such as causality or 
contrariety. Freud also notes the process of ‘secondary revision’, by which sense 
is made out of the dream in waking life.3?
As he interpreted his patients’ dreams, Freud found that the forbidden thoughts 
distorted in them bore the uninhibited characteristics not only of human 
prehistory but also of individual prehistory. The aggression and sexual energy or 
‘libido’ which proved to be the stimulus of dreams corresponded to the impulses 
of early childhood that were repressed from the conscious system as the child 
learnt the practical necessity of renouncing them. Hence Freud writes, ‘What is
29 Ibid. p. 205.
30 Ibid. p. 208.
31 PFL 4 p. 414.
32 Ibid. p. 454.
33 PFL 1 p. 210.
34 Ibid. p. 216.
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unconscious in mental life is also what is infantile’.^ In his Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud describes children up to the age of about five 
as ‘polymorphously perverse’, by which he means that they have a 
predisposition towards all the satisfactions that in an adult would be described as 
perversions.^ These impulses are gradually organised in healthy development 
around the reproductive function. Freud takes thumb-sucking as an example of 
infantile sexuality. The pleasure generated by the activity was originally 
associated with a vital function, from which it has gradually become 
independent. The lips and mouth were initially stimulated whilst the infant was 
sucking at its mother’s breast, and this pleasure is now obtained in the absence of 
this activity. Freud calls such pleasure ‘auto-erotic’, that is, derived from the 
infant’s own body?9 Auto-erotic stimulation of a zone associated with a vital 
function characterises infantile sexuality for Freud. As the child grows, it 
discovers the pleasure generated by stimulation in the anal zone, which it can 
produce by accumulating a certain amount of stool before defecation. These 
pleasures characterise what Freud calls the ‘pre-genital’ organisations of 
sexuality.99 These organisations subordinate the polymorphous ‘component 
instincts’ to activity dominated by a particular erotogenic zone. In the ‘oral’ or 
‘cannibalistic’ organisation sexual activity (in the sense defined above) is 
identified with the ingestion of food. In the second ‘sadistic-anal’ phase, it is 
split into active and passive currents, as the infant controls defecation (activity) 
and experiences anal stimulation as a result (passivity)^ In ‘The Infantile 
Genital Organisation’ (1923), Freud described a ‘phallic’ stage, in which the * * * *
35 Ibid. p. 247.
36 SE VII p. 191.
37 Ibid. p. 181.
38 Ibid. p. 197.
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libido of both sexes is organised around a fascination with the penis.® The goal 
of development is the ‘genital’ organisation, in which all the component sexual 
instincts are subordinated to the pleasure derived from the genital zone and 
hence the reproductive function. This occurs at puberty, and is often anticipated 
by various educational prohibtiions.ii
As the sexual ‘aim’, that is the kind of act from which pleasure is derived, 
develops during childhood, so too does the sexual ‘object’, that is, the person or 
thing towards which the instincts are directed. For the sake of simplicity, we will 
describe the development of the male child in this respeet.39 40 41 42 At an early point in 
the infantile stage, the child develops an ‘object-cathexis’, that is, an investment 
of sexual energy, for its mother, which derives from its earliest relation to her 
breast?3 At the same time, he identifies with his father, that is, takes him as an 
ideal image of himself.44 As he progresses to the phallic organisation of his 
libido, the boy’s sexual wishes towards his mother intensify, and his father is 
perceived as a threat to them. His identification with his father thus becomes 
‘ambivalent’, taking on a hostile tendency and a wish to replace him in his 
mother’s a^f^f^etitins.s5 This orientation is the basis of the ‘Oedipus complex’. 46 
This complex of wishes, in Freud’s view, is the phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
heritage of every human being. We have described it so far in what Freud calls
39 Ibid. p. 198.
40 SE XIX pp. 142-145.
41 Ibid. p. 199.
42 As we will see below, there are several problems with Freud’s account of the development of 
girls. After a series of theories, certain phenomena of female psychology eventually forced liim 
to retract his argument for the universality of the Oedipus complex. See ‘Female Sexuahty’, SE 
XXI p. 227.
43 See ‘Tlie Ego and the Id’, SE XIX p. 31. Here we elide the accoimt of narcissism, in which the 
ego initially cathects itself with hbido before any external object-choice. See ‘On Narcissism'. 
SE XIV pp. 163-190.
44 See ‘Group Psychology and tlie Analysis of the Ego’, SE XVIII p. 105.
" Ibid.
46 SE XIX p. 32.
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its ‘simple positive’ form.4? He writes that the innate bisexuality of children 
determines a parallel negative version of the complex, in which the boy displays 
an affectionate attitude towards his father and a corresponding jealousy of his 
mother. Healthy human development is contingent upon the successful 
dissolution of the Oedipus complex at the end of the period of infantile sexuality. 
A broad ‘experience of painful disappointments’ brings about this dissolution, 
most significant among which is the ‘threat of castration’4? During the phallic 
phase of libidinal development, the boy tends towards masturbation as a means 
of fulfilling his Oedipal wishes.4? Disapproving adults may threaten him with 
some kind of castration, as Freud found in the case of ‘Little Hans’.?® If so, he 
initially disbelieves the possibility, but when he first sees female genitals, he 
infers that women have been castrated. The threat becomes a real possibility to 
him?* This leads him to turn away from or repress the Oedipus complex, since in 
its positive form he imagines that castration will ensue as a punishment, and in 
its negative form it must occur as a precondition. He replaces his object-cathexes 
with identifications with his parents. He ‘introjects’ their prohibitions against 
incest, that is, sets them up as objects within his own ego, where they form the 
basis of his ‘super-ego’ or conscience?2 His libidinal energy is ‘sublimated’ into 
non-sexual aims and inhibited into affection. 53 The more completely this 
repression is carried out, the greater the disposition to mental health of the adult. 47 48 49 50 51
47 Ibid. p. 33.
48 ‘The Dissolution of tlie Oedipus Comj^l<2.x’, SE XIX pp. 173,175.
49 Ibid. pp. 174,176.
50 SE X pp. 30-36.
51 SE XIX p. 176.
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2. Freudian Literary Criticism
In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud had linked the emotional force 
of Sophocles’Oec%w Rex with the repressed wishes of its audience. He writes, 
‘[Oedipus’] destiny moves us because it might have been ours...[He] merely 
shows us the fulfilment of our childhood wishes’/4 In ‘Creative Writers and 
Daydreaming’ (1908), Freud sets out his fundamental aesthetic thesis, that art 
allows us access to forbidden pleasures. He links creative writing to children’s 
play, in that both involve the rearrangement of reality into a strongly cathected 
fictional form. 99 The adult equivalent of play is the daydream, in which wishes, 
typically egocentric or erotic, are imaginatively fulfilled. Many literary works 
are analogous to daydreams, in that they have a hero of some kind, who is the 
centre of interest and lives a providentially protected life. He often has a series of 
amorous encounters. They are in short precisely the same kind of imaginary 
wish-fulfllment as can be found in daydreams, according to Freud. To prevent 
his egocentric wishes arousing the reader’s disgust, the writer clothes them in 
aesthetic form. Freud professes ignorance concerning the nature of form, but he
conceives of it as a kind of bribe offered to the reader in order that he should 
accept the writer’s fantasies. He calls it an ‘incentive bonus’ or ‘fore-pleasure’/9 
By consciously reading the work in order to derive pleasure from its aesthetic 
form, the reader can unconsciously experience the pleasure of the writer’s 
fantasies as if they were his own. Freud writes, ‘Our actual enjoyment of an
52 See ‘Tlie Ego and tlie Id’, cli. III. Tlie character of tlie super-ego depends on the specific 
combination of maternal and paternal identifications from wliich it is formed.
53 Se XIX p. 177.
54 PFL 4 p. 364.
55 PFL 14 p. 132.
56 Ibid. p. 141.
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imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds’.5? With 
our conscience satisfied that we are enjoying a formal pleasure, we are free to 
enjoy the forbidden pleasures of egocentric and erotic fantasy.
In ‘The ‘Uncanny” (1919), Freud again professes his lack of competence in 
aesthetics, but finds himself qualified to analyse the production of certain affects 
by literary works. In this essay he examines the unheimlich, the ‘uncanny’, 
sinister or spine-chilling affects, in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story ‘The Sand-Man’ 
(1816). Freud had long been impressed by the observation of the philologist Karl 
Abel that in many ancient languages words that denoted the most fundamental of 
concepts also denoted what now appears to be their opposite. 58 The Latin word 
sacer, for example, means both ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’. Freud points out that the 
German word heimlich works like this. Its fundamental meaning is ‘homely’ or 
‘familiar’, but it extends to states of such close familiarity or intimacy as to mean 
‘clandestine’ or ‘forbidden’.59 tt can thus slip into the same meaning as its 
apparent opposite, unheimlich, ‘eerie’ or ‘uncanny’.?0 Both can denote 
something that should remain hidden or out of normal view. Freud finds that the 
chief source of uncanny affect in ‘The Sand-Man’ is the ghostly title figure,
whom the hero’s nurse described to him in childhood as someone who would
tear out his eyes. According to Freud, ‘psycho-analytic experience’ suggests that 
‘anxiety about one’s eyes, the fear of going blind, is often enough a substitute for 
the dread of being castrated’.?1 Freud notes that in the story, anxiety about the 
eyes is related to the death of the hero’s father and that the Sandman appears as a
disturber of love. These facts corroborate his assertions that the Sandman * 60
* Ibid.
See his review article ‘The Antithetical Meaning of Primary Words’, SE XI pp. 151-161.
39 Todav, this is die word’s primary meaning.
60 Freud, ‘The “Uncanny”’, SE XVII pp. 222-226.
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represents ‘the dreaded father at whose hands castration is expected’, and that 
the uncanny affect the character produces in the reader is related to ‘the anxiety 
belonging to the castration complex of childhood’.61 2 63Freud goes on to derive 
uncanny experience in general from a factor of ‘involuntary repetition’, which he 
relates to the ‘compulsion to repeat’ driven by the death-instinct.?? He writes that 
‘whatever reminds of us of this inner ‘compulsion to repeat’ is perceived as 
uncannn’.64 65He concludes that the uncanny is the subset of frightening 
experience in which the frightening element is the recurrence of something 
repressed. This explains the linguistic phenomenon that the meanings of the 
words heimlich and unheimlich converge. The uncanny is that which is both 
profoundly familiar and also hidden {heimlich1) from consciousness by the 
process of reprercion.ss Freud concludes that, at least in realistic literary works, 
an uncanny effect is produced by an impression that reminds the reader of a 
repressed infantile complex.66
3. Jacques Lacan
Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) explored the connections between psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis in his doctoral thesis on paranoia, published in 1932, and became 
a full member of the Societe Psychoanalytique de Paris six years later. In 1953 
he resigned from this organisation and hence from the International
61 Ibid. p. 231.
62 Ibid. pp. 232,233.
63 Ibid. pp. 237. 238. See ‘Bevond tlie Pleasure Pr^in^^iioiie’. SE XVIII pp. 18 ff.
64 SE XVII p. 238.
65 Ibid. p. 241.
66 Ibid. p. 249. In ‘Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s Gradiva' (1907), PPL 14 pp. 3-18, Freud 
reads tlie plot and characters of Jensen's story in psychoanalytic terms. In The Life and Works of 
Edgar Allen Poe (London: Imago, 1940), one of the most distinctively Freudian works of
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Psychoanalytic Association, to form the Societe Franpaise de Psychanalyse. This 
was characterised by an opposition to ego-psychology, in which the ego is seen 
as the basis of mental stability, and by an understanding of Freud through the 
ideas of Hegel, Heidegger and Saussure. In 1964 Lacan formed the Ecole 
Freudienne de Paris and conducted his weekly seminar from the Ecole des
Hautes Etudes.
Lacan contributed the ‘mirror stage’ to the psychoanalytic theory of mental 
development. He introduced the idea at the International Psychoanalytical 
Congress in 1936, and elaborated on its consequences in ‘The Mirror Stage as 
Formative of the Function of the F (1949). In this paper, he argues that between 
the ages of six and eighteen months an infant will recognise his own image in a 
mirror, or in another person imitating his movements. He playfully experiences 
the contrast between his apparent control of the image and his lack of control of 
his own motor functions. He ‘identifies’ with the image, that is, he begins to 
form an idea of himself based on the image. 67 68It is large and whole, in contrast to 
his small size and turbulent experience, and he anticipates that he will eventually 
assume its characteristics. Lacan writes, ‘The mirror stage is a drama whose 
internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation’... The 
significance of this thrust is that it ‘situates the agency of the ego.. .in a fictional 
direction’.69 The ego, that is, is a misrepresentation of the subject. Lacan sees in 
the distress caused by the motor incapacity and the anarchic desires of infants a 
‘real... prematurity of birth’ in man. This uncoordinated and dependent creature
psychoanalytic criticism, Marie Bonaparte reads Poe’s work as a series of symptoms whose 
determination she establishes from liis biography.
67 Freud describes the process of identification in tlie formation of tlie ego in ‘Group Psychology 
and tlie Analysis of tlie Ego’ ch. VII, SE XIX pp. 105-110.
68 Jacques Lacan. Ecrits: A Selection, tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge. 1977) p. 4.
69 Ibid. p. 2.
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is ‘captivated’ by the ‘lure’ of the well-formed and controlled body it sees in the 
mirror, and assumes it as ‘the armour of an alienating identity’.70 * * 73The ‘I’ or the 
‘self is constituted by what Lacan calls a meconaissance, a wilful 
misrecognition or misunderstanding, of the inner disorder and fragmentation of 
the subject, which it serves to keep unconscious.7? It is an ‘organisation of the 
passions’ caused by the subject’s desire for an identity he does not in reality 
possess.7?
In ‘Language and the Analysis of Social Laws’ (1951), the anthropologist 
Claude Levi-Strauss (b. 1908) had posed the question whether the structures of 
kinship and the structure of language were not projections of ‘universal laws 
which regulate the unconscious activities of the mind’.7? In ‘The Function and 
Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’ (1953), Lacan offers an 
answer to this question. He writes that psychoanalysis occurs entirely in the 
dimension of speech, in which the patient restructures his history through speech 
that is addressed to the analyst. He redefines the unconscious as ‘that part of the 
concrete discourse, insofar as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of 
the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse’ .74 75ft is the 
censored chapter in the history which the patient makes for himself by relating it 
to the analyst. Lacan writes, ‘The unconscious of the subject is the discourse of 
the other^r5 It is what emerges in the subject’s discourse that he has not intended 
to express. In ‘The Freudian Thing’ (1955), Lacan expresses this in the formula
Ibid. p. 4.70
;5 Ibid. p. 6.
12 Ibid. p. 19.
73 Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, tr. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest 
Schoepf (London: Penguin, 1963) p. 59. Levi-Strauss described tlie ‘structural laws’ of the 
Freudian unconscious in his essay ‘The Effectiveness of Symbols’, in ibid. pp. 186-205.
74 Lacan. Ecrits p. 49.
75 Ibid. p. 55.
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Qa parle, cit/id speaks’.7? It ‘speaks and functions in a way quite as elaborate as 
at the level of the conscious’.7? In his work on dreams, errors and jokes, Freud 
revealed that ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’.7? The activity of the 
unconscious that Freud discerned in these phenomena is governed by the laws of
language, according to Lacan.
Lacan thinks of language as it conceived by structural linguistics, that is, as a 
system of elements whose meaning consists in their difference from each other, 
and which operates by the selection and combination of these el^i^^^^^. Lacan 
calls this system the ‘symbolic’ order, ‘in the sense that symbol means pact’.?0 
The objects of exchange that constitute a primitive pact have no intrinsic use but 
signify the pact by virtue of their place within the system of exchange. 76 77 78 79 * 81 82
Symbols, that is, derive their meaning from a system rather than from a subject. 
Consequently, ‘symbols envelop the life of man in a network’ which structures 
his life, and which may be said to be its law.?? Lacan writes, ‘The law of man has 
been the law of language since the first words’.83 * 85Levi-Strauss had analysed the 
elementary structures of kinship as an exchange-system corresponding to the 
prohibition of incees-t4 Lacan writes, ‘The primordial Law ic...tTat which in 
regulating marriage ties superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a nature 
abandoned to the law of mating’.^ Lca^n relates the law of language to the
76 Ibid. p. 125. ‘Qa’ is the standard French translation of Freud’s term ‘es’, which the Standard 
Edition renders as ‘id’.
77 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, tr. Alan Sheridan (London: 
Penguin, 1977) p. 24.
78 Ibid. p. 20.
79 See Anika Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, tr. David Macey (London and New York: Routledge, 
1977) pp. 12-66 for Lacan’s debt to structural linguistics.
6 Lacan. Ecrits pp. 64, 61.
81 Ibid. p. 61.
82 Ibid. p. 68.
83 Ibid. P. 61.
M Claude Levi-Strauss. The Elementary Structures of Kinship, tr. James Harle Bell, Jolm Richard 
von Stunner and Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon, 1969).
85 Lacan, Ecrits p. 66.
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prohibition of incest that brings about the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, 
with the concept of ‘kinship nominations’. He writes, ‘It is in the name of the 
father that we must recognise the support of the symbolic function which...has 
identified his person with the figure of the law’
In ‘The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious’ (1957), Lacan describes in 
detail the relation of the unconscious to the structure of language. He takes 
Saussure’s division of the linguistic sign into signifier and signified to imply two 
independent and ‘non-overlapping networks’.*7 The system of the signifier can 
be shown to be dominant, according to Lacan, since it ‘enters the signified’. His 
well-known example of this is a picture of two identical toilet doors, marked 
‘Ladies’ and ‘Gentlemen’.** Though the signified in these two signs could 
strictly be said to be the same, the signifiers as it were enter into its realm, and 
divide it up by means of the chains of cultural associations that ramify from 
them. As a result, Lacan writes, ‘We are forced...to accept the notion of an 
incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier’^ He means that the system 
of signifiers works by reference to other elements in the system in a way that 
disrupts its correspondence to the system of signifieds. Like the symbolic order 
to which it belongs, ‘the signifier’ is an element of a system that is not centred 
on a subject. Lacan contrasts it to the sign, which ‘represents something for 
someone’; a signifier, on the other hand, ‘represents a subject for another 
signifier’.86 87 88 89 90 Lacan describes a series of ways in which this system functions,
86 Ibid. p. 67.
87 Ibid. p. 126.
88 Ibid. p. 151.
89 Ibid. p. 154.
90 Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts p. 207.
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which can be reduced to two, ‘metonymy’ and ‘metaphor’.91 The essence of 
metonymy for Lacan is ‘word-to-word connexion’, and the essence of metaphor 
is substitution of ‘one word for another’.92 The system of the signifier so 
conceived, he writes, is what Freud discovered and called the unconscious.
This is shown particularly clearly for Lacan in The Interpretation of Dreams. 
The dream, for Freud, is a rebus or picture puzzle. The images in this rebus work 
like signifiers as Lacan conceives them, that is, they signify other signifiers 
rather than their own immediate signifieds. The process of ‘distortion’ by which 
this occurs corresponds to what Lacan called the sliding of the signified under 
the signifier. The dream-work which effects this distortion follows the operation 
of the system of signifiers as Lacan conceives it. The work of condensation 
substitutes a manifest image for several latent thoughts, just as in Lacan’s 
‘metaphor’ one signifier is substituted for another. The work of displacement 
substitutes a manifest image or affect for a latent thought or affect distantly 
related to it, just as in Lacan’s ‘metonymy’ one signifier connotes another related 
to it in the system.93 He concludes that ‘the dream-work follows the laws of the 
signifier’.94 For Lacan, this demonstrates that the unconscious is a system of 
signifiers. He writes, ‘The unconscious is neither primordial nor instinctual; what 
it knows about the elementary is no more than the elements of the signifier ’.95 
This becomes apparent in neurotic symptoms, which are determined by the 
‘mechanism of metaphor’, in that they are substitutions in the subject for the 
‘signifier of the sexual trauma’. The constant ‘desire for something else’ which
91 Lacan owes tins distinction to Roman Jakobson’s essay ‘Two Aspects of Language and Two 
Types of Aphasie Disturbances’, Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle, Fundamentals of Language 
(The Hague and New York: Mouton, 1980) pp. 69-96. Jakobson compares the poles with Freud’s 
dream-work differently to Lacan, however.
92 Lacan, Ecrits pp. 156-157.
* Ibid. p. 160.
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structures the primary process operates according to the law of metonymy, 
seeking satisfaction in an object related in the signifying system of the
unconscious to the forbidden object.9?
4. Lacaciac Literary Criticism
Lacan’s seminars on aesthetic works use those works as illustrations of a 
psychoanalytic point rather than considering them in themselves./’ The most 
well-known of these discussions is Lacan’s ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter’”
(1956), in which he uses Edgar Allen Poe’s story to demonstrate ‘the decisive 
orientation which the subject receives from the itinerary of a signifier’.94 95 96 97 8 *In his
seminar of 1954-55, where the ideas were first presented, Lacan was expounding 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle. He sees the repetition-compulsion that Freud 
describes in that work to derive from the ‘insistence of the signifying chain’, that 
is, from the constitution of the subject by the symbolic order.9? Lacan argues that 
the plot of Poe’s story is based upon two structurally similar scenes, in which 
different characters occupy the same positions in the structure. In both scenes, 
Lacan writes, three subject-positions are arranged around the letter of the story’s 
title. The first subject looks at the letter but does not see it. The second sees that 
the first has not seen the letter and imagines that it is hidden. The third sees both
94 Ibid. p. 161.
95 Ibid. p. 170.
96 Ibid. pp. 166-167.
97 This is tlie case with liis seminar on ‘Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet’, tr. 
Times Hidbert, Yale French Studies 55-56 (1977) pp. 11-52.
6 Lacan, ‘Seminar on tlie Purloined Letter’, tr. Jeffrey Melilman, Yale French Studies 48 (1972) 
p. 40. Poe’s story is reprinted along with tlie critical debate provoked by Lacan’s seminar in Jolm 
P. Muller and William J. Richardson, eds.. The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida and 
Psychoanalytic Reading (Baltimore and London: Jolms Hopkins University Press, 1988).
6 Lacan, ‘Seminar on tlie Purloined Letter’ p. 39.
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these positions and the letter.100 Lacan argues that the letter of the story’s title 
can be taken to represent ‘the signifier’ in his sense of the term. Its path from 
character to character can be taken represent the symbolic order. In the story, the 
police make a detailed search of an apartment for the letter but fail to find it 
(because it is hidden in an obvious place, the letter-rack). For Lacan, this 
demonstrates that the signifier does not belong in the order of reality, but in 
another order. He writes, ‘The letter is the symbol of a pact’.101 Symbols of a 
pact are the typical elements of the symbolic for Lacan, and so he writes that the 
letter belongs in the symbolic order. We never know what it symbolises, its 
contents, and Lacan argues that we do not need to know. Since the plot is 
governed by the movement of the letter from character to character, Lacan writes 
that it is the ‘true subject’ of the story, around which the characters arrange 
themselves. 102 IbiLacan writes, ‘The displacement of the signifier determines the 
subjects in their acts’. This is shown clearly in the repetition by different 
characters of the scene with which the plot begins in the scene with which it 
ends. Lacan writes, ‘It is the letter and its diversion which governs their entries 
and roles’. 104 Poe’s story illustrates for him that ‘everything that might be 
considered the stuff of psychology’, a subject’s identity, choices and even 
gender, are determined by the autonomous structure of the symbolic order. This 
structure can thus be conceived of as the subject’s unconscious.105
Despite the difficulty of his work, Lacan’s ideas are still widely used in literary 
criticism. Here I will focus on a well-known early example of Lacanian reading,
100
101
102
103
104
105
Ibid. pp. 41-44.
Ibid. p. 58.
Ibid. p. 59.
Ibid. p. 60.
Ibid.
Ibid. p. 65.
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Shoshana Felman’s essay ‘Turning the Screw of Interpretation’ (1977).10i Henry 
James’teory ‘The Turn of the Screw’ (1908) was analysed in Freudian terms in 
1934 by Edmund Wilson, whose essay provoked debate about the validity of 
Freudian reading. Felman argues that such readings presume to ‘pull the answer 
out of its hiding place’ in the text, that is, to explain the appearance of the text 
with the reality of the mental processes described by psychoanalysis.W7 The 
questions raised by the text are answered in terms of sexuality. Felman objects to 
this kind of reading on the grounds that sexuality in Freud’s thought is not 
simple. It is conceived as a ‘conflict between two forces’, desire and 
repression. 106 107 08 Felman thus compares sexuality to rhetoric, since both are 
constituted by ‘the coexistence of dynamically antagonistic meanings’.109 110She 
writes that sexuality is not the hidden meaning of the text, as in an orthodox 
Freudian reading, but rather that ‘through which the text fails to mean’ in a 
definite or unified way.”0 Felman follows through Lacan’s dictum that ‘the 
unconscious is the discourse of the other’. She notes the prevalence of objects of 
interpretation in the story, letters, speeches and ghosts, and describes the action 
of the central character, the governess, as an attempt to reduce these ambiguities, 
to make sense of their possible senses.1” This also describes the reader’s passage 
through the story, which the text can thus be said to anticipate or to contain. 
Felman compares this reading to the psychoanalyst’s ‘reading’ of the 
unconscious of his patient through the latter’s speech, as described by Lacan.
106 In Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism (London and New York: Longman, 1994) p. 31, Maud 
Elimann calls tliis essay 'one of the finest examples of psychoanalytic criticism to date’. In 
Psychoanalytic Criticism (London: Routledge, 1984) p. 131, Elizabeth Wriglit calls it 
‘exemplary’.
107 Shoshana Fehnan. ‘Turning tlie Screw of Interpretation’, Yale French Studies 55-56 (1977) p.
105.
108 Ibid. p. 110.
109Ibid. p. 112.
110 Ibid. It should be clear tliat she is as influenced by Paul de Man as by Lacan.
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She points out that the Freudian critic behaves like the story’s central character
in attempting to reduce its ambiguities to a definite meaning. Both thereby
repress the unconscious in the text. Felman writes:
In seeking to ‘explain’ and master literature, in...killing...that which, 
within speech, is incapable of speaking,... the psychoanalytic 
reading... turns out to be a reading which represses the 
unconscious...wTicT it purports to be ‘explaining’.
The governess can be seen by a Freudian critic to repress the sexual desires that 
she has herself and perceives in other characters. The Freudian critic, on the 
other hand, can be seen to repress the polysemy of the text, which for Felman 
represents the structure of the unconscious. The Lacanian critic, she writes, is 
attentive to the ‘incessant slippage... of the signifying chain from link to link’ 
which is the reality of the text as the ‘discourse of the other’.11’
5. Julia Kristeva
Julia KaisInva (b. 1941) came from Bulgaria to Paris in 1965 on a doctoral 
scholarship, where she worked with many of the leading intellectual figures of 
the period, including Roland Barthes. She published widely in semiotics, with 
emphasis on works of avant-garde literature, and became professor of linguistics 
at the University of Paris VII in 1974. Under the influence of the linguist Emile 
Benvemste and of Lacan, Kaisteva’s work was increasingly influenced by 
psychoanalysis, and she set up practice as a psychoanalyst in 1979.”14 111 * 113 114
111 Ibid. p. 155.
"? Ibid. p. 193.
113 Ibid.
114 See Ross Mitchell Guberman, ed., Julia Kristeva: Interviews (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 1996) pp. 3-58 for further biograpliicai information.
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In her lengthy doctoral thesis Revolution in Poetic Language (1974), Kristeva 
elaborates a psychoanalytic account of the process of literary signification and of 
its effects in society. She writes, ‘The text is a practice that could be compared to 
political revolution; the one brings about in the subject what the other introduces 
in society’.115 116 117 118 119 120The problem with structuralist semiotics for Kristeva is that it does 
not account for the subject, except as a transcendental ego which performs the 
combinatory operations analysed by semiotics. If semiotics is to account for the 
split or ‘decentred’ subject of psychoanalysis, it must describe the conditions that 
produce the ego as the ‘subject of enunciation’.1^ Structuralism is a science of 
the symbolic order, but it does not account for the passage of the subject of 
language through the Oedipus complex into that order.”7 In order to formulate a 
theory of language that accounts for the subject’s history in this way, Kristeva 
argues that there are two modes of the signifying process, which she calls ‘the 
semiotic’ and ‘the symbolic’.”* The semiotic mode derives from the pre-Oedipal 
organisation of the subject’s drives or instincts.”9 Kristeva borrows Plato’s term 
for ‘space’, chora, to describe this organisation, which she conceives in the 
terms we have seen Freud use in the ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’. She
writes:
Discrete quantities of energy move through the body of the 
subject...and...are arranged according to the various constraints imposed 
on this body...by family and social structures.”®
115 Julia Kristeva. Revolution in Poetic Language, tr. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984) p. 17.
116 Ibid. pp. 30. 36.
117 See also ‘Tlie System and tlie Speaking Subject’, Toril Moi, ed., The Kristeva Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) pp. 25-33.
118 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language p. 24.
119 Kristeva’s translators render her term ‘pulsion’ as ‘drive’. It translates Freud’s term ’trieb’, 
which tlie Standard Edition usually renders as ‘instinct’.
120 Ibid. p. 25.
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Before the ego begins to be formed in the mirror stage, the subject’s experience 
is determined by the influxes of discharges of energy that Freud described in the 
‘Project’. Kristeva calls these ‘drives and stases’, and hypothesises a ‘chora’ 
which constitutes their ‘essentially mobile and extremely provisional 
articulation’.”. In Plato’s Timaeus, ‘chora’ refers to the space in which created 
things exist.”’ It is neither of the order of eternal ideas nor of the order of their 
created images, but a third term necessary to conceive the relation between these 
two orders. It is an ‘invisible and formless being which receives all things’.”’ 
Plato calls it ‘the receptacle...of all generation’ or becoming.”4 Katie va 
hypothesises an analogous space in the mind, in which the flux of drive and 
stasis takes place. Like Plato’s space, the ‘semiotic chora’ is neither intelligible 
nor sensible, because it precedes the symbolic order in which anything can be 
predicated of it. Nevertheless, it is that from which the symbolic is produced. 
The flux of drive and stasis which constitutes it is expressed in the amorphous 
pre-Oedipal subject in sounds and gestures. It is ordered by the infant’s relation 
to its mother’s body, through which it experiences her educational procedures as 
a kind of mediation of the symbolic order in which she lives. The sounds and 
gestures are organised into loosely defined units of rhythm and intonation by the 
maternal organisation of the chora. Kristeva writes, ‘Phonic..., kinetic or 
chromatic units and differences are the marks of [the] stases in the drives’.”.
This vocal flux which characterises the semiotic mode Kristeva sees as a
precursor to the symbolic mode, or the ‘logico-syntactic articulation’ of * * *
121 Ibid.
122 Plato. Timaeus 49c-51b. Toril Moi's erroneous assertion tliat tlie word means 'enclosed space 
or womb’ {The Kristeva Reader p. 12) can cause confusion. Wiilst Plato likens the chora to a 
mother, the space he has in mind is not all enclosed, but the open and indefinite space in which 
things exist and change.
123 Timaeus 51a.
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language.124 125 26 Entry into language-use, however, demands the crucial step of 
‘establishing the identification of the subject and object as preconditions of 
propositionality’.127 The infant, that is, needs to develop an ‘I’, a sense of 
himself as an independent entity in a world composed of similar entities. 
Kristeva follows Lacan in tracing the beginning of this process to the mirror 
stage and finding its completion in the ‘discovery of castration’ by which the 
Oedipus complex is dissolved. Only in this way can he assume the subject 
position demanded by language and form propositions about objects. This 
‘rupture’ with the amorphous pre-Oedipal relation to the mother Kristeva calls 
the ‘thetic phase’, from the Greek word for ‘position’, because the subject begins 
to assume his part in the positional structure effected by language in order to 
articulate conceptual positions.128 She writes, ‘The thetic posits the signifiable 
object: it posits signification as both a denotation (of an object) and an 
enunciation (of a displaced subject)’.129 This phase, that of language-learning, 
constitutes ‘an acute...confrontation between positing-separating-identifying and 
the motility of the semiotic chora’.130 It leads the child into the ‘symbolic’ mode 
of language, that is, the symbolic order as conceived by Lacan. Kristeva writes, 
‘Symbolic would seem an appropriate term for this always split unification that 
is produced by a rupture’, since the word’s etymology connotes two split parts 
joined to form a token.131
The signifying process, once the subject has passed into the symbolic order, 
consists of a constant struggle between its semiotic and symbolic modes.
124 Ibid. 49a.
125 Kristeva. Revolution in Poetic Language p. 28.
126 Ibid. p. 62.
127 Ibid. p. 43.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid. p. 54.
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Kristeva writes, ‘Although originally a precondition of the symbolic, the 
semiotic functions within signifying practices as the result of a transgression of 
the symbolic’.130 131 32 13  134 135 136 137The semiotic, the unconscious of language, tends to irrupt in it 
like a symptom. This, for Kristeva, occurs more in certain types of language than 
others, and is most pronounced in poetic language. The function of poetic 
language, she writes, is ‘to introduce through the symbolic that which works on, 
moves through and threatens it’.1”3 Kristeva’s concept of the symbolic, like 
Lacan’s, includes every kind of systematic regulation of individual satisfaction 
in society, such as law, religion and political structures. With Levi-Strauss in 
mind, she writes:
Social anthropology reconfirms [the] equivalence between the symbolic 
and the social when it considers society’s various means of self­
regulation. .. as languages. n4
Kristeva calls the archaic individual satisfaction repressed by the symbolic order
‘jouissance’, which term denotes intense pleasure and connotes both loss of self
and orgasml’i What occurs in art, she writes, is that
in cracking the socio-symbolic order, splitting it open, changing 
vocabulary and syntax, the word itself and releasing from beneath them 
the drives borne by vocalic or kinetic differences, jouissance works its 
way into the social and symbolic.*”6
Poetry is the enactment in language of this infiltration of jouissance into the 
symbolic. In ‘From One Identity to an Other’ (1975), Kristeva writes, ‘Poetic 
language... would be the equivalent of incest’ from the perspective of law. The 
social effect of this kind of language, Kristeva writes, is that it ‘[disturbs] the
130 Ibid. p. 47.
131 Ibid. p. 49.
132 Ibid. p. 68.
133 Ibid. p. 81.
134 Ibid. p. 72.
135 See Jolm Leclite, Julia Kristeva (London and New York: Routledge, 1990) p. 67.
136 Kristeva, op. cit. p. 80.
137 Kristeva. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. Leon Roudiez 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) p. 136.
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logic that dominated the social order [of an era]...througS that logic itself, by 
assuming and unravelling its position, its syntheses and hence the ideologies it 
controls’.”8
In the second part of Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva analyses the 
semiotic mode perceptible in the poetic texts of Stephane Mallarme and the 
Comte de Lautreamont. She calls this semiotic process the ‘genotext’, that is, the 
text considered in terms of its generation, as opposed to the ‘phenotext’, the 
finished product as it appears and is exchanged in the symbolic order. 138 39 In 
Mallarme’s poem ‘Prose’, Kristeva points out the accumulation of groups of 
phonemes, or units of sound, in certain lines and their repetition in certain 
stanzas. They constitute a ‘phonic insistence [which] establishes itself as the 
predominant organisational principle in the text, almost effacing the underlying 
metric processes’.140 141 142Kristeva compares this ‘phonetic’ organisation of the text, 
which underlies its semantic and syntactic organisation, to the utterance of 
infants who produce all possible sounds before they learn the limited set of them 
which constitute their national language. Each of the phonemes brings with it a
‘semantic constellation’ derived from its association with all the other words and 
forms in which it appear*.1** These phonemic groups constitute a ‘network of 
semantic values which are not necessarily those of the morphemes [units of 
form] and lexemes [units of vocabulary] given in the phenotext’.*4’ Kristeva 
relates the infant’s production of sounds and gradual awareness of their 
difference to the drive activity which animates him. She finds that the first pair
138 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language p. 83.
139 Ibid. pp. 86-88.
140 Kristeva, La Revolution du Langage Poetique (Paris: Seuil, 1974) p. 221. Citations from this 
work are in my translation.
141 Ibid. p. 222.
142 Ibid.
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of phonemes, the labial nasal liquid /m/ of‘mama’ and the labial explosive /p/ of 
‘papa’, ‘translate suction and explosion,...[or] incorporative orality and 
destructive anality, into articulation’.143 In a similar way, she attributes a series 
of phonemes to a series of drives, assigning the liquids (1), (m) and (n) and the 
closed front vowels to the oral drive, the open back vowels to the anal drive, and 
the apical (r) (as in the French ‘rien’) to the phallic drive.144 So in the first stanza 
of Mallarme’s ‘Prose’, Kristeva traces two series of phonemes, one of which 
articulates aggressive phallic and anal drives (/tR/, /dR/, /f7; and /gR/ 
respectively) and the other the incorporative oral drive (/m/). She notes that the 
group /tR/ is semantically overdetermined by its occurrence in other lines of 
Mallarme’s that denote rupture or birth.145 In this way, she traces in detail the 
play of drives that underlies the symbolic organisation of the poem, inscribed in 
the physical qualities of its sounds.
In her later works, Kristeva reads literary texts as examples of certain psychic 
orientations. In Powers of Horror (1980), she describes the mechanism of 
‘abjection’, or the pre-symbolic rejection of the mother which leads to a sense of 
disgust, and she reads the work of Louis-Ferdinand Celine in terms of this 
process. She argues that ‘Celine’s narrative is a narrative of suffering and 
horror...because his whole narrative stance seems controlled by the necessity of 
going through abjection’.146 In Tales of Love (1983), she offers a psychoanalytic
143 Ibid. p. 225.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid. p. 244.
146 Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay 
Columbia University Press, 1982) p. 141.
on Abjection, tr. Leon S. Roudiez (New York:
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account of love, and explains a series of literary works in the terms of this
147account.
(ii) Psychoanalysis and Christianity
In order to assess the value of these theories for Christian literary theory, I will 
examine some of the relations between psychoanalysis and Christian theology. 
For Freud, the scientific world-view in which psychoanalysis was conceived 
prohibited assent to religious doctrines.1” In this section, I will ask whether this 
assertion is justified. I will examine some psychoanalytic interpretations of 
Christianity and some Christian interpretations of psychoanalysis, in order to 
establish the degree to which Christian literary theory can or should use the 
methodologies of psychoanalytic literary theory.
1. Freud on Religion
I will begin with an analysis of Freud’s views on religion. In Totem and Taboo 
(1912), he offers a genetic account of religious rites, comparing the primitive 
phenomenon of taboo, in which objects and people are extremely venerated and 
so considered untouchable, to the symptoms of obsessional neurosis. 
Psychoanalysts, he writes, are in frequent contact with ‘people who have created 
for themselves individual taboo prohibitions... and who obey them just as strictly
147 Kristeva, Tales of Love, tr. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 
pp. 209-233, 280-296, 318-331.
148 See ‘The Question of a Weltanschaurmg’, PFL 2 pp. 193-219.
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as savages obey [their] communal taboos’.*49 They call them obsessional 
neurotics. Freud summarises the similarities between the prohibitions involved in 
this kind of neurosis and those involved in taboo: neither has an apparent motive, 
both carry a strong sense of obligation, both can easily be displaced onto 
different objects by a kind of ‘infection’, and both give rise to the performance 
of ceremonial acts.15® Psychoanalysis explains obsessional symptoms as the 
result of a repressed instinct, typically concerning touching. An obsessional 
neurotic has a strong unconscious wish for something, and a correspondingly 
strong conscious disgust for its fulfilment. Freud calls this object-relation 
‘ambivalent’.*” The tension caused by this conflict is discharged in a ramifying 
series of obsessive practices that approach increasingly closely in sense to the 
originally prohibited activity. Freud applies this diagnosis to the corresponding 
phenomena of taboo which, he writes, must derive from a series of ancient 
prohibitions placed upon a generation by its ancestors. ‘These prohibitions must 
have concerned activities towards which there was a strong inclination’.*” Given 
that the taboos still persist among primitive peoples, the original desire must also 
persist. Freud concludes, ‘The basis of taboo is a prohibited action, for 
performing which a strong inclination exists in the unconscious’.*”
In his essay on totemism, the primitive religious system in which clans are 
identified by an animal or object which they regard as an ancestor, Freud 
established that the strongest taboo prohibitions were the two laws not to kill the
totem animal and to avoid sexual intercourse with members of the same totem
clan. He cites his case-study of ‘Little Hans’ and a case of child analysis
149 PFL 13 p. 79.
150 Ibid. p. 82.
151 Ibid. p. 83.
152 Ibid. p. 85.
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published by Sandor Ferenczi, in which children are seen to display attitudes to 
an animal comparable to primitive attitudes towards totem animals. These are 
identification with the animal and ambivalent emotions towards it. Since these
are the relations in which men stand to their fathers, according to psychoanalysis, 
Freud hypothesises that the totem animal represents the father. It follows from 
this that the taboos against killing the animal and sexual relations within the 
totem clan ‘coincide...with the two primal wishes of children’ which constitute 
the Oedipus complex, murder of the father and sexual relations with the 
mother.* 154 It is probable, Freud concludes, that ‘the totemic system...was a
product of the conditions involved in the Oedipus complex’.155 He goes on to 
consider the primitive rites in which the totem animal or a representative of it is 
sacrificed and eaten by the community in a ceremonial meal. He combines these 
facts with Charles Darwin’s hypothesis in The Descent of Man (1871) of the 
‘primal horde’, that is, that the earliest human societies comprised groups made 
up of an aggressive father who kept all the females to himself and jealously 
drove away the sons. From these data Freud tentatively elaborates an account of 
the origin of religion. 156 There came a time when the expelled sons came 
together and killed the father of the primal horde. Since they were savages they 
ate their victim. The totem meal represents a joyful commemoration of this 
ancient crime. As with all sons, the brothers had an ambivalent complex of 
emotions towards their father, both loving him and hating him, and later felt 
remorse for their crime. In the process Freud calls ‘deferred obedience’ they 
attempted to atone for their crime by forbidding the killing of the totem animal,
!53 Ibid. p. 86.
154 Ibid. p. 192.
155 Ibid. pp. 192-193.
156 Ibid. pp. 203-208.
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the representative of the father, and by resigning their claim to the women set 
free for them by their parricide. The two fundamental taboos of totemism thus 
arose as a means of allaying the guilt aroused by this ancient crime.
Freud goes on to hypothesise that ‘all later religions are...attempts at solving 
the same problem’.157 158 159Throughout the development of religion from totemism to 
monotheism, according to Freud, ‘God is nothing other than an exalted father’.*5* 
He sees the same Oedipal complex of attitudes to the father at work in 
Christianity. Christ sacrificed himself, and so redeemed the company of brothers 
(the Christian community) from their original sin. This sin, since it required a 
death for its atonement, must itself have been a murder. Since the original sin in 
Christian theology, according to Freud, was one against God the Father, it must
have been a murder of the father. He writes;
In the Christian doctrine...men were acknowledging in the most 
undisguised manner the guilty primeval deed, since they found the fullest 
atonement for it in the sacrifice of this one son.
Their rebellious emotions towards the father find expression in the displacement 
of a religion of the father by a religion of the son, Freud goes on. In communion, 
the brothers eat and identify with the son just as the totem animal is eaten and 
identified with in totemism. In Moses and Monotheism (1939), Freud applies his 
theory to Judaism. He argues that the God represented by Moses was revered as 
a father.160 161Although hostility towards him was largely repressed, the strictness 
of the Jewish Law, Freud writes, derives from ‘the sense of guilt felt on account 
of a suppressed hostility to God’.*®*
157 Ibid. p. 206.
158 Ibid. p. 209.
159 Ibid. p. 216.
160 Ibid. pp. 356-370.
161 Ibid. p. 384.
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In The Future of an Illusion (1927), Freud discusses the value of religious 
ideas in civilisation. He defines religious ideas as those not arrived at by 
empirical observation and inference but which nevertheless lay claim to our 
belief. Whilst they are the most potentially useful concepts that civilisation 
provides, he writes, religious ideas are also the least well authenticated. Freud 
accounts for their persistence by suggesting that they are ‘illusions, fulfilments 
of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind’.*6’ By an illusion, he 
means an imaginary wish-fulfilment. The wishes from which religion arises, 
according to Freud, derive from the experience of helplessness both of each 
individual in his early infancy and of the human race in its early stages of 
development. He writes, ‘A store of ideas is created, born from man’s need to 
make his helplessness tolerable’.*®’ Civilisation is constructed as a means of 
defending man from the superior power of nature and the WUFFrnreAe of fate. 
Religious ideas develop, according to Freud, as a part of this process of 
civilisation. Primitive man tries to overcome his helplessness with respect to 
natural forces by peopling the world with anthropomorphic spirits and relating to 
them in religious rites. Human helplessness in the face of nature recalls each 
individual’s helplessness as an infant, when he feared his father but also hoped 
for and experienced his protection. So primitive men gave their deities the 
ambivalent character of a father. As religious ideas develop to keep pace with 
natural science, Freud writes, ‘man’s helplessness remains, and along with it his 
longing for his father and the gods’.*®4 Judaism eventually allowed men to relate 
to God precisely as to a father, and was followed in this by Christianity. As in 
Totem and Taboo, Freud concludes that religion is something like ‘the universal
162 SE XXI p. 30.
163 Ibid. p. 18.
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obsessional neurosis of humanity... [which] arose out of the Oedipus 
complex’.*®5 We project onto God the precepts of morality that are in fact the 
result of the process of civilisation, in which the pleasure principle is renounced 
in favour of the reality principle. In Freud’s view, science has brought humanity 
to the point where it is time to mature from the infantile religious attitude, and 
‘honestly admit the purely human origin of all the...precepts of civilisation’.*6® 
In this way, people could understand that these precepts were made to serve
them rather than to rule them.
2. An Assessment of Freud’s Atheism
It is difficult to take the genetic account of Christianity that Freud gives in
Totem and Taboo seriously. It looks like unsubstantiated mythology and that is
on the whole what it is. As A.L. Kroeber writes in his review of Totem and
Taboo, ‘The mere extrication and presentation of the...hypothesis...is probably 
sufficient to prevent its acceptance’.*®7 We should note first of all that Freud’s 
texts on religion contain many qualifications and acknowledgements of the 
speculative nature of their assertions. The argument for the development of 
religion from an Oedipal complex of emotions enacted in an ancient parricide 
depends on the identification of the totem animal with the father, which is based
on two case studies of neurotic children. Freud does not tell us whether these
children’s displacement of their attitudes towards their fathers onto animals is 
typical, and it is difficult to believe that this is the case on the basis of only two
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid. p. 43.
166 Ibid. p. 41.
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studies. This is especially true since in one of the cases, the boy's ‘totemic
interests did not arise in direct relation with the Oedipus complex but on the
basis of its...precondition, the castration complex'.167 68 169 170 171 172Freud writes of his
identification of the totem animal with the father that it leads to his conclusions,
‘if this equation is anything more than a misleading trick of chance'.^9 He
merely asserts as a result that it is ‘probable' that totemism is a product of the
Oedipus complex. *'9 But even this is an overstatement if the premise on which it
is based has no more support than Freud has described. As for the myth of the
primal horde from which he derives religion, Freud writes:
The lack of precision in what I have written...may be attributed to the 
reserve necessitated by the nature of the topic. It would be as foolish to 
aim at exactitude...as it would be unfair to insist upon certainty.*7*
Freud points out at various points in his argument some of the inadequacies 
that force themselves upon him. He acknowledges that in deriving religion from 
a father-complex he cannot account for the development of mother-goddesses, 
whose worship may have preceded that of father-gods.*72 His explanation of the 
Christian eucharist is awkward. Whilst describing Christianity as a son-religion 
that displaces the father-religion, and acknowledging that the Christian meal is a 
consumption of the son, Freud nevertheless asserts, ‘The Christian communion, 
however, is essentially a fresh elimination of the father', like a totem meal.*”3 
Freud gives no explanation for this transition from eating the son (which is what 
happens) to eating the father (which supports his argument). We can accept his
167 A.L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Cliicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1952) p. 302.
168 PFL 13 p. 190. We might add that it is difficult to describe the castration complex as the 
‘precondition’ of the Oedipus complex in boys, since Freud usually describes the former as a 
result of tlie latter.
169 Ibid. p. 192.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid. p. 204.
172 Ibid. p. 211.
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citation from J.G. Frazer, that the Christian communion represents an absorption 
of a pre-Christian ritual, but not Freud’s own assertion that it represents 
consumption of a father. When Freud comes to discuss the phylogenetic 
assumptions that underlie his hypotheses, he writes, Tt must be admitted that 
these are grave difficulties...Any explanation that could avoid presumption of 
such a kind would seem to be preferable’.*74 There is no doubt that Freud’s 
confession of presumption is justified with respect to his method of argument. 
Unsupported speculation underlies many of the fundamental theses of Totem, and 
Taboo. As a result, whilst it is compelling for its imaginative quality, we cannot 
accept it as a true account of the origin of religion.
We should also note that anthropology and history of religion have not 
accepted Freud’s arguments. Concerning Freud’s account of the primal horde, 
which he constructed from Darwin and J.J. Atkinson, the anthropologist A.L. 
Kroeber writes, ‘The Darwin-Atkinson supposition is only hypothetical’.* ”5 ‘It is 
a mere guess’, he writes, that the earliest organisation of human society was so 
organised.*’® Levi-Strauss, who is sympathetic to psychoanalysis, nevertheless 
writes of ‘the gratuitousness of the hypothesis of the male horde and of 
primitive murder’, which makes Totem and Taboo anthropologically 
unacceptable.*”7 It constitutes a vicious circle, deriving the social state from 
events that presuppose it. Levi-Strauss writes, ‘The desire for the mother or the 
sister, the murder of the father and the sons’ repentance, undoubtedly do not
173
174
175
176
177
Ibid. p. 217.
Ibid. p. 220.
Kroeber, The Nature of Culture p. 302.
Ibid.
Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship p. 491.
163
correspond to any facts or group of facts occupying a given place in history’. 
The importance Freud attaches to the totem meal is based on W. Robertson 
Smith’s assertion that sacrifice was the essential feature of primitive religion.
Kroeber writes:
Robertson Smith’s allegation that blood sacrifice is central in ancient cult 
holds chiefly for the Mediterraneanoid culture of a certain ..It
does not apply to regions outside the sphere of affection by these 
cultoires.i®0
In his book Anthroplogy (1923), Kroeber traced the development of religion 
among the Californian Indians. The earliest rites he found there were a girls’ 
adolescence rite and a victory dance, which contradicts Freud’s premise that the 
totem meal is the earliest and basic religious rite.*** In Structure and Function in 
Primitive Society (1952), the anthropologist A.R. Radcliffe-Brown writes of the 
diversity of totemic rites, and of the impossibility of assigning a single origin to 
them. He asserts, Tt is clear that the very diverse forms of totemism that exist all 
over the world must have had very diverse origins’.**’ Any thesis such as 
Freud’s which attempts to speak of an origin of totemism must assume that all its 
diverse forms are modifications of a single form. Radcliffe-Brown writes, ‘There 
does not seem...to be a particle of evidence to justify such an assumption’.**’ 
Even if one makes it, he continues, the resulting assertions of what this original 
form of totemism was, how the existing forms were produced from it, and how it 
came into existence itself, can be no more than speculation. He writes, ‘Such
178 Ibid. Levi-Strauss also objects to Freud's equation of ontogenesis and phylogenesis. He 
writes, ‘The most primitive culture is still as adult culture, and as such is incompatible with 
infantile manifestations even in the most highly developed civilisation (ibid. p. 92).
^91P-L 13 p. 193.
180 Kroeber. The Nature of Culture p. 302.
181 A.L. Kroeher, Anthropology (London: Harrap, 1923) pp. 300-316.
182 A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society: Essays and Addresses 
(New York and London: The Free Press, 1952) p. 122.
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speculations, being for ever incapable of inductive verification, can...have no 
value for a science of culture’. 183 84 Radcliffe-Brown asserts that religious rites are 
symbolic expressions that regulate and perpetuate the sentiments on which the 
constitution of a given society depends. Religions therefore vary according to the 
structure of the society in which they function. 185 To account for totemism, and a 
fortiori religion in general, in terms of a universal phylogenetic heritage, as 
Freud did, is for Radcliffe-Brown simply a category mistake.
We should also note that Freud admits that his psychoanalytic account of 
religion is not exhaustive but rather contributes to an understanding of one of its 
many determinants. He writes:
If psychoanalysis is compelled... to lay all the emphasis on one particular 
source [of religion], that does not mean it is claiming either that that 
source is the only one or that it occupies first place [among the many 
sources].186
He points out that in designating religious ideas as illusions he is not concerned 
with their truth but only with their ‘psychological nature'.187 188He writes, ‘To 
assess the tmth-value of religious doctrines does not lie within the scope of the 
present enquiry'.m He adds that the analogy he draws between religious and 
infantile attitudes ‘does not...exhaust the essential nature of religion’.1897. is 
right to make these qualifications, since the thesis that religious ideas are wish-
fulfilments does not entail a conclusion about their truth-value. Freud’s
hypothesis that we project onto God our infantile and inherited attitudes to our
183 Ibid. In Freud and the Problem of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) p. 67, Hans 
Kung writes that the claim that any form of religion was everywhere original is ‘a dogmatic 
postulate, not a historically proved fact’.
184 Radcliffe-Brown. Structure and Function, p. 122.
185 Ibid. pp. 157-161.
186 PEL 13 p. 159.
187 SE XXI p. 33.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid. p. 43. See Freud’s letter to Oskar Pfister of 9 February 1909, in wliicli he writes, “In 
itself psychoanalysis is neither religious nor irr<2Jligious but an impartial tool’. Psychoanalysis and
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fathers is indebted to Feuerbach’s projection theory, which we have seen also 
influenced Marx.190 In Freud and the Problem of God (1979), Hans Kung argues 
that Freud’s illusion-theory must be judged in the same way as Feuerbach’s 
projection-theory, as ‘a hypothesis which has not been conclusively proved’.191 192
No doubt religion can be an expression of neurotic regression to infantile 
attitudes, as Freud asserts, but it does not follow from this that this is always the 
case. No doubt belief in God is structured by a child’s attitude to its parents, but 
it does not follow from this that God has no independent existence. As Kung 
writes, ‘A real God may certainly correspond to the wish for God’.^ The case 
cannot be proved either way.
Freud’s critique of religion in The Future of an Illusion nevertheless has its 
value. His comparison of religious practices with obsessional neurosis can be 
taken as a description of the ease with which such practices can slip into 
automatic and meaningless rituals which do not contribute to a deeper relation 
with God but are motivated by fear or by guilt. Freud’s comment that religious 
people have ‘always known how to externalise the precepts of religion and thus 
to nullify their intentions’ is also fair.! He is right to assert that religion can be 
a means of avoiding a responsible moral life rather than an incentive or 
encouragement to one. His wish-fulfilment theory similarly reflects the fact that 
religion can degenerate into a means of avoiding an encounter with the
Faith: The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Oskar Pfster, ed. Heinrich Meng and Ernst L. Freud 
(London: Hogarth, 1962) p. 17.
190 See Ralph D. Wood, “Psychoanalysis and Fundamentalism: A Lesson from Feminist 
Critiques of Freud', in Janet Liebman Jacobs and Donald Capps, eds., Religion, Society and 
Psychoanalysis (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997) p. 59, In ‘Christianity and Psychoanalysis Part I: 
Jesus as the Anti-Oedipus’, Journal of Psychology and Theology 12 (1984), Paul C. Vitz and 
John Gartner write that Freud read Feuerbach avidly in his youth (p. 12). In The Essence of 
Christianity, tr. from the German, (New York: Harper, 1957) p. 33, Feuerebach argues that ‘in 
religion man contemplates his own nature’.
191 Kung, Freud and the Problem of God p. 76.
192 Ibid. p. 78.
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transcendent reality of God rather than constituting such an encounter. Freud’s 
critique of potential psychological over-simplicity in theological concepts 
reminds Christian theology of the complexity of the psyche for which it must
account.
It is clear, however, that Freud’s theories are not as incompatible with religion 
as he himself asserts. His argument that certain Christian doctrines have their 
origin in an ancient parricide is no more than speculation, and has been rejected 
as such by anthropology. His thesis that totemism is the original form of religion 
has also been rejected, upon which his account of the Oedipus complex as the 
source of religion depended. His wish-fulfilment theory has no implication for 
the question of the existence of God, but provides an ethical critique of certain 
degenerate forms of religion. There is nothing in Freud’s studies on religion that 
presents a serious obstacle to Christian belief, and the last point constitutes a 
certain amount of shared ground with it. What this means for Christian literary 
theory is that Freud’s thought on religion does not prevent us from using 
psychoanalytic critical methodology when it seems appropriate to do so.
3, Jung and Fromm on Religion
It is well known that Freud’s atheism was not shared by many other 
psychoanalysts. Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) points out that Freud’s illusion 
theory is ‘based on the rationalistic materialism of the scientific views current in 
the late nineteenth century’.194 In Psychology and Religion (1938), Jung argues 
that God is a psychological reality. He defines a religious event in accordance
193 SE XXI p. 37.
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with Rudolf Otto’s concept of the ‘numinous’, that is, as ‘a dynamic existence or 
effect not caused by an arbitrary act of will’.194 95 196 197For Jung religion denotes ‘the 
attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been altered by the experience of 
the numinosum’.n On this definition, experiences that proceed from the 
unconscious can be called religious. Jung’s unconscious is not the seat of 
repressed instincts, as Freud conceives it, but ‘an illimitable and indefinable 
addition to every personality’.^7 For Jung, an individual’s personality consists of 
a more or less definable conscious part and an unconscious part about which we 
only know what we must infer to explain certain psychological facts that cannot 
be attributed to consciousness. Certain dreams that Jung analyses contain clear 
and authoritative voices that on waking have the force of an intuition. 
‘They...contain a superior analysis or insight which consciousness has not been 
able to produce’.198 R^r Jung these constitute an ‘immediate experience’ of the 
numinous, that is, of an unknown factor that impinges upon consciousness from 
without. Hence he calls them a ‘basic religious phenomenon’.199
Certain Christian dogmas, such as those of the Incarnation, the Trinity and the 
Virgin Birth, Jung sees as such articulations of the unconscious. They appear so 
frequently in analysis and in the history of religions that he concludes that they 
also come to the consciousness of individuals and groups from another source 
than conscious decision. He writes, ‘The dogma is like a dream, reflecting the 
spontaneous and autonomous activity of the objective psyche, the
194 Jung, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Cure of Souls’, Collected Works Vol. 11, tr. RFC. Hull
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p. 349. ,
195 Jung, Psychology and Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) p. 4.
196 Ibid. p. 6.
197 Ibid. p. 47.
198 Ibid. p. 149.
199 Ibid. p. 46.
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unconscious'.2J Jung’s unconscious contains collective material as well as 
individual, whose existence he induces from the repeated occurrence of certain 
motifs in the mythology and folklore of different peoples. He calls these motifs 
‘archetypes’ and defines them as ‘forms or images of a collective nature which 
occur practically all over the earth as constituents of myths and at the same time 
as autochthonous, individual products of unconscious origin’.200 01 He finds that 
symbols of quaternity are archetypes of ‘a world-creating deity’.202 This is 
particularly the case when the number four is combined with the circle form, 
such as in a quartered circle. Jung supports this assertion by a series of 
references to ancient and medieval philosophy and theology. God’s unity and 
infinity are symbolised by the circle, and the four elements of creation by the 
quaternity. Jung writes, ‘The four symbolises the parts, qualities and aspects of 
the One,...a more or less direct representation of the God manifested in his 
creation’.223 These comparisons, Jung writes, ‘prove the existence of an 
archetypal image of the Deity’, whose frequency makes its existence ‘a 
noteworthy fact for any theologia naturalis' ,204 205The most complete form of this 
symbol in Jung’s experience is the mandala, a Buddhist symbol of the universe, 
typically composed of a series of concentric circles surrounding a series of 
squares. In analysis, Jung found that production of this symbol expressed a 
feeling of harmony. He writes that it represents an experience of wholeness, of 
reconciliation of the conscious personality with the uncorueious.2e5 Before the 
existence of God was doubted, according to Jung, man would project
200 Ibid. p. 57.
201 Ibid. p. 63.
202 Ibid. p. 71.
203 IbicL pp. 71-72.
204 Ibid. p. 73.
205 Ibid. p. 99.
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unconscious experience onto the gods. Nowadays, if he is to achieve mental
stability, he must recognise these experiences as part of a greater self than that of
which he is conscious. The mandala symbolises this recognition and hence ‘the
transformation of man into a divine being’.206 For Jung, religion proved very
often to be a necessity for this kind of internal integration, upon which he saw
mental health to depend. In ‘Psychotherapists or the Clergy’ (1932), he writes:
Every one [of my patients over thirty-five] fell ill because he had lost 
what the living religions...have given to their followers, and none of 
them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook.207
Jung does not directly contradict Freud’s thesis that no independently existent 
reality corresponds to our religious ideas. He asserts primarily that these ideas 
correspond to a psychic reality. He does not see this kind of explanation as 
reductive, however. In ‘Transformation Symbolism in the Mass’ (1954), he
writes:
The modem psychologist is aware that he can produce no more than a 
description...of a psychic process whose real nature transcends 
consciousness just as much as does the mystery of life or of matter. At no 
point has he explained the mystery itself.208
Jung remained a Christian to the end of his life, although he thought that 
Christianity lacked a proper explanation of the unconscious.209 He makes no 
judgement on the independent existence of God, since he regards such a 
judgement to lie outside the field of psychology, but he clearly asserts that his 
own branch of psychology acknowledges that such existence is possible. It is 
certainly a psychic reality, acceptance of which in religious belief leads to 
increased mental well-being, and for some may be a necessary condition of such 
well-being. In Jung’s thought, psychoanalysis neither contradicts the doctrines of
2 Ibid. p. 112.
207 Jung, ‘Psychotherapists or the Clergy’, Collected Works Vol. lip. 334.
208 ‘Transformation Symbolism in the Mass’, Collected Works Vol. lip. 296.
170
Christianity nor implies that assent to them is a psychic delusion whose reality is
to be explained by psychoanalysis.
Erich Fromm (1900-1980) criticises what he sees as Jung’s exclusively 
psychological perspective on religion. In Psychoanalysis and Religion (1951), he 
attempts to widen the scope of the question by considering the social dimension 
of the psychology of religion. He defines religion as ‘any system of thought and 
action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an 
object of devotion’.209 10 On this definition, every person needs religion to help him 
solve the inescapable problem of his existence and to achieve some degree of 
synthesis of his conflicting energies into a mature social life. There is no-one 
without religion, according to Fromm. The question is only to which kind of 
religion a person adheres. Man ‘has only the choice of better or 
worse^nSatisfactory or destructive forms of religions’211 212fro mm discusses 
several modern religions, such as devotion to a state or to a company, but finds
that the basic distinction to be drawn is that between ‘authoritarian’ and 
‘humanistic’ reli^i^c^n^.m The former constitutes essentially ‘surrender to a 
power transcending man’ which has the right to demand his obedience. 213 
Calvinism and totalitarianism are examples of this kind of system. Humanistic 
religion, on the other hand, is based on ‘man and his strength. ..his relationship 
to his fellow men and his position in the universe’?.4 Its goal is self-realisation 
rather than obedience. Fromm counts the teachings of Jesus, Socrates, Buddha 
and Spinoza among this kind of system. He sees church history as a conflict
209 See Letters of C G. Jung, ed. Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffe, Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 
1976) p. 575.
210 Erich Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion (London: Victor Goilancz, 1951) p. 29.
211 Ibid. p. 36.
212 Ibid. p. 42.
213 Ibid. p. 43.
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between the two principles. Psychoanalysis is concerned with the ‘human 
reality’ underlying religious formulations and practices, according to Fromm. In 
the humanistic religions this is ‘the striving for love, truth and justice’, and in the 
authoritarian religions ‘submission to power, lack of love and of respect for the 
individual’.* 215
Fromm writes that psychoanalytic therapy has two interdependent functions, 
that of leading the patient to increased social adjustment and that of leading him 
to greater self-realisation. He writes that the latter, which he describes as ‘cure of 
the soul’, has ‘very definitely a religious function’.216 He finds that there is ‘a 
core of ideas and norms’ shared by the humanistic religions, and that 
psychoanalytic therapy aims to achieve precisely the attitude they descu^i^t)t..212 
Humanistic religions assert that man must seek the truth about himself and his 
place in the world. Fromm writes that ‘the psychoanalytic process is... a search 
for truth’ also, that of an individual’s internal sources of motivation.218 Fromm 
continues that psychoanalysis follows humanist-religious thought in linking an 
individual’s search for truth with his attainment of freedom and independence. 
Fromm thinks that Freud’s thought must be ‘[translated].. .from the sphere of sex 
into that of interpersonal ^elations’.219 Where Freud speaks of incestuous 
instincts, that is, Fromm sees ‘the more profound and fundamental desire’ to 
remain a child, attached to protective figures whose prototype is the mother. It is 
this infantile attitude from which psychoanalysis helps an individual to mature 
into a morally responsible agent, he writes. In this it agrees with the teaching of
2,4 Ibid. p. 44.
215 Ibid. p. 70.
216 Ibid. p. 81.
217 Ibid. p. 82.
218 Ibid. p. 83.
219 Ibid. p. 85.
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humanist religions that man must free himself from ‘incestuous’ orientations 
towards gratification and find his humanity in independent moral action. Fromm 
adds that psychoanalysis follows these religions in asserting that this action is 
primarily love. He writes, ‘Analytic therapy is essentially an attempt to help the 
patient gain or regain his capacity for love’. 2 He concludes, ‘The 
psychoanalytic cure of the soul aims at helping the patient to achieve an attitude 
which can be called religious in the humanistic... sense’.220 21
Like Jung, Fromm makes no judgement concerning the independent existence 
of God. But as with Jung, he asserts that psychoanalysis is not opposed to 
religious belief. It is neither false nor harmful, as Freud had argued. On the 
contrary, in Fromm’s thought, Christian belief can be a way to achieve the 
personally and socially valuable mental orientation which is the goal of 
psychoanalysis. For Fromm, analytic therapy and Christianity share similar 
moral goals. In my examination of Freud’s critique of religion I argued that 
psychoanalysis does not imply a denial of the truth-content of Christian doctrine, 
as Freud suggested. The thought of Jung and Fromm shows that, as it developed, 
various forms of psychoanalysis ceased to assert even that this was the case. The 
psychoanalytic accounts of religion mean that there is no inconsistency in 
Christian criticism using the methods of psychoanalytic theory if they should 
seem appropriate..
220 Ibid. p. 92.
221 Ibid. p. 98.
173
4. Psychoanalysis and Christian Tradition
Two significant studies appeared recently that argued that psychoanalysis 
constituted a restatement in modern secular terms of a psychology once 
formulated by Christian theology. In the first of these, Why Freud Was Wrong 
(1995), Richard Webster argued that Freud’s basic concepts are ‘not fresh
theories of human nature but Judaeo-Christian orthodoxies which have been
reconstructed in a secular form’.222 There are several similarities between the 
theology of original sin and Freud’s concept of the unconscious. Webster notes 
that both doctrines ‘universalised the concept of illness’, that is, they attributed a 
body of negative impulses beyond conscious control to all human beings.223 
Whilst individuals might achieve a certain degree of control over these impulses, 
they remain endemic. Psychoanalysis recasts the concept of an innate tendency 
to evil, against which one must struggle in order to live a frilly human life, which 
had been established by the theology of original sin. Just as in Christianity 
everyone stands in need of grace as a result, so in psychoanalysis everyone needs 
to overcome the Oedipus complex. Webster also points out that in attributing 
incestuous and aggressive tendencies to children, Freud did not innovate as 
radically as is sometimes suggested. He writes that according to the doctrine of 
original sin, ‘children do not come into the world and then learn how to sin, but 
come into the world bringing their sinful sensuality with them’.224 In Webster’s 
view, Freud’s theory of infantile sexuality represents a restatement of this 
position.
222 Richard Webster, Why Freud was Wrong: Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis (London: Harper 
Collins, 1995) p. 7.
223 Ibid. p. 314.
224 Ibid. p. 330.
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In The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis (1996), Suzanne R. 
Kirschner situates modem American forms of psychoanalysis in an argument 
familiar to readers of M.H. Abrams’ Natural Supernaturalism (1971). Kirschner 
maps out the ‘psychoanalytic developmental narrative’, which she finds most 
clearly and representatively expressed in the work of Margaret S. Mahler (1897­
1985). She describes this process as a ‘developmental spiral’.225 226The infant is 
initially aware of a blissful symbiotic ‘dual-unity’ with the mother, from which
he ‘individuates’ or assumes his own individual characteristics. This leads to a
sense of helplessness and vulnerability, which is overcome by forming a sense of 
relatedness to objects whilst preserving a sense of individual integrity. The 
initially disappointing existence of self and other must be accepted and 
integrated, in order that meaningful and satisfying relationships with others can 
be formed. This trajectory can also be plotted in Freud’s theories. As Richard 
Webster writes, ‘Freud saw human history as a difficult upward progress from 
the realm of the flesh to the realm of the spp-it’?26 The pre-Oedipal infant 
experiences a series of initially uninhibited gratifications, which his increasing 
awareness of threats of punishment obliges him to renounce. These renunciations 
culminate in the repression of the Oedipus complex, and the resulting internal 
conflict. Nevertheless, this conflict is the precondition for the more valuable 
attainment of moral maturity and contribution to the process of civilisation.
Kirschner compares Mahler’s narrative with the patristic tradition of 
Neoplatonic Biblical exegesis. In Neoplatonic thought, the highest and most 
fundamental reality is the One, which is also the Good, from which all entities
“25 Suzanne R. Kirsclmer, The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis: Individuation 
and Integration in Post-Freudian Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 77 
passim.
226 Webster, Why Freud was Wrong p. 311.
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emanate in varying degrees, and to which they strive to return. The soul can 
achieve this return by turning inwards from the sensible world to contemplate in 
itself the One that is its source.M.H. Abrams describes the Biblical exegesis 
influenced by this kind of thought, initiated by Origen (c. 185-254), in which 
God is conceived primarily as a principle of unity rather than as a father, the Fall 
is conceived primarily as ‘alienation from the source’, the original sin as self- 
centredness, and redemption as a return to lost unity with God propelled by the 
sustaining energy of His love?22 Kirschner compares this historical narrative, 
recast at the individual level by mystics like Jakob Boehme (1575-1624) and the 
Romantics, to the psychoanalytic developmental narrative. Both describe the 
same trajectory of ‘unity, rupture and division into contraries, higher unity ’,229 
She argues that psychoanalysis follows Neoplatonic Christian theology in 
asserting that ‘human selfhood...originates in and emanates out of an 
undifferentiated unity’, in the former with the mother and in the latter with 
God* 2™ In both systems, ‘the recognition of one’s estrangement from [this] 
‘source’ is associated with self-consciousness...and suffering’?31 Freud 
describes it as being ‘cast out of.-ppadiae’s^ In both systems, the individual 
retains a deep yearning to return to the undivided state. Nevertheless, this 
estrangement constitutes a fortunate fall in both cases, leading to ‘higher and 
more constructive forms of consciousness and reiationship’?i3 In Mahler’s 
version of the psychoanalytic narrative, healthy development results in the 
capacity to form fulfilling relationships, whose prototype is marriage. For Freud,
227 See R.T. Walsh. Neoplatonism (London; Duckworth. 1972) pp. 37-93.
228 M.H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature 
(New York and London: Norton, 1971) pp. 146-154.
2 Kirschner. The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psvchoanalvsis p. 180.
2° bjid. p. 183.
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successful negotiation of the Oedipus and castration complexes results in an 
adequate and lasting choice of love-object.232 233 34 235 236Kirschner compares this ‘higher 
union' (than with the mother) to the higher union (than the prelapsarian) with 
God, described by the mystics as the ‘divine marriage' of God and the soul.444
Webster bases his argument that Freud re-writes certain Christian doctrines on 
the position that these doctrines had become so unfamiliar in Freud's rationalist
milieu that he was unaware of his debt to them. Freud's treatment of Christian
theology is not detailed, but it is too contrary to his cultural knowledge to 
suggest that he was simply unaware of the historical significance of the doctrine 
of original sin, for example.^ Nevertheless, the similarities between Freud's 
concept of the unconscious and the doctrine of original sin are as pronounced as 
Webster argues. Kirschner's thesis that psychoanalysis owes the structure of its 
developmental narrative to Neoplatonic Christianity by ‘cultural genealogy' or 
‘the redeployment of a pre-existing cultural template to a new context' is more 
plausibie.237 Put simply, it means that Freud built his theory out of the materials 
around him. This means that psychoanalysis has less claim to explain or interpret 
Christian doctrines in its own terms than one might expect, given the prevalence 
of this kind of interpretation. All of Kristeva's studies on religion, for example, 
read Christian texts in psychoanalytical terms. In In the Beginning Was Love 
(1985), she writes that ‘the Credo embodies basic fantasiese238 Wbbster’s and 
Kirschner's studies, on the other hand, show that the basic fantasies described by
232 SE XIX p. 173.
233 Kirsclmer. The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis p. 185.
234 PFL 1 p. 380.
235 Kirsclmer. The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis pp. 190-191.
236 It could be pointed out tliat Webster’s own understanding of the doctrine does not appear 
profound. He speaks for example of its ‘exponents... deliberately setthig out to create anxiety and 
exacerbate feelingsof guilt’ {Why Freud Was Wrong, p. 321).
237 Kirsclmer, The Religious and Romantic Origins of Psychoanalysis p. 7.
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psychoanalysis can also be said to embody the Creed. The structural debt of 
psychoanalysis to Christianity calls into question the privilege of the former as a 
hermeneutic code. If psychoanalysis owes some of its own formulations to 
Christian theology, it is difficult to see it as an exhaustive explanation of such 
theology.
Webster and Kirschner are in their different ways concerned to show that 
psychoanalysis is not as based on empirical observation as it claims. In their 
article ‘Christianity and Psychoanalysis’ (1984), Paul C. Vitz and John Gartner 
consider psychoanalysis from an orthodox Christian point of view. They see it as 
‘a useful theoretical representation of the psychology of sinful humans ’238 39 *
Whilst they do not follow Freud in seeing the Oedipus complex as universal, 
they write:
/
There is no barrier to Christian acceptance of the basic psychology of the 
Oedipus complex as a... description of the psychological nature of 
original sin in the lives of many.2 °
They see the essence of original sin as a tendency towards a fictitious autonomy, 
and they see the concept of the Oedipus complex as a description of this 
tendency. ‘It is a specific representation of the struggle to become an 
autonomous ruler of our own and others’ lives’?41 Discussing Freud’s argument 
that religion is a wish-fulfilment, Vitz and Gartner point out that it follows from 
the logic of the Oedipus complex to think rather of atheism as a wish-fulfilment. 
The Oedipal child wishes to kill the father and replace him. Freud thinks of God 
as a substitute for the father, and so the position that He does not exist can be 
seen as a fulfilment of this wish. If, as in Freud’s case, religion is replaced with a
238 Julia Kristeva, In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith, tr. Arthur Goldhammer 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987) pp. 39-40.
239 Paul C. Vitz and John Gartner, ‘Christianity and Psychoanalysis, Part I: Jesus as the Anti- 
Oedipus’, Journal of Psychology and Theology 12 (1984) p. 5.
-'"Ibid. p. 8.
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system confined to the human sphere, the infantile wish to replace the father with 
oneself has also been fulfilled. As Vitz and Gartner write, ‘“God is dead” is... an 
undisguised Oedipal wish-fulfilment’.241 42 They see this as further reason to think 
of the Oedipus complex as a description of original sin, which involves rebellion 
against God. They write, ‘Oedipal motivation is the satanic resistance to God 
deeply stained into human nature’243
This identification of the Oedipus complex and original sin is possible only in 
the most general sense, however, as we can see from St. Thomas Aquinas’ 
formulation of the doctrine in the Summa Theologiae. St. Thomas defines 
original sin as a habitus, by which he means ‘a modification of a nature 
composed of many elements, according as it bears itself well or ill towards 
something’.244 Original sin, he writes, is a ‘disordered disposition [habitudo 
inordinata]' of the powers of the soul, which predisposes each person to acts his 
or her adult conscience would reject.245 This disorder derives from the primordial 
turning of the human will from its subjection to the will of God, which 
constituted original justice, and it can be observed in an ‘unruled [inordinate} 
turning to goods that pass away’, which Aquinas calls by the Augustinian name 
‘concupiscence’.246 In its decree on original sin (1546), the Council of Trent
states:
In the baptised [whose original sin is remitted], there remains 
concupiscence or an incentive to sin [fames peccati}... [It] is of sin and 
inclines to sin.247
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid. p. 13. As we have seen, Freud also attributes love for the father to the infant. Vitz and 
Gartner acknowledge this but argue that in practice Freud is more concerned with tlie infant’s 
aggression towards him.
243 Ibid.
244 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia-IIae 82, 1.
245 Ibid.
246 Ibid. la-Iiae 82, 3.
247 See <http://liistory.lianover.edu/early/trent/ct05os.htm> no. 5.
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It is impossible to equate the Freudian theory of the instincts with original sin or 
with concupiscence so conceived. The disorder of the powers of the soul for 
Aquinas is understood with respect to their proper order, and original sin is 
understood as a privation of original justice. The Freudian instincts have no such 
point of reference. There is no value of which they represent the lack. They are 
not considered as evil or as tendencies to evil but as facts of experience. Whereas 
original sin and concupiscence are contingent upon something more 
fundamental, the Freudian instincts are conceived as themselves fundamental.
Nevertheless, there are certain similarities between the two theories. Both 
describe a drive towards 3elf•gratifscation that must be overcome in an 
authentically human life. This is particularly clear in St. Augustine's formulation 
of the doctrine of original sin. In De Civitate Dei (413-426), he asserts that the 
essence of sin is ‘to abandon God and to exist in oneself, that is, to please 
The concept of pleasing oneself as opposed to God is similar to
Freud's concept of pleasing oneself as opposed to society. Like Freud, Augustine 
writes that this drive towards self-gratification results in psychological conflict
with the adult will. He writes:
Man's wretchedness is nothing but his own disobedience to himself, so 
that. ..he now wills to do what he cannot... [He] is disobedient to himself, 
while his very mind and even his lower element, his flesh, do not submit 
to his will,2..
This conflict of drives, which St. Paul describes as that between ‘the law of sin’ 
and ‘the law of God' (Rom. 7:25), is similar to the conflict Freud describes 
between the pleasure principle and the reality principle.
We cannot identify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with the doctrine of 
original sin, although there are structural similarities in the two theories. The
248 St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei XIV, 14.
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Freudian instincts are not a description of concupiscence nor vice versa. We can 
say, however, that psychoanalysis is not incompatible with the theology of 
original sin. There could in principle be both a Freudian unconscious and 
concupiscence, since Freud describes a psychological conflict of which Christian 
theology has been aware since St. Paul’s expression of it at Romans 7:14-25. 
This means that, as I argued with respect to psychoanalytic accounts of religion, 
there is no inconsistency implied in the use of psychoanalytic methods in 
Christian criticism. Indeed, these methods may illustrate psychological conflicts 
in literary texts which we can then interpret in terms of Christian anthropology.
(Hi) A Critique of Psychoanalytic Literary Theories
Having established that it is in principle possible to use psychoanalytic 
methods in Christian criticism, I will now assess to what degree we should in 
fact do so. There are several significant critiques of psychoanalysis that we must 
take into account in order to make this judgement.
1 ■ The Empirical Critique
In Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Karl R. Popper writes that the criterion 
of demarcation between a scientific theory and a pseudo-scientific theory is that 
the former alone possesses ‘falsifiability, or refutability, or testability’^0 For 
Popper, science does not proceed by induction, as is commonly thought, but by a
249 Ibid. XIV, 15.
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process of trial and error. A hypothesis is formed, and then tested by repeated 
observations and experiments which attempt to refute the hypothesis. 
Psychoanalysis begins with conjectures but does not attempt to refute them in the 
manner of a science, for Popper. He writes that its theories ‘contain most 
interesting psychological suggestions, but not in a testable form’.250 51 Any human 
act can be explained in terms of psychoanalysis: it finds verification everywhere. 
But this apparent hermeneutic strength is precisely its scientific weakness. If 
psychoanalytic theories are not falsifiable, according to Popper, they cannot be
accounted scientific.
In ‘Freud and the Idea of a Pseudo-Science’ (1970), Frank Cioffi extends this 
critique. He assesses the ‘empirical character’ claimed for psychoanalytic 
theories, and concludes that in fact they constitute a ‘pseudo-science’.252 His use 
of this word is stronger than Popper’s: he means not only a system whose 
procedures in fact prevent the discovery of disconfirmations but one whose 
procedures’ function is to prevent such discovery. He writes, ‘To claim that an 
enterprise is pseudo-scientific is to claim that it involves the habitual and wilful 
employment of methodologically defective procedures’.253 Such procedures 
characterise psychoanalysis, in Cioffi’s view. He rightly points out that Freud 
often seems to suggest that he has inferred conclusions about the determination 
of symptoms by an independent investigation of sexual life, and that on a closer 
reading, this turns out not to be the case. Freud’s accounts of the Oedipus and 
castration complexes are examples of this. On one hand Freud suggests that
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these hypotheses could be tested by observing the behaviour of children. He 
even asserts that this behaviour confirms his hypotheses so clearly that one 
would have go to some lengths to avoid noticing it... On the other hand Freud 
writes in the prefaces to the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality that only 
the psychoanalytical^ trained can make the proper inferences from the 
observation of children to the Freudian hypotheses. Freud writes, Tf mankind 
had been able to learn from direct observation of children, the3e...essay3 could 
have remained unwritten’.254 55 *Caaally, empirical confirmation of Freud’s theories 
of sexuality is not as obviously available as he often implies. Cioffi points out 
that the extent to which psychoanalysis accords with the empirical observation of 
children is the only way of establishing the validity of its clinically derived 
hypotheses concerning them. What he calls the ‘retreat to the C3otcrically 
observable' in the face of disconfirmatory evidence simply begs the question of 
the validity of the analytic hypotheees-m Freud’s oft-expressed preference for 
analytic reconstructions (from free-association, dream-interpretation and so on) 
over empirical investigation of an individual’s past similarly begs the question of 
the validity of these reconstructions. Furthermore, Freud posits a phylogenetic 
heritage of fantasies corresponding to memories of Oedipal wishes and castration 
threats in individuals who have not directly experienced these wishes or threats 
themselves. As Cioffi writes, if Freud could attribute a discrepancy between his 
reconstruction of a patient's infancy and the empirically constructable events of 
that infancy to a phylogenetic heritage, he could never discover invalidity in his 
reconstructions. As a result Cioffi describes these reconstructions as ‘pseudo­
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narratives’, which impose ‘spurious allusions’ between events whose real 
relation is unconfirmed and unlikely.257 258
Cioffi’s critique is more pertinent than Popper’s. There is no reason why 
psychoanalysis is not in principle falsifiable, as the latter asserts. The long 
tradition of experiments designed to test psychoanalytic hypotheses suggests that 
they are in principle testable. Cioffi’s argument, that psychoanalysts rarely 
attempt to test their hypotheses in practice, however, is fair. There is no doubt 
that this is almost always true of Freud. Lacan and Kristeva make occasional 
references to experiments or independent confirmations of their own distinctive 
additions to psychoanalysis, but insofar as they accept Freud’s ideas they use 
empirically unconfirmed concepts.^n Furthermore, Cioffi is right to assert that 
the sources of Freud’s hypotheses are on the whole inaccessible in principle to 
an independent observer. The knowledge of the unconscious derived from 
dream-interpretation is an example. The only conceivable way to test the 
veracity of a dream-interpretation is to check it against the opinion of the 
dreamer. According to Freud this is not possible, since the dreamer continues to 
repress his dream-wishes in waking life. His interpretations of his patient’s 
dreams then become a matter merely of assertion. It is impossible to gainsay 
them, since even their subject, the dreamer, is denied awareness of the correct 
interpretation. They are acts of absolute authority on Freud’s part. Perhaps this 
would be of little significance if it were not that dream-interpretation provided 
Freud with most of his knowledge of the unconscious. He described it as ‘the 
royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious’.n® This means that the qualities 
Freud predicated of the unconscious are largely derived from statements that
257 Ibid. pp. 483, 489.
258 See Lacan, Ecrits p. 1; Kristeva, Desire in Language pp. 133-134.
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cannot be checked, either in practice or in principle. As Richard Webster writes, 
Tf the psychoanalyst himself made up the rules for decoding dreams, these could 
be formulated in such a way that dreams would always yield the desired 
conclusion’.259 60 261 262Freud is the sole and final authority for the nature he attributes to 
the unconscious. Although it is not impossible that he always or often interpreted 
dreams or described the unconscious rightly, there is simply no way of 
knowing ®i In the absence of this knowledge there is no reason for assent. A 
second example of inaccessible evidence is Freud’s self-analysis, from which he 
derived the materials for the theory of the Oedipus complex. This self-analysis
was conducted in 1897 and Freud described its results in a series of letters to his
friend Wilhelm Fliess. Its results, as with those of any introspection, are entirely 
untestable by an independent observer. Freud writes, T have found in my own 
case-falling in love with the mother and jealousy of the father, and I now 
regard it as a universal event of early childhood’.26i hi Skeptical Engagements 
(1986), Frederick Crews describes this as ‘a set of intuitions that were revealed 
to the Master in an access of personal transcendence’.263 WhUst this is rather 
overstated - the analysis did not have the spontaneous character of an intuition - 
it accurately describes the absolute authority with which Freud predicates 
qualities of the unconscious. As in the case of dream-interpretation, in the
259 PFL 4 p. 769.
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absence of any means of checking these predications, we have no reason to
assent to them.
As I pointed out above, however, there have been extensive attempts to test the 
validity of psychoanalytic hypotheses experimentally. There have been over 
1500 such experimente?6. In their anthology The Experimental Study of 
Freudian Theories (1973), Hans J. Eysenck and Glenn D. Wilson collect and 
analyse twenty-one experiments, most of which are ‘considered by experts to 
reflect favourably on psychoanalytic hypotheses'?.. In the conclusion to their 
analyses, Eysenck and Wilson list a 3erie3 of faults they find with the 
experiments in general. The most pervasive of these is a ‘failure to discuss 
alternative hypotheses’?.® Many of the experiments, they write, make a 
deduction from Freudian theory, provide results in partial agreement it, but then 
‘fail to consider the duty incumbent upon any scientist to consider alternative 
hypotheses which might equally well, or even better, explain the results 
found’?67 Eeen in the experiment Eysenck and Wilson find most properly 
executed, that of Irving Sarnoff and Seth M. Corwin on the relation of castration 
anxiety and the fear of death (1959), alternative hypotheses are not adequately 
consideeed?6. For example, castration anxiety was determined by the degree of 
distress registered at a picture of a dog observing another with a knife over its 
tail. Eysenck and Wilson point out that ‘a personality dimension such as anxiety 
or emotionality’ is just as likely, if not more so, to be registered by the response 264 * * 267 *
264 See Erwin, A Final Accounting p. 146.
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to this picture®®9 What is certain is that the experiment made no provision to 
establish whether or not this was the case. Eysenck and Wilson also criticise the 
indefinite nature of the Freudian theories tested, particularly with respect to the 
role of reaction-formation, which is employed to account for contradictory 
results without the establishment of proper criteria as to when it could be 
expected to occuuIbi 270 They also criticise the predominant lack of repetition of the 
experiments. They conclude that the experiments they have collected ‘give little 
if any support to Freudian concepts and theoriei’271 hiey write, ‘There is not 
one study to which one could point with confidence and say “Here is definitive 
support of this or that Freudian notion”’.272
In A Final Accounting: Philosophical and Empirical Issues in Freudian 
Psychology (1996), Edward Erwin takes account of post-1980 experiments 
unavailable to Eysenck and Wilson. He concludes that like the previous body of 
research, it ‘[yields] very little support, if any, for Freudian tlno’.273 IbiEnvin 
notes that most psychologists accept that unconscious mental events occur, and 
he allows that experimental evidence suggests that there may be unconscious 
mental events which have an effect on behaviour, as M.H. Erdelyi posited in 
Psychoanalysis (1985). He also accepts Erdelyi’s account of repression as what 
occurs when we ‘intentionally keep something out of consciousness in order to 
avoid psychological pain’, such as denial of a terminal nlnes’.^4 But the 
Freudian concepts of the unconscious and repression remain unconfirmed. Erwin 
writes, ‘The amount of confirmation of distinctively Freudian hypotheses is
269
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close to zero’?25 Indeed, some of them have been disconfirmed, such as Freud’s 
theories of the aetiology of the neuroses. If these theories were true, we should 
expect that relapse or resumed symptoms would generally follow treatments that 
were not aimed at bringing repressed wishes into consciousness. But, as Erwin 
writes, ‘that prediction has been disconfirmeC by numerous studies of 
behavioural and cognitive-behavioural therapiesie He adds that the same 
applies to the existence of counter-wish dreams with respect to Freud’s theory of 
dreams. He concludes, like Eysenck and Wilson, that virtually none of Freud’s 
theories have been confirmed by the evidence of empirical observation. He adds 
that there are disconfirmations which provide some reason to think some of the 
theories false, although they do not prove this. Given that this is the conclusion 
to be drawn after a sixty-year experimental tradition comprising over 1500 
experiments, Erwin adds that the theories are unlikely to be confirmed in the
future.
It is clear that the truth of Freud’s theories remains empirically unconfirmed. 
Whilst there may be some patients who derive some benefit from 
psychoanalysis, there is no reason to assume that they have derived this benefit 
as a result of the truth of the theories upon which the analysis is based. The result 
of this conclusion for psychoanalytic criticism is that there is no reason to 
believe that it contributes to increased knowledge of the text towards which it is 
directed. There is no doubt that much psychoanalytic criticism is valuable for its 
imaginative and creative qualities. But there is equally no doubt that it is not 
valuable for the truth of its assertions. For example, Kristeva’s tracing of an 
alternative physical register underneath the logic and syntax of Mallarme’s * *
375 Ibid. p. 294.
276 Ibid. p. 288.
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poetry, whilst compelling, cannot be taken as the referential description it is 
presented to be. There is simply no reason to assume that it really describes an 
infantile articulation of the drives. As we said with respect to Freud's basic 
theories, it might be true, but there is no way of knowing whether it is. This must 
be our verdict on all the psychoanalytic criticism we have discussed. It means 
that Christian literary theory has no reason to assimilate the conclusions or to 
endorse the methods of psychoanalytic criticism. Whilst it implies no 
contradiction of Christian theology, psychoanalytic theory cannot be taken to 
describe any reality concerning literary texts, and as such we have no reason to
use its methods.
2. The Feminist Critique
In 1927, Freud’s otherwise orthodox disciple Ernest Jones described the 
‘unduly phallo-centric view' of development established by male 
psychoanalysts.277 In New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), the psychoanalyst 
Karen Homey attempted to eliminate the ‘debatable premises' on which she saw 
Freud’s system to be constructed in order to enable psychoanalysis fully to 
realise its therapeutic poteetiai.278 279One such premise, in her view, was the 
concept of penis-envy, in terms of which Freud described almost every female 
characteristic. Homey writes that it is ‘contradictory to biological thinking’ to 
assert that women, ‘physically built for specifically female functions, should be 
psychically determined by a wish for attributes of the other sex'...9 The data
277 Ernest Jones, Papers on Psychoanalysis, 4* ed., (London: Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1938) p. 
556.
278 Karen Homey, New Ways in Psychoanalysis (London: Kegan Paul, 1939) p. 8.
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from which the concept is induced are scant, she points out, all of them readily 
permitting a different interpretation. Whilst Freudians may take female 
tendencies like nagging, envy or ambition as indications of penis-envy, Homey 
writes, ‘these trends are sometimes imputed to underlying penis-envy without 
further evidence’?80 Wfc^t Freud also fails to take into account, according to 
Homey, are the cultural factors that contribute to the female characteristics he 
describes. For Freud, ‘anatomy is deosiny’.* 281 Homey accepts that differences in 
sexual constitution and function influence mental life, but denies that they 
determine it as entirely as Freud in practice asserts. If psychoanalysis is 
genuinely to determine the sources of its patients’ motivations, in Homey’s 
view, it must also account for ‘the way specific cultural constitutions engender 
specific qualities and faculties’ in both men and women.
In Sexual Politics (1970), Kate Millott offers a sustained critique of Freud’s 
account of feminine sexuality. In order to account for the transfer of a girl’s 
object-cathoxis from her mother to her father, Freud hypothesised that ‘girls hold 
their mother responsible for their lack of a penis and do not forgive her for their 
being thus put at a disadvantage’.2! TOve consequent ‘envy for the penis’ leaves 
‘ineradicable traces on their dovelopment and tho formation of their 
character’.! Millott follows Homey in suggesting that if girls have perceived 
themselves to bo inferior to boys, this is more a result of ‘tho conditions of 
patriarchal society and tho inforior position of women within this society’ than of 
their lack of a penie.274 Why should the little girl porceive her brother’s oe 
playmate’s penis as something enviable, after all? ‘Might sho just as easily
Ibid. p. 106.
281 SE XIX p. 178.
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imagine...the penis is an excrescence and take her own body as the norm?' 
Millett asks.284 85 * 287 *This is what boys do, in the Freudian account, and he gives no 
good reason why girls should not. As Homey had suggested, it seems unlikely 
that one half of humanity should have a biological reason to prefer what the 
other half possesses but not vice versa. Tt is especially curious...that half the 
race should attribute their clear and obvious social-status inferiority to the 
cmdest biological reasons', Millett adds.555 Even if one were to hypothesise 
exclusively at the physical level, she writes, ‘surely the first thing all children 
must notice is that the mother has breasts while the father has none'.555 She 
concludes that the subjectivity attributed to infants in Freud's developmental 
theories is marked by ‘a strong masculine bias', which she identifies with
Freud's own. This masculine bias extends to the social function of Freud's
theories, Millett continues. Often, ‘Freud's language makes no 
distinction...between fact and feminine fantasy', that is, it slips from a 
description of the girl's perception of inferiority to an assumption that this 
inferiority really exists.555 The theory of penis-envy perpetuates the social 
inferiority of women, Millett writes. It converts childbirth, ‘an impressive female 
accomplishment' and the only one recommended by Freud, into ‘nothing more 
than a hunt for a male organ'.289 She points out that by attributing ‘little sense of 
justice' to women, Freud deprives them of the ‘moral position which is 
their...claim for just treattnent’.290 Mlllett concludes that Freud's female 
psychology is based on an inadequate distinction between women's physical
284 Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (London: Virago, 1970) p. 180.
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constitution and their social position, the result of which is the assertion that ‘a 
man’s world has made of woman.. .what nature had made of her first’289 * 91 292 293 Iri *
The most sustained feminist critique of Freud is Luce Irigaray’s essay, ‘The 
Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry’ (1974), in which she closely reads 
Freud’s essay ‘Femininity’ (1933). The essence of Irigaray’s critique is that ‘the 
“differentiation” into two sexes derives from the a priori assumption of the 
same’.999 This means that Freud’s account of female psychology is constructed 
in terms in which male psychology is unjustifiably taken as a norm. In his 
account of the girl’s phallic stage of libidinal organisation, Freud writes that ‘the 
little girl is a little man’?" Irigaray questions why a girl should enter a ‘phallic’ 
stage at all, in which her libido is as centred upon the male organ as the boy’s. 
She writes that if, as Freud asserts, a girl is to pass through phases of libidinal 
organisation, there should surely be vulvar, vaginal and uterine stages to account 
for?" In the phallic phase, according to Freud, the clitoris, the girl’s ‘smaller 
penis-equivalent’ is her primary erotogenic zone. This is ‘against all rhyme and 
reason’ of female physiology, Irigaray writes?" In order to account for the girl’s 
development in the same (phallic) terms as the boy’s, Freud has to give an oddly 
censored and restricted account of women’s ordinary experience of sexuality. 
There is no good reason other than the desire to make female development 
conform to the male pattern why the girl should begin to hate her mother in a 
way that the boy does not, Irigaray continues. The discovery of castration and
289 Ibid. p. 185. See PFL 2 p. 162: 'The feminme situation is only es^^l^li^lhsc^.. .if the wish for the 
penis is replaced by one for a baby...in accordance with an ancient symbolic equivalence’.
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resulting penis-envy is an answer as suspect as the question. For Irigaray, Froud 
uses the concept of penis-envy in order to establish that the man is tho norm in 
human devolopment. She finds it suspicious that tho dosiro for tho penis Feeud 
attributes to women confirms tho value of being a man and the inforior value of 
being a woman. It confirms that a woman is a man who lacks certain things. As 
Irigaray puts it, ‘Envy, jealousy, geeed aee all correlated to lack...All these terms 
describe female sexuality as merely the other side...of a male sexualism’. 
Feeud does not allow for tho possibility that women have ‘other dosiros, of a 
different naturo from his representation of tho sexual’.296 97 This is presumably the 
reason Froud posits no onvy for the vagina or for the uterus, Irigaeay assorts. It is 
quite possible to conceive of two separate soxual economies, sho writes, in which 
each pole would desire the attributes of the other, but for Freud sexuality is in the 
end a matter of being plus or minus the ono phallus. 298 As she puts it in her 
interview ‘The Power of Discourse and tho Subordination of the Feminine’
(1975), ‘All Froud’s statements describing female sexuality overlook the fact 
that the female sex might.. .have its own “specificity”’.299
There aee two fundamental criticisms made of psychoanalysis in these 
critiques, which we could call ethical and hermeneutic. The ethical criticism, 
made most strongly by Kate Millett, is that the social function of psychoanalysis 
is to keep women in the subordinate positions they have traditionally occupied in 
Western sociotios. Feminist writers aro not agrood on this point, howevor. In 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974), Juliot Mitchell arguos that
296 Ibid. p. 51.
297 biiL.
2 Ibid. p. 52.
299 Margaret Whitford, ed., The Irigaray Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) p. 119. In ‘The 
Poverty of Psychoanalysis’ (1977), in ibid. pp. 79-104, Irigaray argues a similar case with respect 
to Lacan’s concepts of the imaginary, symbolic and real registers.
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‘psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an 
analysis of one’.300 For Mitchell, the theory of the Oedipus complex accurately 
describes the process of assuming a social role within such society. She writes, 
‘The psychoanalytic concept of the unconscious is a concept of mankind's 
transmission and inheritance of his social (cultural) laws'.301 *hi Mitchell's 
Marxist perspective, the concept corresponds to an analysis of the psychological 
effect of patriarchal ideology® As a contribution to ideological analysis, 
psychoanalysis is a potentially useful tool for revolutionary femininm.303 in 
Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (1986), Elizabeth Grosz points out that
Lacan’s theories can be seen to have a similar value. She writes:
His decentring of the rational conscious subject...[has] helped to free 
feminist theory of the constraints of a largely metaphysical and implicitly 
masculine notion of subjectivity.304
Given that such feminist defences of psychoanalysis exist, we cannot 
immediately disregard its critical methods on grounds of social ethics.
The hermeneutic criticism is more serious, however. It means that Freud's 
theories do not adequately explain female psychology. Female development and 
sexuality represent data to which the theories of the Oedipus and castration 
complexes are insufficient explanatory hypotheses. There are two reasons for 
which we might accept the theory of penis-envy. The first would be that the 
theory is confirmed by observation. Freud himself tells us that this is not 
possible, however. He writes, ‘One has opportunities of seeing little girls and
300 Juliet Mitchell. Psvchoanalvsis and Feminism (London: Allen Lane. 1974) p. xv.
301 Ibid. pp. 402-403.'
3 Ibid. pp. 412-416.
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notices nothing of the sort’?® He adds that this is because a child can 
communicate only very little of its sexual wishes. We have already established 
the reasons why we cannot assent to the characteristics Freud attributes 
retrospectively to the unconscious. The second reason for which we might accept 
the theory of penis-envy despite this would be that it explains observable 
phenomena in women. This is not the case, however. Freud asserts that the 
theory explains why women are more prone to jealousy than to men, why they 
are ‘weaker in their social interests’ and why they ‘[have] little sense of 
justice’.305 06 307None of these attributes, however, can be regarded as commonly 
observable feminine characteristics, and in the absence of confirmatory evidence 
from Freud we cannot take them as such. We might add that the attribution of a 
diminished sense of justice to women is also inadmissible theologically. In the 
absence of these reasons to accept the theory of penis-envy, we must conclude 
that Freud has not adequately described female psychology, despite having 
claimed to have done so???
This constitutes a second reason for Christian literary theory not to endorse or 
use the principles of psychoanalytic criticism. Since it cannot be accounted an 
empirical science, psychoanalysis can only be considered valuable as a human 
science, or as a system of interpretation. The feminist critique, however, makes it 
clear that it does not adequately account for half of humanity. In Freud and 
Philosophy (1970) Paul Ricoeur writes, ‘Psychoanalysis is a hermeneutics... [It]
305 PFL 2 p. 154.
306 ‘Some Psvchical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinctions Between tlie Sexes’, SE XLC 
p. 254; PFL 2 pp. 168-169.
307 Freud acknowledged as much in ahnost every one of liis essays on feminine sexuality. ‘Our 
msight mto these developmental processes in girls is unsatisfactory, incomplete and vague (SE 
XIX p. 179). ‘[Wliat I have to say about femininity] us... incomplete and fragmentary (PFL 2 p. 
169). In ‘Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between tlie Sexes’, 
he describes his conclusions as ‘based on a handful of cases’ (SE XIX p. 258).
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aims at giving an interpretation of culture in its entirety’.308 It is clear from the 
feminist critiques, however, that it can succeed in this only with respect to men. 
Psychoanalytic criticism cannot be considered valuable even as a system of 
interpretation, since it is incompetent to explain the psychological nature and 
social role of women in and pertaining to the texts it is used to interpret. Since 
psychoanalysis cannot thus produce a consistent knowledge of such texts, there 
is no compelling reason why Christian literary theory should accept or use its 
methods of interpretation.
This concludes the first part of this thesis. I have examined the three 
fundamental discourses of modern literary theory, all of which constitute 
significant arguments against the existence of God as it has been traditionally 
understood in Christian theology. I have argued that deconstruction, whilst it 
necessitates a certain understanding of Christian theological discourse, does not 
imply that such discourse is meaningless or refers to nothing, as is sometimes 
assumed to be the case. I have argued that the atheism of Marx and Freud rests 
on fallacies that render their views on religion unproved hypotheses. This means 
that the concept of Christian literary theory, as I have defined it in the 
introduction to this work, is a legitimate one today. I have begun to expound 
some of the principles of which such a theory might consist, by suggesting which 
elements of the modern theories I have examined it ought to accept and which it 
ought to reject. In the second part of the thesis, I will continue this exposition
308 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1970) p. 66.
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with an examination of some of the most significant Christian texts that pertain 
to literary theory.
4. Christian Tradition and Literary Theory
In this chapter, I will examine some of the major texts of Christian tradition, 
and assess what they contribute to the contemporary practice of literary theory. I 
aim to show two things by this examination. Firstly, that a Christian tradition of 
literary theory exists, although it is little known or used in modern criticism, and 
secondly, how this tradition can be used in Christian literary theory today. The 
limited space of this chapter restricts my discussion to the most fundamental 
texts of the Western tradition, those of the Bible, St. Augustine (354-430) and St. 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Many other Christian writers could have been 
consulted with profit for this study, such as the Greek fathers on aesthetics, 
Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 500) on theological language, or Dante Alighieri (1265­
1321) and the Italian humanists on the truth contained in poetry. Nevertheless, in 
order to give a concise picture of the Christian tradition of thought that pertains 
to literary theory, I will examine the work of those two doctors of the church 
who have discussed these subjects at the greatest length and with the greatest 
influence. I will examine their theories of language and of aesthetics, and will 
suggest how these theories can be used by Christian critics today.
(i) The Bible
The Bible contains several texts that are concerned at a fundamental level with
the nature of language. I will offer an exposition of these texts, with a particular 
view to their relevance to the study of literary language.
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1. The Logos
The text with the profoundest implications for Christian thought on language is
the prologue to the fourth gospel (Jn. 1:1-18). It begins:
In the beginning was the Word [logosj, and the Word was with God and 
the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came 
into being through him and without him not one thing came into being. 
What has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light of all 
people (Jn. 1:1-4)?
There are several traditions which influenced the author of the fourth gospel with 
respect to this description of Jesus as the Logos. As C.K. Barrett points out in his 
commentary on the gospel of John (1978), the author’s introduction of the term 
without explanation indicates that it was already familiar to his readers? The 
term has two fundamental senses. Firstly, it denotes ‘reason’, and hence the 
related concepts of ‘reflection’, and the ‘explanation’ or ‘formula’ of a thing. 
Secondly, it denotes ‘that which is said’, and hence ‘word’, ‘speech’ or 
‘narrative’? As C.H. Dodd writes in The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel 
(1953), ‘For us, the concepts [of thought and word] are distinct as they were not 
for Greek-speaking persons’.* 2 * 4 Tlie Stoics distinguished between ‘immanent 
logos’ {logos endiathetos), or man’s reason present in him, and ‘expressed logos’ 
{logos prophorikos), or that reason made known by the faculty of speech.? In 
Stoic physics, the logos is the rational structure of the universe, which the Stoics
' This and subsequent citations from Scripture, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from tlie 
New Revised Standard Version Bible, ed Wayne A. Meeks et al. (London: Harper Collins. 
1989).
2 C.K. Barrett, The Gospel According to St. John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes 
on the Greek Text, 2nd ed (London: SPCK, 1978) p. 152. Cp. RudolfBultmami The Gospel of 
John: A Commentary, tr. G.R. Beasley-Murray, R.W.N. Hoare and J.K. Riches (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1971) p. 19.
2 See Hemy George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. Henry Stuart Jones 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1968).
4 C.H. Dodd The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1953) p. 263. Cp. Barrett, St. John p. 152.
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identified with God. Man’s reason is a fragment of this divine logos, by which he 
should order his actions as the divine logos orders the universe.5 6 This concept 
bears little direct resemblance to that of the evangelist, who thinks of the world 
{kosmos) as opposed to the logos rather than ordered by it.7 * *The evangelist’s 
thought is closer to that of Philo of Alexandria (c.20 BC-c.50 AD). Philo sought 
to interpret his native Judaism in the light of Greek philosophy, in a way typical 
of‘the kind of religious philosophy which emerged... from the cross-fertilisation 
of Hebrew and Greek thought’ in the Near East at the time? Philo interpreted the 
Old Testament figure of Wisdom as the logos of Greek philosophy? In the 
Wisdom literature, Wisdom is said to be God’s first creature, through which he 
created the world. Dodd describes it as ‘the Sypos9asisad thought of God, 
immanent in the world’.10 hhilo knew from Ps. 33:6 that the heavens were made 
toi logoi tou kuriou, ‘by the word of the Lord’. Wisdom and the word of the Lord 
are closely allied in Wisd. 9:1-2: ‘O God...who have made all things by your 
word [en logoi sou], and by your wisdom [tei sophiai sou] have formed 
humankind’. Philo writes that just as there is a logos endiathetos and a logos 
prophorikos in man, so God’s immanent logos is His eternal Wisdom, and His 
expressed logos is the projection of His Wisdom into formless matter by which
5 See J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 5th ed. (London: A. & C. Black, 1977) pp. 17-19.
6 See Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages Vol. I (Leiden: 
E.J. BriU, 1985) pp. 21-60.
5 See Ernst Haenchen, John I: A Commentary on the Gospel of John Chapters 1-6, tr. Robert W.
Funk (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) p. 137; Rudolf Sclmackenburg, The Gospel according to St. 
John Vol. 1, tr. Kevin Smyth (London: Bums and Oates, 1980) p. 481-482; Bultmann, John p. 
24.
5 Dodd. Fourth Gospel p. 54. See also Uhomas H. Tobin, ‘Tlie Prologue of John and Hellenistic 
Jewish Speculation’, Catholic Biblical Quarterly 52 (1990) pp. 252-269. 
h Sclmackenburg, St. John pp. 485-487; Dodd, Fourth Gospel p. 66
10 Dodd, Fourth Gospel p. 274.
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the universe was created. 11 He speaks of the divine logos both as the image 
(eikon) and as the firstborn son (protogonos huios) of God??
There are many parallels between the figure of Wisdom in the Bible’s Wisdom 
literature and the Johannine Logos. In Prov. 8:30, Wisdom is said to be with God 
(par'autou), just as in John 1:1 the Logos is pros ton theon, ‘with God’. In Prov. 
8:22, Wisdom is said to have been created at the beginning of God’s ways 
(archen hodon autou), and John describes the Logos as en archei, ‘in the 
beginning’. As we have already mentioned, Wisdom is repeatedly described as 
the agent of creation (Prov. 8:30, 3:19; Wisd. 9:2, 7:22), just as in John 1:3 it is 
said that all things came into being through the Logos ipanta di 'autou egeneto). 
Wisdom is described in terms of life (Prov. 8:35) and of light (Wisd. 7:26), and 
John 1:4 says of the Logos, ‘In him was life and that light was the light of men’. 
In Enoch 42:2, Wisdom seeks to dwell among men, and they reject her, just as in 
John 1:10-11, the Logos came to his own but his own did not receive him. Sir.
24:23 identifies Wisdom with the Torah, or Law. Ernst Haenchen and Rudolf 
Schnackenburg point out in their commentaries on the fourth gospel that 
Rabbinic Jewish exegesis tended to interpret Wisdom in terms of the Torah. * 12 13
Dodd adds that in these exegeses, the Torah is given many of the characteristics 
that John attributes to the Logos, such as pre-existence, being with God, agency 
in creation, life and li^Ih.14 Commentators disagree on the differing extent to 
which the evangelist used orthodox Jewish ideas of Wisdom and of the Torah 
and to which he used Hellenistic interpretations of them such as Philo’s.
" De VitaMosis II, 127. See Dodd, Fourth Gospel p. 66.
12 See ibid. p. 67; Sclmackenburg, St. John p. 486.
13 Haenchen, John p. 138; Schnackenburg, St. John p. 485-46.
14 Dodd, Fourth Gospel pp. 85-86.
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Haenchen argues that John borrows directly from the Wisdom myth.15 16 17Dodd, 
Schnackenburg and Barrett argue that the evangelist synthesised elements of 
Rabbinic and of Hellenistic Jewish thought.1? It seems most reasonable to 
assume that, given ‘the easy give-and-take of... intellectual life’ of the period, the 
latter hypothesis is more likely to be true. This means that by the word of God, 
the evangelist describes a divine hypostasis through which an otherwise 
transcendent God reveals himself in the temporal order of human existence.
In his commentary on the gospel of John (1964), Rudolf Bultmann argues that 
the evangelist’s description of the logos as an incarnate redeemer is indebted to 
Gnosticism, the amorphous group of syncretic religious systems described by St. 
Irenaeus (c. 130-c. 200) and St. Hippolytus (c. 170-c. 236)5? All Gnostic thought 
was dualist, distinguishing sharply between the spiritual and material orders, and 
regarding the latter as evil. Most systems had a series of mediators between God 
and the material world, which were instruments of its creation and which 
descended into it to reveal God and to make a way for men to ascend to Him. 
These figures have a series of names, including huios theou (son of God), 
monogenes (only-begotten), and eikon tou theou (image of God). Bultmann 
hypothesises that the evangelist used an early oriental Gnostic source, in which 
the Logos was the only mediator between God and the world. 18 He writes, ‘The 
central theme of the Gnostic redeemer-myth is that a divine being, the Son of the 
Highest, assumed human form...in order to bring revelation and redemption’.19
15 Haenchen, John p. 139.
16 Dodd. Fourth Gospel p. 280; Schnackenburg, St. John p. 493; Barrett, St. John p. 154-155.
17 See Dodd, Fourth Gospel pp. 97-114; J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 5!h ed. 
(London: A. & C. Black, 1977) pp. 20-28.
18 Bultmann. John p. 29.
19 Ibid. p. 61.
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In the source used by John, according to Bultmann, this was the role of the
Logos.
Most commentators now disagree with the hypothesis of a Gnostic source, but 
Bultmann’s existentialist exegesis nevertheless provides a useful interpretation 
of the evangelist’s concept of the divine word. He stresses the revelatory 
function of the Logos and the consequence of this for our knowledge of God. He 
writes, ‘The idea of God is determined...by the idea of revelation. To speak of 
God means: to speak of his revelation; and to speak of his revelation means: to 
speak of God’.?0 The Logos, that is, is God insofar as He reveals himself 
Bultmann stresses the inaccessibility of God to human knowledge suggested in 
the verse, ‘No-one has ever seen God. It is God the only son, who is close to the 
father’s heart, who has made him known’ (Jn. 1:18). This means that God cannot 
be an object of knowledge, nor thought of ‘in himself. Bultmann writes, ‘God 
ceases to be God if he is thought of as an object’.20 1 He is known only insofar as 
he reveals himself. This revelation, Bultmann stresses, takes place in humanity. 
Expounding Jn. 1:14, ‘The word became flesh {ho logos sane egeneto]’, he 
writes, ‘It is in his sheer humanity that he is the Revealer’. Sane (flesh) denotes 
the transitory and vain qualities of the worldly sphere. When the evangelist 
continues, ‘We have seen his glory Bultmann writes, ‘The doxa is not to
be seen... through the sane, as through a window; it is to be seen in the sarx and 
nowhere else’.?? In Bultmann’s exegesis, the divine word is a hypostasis through 
which God reveals himself in the order of human existence, and through which
alone Si is known in that order.
20 Ibid. p. 35.
21 Ibid. p. 81.
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2. Adam’s Names
The Bible describes the origin of human language at Gen. 2:19:
Out of the ground the LORD God formed every animal of the field and 
every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what he would 
call \yiqra ’] them; and whatever the man called every living creature, that 
was its name [shetri].
From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, linguists saw in this verse a 
description of an original language given to Adam by God.22 3 As Michel Foucault 
writes, in The Order of Things (1966), this language was conceived as ‘an 
absolutely certain and transparent sign for things, because it resembled them’.24 
Traces of this transparency remained in the Hebrew language. In his commentary 
on Genesis (1956), Gerhard von Rad argues that today, ‘we are not dependent 
for an explanation on the primitive view of the connection between a name and 
its bearer’.25 What he sees described in these verses is the development of 
language as a human means of interpreting the world. He writes that the naming 
is ‘both an act of copying and an act of appropriative ordering’, by which man 
makes sense for himself of the chaotic mass of forms that impinge upon his 
senses.26 In his Old Testament Theology (I960), he links this to the ancient idea 
of the power of mastery attached to names. He writes, Tt was only when man 
gave the animals their names that they existed for him and were available for his 
use’.27 In Orality and Literacy (1982), Walter J. Ong points out that the idea of 
power in naming is less archaic than it can seem. He writes, ‘Without learning a
22 Ibid. p. 63.
23 See Hubert Bost, Babel: Du Texte au Symbole, (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1985) pp. 167-174.
24 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, tr. from tlie 
French (London: Tavistock, 1970) pp. 34-42.
25 Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, 2nd ed. tr. John H. Marks (London: SCM. 1963) p. 
80.
26 Ibid. p. 81.
27 Von Rad, Old Testament Theology Vol. II p. 81.
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vast store of names, one is simply powerless to understand, for example, 
chemistry and to practice chemical engineering’.?? Claus Westermann, in his 
commentary on Genesis (1976), follows von Rad’s exegesis. He understands the 
description of God’s bringing the animals to the man to mean that ‘man is 
autonomous within a certain limited area’.?? Man must accept the created world 
as it has been created, but he can determine his relationship to it. Westermann 
sees this as an explanation by the Yahwist of the Priestly source’s assertion in 
Gen. 1:26 and 1:28 that God appointed man master of the animals. For 
Westermann, this means that by devising names for them man determines their 
place in his world. He writes, ‘By naming the animals the man opens up, 
determines and orders his world and incorporates them into his life. The world 
becomes human only through language’.28 * 30 This is a fair interpretation. We can 
take Gen. 2:19-20 to mean that language is a means by which man makes 
himself at home in the world. Finding themselves in a world not of their own 
making, people divide their experience into discrete parts by means of names in 
order to make it comprehensible. This gives them an increasing amount of power 
over this experience.
3. The Tower of Babel
The nature and value of this power is elaborated in the story of the Tower of 
Babel, at Gen. 11:1-9. It was clearly composed from several different sources,
which the Yahwist has formed into a consistent whole. One of the elements
28 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London and New York;
Methuen, 1982) p. 33.
h Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary, 2nd ed, tr. John J. Scullion (London; SPCK, 
1984) p. 228.
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incorporated into the story is an aetiology of the diversity of languages. It runs as
follows:
The whole earth had one language [saphah, lit. Tip’] and the same words 
[devarim]... [The people] said, ‘Let us build ourselves a city, and a tower 
with its top in the heavens, and let us make a name [shem] for 
ourselvas’...YaSweh said...‘They are all one people and they have all 
one language;...nothing they propose to do will now be impossible for 
them^^t us go down and confuse their language...so that they will not 
understand one another’s speech [saphathy. So Yahweh scattered them 
abroad from there over...all the eartS...[The city] was called Babel 
because there Yahweh confused [balal] the language of all the earth.
The story comes at the end of the Bible’s ‘primeval history’, Gen. 1-11. The 
genealogy of Shem that follows in 11:10-27 provides the link to Abraham, with 
whom the patriarchal history begins in Chapter 12?? Westermann writes that, in 
contrast to the latter, the primeval history ‘[looks] to the universal; [it] includes 
all humanity; and primeval time in which all takes place cannot be fixed on the 
^^l^^nd^’.rHHei^ce the subject of the story of Babel is humankind in general, and 
‘the basic motif is world wide’.?? It is one of the ‘narratives of crime and 
punishment’ which, together with creation stories and genealogies, comprise the 
whole of the primeval history. The Yahwist uses these stories for an aetiological 
purpose. Westermann writes, ‘Their intention is to explain something of the 
negative side of human existence by means of a punishment caused by a 
revoit’?4 The negative experience in the story of Babel is that of the diversity of 
languages. Wester-mann writes, ‘It was the common experience of humanity at 
an early stage that the multiplicity of languages was not natural’, citing parallel 
stories concerning the confusion of lan£gIaget.33 Gen. 11:1, ‘The whole world
30 Westermann Genesis 1-11 pp. 228-229.
31 See Von Raid. Genesis pjp. 148-150.
32 Westermaiui Genesis 1-11 p. 4.
33 Ibid. p. 542.
34 Ibid. p. 53.
35 Ibid. pp. 537-9.
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had one language’, is misconstrued as a historical statement, since historical 
reference is not a concern of the genre of which the verse is a part. Westermann 
describes it rather as ‘a hypothesis to which one concludes from the unnatural 
present situation’, of which alone human memory has experience.
The story in its present form concerns a kind of sin of pride. There is a parallel
to the story in Isa. 14:13-14, where the prophet says of the king of Babylon:
You said in your heart,
T will ascend to heaven;
I will raise my throne 
above the stars of God...
I will ascend to the tops of the clouds,
I will make myself like the Most High.’
Here the ambition expressed in a high Babylonian building is equated with the 
desire to become like God. The same is suggested at Jer. 51:53, ‘Though 
Babylon should mount up to heaven, and though she should fortify her strong 
height...’. It thus seems reasonable to connect the sin of the builders with the 
temptation of Eve at Gen. 3:5, where the serpent tells her that she ‘will be like 
God’. These passages occur at the beginning and at the end of the primeval 
history, with the pattern enacted first by individuals and then by humankind in 
general. Westermann argues that this is intended to express that human beings 
are capable of overstepping the limits of their created state. He writes, ‘In J’s 
understanding of humanity... humans are to remain within the limits assigned to 
them. Here alone can their existence find fulfilment’.36 7 It seems reasonable to 
connect the confusion of languages with the builders’ motivation to ‘make a 
name’ for themselves, since both pertain to language. Umberto Cassuto and 
Westermann argue that there is nothing inherently reprehensible in this desire,
36 Ibid. p. 542.
37 Ibid. p. 555.
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citing a series of passages in which the construction occurs.?? Nevertheless, in 
each of these passages, Yahweh is the one who makes a name for himself, by 
salvific action on behalf of Israel. This is directly the case in Isa. 63:12, Jer. 
32:20, Neh. 9:10 and 2 Sam. 7:23; and in Gen. 12:2, Yahweh makes a name for 
Abraham. Making a name for oneself is clearly the prerogative of Yahweh. The 
builders’ attempt to do so represents a failure to respect their creaturely status. 
The Targum expresses this by replacing the words ‘Let us make a name for 
ourselves’ with ‘Let us make an idol at [the tower’s] summit and place a sword 
in its hand’.?? This suggests that the ‘name’ described in Gen. 11:4 describes a 
kind of language-use contrary to the will of God, which represents an 
overstepping of mankind’s creaturely status.
The structure of the story suggests the nature of this kind of language in its 
combination of elements concerning the diversity of languages with elements 
concerning the diversity of societies. The connection between the two is most 
pronounced in the divine monologue at 11:6: ‘They are one people and they have 
all one language’. The story suggests that language is instrumental in the 
structure of society. It allows people to work together in communities, and this 
work can be for good or for evil. We have indicated the connection between 
naming and power in the Old Testament. The story of Babel suggests that a 
significant part of this power is social. As Walter Brueggemann writes in his 
commentary on Genesis (1982), ‘Language shapes the ways in which human 
communities...arTange power’.38 39 40 The divine reflection that ‘this is only the 
beginning of what they.will do; nothing...will now be impossible for them’
38 Umberto Cassuto, .4 Commentary on the Book of Genesis Vol. II, tr. Israel Abrahams 
(Jerusalem: tlie Magnes Press, 1964) p. 243; Westermaim, Genesis 1-11 p. 548.
39 Targum Neofiti 1: Genesis, tr. Martin McNamara (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1992) p. 84.
40 Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982) p. 102.
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indicates the extent of the social aspect of the power of language. Since they 
incur Yahweh’s punishment, we can assume that the builders represent a use of 
language contrary to his will. Since the unity of society is also part of the 
problem, it seems that the kind of language that forces society into a unity 
detrimental to many of its members is being described. This must be language 
which claims an authority to which it has no justifiable claim, that is, the 
language of ideology. Gen. 11:1-9 indicates that the power inherent in naming 
can be used to exploit others and the world, and that this practice is contrary to 
the will of God. Since this is an abuse of the social power of language, we can 
infer that the Bible’s view of the proper end of language is the good of the 
society in which it is used.
4, Pentecost
Pentecost, the fiftieth day after Passover, was the Festival of Weeks of Lev. 
23:15-21 and Deut. 16:9-12, as Tob. 2:1 makes clear. It was originally a harvest 
festival, also known as the ‘day of the first fruits’ (Num. 28:26). The Book of 
Jubilees 6:17-19 connects the feast to the covenant with Noah, and in later 
Judaism it became associated with the giving of the Law at Sinai.41 C.K. Barrett, 
in his commentary on Acts (1994), writes that the evidence of this development 
is too late to have influenced Luke, but Ernst Haenchen argues that despite this, 
the feast had ‘doubtless already been transformed in people’s minds into the 
feast of the lawgiving’.42 Certainly the ‘sound’, ‘violent wind’ and ‘fire’ (Acts
41 See Leo O’Reilly, Word and Sign in the Acts of the Apostles: 4 Study in Lucan Theology 
(Rome: Editrice Pontifica Universita Gregoriana, 1987) p. 18-21.
42 C.K. Barrett, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, Vol. I 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994) p. Ill; Ernst Haenchen, The Acts of the Apostles: A
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2:2-3) which accompany the disciples’ filling with the Holy Spirit are elements 
of Old Testament theophanies, the last in particular associated with the 
revelation of the Law at Sinai (Ex. 19:18, Deut. 4:12). In De Decalogo, Philo 
portrays the voice of God at Sinai visible as fire.43 44 45 46A Rabbinic tradition 
concerning the giving of the Law held that the voice of God at Sinai divided into 
seventy voices, one for each of the nations of the world, as enumerated in Gen. 
10. Although only Israel heard and accepted the Torah, it was heard by all 
nations in their own la^jg^^ges.s4 Whilst this saying post-dates Luke, Haenchen 
argues that he was familiar with the tradition from which it evolved. In Word 
and Sign in the Acts of the Apostles (1987), Leo O’Reilly notes that the Targum 
to Deut. 33:2, in which the Law is communicated in several languages, indicates 
the age of the ti*^diiion.33
These parallels make it likely that Luke intends a comparison of the coming of 
the Holy Spirit to the giving of the Law. The tongues as of fire (glossai hosei 
puros) that split and rest over the disciples (v. 3) are reminiscent of the voice of 
God at Sinai. A Rabbinic tradition has fire resting on the heads of rabbis as they 
study and discuss the Torah^ It seems reasonable to associate them with the 
‘other tongues’ {heterais glossais) in which the Spirit gives the disciples to speak 
(v. 4). Clearly Luke is portraying an event in which the word of God is given to 
all nations. He emphasises the tradition in which this was said already to have 
occurred at Sinai. The long list of nationalities in w. 9-11 contains devout men 
‘from every nation under heaven’ {apo pantos ethnous ton hupo ton ouranon).
Commentary, tr. Bernard Noble. Gerald Shiim and R. McL. Wilson (Oxford: Blackwell. 1971) p. 
174.
43 Plulo of Alexandria, De Decaiogo 46-48.
44 Midrash Rabbah: Exodus V, 9. See Barrett, Acts p. Ill; O'Reilly, Word and Sign p. 23.
45 O’Reilly, Word and Sign p. 23.
46 The Babylonian Talmud: Shabbath 88b. See Barrett. Xc/s p. 114.
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Luke records that ‘each one heard them speaking in the native language [tei idicii 
dialektoi] of each’ (v. 6). The miracle at Pentecost represents the word of God 
expressed in as many languages as there are people to hear. As Stanley 
Hauerwas writes in ‘The Church as God’s New Language’ (1987), ‘At 
Pentecost, God created...the miracle of being a people whose very differences 
contribute to their unity’.47 Despite many instances of cultural history to the 
contrary, the account of Pentecost indicates that the word of God and the 
language of ideology are mutually exclusive. Human language used according to
the will of God aims at communication with the hearer in his or her individual
humanity.
The account also suggests that experience of God transcends the limits of 
language. Just as at Sinai, what is expressed at Pentecost is God’s salvific self- 
revelation to mankind. The disciples speak of ‘God’s deeds of power’ or ‘great 
things’ (to megaleia tou theou), which we can take to be those on which Peter 
discourses in w. 14-36, namely the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the filling with the Holy Spirit described in v. 4 
denotes an immediate experience of that which the disciples go on to proclaim, 
God’s salvific will in Christ. Peter associates their speech with prophecy in 2:17- 
18, and Haenchen points out that apophtheggomai, the verb used in the phrase to 
‘speak in other tongues’, denotes the solemn or inspired utterance characteristic 
of prophecy.48 The language miracle suggests that experience of ‘the great things 
of God’ is not adequately represented within the conceptual confines of any 
given language. We saw in Gen. 2:19-20 that the Bible portrayed language as a 
means by which people interpret the world in which they find themselves. Acts
47 Garrett Green, ed., Scriptural Authority and Narrative Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1987) p. 185.
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2:1-13 suggests that the categories devised in this process cannot adequately 
represent the creator of that world. God cannot be understood by human thought 
and hence not denoted by human language.
What do these concepts of language expressed and implied by the Bible mean 
for Christian literary theory and criticism? We can take them to mean the 
following. The act of authorship is an imitation of God. The revelation of one's 
mind to others in external words is an analogy of God’s revelation of himself to 
mankind by his Word, primarily in the creation and the Incarnation, which is to 
say that authorship is analogous to these events. The analogy is imperfect, 
however. Literary texts are not merely expressions of fully-formed thoughts, but 
a means by which the author attempts to understand the world of his or her 
experience and to make a home in it. Finally, the Bible suggests that literary 
works necessarily have social and political effects. Christian criticism must 
therefore assess and judge these effects. It will be attentive to the role of 
ideology in the production and reception of a work, as we discussed in Chapter 
2, and it might take as a standard of value the degree to which a work can be 
perceived, in terms of Christian social ethics, to benefit a given community of
readers.
5. Art in the Bible
The Bible has no concept of fine art, that is, of works whose end is their own
beauty. Art is mentioned in the Bible almost entirely in connection with places 
and acts of worship. The first extended treatment of the subject comes in Ex. 25-
48 Haenchen, Acts p. 168.
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39, where Yahweh gives Moses instructions for building the tabernacle, which 
are then carried out. These chapters associate works of art with the presence of 
God. The purpose of the tabernacle is made clear in Ex. 25:8, where Yahweh 
says, “Have them make me a sanctuary so that I may dwell among them”. In 
Ex. 24:16-18 the glory {kebod) of Yahweh is described as settling on Mount 
Sinai, and in Ex. 40:34, ‘The glory of Yahweh filled the tabernacle’. As Brevard 
S. Chiids writee in his commennary on Exodus (1974), cThe preeence of God 
which had once dwelt on Sinai now accompanies Israel in the tabernacle’.49 The 
closest object to a work of fine art prescribed for this place is the sculpture of 
two cherubim that form one piece with the ‘mercy seat’, or lid, of the ark of the 
covenant. 50 Io Ex. 25:18-20, Yahweh tells Moses that they are to be made of 
hammered gold, and to face one another ‘overshadowing the mercy seat with 
their wings’. He says, ‘There I will meet with you, and from above the mercy 
seat, from between the two cherubim...I will deliver to you all my commands’ 
(v. 22). This promise is fulfilled in Num. 7:89: ‘When Moses went into the tent 
of meeting to speak with Yahweh, he would hear the voice speaking to him 
from...between the two cherubim’. This art-work stands in the very place of 
Yahweh’s presence to Israel. It is put in the ‘most holy’ part of the tabernacle 
(Ex. 26:34), and Yahweh speaks from its midst. We can take this to indicate that 
art works have a sacred character. Although we cannot say that the mercy-seat is 
representative of art-works in general, the text suggests that such works are, at
49 Brevard S. Childs, Exodus: A Commentary (London: SCM Press, 1974) p. 536.
The word ‘mercy-seat’ translates the Hebrew kapporet, which derives from a root originally
meaning ‘to cover’, but used mainly in tlie Old Testament with the sense ‘to absolve’. The 
Septuagint and Vulgate translations retain the sense of ‘mercy’, as do Luther’s translation and the 
Authorised Version. J. Philip Hyatt, in Commentary on Exodus (London: Oliphants. 1971) pp. 
266-267, and Martin Noth, in Exodus: A Commentary, tr. J.S. Bowden (London: SCM, 19*62) pp. 
204-205, agree tliat the sense simply of ‘covering’ is tlie most likely. Cherubim are imaginary 
creatures with human faces, wings and the body of an animal. Hyatt writes, ‘They were widely 
known in Mesopotamia as guardians of temples and palaces’ (Exodus p. 267).
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least potentially, both acts of worship of God and symbols or representations of
his presence.
Ex. 31 and 35:30-36:1 describe artistic skill as a charism from God. Yahweh
designates two artisans to supervise the construction of the tabernacle, who are
described as follows:
See, I have called by name Bezalel, son of Uri.,. of the tribe of Judah, and 
I have filled him with divine spirit [ruach elohim], with ability, 
intelligence and knowledge in every kind of craft, to devise artistic 
designs in... every kind of craft... I have appointed with him Oholiab, son 
of Ahisamach, of the tribe of Dan (Ex. 31:1-6).
Yahweh's ‘call by name’ indicates an intimacy of relationship to Him in the 
recipient, as in Isa. 43:1; 45:3-4; Ex. 33:17. Bezalel stands in this relationship to 
God in his capacity as an artisan. As George Knight writes in his commentary on 
Exodus (1976), ‘The artisan is...as much elect to serve God’s plan as is the 
prophet and the priest’.51 Bzzalel's skill is described as a direct result of the 
action of the ‘divine spirit’. This is also said of every worker who assists the two 
masters. Ex. 36:1 describes ‘every skilful one to whom Yahweh has given skill 
and understanding to know how to do any work'. This suggests that all artistic 
skill is a gift from God. In his Theology of the Old Testament (1964) Walther 
Eichrodt describes the spirit of God, with which Bezalel is filled, as ‘the medium 
through which God’s presence in the midst of his people becomes a reality ’.52 
This accords with the function of art in the tabernacle. The art-works produced 
as a result of Bezalel’s inspiration are mediations of the presence of God. This is 
reinforced in the Bible’s other extended discussion of the plastic arts, 1 Kings 6­
8, where Solomon builds the Temple in Jerusalem, which replaces the tabernacle
51 George A.F. Knight, Theology as Narration: A Commentary on the Book of Exodus 
(Edinburgh: Handsel, 1976) p. 182.
52 Walther Eichrodt. Theology of the Old Testament, Vol. II, tr. John Baker (London: SCM,
1967) p. 61.
214
as the dwelling of Yahweh in Israel. The Bible describes art as a divine charism, 
and suggests that the works it enables its recipients to produce are symbols in the 
community of God’s presence there.
It is possible, in the Biblical view, to use this skill both for and against God’s
will, as the forging of the golden calf in Ex. 32:2-4 indicates. The commandment
against images is repeated eight times in the Pentateuch. Ex. 20:4-5 reads:
You shall not make for yourself an idol \pese[\, whether in the form 
[temunah] of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth 
beneath...You shall not bow down to them or worship them; for I, the 
LORD your God am a jealous God.
The word pesel refers to an image carved in wood or stone, and later came to 
refer to metal figures also?3 As Martin Noth writes in his commentary on 
Exodus (1962), ‘The possibility of a merely ornamental art is surely not 
envisaged’, since the commandment concerns worrhip?. Since the previous 
commandment has forbidden other gods, it seems that ‘originally the prohibition 
concerned Yahweh images’, and that a later redaction widened its scope to 
include images of other gods?? Wis. 13-15 and Isa. 40:19-20 describe and 
condemn the fashioning of such idols by artisans. When the Bible describes the 
beauty of an art-work enjoyed in itself, it is always in the context of idolatry, as
in Wis. 14:20 and Isa. 41:7. Wis. 15:4-5 describes ‘human art...whose
appearance arouses yearning in fools, so that they desire the lifeless form of a 
dead image’. Both making and perceiving works of art, in the Old Testament 
view, are properly acts of worship of Yahweh. Outside this context, they are 
simply misused. * * *
53 Childs, Exodus p. 404.
54 Noth, Exodus p. 162.
55 Childs, Exodus pp. 405-6.
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The Bible also sees music and song as acts of worship. In 1 Chr. 6:31-48, the 
singers and musicians whom David appointed to minister before the ark of the 
covenant which he had brought to Jerusalem - Heman, Asaph and Ethan - are all 
traced genealogically back to Levi. The Pentateuch describes Yahweh's 
appointment of the tribe of Levi as his ministers. ‘The LORD set apart the tribe 
of Levi to carry the ark of the covenant of the LORD, to stand before the LORD 
to minister to him...to this day' (Dt. 10:8-9). ‘The LORD...has chosen Levi out 
of all your tribes to stand and minister in the name of the LORD... for all time' 
(Dt. 18:5. See also w. 1-8; Num. 8:5-26). Num. 18:1-7 describes the Levites in 
general to be in the service of that line of the tribe which descends from Aaron, 
the priests, and the Chronicler maintains the distinction between the two groups 
(1 Chr. 6:49-53).56 Singing and making music are thus represented as 
specifically priestly functions by the Chronicler. 1 Chr. 15:16-24 and 16:4-7 
describe in some detail the various kinds of instruments and music played by the 
Levites before the ark. As with the construction of the tabernacle, these passages 
indicate the sacred character of music. It is seen as a form of worship of God, 
and as a priestly work. It is associated with the ark of the covenant, and so with 
God's presence to Israel. In 2 Ki. 3:15-16, Elisha begins to prophesy to the
sound of music:
While the musician was playing, the power of the LORD came on him. 
And he said, ‘Thus says the LORD... '
The Bible sees music, like the plastic arts, both as an act of worship and as a 
means by which God can be revealed in the community.
56 See R. J. Coggins, The First and Second Books of the Chronicles (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976) pp. 45-46, and Sara Japhet, Chronicles: A Commentary (London: SCM 
Press, 1994) pp. 149-165.
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There are several principles in the Bible’s treatment of art that we can use in 
Christian literary theory today, if we can legitimately predicate of literary texts 
the qualities with which the Bible describes works of plastic and musical art. We 
can take from the Bible the idea that the production of fictional works in general 
is a charism, an effect of the presence of the Holy Spirit in an author. The 
reception of such works can, as a result, be thought of as a kind of worship, 
however unconscious, insofar as some texts can for some readers symbolise or 
represent the immanent presence of God in the world. I will suggest in more 
detail how this might be the case in the next chapter, but we can note here that 
the Bible provides the basis for a Christian theory of literary value insofar as it 
distinguishes between works which are associated with the presence of God and 
works which take the place of God. A valuable text, it suggests, is one in which a 
reader experiences in some way something of the divine mystery of his or her 
experience.
(ii) St. Augustine
St. Augustine, ‘the greatest of the Fathers both from a literary and from a 
theological standpoint’, dominated the Christian theology and philosophy of the 
West until the rediscovery of the works of Aristotle in the twelfth century. 57 Io 
his Studies in Tertullian and Augustine (1930), B.B. Warfield writes:
57 F.C. Copleston./l History of Philosophy Vol. II: Medieval Philosophy, Augustine to Scotus 
(London: Bums. Oates and Washboume, 1950) p. 40.
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The Western church has felt the force of his influence in all the main 
lines of its development, and in no one of its prominent characteristics 
could it have been without him what it has become.58 59
Augustine had been a teacher of rhetoric before his conversion, and his thought 
remained deeply informed by his acquaintance with the liberal arts.
1. St. Augustine's Theory of Signs
In Semiotics and the Philosophy ofLanguage (1984), Umberto Eco argues that 
Augustine was the first to consider language as a species of the genus of signs. 39 
The Stoics had associated language with signs by considering both as parts of 
dialectic. In his life of Zeno (c. 250), Diogenes Laertius writes that one Stoic 
account of the subject of dialectic was ‘signs and things signified’, and he calls 
this their ‘theory of language [te peri phones thedria]’60 Sextus Empiricus tells 
us that the Stoic definition of a sign was as ‘an antecedent proposition in a valid 
hypothetical major premise, which serves to reveal the conseququt’61 62 63In the 
premise, ‘If there is smoke, then there is fire’, the proposition (axioma) ‘there is 
smoke’ is a sign (semeion) of the proposition ‘there is fire’. The Stoics thought 
of statements as signs. As Diogenes Laertius writes, ‘Speech [lexis] differs from 
a sentence or statement [logos] because the latter always signifies something
[semantikos estiY. 2 St. Augustine differs from the Stoics by thinking of words
• 63as signs.
58 Benjamin Breckenridge Warfield, Studies in Tertullian and Augustine (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1930) p. 120.
59 Umberto Eco, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (London: Macmillan, 1984) p. 33.
™ Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers VII, 62.
61 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians II, 245. See also Outlines of Pyrrhonism II, 104-106.
62 Diogenes Laertius, op. cit. VII, 57.
63 In ‘St. Augustine on Signs’, Phronesis 2 (1957), R.A. Markus argues that Augustine thought of 
words as signs in order to devise a theory of Scriptural signs (p. 65). In ‘Les Origines Stoiciennes 
de la Theorie Augustinienne du Sig^^’, Revue des Etudes Latines 59 (1981) pp. 260-268, Marc
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He establishes the context of semiosis in De Genesi contra Manichaeos (388­
390). Before the fall, Augustine writes, God was directly present to the human 
intellect. Man needed no ‘exterior words' to communicate with God, but knew 
Him through ‘the immanent presence of truth' to his intellect:.64 After the fall, the 
soul was no longer watered by this inner spring, but needed ‘to be taught by 
human words' in order to know God^ In the next life, Augustine writes, the 
science of interpreting these words will become unnecessary, because we will 
see God face to face.64 He argues that in the ‘transparency and simplicity' of the 
celestial body, the movements of the sool will be immediately apparent and 
incapable of being hidden, as in our motaal bddie447 Lying add all 
misunderstanding, which will then be impossible, are a direct result of ‘the 
mortality of the flesh' with which the human race was punished after the fall.
In the Confessions (397), Augustine understands the sda-crepturds of Gen. 1:22 
to refer to the ‘physical signs and manifestations', which we need to use because 
‘the flesh which envelops us is like a eepp see’.64 Ssmmolic acttvity, for 
Augustine, is necessary because of our ffh i mo a state in which our senses are 
not properly subordinated to our intellect, whose contemplation of God 
constitutes our happiness.
Baratin suggests a more convincing reason for the change of emphasis. Diogenes Laertius tells us 
that the Stoics distinguished between phone or vocal utterance, lexis or articulate but not 
necessarily meaningful utterance, and logos or meaningful utterance {Lives VII, 57). Baratin 
argues that the Alexandrian grammarians redefined the grammatically useless term lexis so that it 
denoted the smallest element of a significant utterance, a word. He cites Dionysius Thrax, 
Grammatici Graeci 1 1. Baratin argues that Augustine was familiar with this redefinition of the 
Stoic system.
64 De Genesi contra Manichaeos II. iv, 5.
65 Ibid. II, v. 6.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. II, xxL 32.
68Ibid.
® Confessiones XIII, xxiv, 37.
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For St. Augustine, the intellect is superior to the bodily signs we use to make 
known its operations. It knows eternal truths, which are of greater value than the 
temporal objects known by the senses. In De Catechizandis Rudibus (c. 400­
405), Augustine writes that, as a result, it is difficult to translate thought into 
speech. He writes, ‘When my capacities of expression prove inferior to my inner 
apprehensions, I grieve over the inability which my tongue has betrayed in 
answering to my heert’.70 This is because the process of forming a concept is 
‘something like a rapid flash [quasi rapida coruscatione]\ whereas speech is 
protracted in time, and of a ‘vastly different nature’ to understanding.71 As 
Augustine writes in De Fide et Symbolo (393), ‘Between mind and body there is 
the greatest difffrenee’.72 When we speak, we are attempting to transfer into the 
mind of another the understanding of our own mind by bodily means. Because of 
the gulf between the two, ‘the mind of the speaker cannot become perfectly 
known’.73 Even the traces of understanding in our memory exist in the mind and 
so are altogether different to bodily signs.74 IbSometimes, Augustine continues, we 
can try so hard to convey our understanding that the very fervour of the attempt 
(ipsam intentionem) prevents us from doing so..
In De Doctrina Christiana (396-426), Augustine defines a sign as ‘a thing 
which causes us to think of something [in cogitationem venire] beyond the 
impression [speciem] the thing itself makes upon the senses’.76 Strictly speaking, 
a thing (res) is ‘that which is not used to signify something else’. So every sign 
is also a thing, although not every thing is a sign. As Augustine writes in De
70
71
72
73
74
75
De Catechizandis Rudibus ii, 3.
Ibid.
De Fide et Svmbolo iii, 4.
Ibid.
De Cat. Rud. ii, 3 .
Ibid.
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Dialectica (387), ‘words are signs of things without ceasing to be things’.76 77 8 79
Signs can be divided into two kinds, natural (naturalia) and given (data) signs, 
according to whether or not they are produced by the will Z? The former arise 
‘without any desire or intention of signifying’, as when smoke signifies fire. The 
latter, Augustine writes, are:
those which living creatures show to one another for the purpose of 
conveying, insofar as they are able, the motion of their spirits [motus 
atiimi] or something which they have sensed or understood...[They are 
used for] bringing forth and transferring to another mind the action of the 
mind in the person [idquodanimo gerit] who makes the sign.80 81 82
Among given signs, words have come to be predominant among men.?1 In De 
Dialectica, Augustine distinguishes four elements in the class of verbal signs. 
There is the thing (res), sensed or understood. If this thing is a word, as when we 
discuss words, then it is a verbum, or ‘mention’. A word spoken to signify 
something other than itself Augustine calls a dictio. Finally, there is the dicibiie, 
which is ‘that which the mind not the ears perceives from the word and which is 
held within the mind itself . It is the ‘meaning’ of a word, the concept its 
speaker means to express by it. He ‘bears it in his mind’, and aims to transfer it 
into the mind of his hearer by means of his bodily words.
Augustine elaborates his theory of meaning most fully in De Trinitate (400­
417). He writes that a word can be understood before it is uttered aloud and even 
before the images of its sounds are rehearsed in thought. This is the ‘word
76 De Doctrina Christiana II. i, 1.
77 Ibid. I, ii, 2.
78 De Dialectica v.
79 De Doct. Chr. II, i, 2. As B. Darrell Jackson points out in ‘St. Augustine’s Theory of Signs in 
De Doctrina Christiana', Revue des Etudes Augustiniennes 15 (1969) p. 14, signa data is 
mistranslated as ‘conventional signs’. Tlie difference between natural and given signs is the 
absence and presence of will m them.
80 De Doct. Chr. II. ii, 3.
81 Ibid. II, iii, 4.
82 De Dial. v.
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spoken in our heart [verbum... quod in corde dicimusY*3 When we speak of what 
we know, Augustine writes:
There must be bom out of the knowledge held in our memory a word 
which corresponds in all respects to the knowledge of which it is bom. 
The thought [cogitatio] which has received form from the object of our 
knowledge is the word spoken in our heart?.
When we see a bodily object, in Augustine’s view, the sense of sight receives the 
form of the object’s outward appe^a^e?5 In the same way, when we think of 
something that we know, our intemal vision receives the form of the image of 
the thing known, stored in our memory. De Ib Ib 86 IbIntemal vision so informed he calls 
cogitatio, or conscious thought. The form of the thing known in the intemal
vision he calls the word of the heart. This is because ‘in the inward realm of our 
thoughts, [locution and vision] are one and the same’?. In the process of coming 
to know something, a ‘darting movement of passage in the mind’ lights upon the 
image of a sensible object or upon a universal tmth in the memory, receives its 
form, and becomes a ‘true word’ of knowledge. 88 This is what verbal signs 
signify. ‘The word in its outward sounding’, to which we usually give the name 
of word, is a ‘bodily sign’ of the ‘word that is inwardly luminous’.89 IbIt does not 
represent the inner word ‘as it is truly is, but in the manner in which it may be 
seen or heard through the medium of the body’. 0 Augustine likens the process of 
signification to the Incamation:
We may compare the manner in which our own word is made as it were a 
bodily uttrrance...as a means of displaying itself to men’s senses, with
83
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De Trinitate XV. x, 19.
Ibid.
Ibid. XL ii. 5.
Ibid. XI. iii. 6.
Ibid. XV, x 18.
Ibid. XV. xv, 25; XV, xii, 22.
Ibid. XV. xi. 20.
Ibid.
222
that in which the Word of God was made flesh. ..as a means of displaying 
himself to men's senses.91 92
Just as the Word did not become the flesh he assumed, so our inner word does
not become the sounds it assumes, but remains unchanged in itself, in the same 
way that the Word remained unchanged when incarnated
In De Magistro (389), Augustine discusses the role played by words in 
imparting knowledge. He argues that, ‘Nothing is learned even by its appropriate 
sign’, which means that, ‘We learn nothing by means of these signs we call 
words'93 Util I know the thing of which a word is the sign, I do not know that it 
is a sign at all. As a result, we should say that signs are learned from things, 
rather than vice versa. I only come to learn something if I perceive it with my 
eyes, with one of my other senses, or with my mind. I know sensible things 
either by sensing them or by having once done so, so that images of them are 
imprinted in my memory. When I express these images in words, nu-oad can 
understand the words' meaning unless he has similar images in his own memory. 
He ‘recognises the truth of what I say by [these] images'.94 95 *We know intelligible 
things by ‘looking upon them directly in the inner light of truth which illumines 
the inner man'd This inner light is divine. In the Soliloquies (386), Augustine 
writes:
The mind has, as it were, eyes of its own, analogous to the soul’s senses. 
The certain truths of the sciences are analogous to the objects which the 
sun's rays make visible... It is God himself who illumines all.44
For St. Augustine, God is like an intelligible sun which enables the mind to see 
intelligible objects. The comparison came to him from Plato, by way of
91 Ibid.
92 See De Doct. Chr. I, xiii, 12.
93 De Magstro x, 33-34.
94 Ibid. xii, 39.
95 Ibid. xii, 40.
9 Soliloquia I, vi, 12.
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Plotinus.9? If a pupil does not know whether what his teacher has said is true, he
learns nothing from him. If the pupil recognises either that the teacher has
spoken truly or falsely, this recognition cannot derive from the teacher’s words,
since these are susceptible both of truth and of falsity. The pupil has judged what
he understands to be his teacher’s concepts by an inner standard of truth,
possessed by all. Augustine writes, ‘When I speak what is true, and [the hearer]
sees what is true...he is taught not by my words but by the things themselves
which inwardly God has made manifest to him’.?? If I tell him that seven and
three make ten or that wisdom is better than folly, he looks within himself and
discovers that it is true. The intelligible light of God in his mind illuminates the
concepts and enables him to see their truth. Hence, as Scripture says:
Our real Teacher is he who is listened to [within], who is said to dwell in 
the inner man, namely Christ, that is, the unchangeable power and eternal 
wisdom of God??
Augustine grants that ‘when words are heard by one who knows them, he can 
also know that the speaker has thought the things which the words signify’. 97 * * 100
But the words do not teach him anything. They simply prompt him to look 
within himself, either for traces of sensible knowledge in his memory or for 
intelligible knowledge in the inner light of his mind. Augustine writes, ‘The 
utmost value I can attribute to words is this. They bid us look for things 
[admonent,.. ut quaeremtis res]’.10?
We are bidden to look for the things the speaker intends us to know only 
insofar as we understand his intention by means of his words. As a result of their 
bodily nature, words often fail to convey this intention precisely. We can make
97 See De Civitate Dei X ii.
De Mag. xii, 40.
w Ibid. xi, 38.
100 Ibid. xiv, 45.
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slips of the tongue, we can hear incorrectly, and the meaning we intend to 
convey in our words can be misunderstood.10. This last happens as a result of 
‘the hindrances...which come from the force of words hac verborum
vi... impedimenta]', namely their obscurity {obscuritas) and their ambiguity 
(ambigiiitas)™ Words are obscure when their receiver does not know their 
meaning. This can be remedied by clear pronunciation and simple vocabulary in 
speakers and by a knowledge of languages and of the liberal arts in hearers. Ibi Ibi De  104 De 
Ambiguity is more difficult to remedy. ‘Every word is ambiguous’, either 
univocally, if its definition includes different concepts, or equivocally, if it must 
be defined in different wayt.® The word ‘Tullius’ is equivocal, since its 
definition can be ‘a name by which a man is signified’, ‘the greatest orator’, ‘a 
dactylic foot’ or even ‘an equivocal’. 106 Ibi IbiIn equivocals, Augustine writes, ‘The 
tangle [perplexio] of ambiguities runs wild, almost without limits [prope 
infinlta]'.™1 When he discusses equivocals whose different definitions 
nevertheless derive from the same source, he writes, ‘to pursue and defrat...this 
kind of ambiguity is an endless [infinitum] task’.™. In De Dialectica, he does 
not claim to have succeeded in the task, but leaves that judgement to his 
reader. 109 In De Doctrina Christiana, he comes to the similar conclusion that the 
ambiguities which arise from figurative expressions (locutiones figuratae) are in 
the end impossible fully to resolve. Having expounded Tyconius’ seven rules for 
interpreting figurative expressions in Scripture, Augustine writes:
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‘Whether my attempt succeeds, you may judge’ (ibid.).
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The scope of such expressions, it seems to me, is too broad for any one 
man to comprehend entirely \ab aliquo universa comprehends]}™
There are so many ways in which one thing is understood from another that the
art of rhetoric cannot categorise them ail. When considered alone or in a written
text, whose author cannot answer our questions, it may finally prove impossible
to determine the meaning a word or phrase was intended to express. This is as 
the
true of the Scriptures as of any other text. It may bd^^itse that ‘what he who wrote 
the passage intended remains hidden'.110 11 112Augustine writes of the book of
Genesis:
When so many meanings can be extracted from the words that Moses 
wrote, do you not see how foolish it is to make a bold assertion that one 
in particular is the one he had in mindV^
The ambiguities of words can be resolved when the hearer is face to face with 
the speaker, however. Although every word taken in itself is ambiguous, 
Augustine writes, ‘ambiguities are explained through discussion 
[diyputando],..by words already combined which will not be ambiguous'.113 hhe 
purpose of speaking is to transfer the concepts in our minds into the mind of 
another, and our prdsdacd to one another allows a reciprocal process of definition 
that makes this transfer as accurate as possible. As we saw, the gulf between 
mind and body is such that the correspondence between the speaker's and the 
hearer's understanding will never be perfect. In fact, it is achieved most fully by 
love, since, as Augustine writes, ‘we dwell in one another by the bond of love 
\per vinculis amoris]',114 In De Catechizandis Rudibus, he recommends that the
110 De Doct. Chr. III. xxxvii, 56.
And. Ill, xxvii, 38.
112 Conf'. XII, xxv, 35.
113 De Dial. ix.
114 De Cat. Rud. xii, 17.
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best means of communicating our concepts is charity towards those to whom we
are speaking. He writes:
So great is the power of a sympathetic disposition of mind that, as they 
are affected as we are speaking, and we are affected as they are learning, 
we have our dwelling in one another. Thus...they as it were in us speak 
what they hear, and we in them learn after a certain fashion what we 
teach.115
The principle of charity is the basis of all Augustine’s rules for Scriptural 
interpretation. He writes that ‘Scripture teaches nothing but charity’, and that any 
expression that does not do this if taken literally must be figurative. 116 Whatever 
Moses meant in the Pentateuch, ‘he meant it to be understood in the spirit of 
[the] two precepts of charity’, love of God and of neighbour, and so any 
interpretation of his words in accordance with this spirit is acceptable. 117 118Both 
reason and the rule of faith tell us that charity is God’s will for us??? It is the 
most effective means we have in our fallen state of effecting the presence of one 
mind to another, which is our aim when we use language. As a result, language 
is a means of charity. Augustine writes, ‘Charity...would not have a means of 
infusing souls and almost mixing them together if men could teach nothing to 
men’?1?
Although we cannot use Augustine’s Neoplatonic philosophical framework in 
a contemporary theory, there are nevertheless several aspects of his semiotics 
that could be worked into a Christian literary theory today. Firstly, we could 
follow his assertion that words are signs given to communicate a speaker’s 
thoughts and feelings to another, and we could accept that the difference 
between mental life and language is so great that it is impossible to communicate
115 Ibid.
1,6 De Doct. Chr. IH. x, 15.
117 Conf. XIT xxv, 35.
118 De Doct. Chr. I. xxxv, 39; III, ii, 2.
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these thoughts and feelings perfectly in words. A Christian literary theory would 
therefore think of literary texts as imperfect communications of the author's 
experience. Secondly, we could follow St. Augustine in asserting that we may be 
unable to reduce the multiple meanings of a literary text, and that we will rarely 
be able to say with certainty what precisely an author meant. We need not accept 
his epistemological doctrines of reminiscence or of inner light, but we can 
understand his view that words make us look for things by asserting that literary 
texts give their readers ways in which to interpret their experience. Rather than 
believing that texts tell us what we already know, that is, we can say that they 
allow us to understand what we have experienced. Finally, Christian criticism 
could learn from Augustine the use of charity as a hermeneutic principle. 
Augustine applies the principle only to Scripture, but according to the logic of 
his concept of charity as the proper end of human action, we can follow him in 
using the principle in literary hermeneutics. Augustine defines charity as the 
twofold love of God and neighbour, and so we can take from him the principle 
that Christian criticism should prefer interpretations that pertain in some way to
this love.
2. St. Augustine's Theory of Beauty
I will now turn to an examination of St. Augustine's theory of art, in order to 
establish which of its principles Christian literary theory can or should use today. 
To understand this theory, we must first examine Augustine's view of beauty,
since he conceives the one in terms of the other. His most detailed discussions of *
119 Ibid. proem., 6.
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beauty are to be found in the works written between the time of his conversion in 
386 and his ordination in 391. Between 386 and 387, he lived a life of study and 
prayer with friends and students at a friend’s villa near Cassiciacum. In De Beata 
Vita (386), one of the philosophical dialogues composed during this period, 
Augustine argues that happiness, which all men desire, consists in wanting 
something that will make one happy, that is, something permanent, which cannot 
be removed by time or chance. God is absolutely permanent, and so ‘he who 
possesses God is happy’. 120 Augustine writes that ‘He who arrives at the highest 
measure by means of truth is happy. He possesses God in his mind [animo Deum 
habereY?21 Augustine discusses the nature of truth in De Libero Arbitrio (387­
396). He writes that knowledge comes from three faculties; the bodily senses, an 
‘interior sense’, which perceives the acts of the bodily senses, and reason, which 
provides knowledge (scientia) properly so called. 122 Reason is the highest faculty 
in man, by which he comes to know truth, and is surpassed only by truth itself. 
Truth, in Augustine’s view, is unchangeable and eternal. If the whole world 
perished, it would still be true that it had perished. 123 De  IbiAugustine writes, ‘There is 
an unchangeable truth which contains everything that is unchangeably true’, 
such as the rules of mathematics and of wisdom. i24 It is like ‘some mysterious 
yet public light’ in which true propositions are intelligible to alfm This eternal 
truth is that ‘chief good’ whose possession bestows happiness, namely God.. 
This is the context of Augustine’s aesthetics, that happiness consists in the 
certain knowledge of divine and eternal truth, to which reason alone can attain.
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Since beauty gives pleasure, the highest beauty is to be found in the highest 
pleasure, namely the mind’s contemplation of eternal things in the light of truth. 
Augustine speaks of ‘the beauty of truth and wisdom’, which does not pass like 
that of a skyscape or of a song. Ibi 127 ConIn Contra Academicos (386), he speaks of ‘the 
beauty of philosophy’, and argues that the pursuit of beauty is an inferior type of 
the pursuit of wisdom, conducted at the level of sense-perception??? Augustine 
writes:
What is philosophy? Love of wisdom. What is philocaiia? Is it not love 
of beauty?... What, then, is wisdom? Is it not true beauty?129
Augustine writes that philosophy and philocalia are ‘sisters bom of the same 
parent’. Philosophy can teach those who love the false beauties of sensible things 
to love her own ‘tme beauty’, found in the contemplation of eternal truths. This 
had been Augustine’s own experience, as he records in the Confessions (397): 
‘Your beauty [O God] drew me to you...I wondered how it was that I could 
appreciate beauty in material things’.130 Baauty is most properly an attribute of 
God, for St. Augustine. He writes:
It was you, O Lord, who made [material things], you who are beautiful, 
for they too are beautiful ..But they are not beautiful...as you are 
beautifjl...In comparison with you they have neither beauty nor 
goodness nor being at all.m
Tme beauty belongs to God. It is known by the mind, which contemplates Him 
in the eternal light of tmth. Material things are beautiful insofar as they 
participate in the qualities of this intelligible beauty.
The most important of these qualities for Augustine is proportion. Proportion 
makes a thing beautiful because it manifests the principle of reason in it. In De
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Ordine (386), St. Augustine writes that we call a visible object beautiful whose
congruence of parts presents itself as rational (in quo congruentia partium
rationabilis dicitur). We call a song or piece of music beautiful if its harmonies
and rhythms appear rationally ordered to us.m It is self-evident, according to
Augustine, that the pleasure we derive from looking at or hearing a thing is
produced by the ordered distribution of its parts. He calls this distribution
dimensio atque modulatio, ‘proportion and measure'. bi De Vera Religione
(390), Augustine writes that a symmetrically constructed building gives pleasure
because it is beautiful, and that it is beautiful because ‘its parts correspond and
are so joined together as to form one harmonious whole [imam
convenientiamY ,Con Ibi De  Ibi 134 IbiThe b auty of the natural universe derives from the same
quality. Augustine writes, ‘The world is full of designs and is beautiful... because
of the reason that is in it [rationeY^ All greater things are made out of lesser
parts, each proportionally related to the other and all related to the whole. This is
true also of the cycles of time. In De Musica (388-391), Augustine writes:
The circling sky continually returns to its place of starting, recalling 
thither the heavenly bodies, with the days, months, years, five-year 
periods and other cycles of time.. .according to the laws of equality, unity 
and order.136 De 
The order of the temporal universe is its beauty. Augustine writes, ‘The whole 
rhythmic succession and gradation in space and time is judged to be 
beautifuL. .by its ordered fitness [ordinata convenientiaY?37
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The value of sensible beauty, for Augustine, is that by prompting us to
consider the intelligible principles in which it consists, it can lead us to the
contemplation of those principles in which happiness is to be found. He writes:
Nothing hinders the perception of truth more than a life devoted to... the 
false images of sensible thmgs...The mind has to be healed in order that
it may behold the immutable form of things which remains ever the
138same.
God in his mercy has provided for this healing by the temporal dispensation, in 
which ‘he has used the mutable creation, obedient however to his eternal laws, to 
remind the soul of its original and perfect nature’.138 39 Beauty is a part of this 
providential dispensation. As Robert J. O’Connell writes in Art and the Christian 
Intelligence in St. Augustine (1978), this is ‘an aesthetic for the fallen soul’.140 
Augustine’s criterion of proportion demands unity and equality in an object, the 
equality or similarity of parts and intervals to one another, and the harmonious 
unity of the whole so comprised. But, Augustine writes, ‘Who can find absolute 
equality or similarity in bodily objects? Who would venture to say...that any 
body is truly and simply one?’040 In the case of unity, it is clear that ‘it cannot be 
perceived by the senses’.142 Any bodily object has innumerable parts. However 
compact, it has a top and a bottom, a left-hand and a right-hand side, and so on. 
These parts could not be counted without some notion of unity, because all 
numbers are multiples of one, so unity must be known with the mind rather than 
with the senses. Augustine writes, ‘We must know this by the inner light, of 
which bodily sense knows nothing’.143 Now sensible things clearly possess a 
trace (vestigium) of the intelligible unity, and the more beautiful they are the
138 Ibid. iii, 3.
139 Ibid. x, 19.
140 Robert O'Connell, A rt and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1978) p. 25.
141 De Vera Religione xxx, 55.
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more marked is this trace.De  Ibi 144 Sensibly beautiful things ‘imitate but cannot 
completely achieve [non posse assequi earn quam sequitur]' unity, and by doing 
so they prompt us to seek the true unity of which they are imperfect copies.145 
When we seek true unity, we find it in the realm of intelligible tiuths illuminated 
by the divine light of truth. Augustine writes ‘By the true light you see the unity 
whereby you judge whatever you see to be one’.146 It is the same with the 
equality of sensible beauties. We judge sensibly equal things by the ‘absolute 
standard of equality’ which exists in the beatific order of eternal truth.147 For 
Augustine sensible beauty is a ‘pointer towards the happy life [admonitio beatae 
vitae]' in a realm where happiness is not otherwise to be found.148 It is one of the 
‘steps made by divine providence [gradibns quos...divina providentia 
fabricare]' by which our fall into our present state, in which sense usurps the 
proper domination of reason in our souls, can be undone.149
There is less in Augustine’s aesthetics that we can use in Christian literary 
theory today than in his semiotics, since it is so deeply permeated by his 
Neoplatonic metaphysics. Nevertheless, there are several principles which we 
can accept. We can follow Augustine in asserting that beauty is primarily an 
attribute of God. We can accept that God is the most beautiful of beings, whose 
transcendent beauty is obscurely known from the beauty of created things. We 
cannot accept the rationalism of Augustine’s aesthetics, but we can use some of 
its other-worldly emphasis. We can say, that is, that sensibly beautiful things can 
lead us to consider the more perfect beauty of God, but we need not assert with
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Augustine that they do so by means of the intelligible principles according to 
which they are constructed. We can take from Augustine the principle that the 
beauty of a literary work is a pointer to the perfectly satisfying beauty of God, 
known in the beatific vision. We can follow him in defining beauty in such 
works as that which puts the reader in mind of a happier, more blessed life than
his or her own.
3. St. Augustine’s Theory of Art
St. Augustine distinguishes between art ‘in the vulgar sense’ {ars vulgaris) 
and the liberal arts. The former comprises ‘nothing but the memory of things we 
have experienced and which have given us pleasure, with the addition of some 
skilled bodily activity’.^ This combination of memory and physical skill 
comprises such arts as building, playing musical instruments and singing. They 
are ‘not far from reason and truth’, but they are to be distinguished from science, 
or the liberal arts, which pertain to reason alone. 151 Vulgar arts pertain both to 
the senses and to reason. Nevertheless, they have their place in the dispensation 
of providence. Augustine writes:
The artificers of all corporeal forms work by number and regulate their 
operations thereby [habent numeros quibus coaptant opera sua\...They 
move their hands and tools until that which is fashioned in the outer 
world, being referred to the inward light of number, receives such 
perfection as is possible.152
Numbers are truths unavailable to the senses, which we know by the divine inner 
light of truth. Both the number one, of which all others are multiples, and the 148 * 150 151
148 Ibid. xiv, 84.
"" Ibid. 1, 98.
150 Ibid. xxx, 54.
151 Ibid. De Musica I, iv, 6.
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‘fixed and unchangeable law' of the numerical series, are eternal truths.1 53 
Number is the basis of order and hence of the proportion which causes beauty. 
Augustine writes, ‘Examine the beauty of bodily form, and you will find that 
everything is in its place by number'.152 153 54 hhe skill of an artist, like the beauty of 
his work, derives from number, as the artist learns the proper order of 
movements necessary to make or perform the work. An art-work makes us think 
of the skill by which it was made, and those who know how to behold it rightly
will ‘rise above even the mind of the artificer to behold the eternal realm of 
number'.155 As Augustine writes in the Confessions, ‘The beauty which flows 
through men's minds into their skilful hands comes from that beauty which is 
above their souls'.156
The liberal arts (artes liberates) or school disciplines (disciplinae) lead the soul 
more surely to the eternal realm, since they are of an entirely intellectual nature. 
They are the study of the rational principles which govern a given field of 
practice. In the Soliloquies, Augustine writes that a discipline consists in 
‘definitions, divisions and reasonings, where the nature of each thing is set forth 
[and] each part receives its due attention without confusion'. 157 Since these rules 
are learnt and hence known, and since one cannot know what is false, Augustine 
writes that all the disciplines are true.. In De Immortalia Animae (387), he 
writes that the truths they teach are eternal and present in the soul/n In De 
Ordine (386), he lists the liberal arts as grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, music, 
geometry and astronomy. Each comprises a system of rules discerned by reason,
152 De Libero Arbitrio II, xvi, 42.
153 Ibid. II, viii. 23.
154 Ibid. II, xvi, 42.
155 Ibid. II, xvi, 43; 42.
156 Confessiones X, xxxiv, 53.
157 Soliloquia II, xi, 21.
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and which pertain to number.158 159 60 Augustine writes, Tn all the disciplines, 
everything presented itself to [reason] as governed by numbers {numerosaY ,161 
Since number is of the order of eternal truth, careful study of the liberal arts can 
lead the mind to beatific contemplation of this truth. *°2 This means that 
knowledge of the numerical rules by which an art-work is made is more valuable 
than the work itself. Augustine writes, ‘The art of versifying is not subject to 
change with time’ as verses themselves are, since it possesses eternally the rules 
for making temporal verses. Verse itself is beautiful by ‘exhibiting faint traces of 
the beauty which the art of poetry keeps steadfastly and unchangeably’. 163 Those 
‘perverse people’ who prefer poems to the art of poetry prefer temporal things 
rather than God, who created time and providentially governs it164 This, 
according to Augustine, is as absurd as wanting continually to hear one syllable 
during the recitation of a whole poem.
St. Augustine discusses the art of verse in detail in De Musica. This work is 
concerned primarily with poetic rhythm. Augustine defines music as the ‘science 
of measuring well [scientia bene modulandi]\ As H.-I. Marrou points out in 
Saint Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique (1938), this science pertained in 
late antiquity both to rhythmic and harmonic measures. 165 St. Augustine confines 
his discussion to rhythm and hence to verse, with which his profession as a 
teacher of rhetoric had made him familiar, rather than to music in our sense of
melody and harmony. Music, for Augustine, is a science, that is, a ‘pure and true
158 Ibid. II, xi, 20.
159 De Immortalia Animae iv, 5.
160 De Ordine II, xii, 35-xv, 43.
161 Ibid. II, xv, 43.
162 Ibid. II, xvi, 44.
163 De Vera Religione xxii, 42.
164 Ibid. xxii, 43.
165 Henri-Irenee Marrou, Saint Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique (Paris: Boccard, 1949) p. 
267.
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understanding’ of the numerical relations by which poetic rhythms are 
constructed.166 Neither songbirds nor those who play instruments by ear possess 
such understanding. They can ‘produce numerical works’ (numerosa facere} but 
they do not ‘know numbers’ (numeros cognoscere), by which the works are 
pr^^uu^c^.d7 The value of the science of music is that it can lead those minds 
which incline towards grammar and poetry ‘from the things of sense to God, 
with reason as a guide’.168 IbiAugusiine writes, ‘I have written for those who 
possess secular education, but. ..do not know where the true joy is’^
The pleasure we take in rhythmic verse derives from the principle of equality
which underlies its measures. Augustine writes, ‘What possible principle can
bring all feet into mutual harmony except the principle of equality?’170 We know
that true equality is an eternal principle, towards which imperfect sensible
equalities point us. The rhythms which govern the whole temporal universe
guide our reason to this true equality. Augustine writes:
The higher things are those in which equality resides supreme, unshaken, 
unchangeable, eternal; where there is no time, because no mutability; 
whence, in imitation of eternity, times in our world are made, ordered 
and modified.171
The rhythms of the temporal universe make it comprehensible as a great metrical 
poem, a carmen universitatis or ‘universal song’. The beauty of poetic rhythm, 
Augustine writes, is ‘formed out of our penal mortality’, that is, out of the 
passing and sensible things which we chose at the fall over the eternal 
knowledge of God for which we were made. 572 Nevertheless, as we know, God 
‘has not so forsaken us that we cannot be recalled from carnal delight and
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quickly retrace our way' to Him?7. In the ‘rhythm which passes' we can 
recognise ‘the rhythm which remains', by which the former is constructed, i™ 
Temporal verse is a gift of divine providence, ‘in its own kind beautiful’. We 
must not love it in itself, because it cannot make us happy in itself, but rather 
treat it ‘as a plank amid the waves of the sea', neither rejecting it as a burden nor 
clinging to it as if stable. Ibi Ibi De  Ibi 175 I iAugustine writes, ‘We must use it well, so that 
eventually we may dispense with it'.iii
St. Augustine says less about the content of poetry than its rhythm. In De
Ordine, he writes that poets apply the principle of number not only to the sound
of their words but also to the relations between words and to the things which
those words signify. 177 Ibi ConHence poetry can be called the ‘power of inventing
rational fictions [rationabilium mendacionum poteeatem]1. He gives as an
example of such a fiction the myth that the Muses are the daughters of Jove and
Memory. The ‘reason' in this myth is the truth it signifies, namely that music
derives both from the divine principle of number and from the human memory.
In the first book of the Confessions, Augustine is more austere. He describes the
epic poems he learned in his youth as ‘empty'. He writes:
I was obliged to memorise the wanderings of a hero named Aeneas, 
while in the meantime I failed to remember my own erratic ways. I 
learned to lament the death of Dido...while all the time...I was dying,
1 70separated from you, my God.
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Augustine’s theme in the first book of the Confessions is that he ‘looked for
pleasure, beauty and truth not in [God] but in myself and his other creatures’.180 181
He is concerned with having used poetry wrongly, that is, having loved it in
itself. Nevertheless, it is in keeping with his aesthetics that the fiction of Aeneas’
wanderings, if used rightly, could be valuable by reminding the soul of its own
wanderings. This is the logic of the concept of rational fiction. The pleasure the
soul takes in such fiction could be seen to derive from the principle of number
which underlies the arrangement of its parts. In fact, Augustine’s concern with
poetry in the Confessions is not essentially different from that of the De Musica.
Both works are concerned with the right use of a temporal good; the latter simply
places greater emphasis on the danger of its misuse. In De Trinitate, Augustine
describes the twofold good of poetry as musical rhythm and ‘profound
thought’/^ Even in his later works, he regards the content of poetry as valuable.
This is shown by his repeated use of citation from the Latin poets to illustrate
points in an argument. As he discusses the production of the verbum cordis in
conscious knowledge, Augustine writes:
That great master of language, Vergil, knew well the value of words, 
with a sure insight into the nature of thought, when he wrote in his poem, 
‘He passes within himself the varied happenings of war’.182
It is possible for poetry to express ‘sure insight’ into truth. Despite the austere
presentation in the first book of the Confessions, in practice Augustine did not
abandon his early concept of the rational fiction. He uses poetry to illustrate his
arguments throughout De Civitate Dei (413-426). To give one example from
180 Ibid. I, xviii, 31.
181 De Trin. VIII, in, 4.
182 Ibid. XV, xvi, 25.
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many, he describes the ‘perception’ expressed in Horace’s poetry as ‘morally 
clear-sighted’.166
It is difficult to make use of Augustine’s Pythagorean aesthetics of number 
today, but there are several principles that a Christian literary theory can take 
from his theory of art nevertheless. We can no longer accept his belief that 
number is the principle of the beauty of literary works, but we could translate 
this aspect of his aesthetics into the more general principle that literary works 
manifest something beyond themselves, and that this is the nature of their 
beauty. We could also take his concept of rational fiction to mean that fictional 
texts can teach their readers truths about their own experience, and that these 
truths can be ethical, that is, that they can challenge a reader to change his or her
actions.
(iii) St. Thomas Aquinas
As F.C. Copleston writes, St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) occupies a 
‘favoured position in the intellectual life of the Catholic Church’.^4 He was 
canonised in 1323, and declared a doctor of the church in 1567. According to 
Josef Pieper, in his Guide to Thomas Aquinas (1962), St. Thomas was the first to 
be canonised primarily for having been a teacher. 183 184 85 In 1917, the Code of Canon 
Law required teachers in Catholic seminaries to hold and teach his method.
183 De Civ. Dei V, xiu.
184 F.C. Copleston,Onw’(?as (nondnn: Penguin, 1955) p. 235.
185 Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, tr. Richard and Clara Winston (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1962) p. 17.
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doctrines and principles. 186 187 188 189 190In his encyclical Studiorum Ducem (1923), Pope Pius 
XI declared that ‘the Church has adopted his philosophy for her very own’.*. 
The century before St. Thomas wrote had seen the translation into Latin of many 
of Aristotle's works besides the familiar Logic, and of the works of Islamic and 
Jewish philosophers influenced by their knowledge of Aristotle in Arabic 
translations.1 ii Like his teacher Albert the Great (1206-1280), St. Thomas 
believed that much of this Aristotelian philosophy was true, and that it therefore 
‘provided a powerful instrument in the construction of a general Christian world- 
view’/ii He used Neoplatonic ideas from Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius, but, 
where he believed their philosophy was lacking, reinterpreted and replaced it. As 
Etienne Gilson writes of St. Thomas' method, in Christian Philosophy in the 
Middle Ages (1955), ‘When a theologian has good reason to think that Augustine 
did not make use of the best possible philosophy, he should not hesitate to 
change it’.!
1. Theoiogicat Language
As Robert H. Ayers writes, in Language, Logic and Reason in the Church 
Fathers (1979), the context of St. Thomas' theories of language is his ‘pursuit of
186 Codex Juris Canonici (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1931) no. 1366. The revised 
code of Canon Law issued under John Paul II in 1983 is less exclusive, stipulating only that St. 
Thomas is to be ‘the teacher in a special way [praesertim] of students of dogmatic theology. 
Code of Canon Law: Latin-English Edition (Washington, DC: Canon Law Society of America, 
1983) no. 252.
187 Pius XI, ‘Studiorum DvccnFActaApostolicae Sedis 15 (1923) p. 314.
188 See F.C. Copieston,^ History of Medieval Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1972) pp. 104-159.
189 Ibid. p. 180. See Joscjh Owens, ‘Aristotle and Aquinas’, in Norman Krclzmami and Eleonore 
Stump, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993) pp. 38-59.
190 Etienne Gilson, Christian Philosophv in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955) p. 
364.
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the clearest and most complete understanding possible of the Christian faith’.191 
He thought of language with a view to the clearest possible understanding of 
theology. In his commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretation (1269-1272), St. 
Thomas writes that language arises as a result of man’s social nature. If he were 
solitary by nature, his knowledge of things would suffice for him. But since he is 
a social and political animal, ‘it was necessary that his conceptions 
[conceptions] be made known to others’.192 Since he does this through utterance 
(per vocem), Thomas writes, ‘there had to be significant utterances [voces 
significativas] in order that men could live together’.193 194Aristotle wrote, ‘Spoken 
sounds are symbols [sumbola] of affections of the soul, and written marks are 
symbols of spoken sounds’. Thomas understands Aristotle’spassiones animae 
to mean intellectus conceptiones, ‘conceptions of the intellect’, and asserts that 
these are likenesses [similitudines) of the things known. 195 * 197 198Spoken words, 
however, are signs [notae, idest signa) of these forms not because of any 
likeness to them but because of human institution [ratio institutionis), or 
convention (pla^tum)™ As a result of the conventional nature of the meaning 
of words, Thomas writes that care should be taken to ‘use words as most people 
use them’ in order that our conceptions are not misunderstood/^ As Aristotle 
said, ‘The usage of the multitude...is to be followed in giving names to 
things’. 196
191 Robert H. Ayers, Language, Logic and Reason in the Church Fathers: A Study ofTertultian, 
Augustine and Aquinas (Hildesheim and New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1979) p. 82.
192 In Libros Perihermenias I, ii, 2. This work will henceforth be abbreviated as In Perth.
193 Ibid.
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195 Ibid. 1, ii. 5.
^InPeeih. h ii, 9; I, iv, 11.
197 De Veniate IV, ii.
198 Summa Contra Gentiles I, i, 1.
242
In De Veritate (1256-1259), Thomas writes that a name is derived from two 
sources, ‘from the one who uses the word [ex parte imponentis] or from the thing 
to which it has been applied [ex parte rei cui imponitur]'?" In his commentary 
on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1252-1256), Thomas calls the former the 
quality of the name and the latter its substance.De  200 SumThe latter is what he also calls 
the ‘definition’ of a name. It is in this sense that he writes in the Summa
Theologiae (1265-1273) that the meaning of a name is its definition 
{ratio...quam significat nomen est definitio)™ In De Ente et Essentia (1252- 
1256), he explains the concept of definition by writing, ‘What sorts things into 
their proper genus and species are the definitions [diffinitionem] that express 
what they are’.202 He writes, ‘Essence is what is expressed in a definition’.203 A 
definition expresses a thing’s essence by demarcating it according to genus and 
species, by virtue of which it is intelligible. It is ‘the thing’s specific difference 
and...what a word properly signifies’.204 Since the intellect, which knows 
essences, is presented with images of sensible objects by the senses, which know 
only the external accidents of a thing, Thomas writes that ‘we use accidents or 
effects in their [i.e. essences’] place and name a thing accordingly’.205 This is the 
first of the two sources of names that St. Thomas distinguishes, that from the one 
who uses the word. In this kind of name, the sensible properties or operations of 
a thing are used to signify the thing itself. Thomas writes, ‘Because we name a 
thing in accordance with our knowledge of it...so from external properties
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names are often imposed to signify dssencds'.ool In this case the word is used 
‘less properly' {minusproprie). Hence when Thomas writes that ‘the meaning of 
a word is our intellectual conception of the thing signified by it’, the conception 
to which he refers is properly that of the thing's essence, and less properly the 
sensation of its accidents and operations, from which the concept is abst^r^^ctt<^ci.2oi
When St. Thomas discusses language about God, he establishes first what one 
can know of God. This is the subject of question la 12 of the Summa Theologiae. 
Thomas writes that a thing is kaowabld so far as it is actualised {in actu). God is 
wholly actualised, there being nothing in him that is merely potential, and so in 
himself is the most knowable of beings {in se est maxime cognoscibile)™ The 
blessed, as a result, are able to see the desdncd of God, although not to 
‘comprehend’ or perfectly understand it.20i In this life, however, a person cannot 
even see the essence of God. This is because the mode of knowledge depends on 
the mode of being of the knower. Since our souls in this life have their being in 
matter, they can by nature only know those things which also have their form in 
matter, or what can be known through such thinsiOio God's essence cannot be so 
known. We can know of Him that he exists, and that ‘he is all that belongs to the 
first cause of all things which is beyond all caused things'?* * As a result, we 
cannot use words of God with the meanings ordinarily proper to them. 
Nevertheless, eiatd we can deduce a certain amount about Him from creaturde,
i5 ST la 18 2.
207 Ibid. la 13, 4. See Ralph M. Mclnemy, Aquinas and Analogy (Washington DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1996) pp. 53-85.
Ibid. la 12, 1.
2(79 Ibid. la, 12, 7
210 Ibid. la, 12, 11.
211 Ibid. la, 12, 12.
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whose essences we do know, we can use words whose meanings properly refer 
to creatures to speak of Him.*12
We know God from creatures according to the way they represent Him 
{secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentan) which they do insofar as they 
possess any perfection [perfectionem aliquam)™ St. Thomas’ writes that ‘a 
thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality’.2 ** Insofar as a thing is frilly 
the thing it ought to be, with none of its appropriate qualities remaining merely 
potential, it is perfect. Thomas writes, ‘Things are perfect insofar as they have 
their being after some fashion’.215 God actualises being in every way, and hence 
contains within His simplicity the perfections of all creatures who actualise their 
being only in the way appropriate to them. Furthermore, Thomas believes that if 
a perfection exists in an effect, it must also exist in its efficient cause. He writes, 
‘The effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause’. This is to exist ‘in a more 
perfect way’?* For Thomas, ‘every agent reproduces itself insofar as it is an 
agent and everything acts according to the manner of its form’, which means that 
the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent.2n Creatures 
resemble God, who is their first efficient cause, as their ‘superior source, whose 
form the form of the effect fails to reproduce, although it resembles it in some 
way’212 Hence words like ‘good’ and ‘wise’ can be predicated of God’s 
substance, but they refer to it imperfectly {significant imperfecte), since that is 
the way in which creatures represent it.2*2 In terms of the things signified [res 
significata) in this way, these words are used more properly [magis proprie) of
212
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God than of creatures, since the perfections they denote belong primarily to God, 
and only derivatively to creatures. But according to the mode of signifying 
{modus significandi), such words are used more properly of creatures, from 
which they are derived.218 219 20 Thomas calls this dual relation of words to God and to 
creatures analogy. He writes, ‘Words are said of God and of creatures by 
analogy, that is, according to proportion [secundum analogiam, idest 
proportionem)' .2 21 Thomas distinguishes two kinds of analogy, that in which two 
senses of a word are related to one common concept {midta habent proportionem 
ad unum), and that in which a word is used in two senses because of a relation 
between these senses {unum habet proportionem ad alternm)?22 Words are said 
analogically of God and creatures in the second sense, that is ‘according to the 
order of the creature towards God [ordo creaturae ad Deum) as origin and cause, 
in whom all the perfections of things pre-exist in a superior way [excellenterY .223
St. Thomas' theories of language give us several ways in which to think of the 
language of literary works. We can take from him the principle that the end of 
language is communication, and that words are signs of mental experience, given 
because man is a naturally social animal, who desires to share his experience. 
Christian literary theory could therefore see a literary text as a system of signs of 
the author's mind, given in order to communicate concepts he or she has formed. 
We can no longer accept Thomas' Aristotelian view that the meaning of a noun 
is the definition of the essence of the thing conceived by genus and species. We 
do not need to assert that there is a real order of things in nature to believe that it
218 Ibid. Ia 13, 2.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid. Ia, 13, 3.
221 Ibid. Ia, 13, 5.
222 Ibid. Cp. Summa Contra Gentiles I, 34.
223 S7Ta, 13,5.
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is God’s creation. We can follow St. Thomas in asserting that we name things as 
we conceive them, however. Christian literary theory can understand the signs 
given in a literary work as signs of the author’s concepts of the things he or she 
is trying to communicate. Finally, as I suggested in Chapter 1, we can use St. 
Thomas’ doctrine of analogy as a rationale for the use of theological language 
that Christian criticism will necessarily entail. We can take from St. Thomas the 
principle that our language about God signifies our concepts of Him, formed 
from creatures which represent Him imperfectly, as effects resemble their cause. 
This means that we know almost nothing of God. The theological language we 
use in Christian criticism signifies only what little we know, namely that what 
we know of creatures exists more fully than we can understand in God.
2. St. Thomas’ Theory of Beauty
St. Thomas’ longest discussion of beauty is found in the fourth book of his
commentary on the Divine Names of Pseudo-Dionysius (1265-1266). He begins
by distinguishing between that which is beautiful (pulchrum) and beauty
(pulchritudo). Whilst the beautiful is a participant in beauty,
Beauty is a participation in the first cause, which makes all things 
beautiful. For the beauty of creatures is nothing other than the likeness of 
the divine beauty in which things participate.22
Thomas analyses the ways in which the terms ‘beautiful’ and ‘beauty’ can be 
predicated of God. Dionysius calls God supersubstantiale pulchrum, beautiful 
beyond being. Thomas interprets this to mean that one can speak of his beauty 
because ‘he gives beauty to all created beings, according to the specificity of 224
224 In Dionvsii de Divinis Nominibus IV, 5. Until otherwise indicated, the following citations are 
from this lectio. The work will henceforth be abbreviated to In Div. Norn.
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each’. One can speak of God as beautiful ‘by way of excess’ [secundum 
excessum) and ‘by way of cause’ [per causam). There are two kinds of excess, 
according to Thomas; that within and that outside of a genus. Fire exceeds in 
heat by an excess in the genus of heat, but the sun exceeds in heat by an excess 
outside the genus. As a result, fire is called calidissimus, ‘most hot’, and the sun 
supercalidus, ‘beyond heat’. Whilst these two kinds of excess do not coincide in 
any creature, God can be called both most beautiful [pulcherrimus) and beyond 
beauty [superpulcher). The former refers to his lack of any defect in beauty 
which occurs in creatures as a result of their variability and of their particularity. 
God is beyond beauty insofar as ‘he has in himself, exceedingly and before all 
else, the fount of all beauty’. All beauty and all beautiful things pre-exist 
uniformly in God’s simple nature, ‘in the way in which many effects pre-exist in
a cause’.
Although he does not say so explicitly, St. Thomas seems to regard beauty as a 
transcendental, that is, as a general property of being. In De Veritate (1256­
1259), he describes such properties as follows:
Our first mental conception., .is what exists Consequently, every
other mental conception adds something to what exists...This means 
expressing some way in which what exists exists not expressed in the 
word existing... The way expressed can be a general way attaching to 
everything that exists.225
Scholastic tradition describes the concepts that add to being in this general way 
as transcendentals. They are properties that belong to every being. They differ 
from being and from each other conceptually but not in reality. They are 
different ways in which being can be conceived. In De Veritate, Thomas lists 
five of these concepts, res, unum, aliquid, bonum and verum, that is, being a 
thing, one, something, good and true. In the Commentary on the Divine Names,
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he identifies the beautiful with the good, asserting that they are same in the
subject [idem in subiecto] but differ conceptually [ratione}. He expands upon
this definition in the Summa Theologiae (1265-73):
The beautiful and the good are the same in a subject...But they differ 
conceptually [rationed The good relates to the appetite, for it is the good 
that all things desire...But the beautiful relates to the cognitive power 
[respicit vim cognoscitivam}; for those things are called beautiful which 
please when seen. 222
For St. Thomas, the beautiful is the good perceived with the cognitive faculties 
of the senses and the intellect, rather than desired with the appetite. As Armand 
Maurer writes in About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation (1983), ‘The 
beautiful attracts us to look at it, but not to possess it [as the good does]’?.. It 
seems reasonable to assert that if, for St. Thomas, the good is a transcendental, 
differing from being only conceptually, and if the beautiful is the same as the 
good, differing only conceptually, then the beautiful is also a transcendental.
This means that all that is, is beautiful. It does not mean that all beings are 
equally beautiful, however. Aquinas writes that, in contrast to God’s perfect 
beauty, ‘there are two sorts of defect of beauty [defectus pulchritudinis] in 
c^^etui^er’.^8 Their beauty is variable (yariabilem) as a result of their temporal 
and corruptible natures, and it is particularised (particulatam) as a result of their 
individual ^^tr^ree^^9 This means that they can be beautiful at one time but not at 
another, and be beautiful in one part but not in another. Creatures are determined 
towards a particular end, which means that they can be beautiful in relation to 
some things but not in relation to others. This in turn means that they can seem 
beautiful to some people and not to others.
225 De Veritate I. 1.
226 ST Ia 5,4 ad 3. See also ibid la-IIae 27, 1 ad 3.
227 Anamid Maurer, About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation (Houston; Centre for Thomistic 
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In a well-known passage of the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas gives his 
fullest definition of beauty He argues that comeliness or beauty {species sive 
pulchritudo) is a predicate appropriate to the Second Person of the Trinity. He
writes:
Three things are required for beauty. First, integrity or completeness 
[integritas sive perfectio], for those things that lack something are 
thereby ugly; second, due proportion or harmony [debita proportio sive 
consonantia]; and finally brightness [claritas], since we call things 
beautiful that have a shining colour [colorem nitidum}™
St. Thomas repeatedly describes the beautiful in terms of clarity and proportion.
It is only in this passage that he also uses the terms integrity or perfection. St.
Thomas defines the twofold sense of perfection in things as follows:
The first type of perfection is that according to which a thing is perfect in 
its substance. This is form of the whole, which arises from the integrity 
[integritate] of its parts. The second type of perfection is the end. This is 
either an operation...or something attained to by an operation?31
The first type of perfection is the adequacy of a thing with respect to the kind of 
thing it is. Thomas writes that things that lack something are thereby ugly. A 
beautiful thing has nothing missing that is proper to it. When a thing is fully the 
kind of thing it ought to be, then it has the beautiful quality of integrity. To 
understand the second type of perfection, we need to emphasise one of the senses 
of the term ‘form’ in St. Thomas. Form, as we will discuss in more detail below,
is that by which a thing is the kind of thing it is. This determines a thing’s end, 
and hence its proper operation with respect to that end. Thomas writes, ‘Upon 
the form follows an inclination to the end...for everything, insofar as it is in act, 
acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form’.232 A thing is 
perfect in this sense when it does all that it ought to do, when it fully performs * 230 231
Ibid.
230 ®T Ia39. 8
231 Ibid. Ia 73, 1.
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the function proper to it. Insofar as it does so, it has the beautiful quality of 
integrity. As Thomas says, the second perfection follows from the first; when a
thing is all it should be, it also does all it should do. When he speaks of ‘due’ 
proportion as a quality of the beautiful, it is these formal perfections to which he
refers.
Thomas’ second criterion for the beautiful is proportion or consonance. Albert 
the Great had defined proportion and clarity as standards of the beautiful in his 
commentary on the Divine Names, De Pulchro et Bono (1248-1249), which 
Thomas had transcribed. In an article of the Summa that raises the question of 
the proportion of the mind to the object of its knowledge, St. Thomas defines the 
two senses of proportion as follows:
One sense indicates a certain relation of one quantity to another, 
according to which double, triple and equal are kinds of proportion. The 
other sense indicates any kind of relationship [quaelibet habitudo] of one
thing to another.
The beautiful quality of due proportion or harmony denotes proper relations in 
and among things. For St. Thomas, the universe comprises a vast series of such 
relations. He writes that God gives beauty to all created beings ‘insofar as he is 
the cause of harmony [consonantia}. ..\n all things’. There are two kinds of 
harmony in things, Thomas writes. Firstly, that according to which all things are 
ordered towards God. God causes this harmony by ordaining all things towards 
Him as their end or goal. Secondly, there is the harmony according to which all 
things are ordered towards each other. Greater things can be said to be in lesser 
things ‘by way of participation’ [secundum participationem), and lesser things in 
greater ‘by a certain excellence’ [per excellentiam quamdam). In this way all 
things are related to each other, and all are mutually ordered towards the one *
232 Ibid. Ia 5, 5.
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end. Thomas describes an array of ways in which all things in the universe are 
related to one another. Things are beautiful by remaining themselves, yet they 
also exist in other things, and this relationship of all things to one another 
(communio omnium in omnibus) is one of consonance. Thomas writes, ‘All 
things lead back to the causality of the beautiful, because they pertain to 
c^nsooi^nae’ceJ jUst as many stones fit together (convenientur) to make a house, 
so in the nature of existence all the parts of the universe fit together. They are all 
suited (cooptontur) to this mutual relationship, and each part is supported 
(iuveiur) by the others, since they are all distributed in proper proportion to one 
another. Thomas writes, ‘All the parts of the universe constitute one single 
universality of things ’.Ibi In  235
Beauty is an analogous quality, for St. Thomas, which is to say that it has 
different senses in different contexts. He writes, ‘Spiritual beauty is different to 
corporeal beauty, and the beauty of one body is different to that of another'. 236 *
This applies to proportion: there is a corporeal and a spiritual proportion, and the 
proportion of one body is not that of another. The former consists in a proper 
distribution of parts with respect to the whole of a body. Thomas' most frequent 
example is that of the human body, whose beauty consists in ‘properly 
proportioned members' (membra... bene proportionate)?"31 He writes that 
spiritual beauty ‘consists in the conduct or action of a man being well 
proportioned according to... reason'.238 Thre is also a psychological sense of the 
quality of proportion, for St. Thomas. He writes:
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The beautiful consists in due proportion because the senses delight in 
duly proportioned things as similar to themselves, for the sense is a kind 
of reason [ratio], as are all the cognitive powers.239
In his Etudes d'Esthetiques Medievales (1946), Edgar de Bruyne points out that 
the idea that the soul enjoys the beautiful because the latter reflects its own 
harmony was common in medieval aesthetics.240 As St. Thomas formulates this 
idea, the intellectual character of his understanding of beauty becomes apparent. 
He asserts that proportion indicates rational order {ratio), and that the soul 
enjoys things so constructed because its own powers are also formed according
to a rational order.
Thomas’ third criterion for the beautiful is that of clarity. In the Commentary 
on the Divine Names, he writes that God gives beauty to all created beings 
insofar as he is the cause of their clarity. This can be said insofar as God ‘sends 
into all creatures, along with a certain brightness [fulgore], a distribution 
[traditionem] of his luminous ray, which is the fount of all light’.241 These gifts 
of the divine ray, Thomas writes, are to be understood secundum participationem 
similitudinis, as a participation in the likeness of the divine splendour. He calls 
them pulchrificae, which is to say that they make creatures beautiful. He puts 
this more precisely by saying:
All form, through which things have being, is a certain participation in 
the divine clarity.242 243
It is through their form that things participate in the likeness of the divine 
splendour. As Aquinas says elsewhere, ‘beauty properly pertains to the concept 
of formal cause s2^ We need now to distinguish two more senses of the term
239 Ibid. Ia 5. 4 ad 3.
240 Edgar de Bruyne, Etudes d'Esthetique Medievale VoI. III, ‘Le XIIIe SiecIe’ (Bruges: De
Tempel, 1946) p. 302.
241 In Div. Norn. IV, 5.
242 Ibid.
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‘form’ in St. Thomas’ thought. First, it denotes that by which a substance has 
actual existence. In De Principiis Naturae (c. 1250), Thomas writes, ‘Just as 
anything potential can be called material, so anything that gives existence...can 
be called form. Because forms make things actual, they are called acts’. 244 245 246 247
Second, form is that by which a thing is the kind of thing it is. In his commentary 
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1269-1272), Thomas writes, ‘It is in virtue of form 
that the thing made up becomes...a ‘this something’ [hoc aliquidy™ In the 
Summa Theologiae he writes, ‘Everything is what it is by its form’ 
{unumquodque sit id quod est per suam formam}? It is this organising 
principle, by which a thing both exists and exists as the kind of thing that it is, 
that Aquinas calls a beautifying participation in the divine clarity. He describes it 
as ‘a certain radiation deriving from the first clarity ’?47
Thomas knew from Albert’s De Pulchro et Bono that the beautiful consisted in
the shining or splendour of form {splendor fotmiae) in matter. Albert wrote, ‘The 
essence of the beautiful in general consists in the resplendence of form 
[resplendentia formae] over proportionate parts of matter’.248 249 250Thomas writes, 
‘Particular things are beautiful according to their own principle [rationem], that 
is, according to their own form’?4. Form, that is, from which clarity derives, is a 
rational principle?*0 We saw that proportion consisted in the determination of a 
thing according to reason. This is why St. Thomas usually describes clarity and 
proportion together. Due proportion consists in a thing’s determination by
244 De Principiis Naturae I.
245 In LibrosMetaphysicorum VII, 2, 24.
246.STIa5,5.
247 In Div. Norn. IV, 6.
248 Albertus Magnus, De Pulchro et Bono V, 421.
249 In Div. Norn. IV, 5.
250 Roy J. Defenari and M. Inviolata Barry, A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1947) p. 937, define the proper meaning of ratio as
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reason, and clarity is the rational principle in a thing. As we saw, Thomas 
distinguishes between spiritual and corporeal beauty. He continues, ‘Each thing 
is called beautiful according as it has clarity in its kind [5W/ generis], whether 
spiritual or corporeal'.251 Again, Thomas' favourite example of the latter is the 
human body, whose clarity consists in bright colour (quodom coloris cloritote, 
clorum et nitidum colorem)?52 De Bruyne points out that in medieval 
physiology, the soul was held to preside over the mix of humours and thus over 
the composition of the blood, which was in turn responsible for the colour of the 
complexion. The latter was thus comprehensible as the shining out of an internal 
physiological order or rotio maintained by the soul.253 Thomas defines spiritual 
beauty as the state in which a man's action is well proportioned ‘according to the 
spiritual clarity of reasso’.254 siseweere he writes that intemperance is the most 
disgraceful sin because ‘the pleasures... of intemperance dim the light of reason 
from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises'.^5 hhe ordered acts of a 
good moral life manifest the principle of reason by which they are ordered. This 
intelligibility of the rotio of a thing's form is what St Thomas means by its 
clarity. As Armand Maurer writes, forms ‘enlighten us as to what things are; and 
so it is natural to think of [them] as a kind of light ’,256
As the concept of intelligibility indicates, St Thomas' definition of beauty 
denotes the relation between a knowing subject and the formal properties of the 
objects of his knowledge. In De Pulchro et Bono, Albert wrote that the clarity of
‘reason’, and continue, ‘From this proper meaning the term is extended to many other things all 
more or less connected with man in his specific nature as rational’.
251 In Div. Nom. IV, 5.
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virtue renders it beautiful ‘even if it is not known by anyone’.257 For Thomas, by 
contrast, ‘we call those things beautiful which please when seen’ 
{pulchra...dicuntur quae visa placeni) and say that something is beautiful 
‘whose very apprehension is pleasing’ {cuius ipsa apprehensio placet)25* The 
beautiful is that which, by virtue of the qualities we have examined, gives 
pleasure to the perceiving subject. It seems clear from the following passage of 
the Summa that the terms visio and apprehensio have the same meaning with 
respect to aesthetic pleasure:
The word ‘vision’ [v/sz'o] originally applied to the act of sense of sight. 
Because of the dignity and certitude of this sense, the word was 
extended...to the knowledge imparted by the other senses [cognitionem 
aliorum sensuum]...a.rvi even to intellectual knowledge [cognitionem 
intellectus]259
Aesthetic perception for St. Thomas is essentially intellectual. The form of the 
object must be known by the intellect. The beautiful is known through the senses 
of sight and hearing, because they are the senses which give most knowledge 
{maxime cognoscitivi sunt) 260 261It is for this reason that, although everything is 
beautiful insofar as it exists, we do not immediately perceive everything as 
beautiful. Such perception occurs when, to use Umberto Eco’s phrase, in The 
Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas (1970), we perceive something sub specie pulchri, 
in its beautiful aspect. A thing is beautiful when seen when it is seen as 
beautiful, that is, when its integrity, proportion and clarity are understood. To 
understand a thing’s integrity, it is necessary to compare it to our idea of what it 
ought to be. To understand its proportion and clarity, it is necessary to discern
257 Albertus Magnus, De Pulchro et Bono V, 426. See de Bruyne, Etudes d'Estetique Medievale 
IIIpp. 161-173.
258 ST Ia 5, 4 ad 1; Ia-IIae 27, 1 ad 3.
259 Ibid. Ia 67,1.
260 Ibid. Ia-IIae 27, lad 3.
261 Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, tr. Hugh Bredin (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1970) p. 191.
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the rational principle of its formal organisation. It is only when these judgmental 
labours are performed that a thing’s beauty is apparent to us.
St. Thomas’ theory of beauty contains several principles that can be used in a 
contemporary theory. We can take from him the principle that God is the most 
beautiful of beings. Since He is the cause of beauty in creatures. He is ‘beautiful 
beyond being’, that is, beautiful in a more eminent way than beautiful creatures. 
Creatures are beautiful by participation in the divine beauty, according to their 
individual natures. We do not need to accept the metaphysical system in which 
the beautiful is called a transcendental as a principle of Christian thought in 
general, but we can follow St. Thomas in asserting that the beauty of a literary 
work is a participation in the divine beauty. St. Thomas’ definition of beauty is 
intimately bound up with his Aristotelian metaphysics, but we can still use some 
of its elements without implying a commitment to this metaphysics. Christian 
criticism could use the criterion of integrity in judging a work’s beauty, that is, 
the degree to which a work is and does what we believe that it should be and do, 
although we will have to look elsewhere than Thomas’ aesthetics to suggest what 
that might be. We can no longer use the criterion of proportion in St. Thomas’ 
sense of a rational distribution of parts, nor that of clarity as the rational principle 
of form, but we can translate these two concepts into less rationalistic terms, and 
think of a work’s determination by a mind in general rather than by the rational 
faculty in particular as its proportion, and of the visibility of this determination 
as its clarity. We can follow St. Thomas in asserting that these qualities please us 
when understood, although we need not suggest that they are the only qualities
which do so.
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3. St. Thomas’ Thhory of yAr
St. Thomas' longest discussion of art occurs in the question of the Summo that
deals with intellectual virtues, or dispositions of the intellect towards good
activity. Prudence iprudentio) is the disposition or habit of the intellect which
directs actions according to right reason. Thomas calls it recto rotio ogibilium.,
right judgement about things to be done^ It presupposes that a man is rightly
disposed towards his end, and is the virtue by which, in a given situation, he
chooses a course of action directed towards that hed.?22 Art (ors), on the other
hand, Thomas calls recto rotio J^c^ctibilium, right judgement about things to be
made. The end of art is the good of the works to be made (bonum... opemm
orttfictolum), and it is the virtue by which, in a given situation, an artist makes a
good work, an object that is all it should be (in se bonum est)262 263 64 265The good of the
work pertains to that for which it is made. Thomas writes:
Every artist intends to put the best arrangement into his work - not 
absolutely but with respect to its end \per comporotionem odfinem]*
So if he is making a saw, whose purpose is to cut, he makes it out of iron, which 
is suited to cutting, rather than of glass, although the latter is the more beautiful 
material. This definition of art includes all the kinds of production we would call 
craft or technology, extending from poetry through shipbuilding to military 
strategy.266
St. Thomas describes such production as analogous to the creative activity of 
God. He writes, ‘All natural things were produced by the divine art, and so may
262 £TIa-IIae 57,4.
263 Ibid. Ia-IIae 57, 5.
s Ibid. 57 4; 57, 3.
265 Ibid. Ia 91 3.
s5 See In Libros Ethicomm VI, iii, 12-19.
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be called God’s works of art’ 267 It is because of this that Thomas can say that 
‘art imitates nature in its operation {in sua operationeY,268 269Natural processes in 
the body combat sickness by various means, and the art of medicine imitates 
these processes. Natural objects proceed by determinate means towards their 
proper ends, and hence appear to be works of intelligence. Art imitates this 
process {in operando...imitatur), by making things suited to their proper ends 
through determinate rneans.^ These can be called works of the artist’s 
intelligence. Thomas writes, ‘Natural things depend on the divine intellect just as 
artificial things depend on the human intellecf.270 271 272Willst art imitates the 
operation of nature, it is nevertheless ontologically dependent upon nature.
Thomas writes:
Art is deficient in comparison with the operation of nature, because 
nature gives substantial form, which art cannot do. All artificial forms are 
accidenta..
Substantial form is comprised by the two senses of form we distinguished above, 
namely that by which a thing both exists and exists as the kind of thing it is. 
Accidental form is that by which a thing is a certain kind of the kind of thing it 
is.777 A man’s humanity is his substantial form: his wisdom and weight are 
accidental forms. By saying that artificial forms are accidental, St. Thomas 
means that art does not bring anything into existence. Rather, it re-arranges the 
outward appearance of an already existent substance. As he writes in De 
Principiis Naturae, ‘art can only operate on something which is already naturally 
in being [constitutum est in esse a naturaY ,273 The artist transforms natural
267 STIa91,3.
268 Ibid. Ia 117, 1.
269 In Libros Physicorum II, iv, 5.
270 Sria 17, 1.
271 Ibid. Ilia 66, 4.
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substances into works of art, such as copper into a statue or language into a
poem.
The Middle Ages did not have a theory of the fine arts, that is, of works whose 
end is their own beauty as opposed to practical use. St. Thomas employs the 
standard medieval distinction, which derived ultimately from Aristotle, between
the liberal and the servile or mechanical arts.274 The latter are directed towards 
works done by the body {opera per corpus exercita). They are called servile 
since the body is subject in a servile manner to the soul {serviliter subditur 
animae), with respect to which man is free?.5 The liberal arts are called arts by a 
certain analogy (per quamdam similitudinem) with them. These are habits of the 
speculative reason which involve a certain degree of work {cumsdam operis), 
such as the construction of a syllogism in the art of logic or the construction of 
an eloquent discourse in the art of rhetoric. Composition of a piece of music, in 
this taxonomy, is a liberal art, whilst playing a musical instrument is a servile art.
St. Thomas did not distinguish arts that tended towards beauty from arts that 
tended towards the useful, as we do. Nevertheless, we cannot say with 
Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, in his History of Aesthetics (1970), that ‘St. 
Thomas’...theory of art was not concerned with beauty’.276 On the contrary, as 
de Bruyne points out, for St. Thomas all the arts tended towards beauty. 277 This 
is firstly because each art tends towards a definite end, namely the perfection of 
the work to be made. Thomas writes, ‘Since making passes into external 
material, its perfection is that of the thing made \perfectio...factiY 278 This means
274 See Aristotle, Politics VIII, 2 1337b
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that all the arts tend towards integrity and so towards beauty in Thomas' system. 
Secondly, an artistic form is beautiful by virtue of its being. Insofar as it exists, 
the form of the art-work has the beautiful qualities of integrity, proportion and 
clarity. It has these qualities in the degree to which its perfection is realised.
St. Thomas has a low view of the capacity of poetry to impart knowledge. He 
writes that it is proper to poetry to proceed by means of various similitudes and 
representations {similitudines varias et repraesentationes)299 This process is the 
lowest of all kinds of teaching (infima inter omnes doctrinas), because it 
obscures the truth (veritas occidtatuf)™ Thomas writes that ‘poetic expressions 
[poetica] are not grasped by human reason, because of the lack of truth 
[defectum veritatis] in them'.279 280 81 Such expressions are employed in Scripture for 
several reasons, according to Thomas. Scripture's purpose is to reveal spiritual 
things under the likeness of corporeal things. Hence the ‘sensible figures' 
{figuras sensibiles) of poetic imagery are a fitting way for it to proceed. Further, 
it is intended for all, both those who can understand intelligible things in 
themselves and those who cannot. Its sensible figures are fitting for the latter 
group's instrutfion.282 The value of poetry for St. Thomas derives from its 
capacity to impart pleasure. He writes, ‘Representation is naturally dplightful 
[delectabilis] to man'.222 Poetry belongs among those arts that have recreation 
{Indus] as their proper end, along with drama {officium histrionum) and secular 
music. Thomas writes that ‘recreation is necessary for the conduct 
[conversationem] of human life'^4 The soul needs rest just as the body does,
279 Ibid. Ia 1, 9 ob. 1.
280 Ibid. Ia 1, 9 ob. 2.
281 Ibid. Ia^IIaa 101,2ad2.
Ibid. Ia 1, 9. Cp. Ia-IIae 101, 2 ad 2. 
2 Ibid. Ia 1, 9 ad 1.
2* Ibid. IIa-IIae 168, 3 ad 3.
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and finds it in ‘words and deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul’s 
delight [delectatioY .2S5 Such playful and humorous things {ludicra et iocosd) 
give a certain necessary rest to the soul. It is here, for St. Thomas, that the
delectatio of representation, which is the function of poetry, finds its proper 
place.
There is much in St. Thomas’ theory of art that we can and should use in 
contemporary Christian literary theory. We can take from him the principle that 
artistic production is analogous to the creative activity of God, and can 
understand literary production as an imitation of the work of the divine author. 
We can also take from St. Thomas the principle that the art of literary production 
is an operation on the natural material of language, and so is a continuation of 
the work of the divine art which brought this material into being. St. Thomas has 
a deeply social view of art, much of which is ethically appropriate to Christian 
literary theory. We can follow him in understanding literary creation as one of 
the many kinds of production by which society is sustained. We can take from 
his definition of the liberal arts that it is a kind of labour, whose nature is partly 
physical. St. Thomas reminds us of the essential role of the body in the 
production of a work of literature. Finally, we can agree with St. Thomas that 
one of the ends of a literary work is recreation. Our minds, like our bodies, grow 
tired after a day’s labour, and the pleasure we take in fiction is a useful means of 
resting them.
This concludes my analysis of the contribution to literary theory of these
fundamental texts of the Western Christian tradition. I have argued that, despite 285
285 Ibid. IIa-IIae 168, 2.
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the specific metaphysical frameworks in which the thought of Augustine and 
Aquinas is expressed, there are many principles both of their semiotics and of 
their aesthetics that we can assimilate into a contemporary Christian literary 
theory. I have also argued that the Bible implies certain propositions with respect 
to language and to art that should be so assimilated. I have been concerned with 
whak-Christian literary theory has been, and with how we can use this tradition of 
thought today. In the next chapter, I will turn to an examination of modern 
literary and aesthetic theories that either derive from Christian theology or are 
compatible with such theology, and I will assess how we can integrate these 
modern insights with those of the Christian tradition that we have examined
here.
5. Modern Christian Literary Theories
Is this chapter, I will examine some of the main twentieth-century currents of
Christian thought is literary theory. As in the previous chapter, there are two 
purposes to this examination. I aim firstly to show that a tradition of Christian 
literary theory has existed throughout this century, asd secondly to assess the 
degree to which the various insights of this tradition can asd should be used in a 
contemporary theory. I will examine what I take to be the three most significant 
areas of modem thought for Christian literary theory, namely hermeneutics, seo- 
Thomism and the study of religion asd literature.
(i) Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics, or the theory of interpretation, provides an account of our 
understanding of the meaning of the texts on which Christian faith is based. 
Hermeneutics as a science developed primarily through reflection the meaning of 
the Bible, reaching ‘its first major formulation in the course and the after-effect 
of the Reformation', particularly is the work of the Protestant theologian 
Matthias Flacius (1520-1575)1 Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) developed 
theories of Biblical and classical exegesis into a discipline concerned with the 
interpretation of texts in general? In this section, I will examine the
1 Josef BIeicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and 
Critique (London and Boston: Routledge andKegan PauI, 1980) p. 12.
2 See PauI Ricoeur, ‘The Task of Hermeneutics’, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, tr. 
John B. Thompson (Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge University Press and Editions de Ia Maison 
des sciences de I’Homme, 1981) pp. 45-48.
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hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer (b. 1900), in order to establish what 
Christian literary theory can learn from his thought with respect to the
interpretation both of the Bible and other Christian texts and of literary texts.
1. Gadamer" s Theory of Authority and Tradition
Gadamer was a student of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) at the university of 
Marburg, and his hermeneutic theory is influenced by Heidegger’s concept of 
understanding expressed in Being and Time (1927). Heidegger describes 
understanding not as the cognition of an object by a subject but as a fundamental 
characteristic of human existence in the world, or Dasein3 He thinks of 
understanding as a non-reflective grasp of the possibilities for action, and 
therefore of becoming, determined by a given situation. 4 This grasp becomes 
reflection in the process of interpretation (auslegung), by which things are 
understood as things. Heidegger argues that this process takes place against a 
background of meaningfulness, which he calls the ‘fore-structure’ of 
understanding. He explains that, in order for something to be understood as 
something, there must be a grasp of the situation in general in which it appears 
(which he calls ‘fore-having’, because we ‘have’ an understanding of the 
situation in which a thing takes on meaning for us), a pre-determined way of 
approaching the situation (‘fore-sight’), and an existing system of concepts in 
whose terms the thing can be understood (‘fore-conception’).5 This means that
3 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: SCM 
Press, 1962) p. 182.
4 See ibid. pp. 182-188. See also David Couzens Hoy, ‘Heidegger andtlie Hermeneutic Turn’, in 
Charles B. Guignon, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) ip. 170-194.
3 Heidegger, Being and Time p. 191.
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understanding is circular, since ‘any interpretation which is to contribute 
understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted’? This 
circularity, for Heidegger, is a fundamental characteristic of all human being in 
the world, and he calls it ‘the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself/
In Tnith and Method (1960), Gadamer develops this concept of the fore­
structure of understanding as a characteristic of human existence by means of a 
study of the traditional field of hermeneutics, the human sciences. The principal 
argument of his book is that the empirical method of observation and induction 
used in the natural sciences is not the only means of inquiry with a valid claim to 
truth, but that the human sciences are also ‘modes of experience in which a truth 
is communicated’.? Whilst this truth cannot be verified by empirical method, it 
can nevertheless be legitimated by a ‘more profound investigation of the 
phenomenon of understanding’/ Gadamer argues that any interpretation of the 
past is as conditioned by its specific historical situation as the past object or text 
itself. We bring our own systems of assumptions and presuppositions to 
interpretation, he asserts, which determine in advance the objects we select for 
investigation and the kind of questions we ask. Gadamer calls these 
presuppositions ‘prejudices’ (orurteile), and writes that, ‘all understanding 
inevitably involves some prejudice’. 6 * 8 9 10 He argues that such prejudice is 
determined by the same historical process as the texts that we interpret. He
writes:
6 Ibid. p. 194.
' Ibid. p. 195.
8 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, tr, William Glen-Doepei (London; Sheed and Ward,
1975) p. xii
9Ibid.
10 Ibid. p. 239.
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Understanding is not...so much an action of one's subjectivity...as the 
placing of oneself within a process of tradition in which past and present 
are constantly fused.11
Historical texts can only be understood if the effect Qirkrng) of history in 
understanding, which Gadamer calls ‘effective-history' Qirkurgsgeschichte) is 
taken into account.12 Such ‘effective-historical consciousness', he argues, is a 
condition of validity in interpretation.
Gadamer writes that the Enlightenment's critique of prejudice was directed 
primarily against dogmatic interpretation of the Biibe.13 It was the aim of 
Enlightenment thinkers to understand the Bible without prejudice and according 
to reason alone. Gadamer argues that this attitude is also a prejudice, historically 
determined in the same way as the Bible and Christian tradition. He writes, ‘The 
idea of an absolute reason is impossible for historical humanity'. 14 *Given the 
historical nature of human existence, that is, there are no acts of interpretation 
that are not determined by a system of prejudices itself determined by the 
interpreter's position in history. Gadamer describes this position as the 
interpreter's situation in tradition, by which he means that it is impossible to 
encounter the past without already having been affected by it.
This encounter, for Gadamer, is a process of testing the prejudices that 
determine the conceptual scope or ‘horizon' of the present against those that 
determine the horizon of the past, and vice versa. He calls this process the 
‘fusion of horizons' Qorizonlverschmelzung).^ It can lead to valid 
interpretation, Gadamer argues, because there are such things as ‘legitimate
" Ibid. p. 258.
12 "bid. pp. 267 ff.
13 Ibid. p. 241.
14 Ibid. p. 245.
’5 Ibid. p. 273.
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prejudices’.16 Some prejudices are an obstacle to knowledge, that is, but others 
produce it. The Enlightenment thought of authority in the former sense, as an 
inhibition of reason and an impediment to knowledge. Gadamer calls this a 
subjection of authority to reason. He writes that whilst it can be a source of 
misjudgement, it can also be a source of truth. 17 18 19Authority is misunderstood, he 
argues, as the opposite of reason and freedom. It is essentially a source of 
knowledge, based on a recognition ‘that the other is superior to oneself in 
judgement and insight and for that reason his judgement takes precedence over 
one’s own’.66 This is a free and rational act, Gadamer argues, when what the 
authority states ‘can be seen, in principle, to be true’?6 In this sense, authority is 
granted to a teacher or to a professional specialist. Gadamer writes, ‘The 
prejudices that they implant are legitimised by the person himself. Hence he 
calls them ‘objective prejudices’?0 For Gadamer, acceptance of authority is a 
logical correlative of human finitude. Since I do not know everything, it is in 
principle true that another may have something to teach me. He argues this point 
with respect to tradition as a source of authority, that the choice to preserve the 
truth-claim of certain past assertions can be as free and rational as the choice to 
reject that of others.
Gadamer’s theory of authority and tradition provides the conceptual basis of a 
response to the objections of rationalism and post-structuralism to Christian 
hermeneutics, that is, to the interpretation of Scripture in the community of 
Christian faith and the interpretation of literary texts in the terms of that faith.
Gadamer’s argument that all acts of interpretation are in part determined by the
16 Ibid. p. 246.
17 Ibid. p. 247.
18 Ibid. p. 248.
19 Ibid. p. 249.
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acceptance on authority of some traditional statements implies that Scriptural 
interpretation determined by Christian traditions is not an irrational or unusually 
prejudiced practice. We can accept from Gadamer the principle that no 
interpretation takes place outside some traditionally determined community, and 
that Christian hermeneutics, as I have defined it, is an example of rather than an 
exception to this rule. The ascription of authority to Scripture and Christian 
traditions within the Christian community is, when made consciously, a free and 
rational choice, and one in whose nature all acts of interpretation in fact 
participate. We can accept from Gadamer the principle that no act of 
interpretation is not determined by the acceptance of the truth-claim of some past 
text or texts as authoritative, and that, again, Christian hermeneutics is an 
example of and not an exception to this rule. We can assert as a result that 
Christian literary theory is a legitimate mode of contemporary literary theory.
2. The Gadamer-Habermas Debate
Gadamer’s ideas have been criticised on several fronts. In Validity in 
Interpretation (1967), E. D. Hirsch Jr. argues that Gadamer’s insistence on the 
historical situation of all understanding leads to a relativism in which no 
understanding can be validated over an cither* 21 Gadamer himself is careful to 
ward off this charge, taking up a position that David Couzens Hoy, in The 
Critical Circle (1978), describes as ‘contextualism’.?? Hoy defines this in 
contrast to ‘subjectivistic relativism’, according to which statements concerning
;0 Ibid.
21 E.D. Hirsch. Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1967) pp. 245­
264.
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the meaning of a text refer in fact to the meaning of the text to the person making 
the statement. According to contextualism, however, whilst no context for 
interpretation can be absolutely validated, some contexts are more appropriate 
than others at a given time. For Gadamer, whilst all interpretation is conditioned 
by the situation of the interpreter, consciousness of this situation can be used to 
justify the interpretation, although such justification remains partial, since no- 
one can be conscious of all his or her prejudices. Gadamer uses Aristotle’s 
concept of practical wisdom and the practice of legal hermeneutics to support 
this position.22 3 24
A more serious charge, particularly with respect to the use I am making of 
Gadamer’s thought, comes from the Frankfurt school of Critical Theory. In his 
book On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1967), Jurgen Habermas (b. 1929) 
levels two criticisms at Gadamer’s theory of authority and tradition, the essence 
of both of which is that it is conservative and excludes the possibility of critique. 
He criticises Gadamer’s ontological conception of hermeneutics, whereby his 
concern is the fundamental experience of understanding rather than its 
misconception by the human sciences. Whilst the latter is a valid enterprise, 
according to Habermas, the opposition between hermeneutical experience and 
scientific method is not absolute. Having criticised the absolute claims of 
empirical science, Habermas argues, a hermeneutic theory of its method is 
necessary. He writes, ‘The claim [of hermeneutics against method], we must 
fear, will be effective either in the sciences or not at all’.66 In Habermas’ view, it
22 David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle: Literature, History and Philosophical Hermeneutics 
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1978) p. 69.
2 Gadamer, Truth and Method pp. 278-305.
24 Jurgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, tr. Sherry Wieber Nicholsen and Jerry 
A. Stark (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) p. 167.
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is necessary to develop a hermeneutical consciousness of scientific method, in 
order that it can become an object of critical analysis.
His second criticism is that Gadamer is too sanguine about the lack of 
opposition between reason on one hand and authority and tradition on the other. 
He questions Gadamer’s validation of the recognition of authority as a rationally 
chosen act of knowledge, asking, ‘Does it follow from the unavoidability of 
hermeneutic anticipation that there are legitimate prejudgements?’?? Gadamer is 
forgetting about ideology, in Habermas’ view, and so participating in its 
perpetuation. Habermas is sceptical about the approval with which Gadamer 
describes the acceptance of tradition in the structure of understanding. The 
prejudices which structure one’s interpretation of the past may well be false, he 
argues, and Gadamer takes no account of this possibility. Habermas writes, 
‘Reflective appropriation of tradition breaks the quasi-natural [naturwiichsige] 
substance of tradition and alters the position of subjects within it’.?? He argues 
that, in addition to becoming conscious of one’s own prejudices, one can come 
to recognise their origins, and as a result to accept or reject them with an adult 
reason. A known prejudice, that is, no longer functions as a prejudice. Gadamer 
illustrated the legitimacy of authority with the example of the student’s relation 
to the teacher. Habermas argues that such prejudices are inculcated, ‘however we 
want to look at it, under the potential threat of sanctions and with a view to 
gratification. A student doesn’t simply accept what he is taught; he has no 
choice. Family, education, and legal systems all demand that he does so. As he 
becomes an adult, however, he can reflect on the prejudices that he has 
internalised in the course of his education, and accept or reject them on rational. * *
25 Ibid. p. 169.
26 Ibid. p. 168.
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and not simply authoritative, grounds. The idea of the legitimacy of certain 
prejudices, validated by tradition, Habermas writes, ‘is in conflict with the power 
of reflection, which proves itself in its ability to reject the claim of traditions'.
It is an illustration of this point, he argues, that hermeneutics arose as a science 
at the Reformation, precisely when the binding nature of Catholic traditions 
began seriously to be questioned.
In his essay ‘On Hermeneutics’ Claim to Universality' (1970), Habermas
further contests the claim of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that it includes in its field
the kind of critical reflection on tradition that Habermas has in mind. He cites
examples of the limits of hermeneutic understanding, principally the systematic 
distortion of communication that psychoanalysis and ideology-critique find 
occurring in ordinary language.27 28 9 He pursues the model of psychoanalysis, which 
finds that even apparently normal speech is in fact distorted communication. In 
the analytic situation there occurs a systematic production of misunderstanding, 
which an ontological hermeneutics cannot comprehend. It takes a theory to 
understand these expressions, a knowledge of the determinants of their 
distortion. Habermas accepts Gadamer’s assertion that all misunderstanding 
presupposes a prior agreement, but argues that his concept of tradition ignores 
the fact that this agreement itself may be a product of pseudo-communication, 
that is, of specifically determined misunderstanding. There is a distinction 
between true consensus and the false consensus which is a product of 
compulsion, Habermas argues, and Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutics cannot 
recognise it. He argues that Gadamer cannot guarantee that a prejudice handed
27 Ibid. p. 169.
28 Ibid. p. 170.
29 Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, ed. The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the 
Enlightenment to the Present (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) pp. 302-312.
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down by tradition is not an example of distorted communication, which 
psychoanalysis and ideology-critique have shown to be prevalent forces in the 
language in which tradition is received.
Gadamer accepts Habermas’ contention that tradition can be ideological, but
he disagrees that is that it is always so. In response to Habermas’ first criticism,
that hermeneutics ought to concern itself with scientific method rather than
oppose itself to it, Gadamer writes that he focussed on the human sciences
because they were concerned with experience that lay outside the scope of
scientific method. This is not to have abandoned method to positivism, he
argues, but to assert that hermeneutic experience is prior to methodological
concerns.30 Gadamer accepts that hermeneutics can function within the sciences
but argues that it cannot be restricted to them. In response to Habermas’ criticism
concerning the ideological nature of tradition, Gadamer writes that the latter’s
claims for the power and scope of reflection are too strong. He is wrong to think
that critical reflection on tradition can take place in a situation that is not itself
determined by tradition. Gadamer writes:
Only a naive and unreflective historicism...would see the historical- 
hermeneutic sciences as something absolutely new that would do away 
with the power of tradition.31
In Gadamer’s view, even critical reason is contained in the hermeneutic circle. In 
asserting otherwise, he writes, Habermas is returning to the prejudice of the 
Enlightenment in which ‘reflection is granted a false power, and the true 
dependencies involved are misjudged on the basis of a fallacious idealism’.32
30 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, tr. David E. Linge (Berkeley and London: 
University of California Press. 1976) p. 26.
31 Ibid. p. 29.
32 Ibid. p. 33.
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Gadamer accepts that tradition can be a source of compulsion, however. He
writes:
I would grant that authority exercises an essential dogmatic power in 
innumerable forms of domination, from the ordering of education. . .to the 
hierarchy of power created by political forces.®
He does not deny the possibility of an ‘emancipating criticism of authority’, but 
only that understanding necessarily involves such a crit:i<iisnr^.33 4 35 *For Gadamer, 
authorities are not always wrong, and so ‘reflection is not always and 
unavoidably a step towards dissolving prior convictions’® He writes that 
Habermas has misunderstood him when he imputes to him the view that tradition 
is the only ground for the acceptance of presuppositions. In fact, Gadamer 
writes, ‘Tradition is no proof and validation of something... where validation is 
demanded by reflection’.® He argues that Habermas has not recognised the 
distinction between true and false authority, that is, between rational 
acknowledgement of the greater knowledge of another and submission to the 
power of another. Whilst one can be more or less consciously compelled to 
accept traditional statements, one can also freely choose to do so. Gadamer 
argues that one cannot reflect on everything, and that much is accepted from 
tradition that cannot be brought to light. It is becoming clear that there is little 
substantial disagreement between the two on the nature of tradition. Gadamer
denies that reflection always involves the dissolution of what one has accepted, 
but Habermas has not said that this is the case. He accepts the possibility that one 
may endorse the data of tradition (in the way that he himself has accepted the 
Marxist tradition of ideology-critique, for example), but asserts that reflection
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. p. 34.
35 Ibid. p. 32.
J6 Ibid. p. 34.
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alters it/9 When appropriated by reflection, knowledge received from tradition is 
no longer accepted on authority, and thus functions differently in hermeneutic 
activity. For his part, Habermas denies that tradition is always passed on without 
ideology, but Gadamer has not said that this is the case. He accepts that the data 
of tradition need validation by reflection, but denies that such validation does not 
take place. Both agree that reflection on tradition can result in the rejection of 
some of the prejudices it has inculcated, but that tradition can be a source of 
truth. They remain divided over whether hermeneutics or critique is the more 
fundamental discourse, but on the issue of tradition, despite a certain amount of 
misrepresentation, their positions are not dissimilar.
Nevertheless, their debate serves to emphasise an important aspect of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics for my argument that his theory can be used to validate 
Christian hermeneutics against rationalist and post-structuralist objections to it. It 
makes clear that to acknowledge the role of tradition in understanding is not to 
advocate a passive acceptance of the past but to describe a process of conflict 
between the past and the present, in which both are transformed in the encounter.
Gadamer writes:
Every encounter with tradition... involves the experience of the tension 
between the text and the present. The hermeneutic task consists in not 
covering up this tension by attempting a naive assimilation but 
consciously bringing it out.37 8
In his essay ‘What is Tradition?' (1991), Gerald L. Bruns emphasises this aspect 
of Gadamer’s theory, against the unified and institutional concept of tradition of
which Habermas and others accuse him. He writes:
Tradition is seamed...as a conflict of interpretations that cannot be 
resolved or harmonised...but must rather be suffered or lived through.
37 Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences p. 169.
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method p. 273.
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The suffering of such conflicts is basic to what Gadamer calls 
hermeneutical experienee.
Gadamer's responses to Habermas make clear that his acknowledgement of the
role of authority and tradition in understanding is not one that entails political
conservatism. We can take from them the principle that the data of Christian 
theory
tradition from which I am arguing that Christian literary^should derive need 
validation by reflection. Certain Christian doctrines and practices have been 
ideological, and reflection is necessary to establish which of them we should 
with adult reason accept and which we should reject. Essential to Gadamer's 
concept of a tradition is that this process of acceptance and rejection is not 
acceptance or rejection of the tradition but precisely the process by which it is 
constituted. Having accepted his assertion that tradition can be a source of truth, 
we can also accept his argument that it is not always or necessarily so.
3e_<Gadumer^iPoetic5
I will conclude this section with an examination of Gadamer's theories of art
and of poetry. Gadamer compares the latter in particular with religious language, 
and I will assess the degree to which we can assimilate his conclusions into a 
contemporary Christian literary theory.
The critique of method in Truth and Method begins with an examination of art, 
the experience of which, according to Gadamer, constitutes a challenge to the
exclusive claim to truth of scientific method. His thesis is that ‘truth is
39 Gerald L. Bruns, ‘What is Tradition?’, New Literary History 22 (1991) p. 12. In The Two 
Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description with Special Reference 
to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer and Wittgenstein (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1980) pp.
314-326, Anthony C. Thiselton emphasises the importance of the element of conflict in
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experienced through a work of art that we cannot attain in any other way’.* 40 This 
idea was lost with Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790), in which the experience 
of art was divorced from conceptual thinking. In Kant’s thought, aesthetic 
pleasure is by definition unrelated to intellectual activity. It has, in Gadamer’s 
words, ‘an autonomous basis freed from the criterion of the concept’41 This kind 
of aesthetic consciousness, Gadamer argues, in fact alienates the reader or 
viewer from the real or authentic experience of an art-work, for which in many 
historical periods it was clearly created, namely its claim upon him or her.42 He 
writes:
The consciousness of art - the aesthetic consciousness - is always 
secondary to the immediate truth-claim that proceeds from the work 
itself.43
Gadamer follows Heidegger in thinking of truth as the ‘unconcealment’ of a 
thing, as the ‘[bringing] to the light what otherwise is constantly hidden or 
withdrawn’.44 In this sense, he argues, the experience of art is an experience of 
truth, and not simply an experience of pleasure.
In his essay ‘On the Contribution of Poetry to the Search for Truth’ (1971),
Gadamer argues that poetry can provide truth in this sense. He asserts that
‘poetry is language in a pre-eminent sense’, that is, that it is language most
clearly revealed as such.45 This assertion is based on Heidegger’s view that the
Greek word for truth, ale the ia, connoted ‘open-ness’. Gadamer writes:
This primary meaning of truth is that we tell the truth, we say what we 
mean. This is supplemented...by a further sense in which...whatever
Gadamer’s understanding of historical interpretation for tlie use of his thought in New Testament 
hermeneutics.
40 Gadamer, Truth and Method p. xii.
41 Ibid. p. 55.
42 Ibid. p. 112.
43 Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics p. 5
44 Gadamer, Truth and Method p. 101.
45 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, tr. Nicholas Walker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. 106.
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shows itself to be what it is, is true...When we say ‘real gold’, for 
example, we mean that it not only glitters like gold but that it is gold.46
A true word, according to this definition of truth, is a word that reveals itself as a 
word, that really corresponds to the concept of a word. It is in this sense that the 
poetic word is a true word, for Gadamer. He has a high view of poetry, in which 
‘the text enjoys greater reality than any of its potential realisations’.47 By this he 
means that the written text of a successful poem primarily says itself rather than 
describing something prior to or external to itself. The reality to which it 
corresponds is that which it conjures up in each reader’s imagination, rather than 
anything in the external world or in the author’s mind, against which its truth-
content could be checked. Gadamer writes that ‘it bears witness to itself and does
not admit of anything that might verify it’.48 Successful poetic language is
revelation itself, he argues, and so ‘stands out as the highest fulfilment of that
revealing... which is the achievement of all speech’.49 He writes that it is the goal
of utterance to bring what was hidden into the light of shared understanding, and
that poetic utterance fully realises this goal. In Gadamer’s view, every statement
acquires meaning from its situation in a more or less explicit dialogue, that is,
from ‘the question to which it supplies an answer’.50 He writes that in the case of
poetry, the ‘nearness’, that is, the intimacy and familiarity to us, of the things
revealed in poetic language constitutes an implicit answer to the question of the
temporality of our everyday experience. He writes:
Our fundamental experience as beings subject to time is that all things 
escape us...[But] the poetic word brings the transience of time to a 
standstill.51
46 Ibid. p. 108.
47 Ibid. p. 109.
48 Ibid. p. 110.
49 Ibid. p. 112.
50 Ibid. p. 106.
51 Ibid. p. 114.
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Language, for Gadamer, is the means by which we make ourselves at home in 
the world, by which it becomes familiar to us. The truth of poetry, he argues, is 
that, in allowing us an experience of intimacy with the things it discloses, which 
is usually effaced by the passage of time, it reveals this very familiarity with the 
world in which language allows us to stand.
In his essay ‘Aesthetic and Religious Experience’ (1978), Gadamer examines
the relation between poetic and religious language. He notes that the issue of the
difference has arisen only in Judaeo-Christian cultures, in which a canon of holy
texts has been established, and that in other cultures the distinction is not sharply
drawn. He writes that the common quality of the language of poetry and religion
in ancient Greek culture, before such a distinction was made, was that of ‘myth’,
that is, that it was an ‘intrinsically inexhaustible process’.52 Greek religion was
transmitted primarily through poetry, and its content was re-interpreted by each
new poet. Gadamer argues that this mythical tradition becomes literature with
the evolution of the re-interpretable narration into the written work. He asserts
that this process can be traced in Greek literary genres:
in the development of rhapsodic performance that went beyond ritual; in 
the choreographical staging of the choral lyric, which had certainly 
emerged from the observance of everyday religious practice; in the 
spectacle of tragedy, which...was embedded in the context of religious 
life.53
He argues that the religious text has evolved in the Christian West from the same 
kind of mythical narration into a ‘proclamation’, or binding document, and into a 
‘promise’, which becomes meaningful insofar as it is accepted by the 
addressee.54 Whilst poetic and religious texts are now different kinds of 
language, he continues, traces of their common origin remain. Both poetic and
52 Ibid. p. 144.
53 Ibid. p. 145.
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religious language have what Gadamer calls a ‘symbolic’ quality, in the sense 
that they can constitute ‘that through which someone or something is known or 
recognised’.54 5 Literary works can arouse in their readers the experience that 
Gadamer calls “‘this is you”’, that is, a consciousness of something shared with 
the things revealed in the text. He writes that this ‘an expansion of that infinite 
process of making ourselves at home on the world which is the human lot’.56 57He 
asserts that the reader of the Christian texts can have a similar experience, 
characteristically that of the poverty of Christ crucified. Despite this formal 
similarity, the Christian texts nevertheless differ from literary texts, in 
Gadamer’s view. He describes this difference by means of the concept of‘sign’, 
in the religious sense, that is, of ‘something only given to one who is ready to 
accept it as such’.®7 Unlike poetic language, he argues, the Scriptures have a 
truth-claim that is accessible only to a reader who is looking for and prepared to 
accept such a claim.
Gadamer’s Romantic premise that the unity and autonomy of the written text 
are fundamental criteria of poetry cannot be accepted today without response to 
the objections that it effaces the social and political contexts of the text’s 
production and receptions. This is lacking in Gadamer’s work, and there is no 
reason for us to accept the premise. Nevertheless, there are certain elements of 
his comparison of religious and poetic language that we can use in Christian 
literary theory. We can accept his argument that the originally indistinct concepts 
of poetic and religious language have evolved into the discourses of literature 
and religion, which still retain traces of their common origin. We can follow
54 Ibid. pp. 147-148.
"Ibid.
56 Ibid. p. 151.
57 Ibid. p. 152.
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Gadamer in asserting that many literary genres evolved from religious contexts 
whose traces can still be discerned in them. One of the tasks of Christian literary 
criticism might be to describe the mythical significance of a text’s genre. 
Secondly, we can take from Gadamer the principle that in reading a literary text, 
a reader can come to understand more fully some previously obscure aspect of 
his or her existence. In this sense we can follow Gadamer in asserting that 
reading fiction can be an experience of truth. We can also follow him in 
comparing this process to reading Scripture. Whilst there are significant 
differences, fictional works, like Scripture, are a means by which readers make 
themselves at home in the world, and which can transform their beliefs and their
actions in it.
(ii) Neo-Thomism
A second significant modem source of Christian literary theory is the revival 
of the thought of Thomas Aquinas that took place in the first half of this century.
Maurice de Wulf, in an article on Neo-scholasticism (1913), describes the
movement as follows:
Neo-scholasticism is...not merely the resuscitation of a philosophy long 
since defunct, but rather a restatement in our own day of the philosophic 
perennis which, elaborated by the Greeks and brought to perfection by
the great medieval teachers, has never ceased to exist even in modern
58times.
What de Wulf calls neo-scholasticism and others neo-Thomism is a school of
thought which seeks to apply scholastic or Thomistic principles to contemporary 
intellectual life in the belief that those principles remain true, despite the
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evolution of science and philosophy from the context in which they were first 
expounded. Neo-Thomist thought was officially sanctioned by the Catholic 
church in Pope Leo XHI’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879), in which he called 
for the restoration of Christian philosophy by an application of the thought of St. 
Thomas to modem life. He wanted ‘to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, 
and to spread it far and wide for the defence...of the Catholic faith.. .and for the 
advantage of all the sciences’.58 9 The following year he established the Institut 
Superieur de Philosophic at Louvain as a centre for Thomistic study, in which 
numerous and influential works on the ‘perennial philosophy’ were written. 
Succeeding popes Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI reinforced the position of 
Aquinas in Catholic thought. In his encyclical Studiorum Ducem (1923), Pius XI 
wrote, ‘The Church has adopted his philosophy for her very own’.60
1. Jacques Maritain
The most significant contribution to literary theory to come from the neo- 
Thomist movement was the philosophy of art and poetry of Jacques Maritain 
(1882-1973). Influenced by Henri Bergson, and a convert to Catholicism under 
the influence of Leon Bloy, Maritain was from his earliest years a friend of many 
of the leading poets, artists and musicians of his day, and he maintained a 
lifelong interest in the fine arts. In his first work of aesthetics, Art and 
Scholasticism (1920), he wrote that whilst the medieval Scholastic philosophers 
had devoted no treatises directly to art, ‘there is nevertheless a far-reaching
58 The Catholic Encyclopaedia, <http://www.kiught.org/advent/cathen/10746a.htiri>
59 Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris: On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy (1879) no. 31, 
<http://listserv. american.edu/catholic/church/papal/leo.xiii/113cphi.txt>.
60 Pius XI, ‘Studiorum Ducem’, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 15 (1923) p. 314.
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theory of art to be found in their writings, but it is to be sought in austere 
dissertations on some problem of logic...or of moral theology’.61 Maritain set 
out to systematise this disparate material, and to outline the fundamental 
principles of a scholastic theory of art. He believed that it would meet the needs 
of aesthetics for honesty after the ‘vast intellectual confusion’ of nineteenth- 
century aestheticism in which the ‘fine’ arts were considered in abstraction from 
the ‘useful’ arts, beauty was considered only in relation to art, and art was 
considered an end in itself.62 His thought increasingly turned to poetry, and to 
the nature of the knowledge embodied in a poetic work. His final work of 
aesthetics, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (1953), is a synthesis of his 
scholastic exposition and of his own concerns with such knowledge.
Maritain insists on the fundamental role of the intellect in art. The Aristotelian
psychology he takes from St. Thomas distinguishes between the speculative and 
practical intellect. These are not two separate powers but different ways in which 
the one intellect operates. The object of the speculative intellect is simply 
knowledge. Maritain writes, ‘The grasping of that which is, is its only goal’.63 
The object of the practical intellect, on the other hand, is to know how to act. 
This is the kind of knowledge that we put to use, rather than simply enjoying 
its truth.64 St. Thomas, following Aristotle, divided the activity of the practical 
intellect into two kinds, action and making, that is, moral and artistic activity.
Action concerns the use of the will in terms of what is done with its freedom to
choose, according to which a person can be judged good or bad. It is the sphere
61 Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism with Other Essays, tr. J.F. Scanlan (London: Sheed 
and Ward, 1934) p. 1.
62 Ibid. p. 2.
63 Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (London: Tlie Harvill Press. 1953) p.
46.
64 Art and Scholasticism p. 4
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of morality, guided by the virtue of prudence, which is ‘the straight intellectual 
determination of actions to be done’.65 Making, on the other hand, concerns 
things produced. It is ordered not to the good of the person making but of the 
work made. It is the sphere of art, in the scholastic sense, and is guided by the 
virtue of art, which is ‘the straight intellectual determination of things to be 
made’.66
Art is not a virtue in the moral sense, in Maritain’s thought, but in the 
psychological sense in which the Scholastics spoke of a habitus, or quality of 
mind. Habits are ‘permanent conditions perfecting in the line of its own nature 
the subject they inform’.67 Health is a habit of the body, grace a habit of the soul, 
and the moral and intellectual virtues are habits of the intellect. A habit in this
sense is a ‘state of possession’, an inner strength in the activity of a given 
faculty.68 A habit of the intellect can be called a virtue in the sense that it 
sharpens an activity of the initially indeterminate intellect to perfection. In this 
sense the Scholastics called art a virtue of the practical intellect, meaning that it 
is an acquired disposition of the intellect fully to perform its capacity of making 
a work. Maritain writes, ‘Manual dexterity is...no part of art, but merely a 
material and extrinsic condition... Art remains entirely by the side of the mind’.69
Art in this sense is comparable to prudence, the virtue of the practical intellect 
concerned with right action. Prudence operates for the good of the worker, 
whereas art operates for the good of the work. Art, considered in the abstract, is 
unrelated to morality. If a jeweller makes a good brooch, the fact that he is 
jealous or avaricious is immaterial to the goodness of the brooch, which is the
65
66
67
68
Creative Intuition p. 48.
Ibid.
Art and Scholasticism p.
Creative Intuition p. 49
9.
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object towards which the virtue of art tends. Prudence presupposes a well- 
disposed will; it determines the means to an end whose goodness is a result of 
the disposition of the will. Art, on the other hand, works independently of a well- 
disposed will, since its end, the good of the work, is outside the sphere of human 
good.69 70 It is more closely related to the virtues of the speculative intellect, for a 
person can also be a good geometer and provide true demonstrations without 
being a good person. In practice, however, since a person is both a human being 
and an artist, the concerns of art and prudence will conflict. Prudence may tell a 
workman to return to his family at the end of the day, whilst art will tell him to 
keep working. Maritain writes, ‘The artist will require a measure of heroism to 
keep always in the direct line of action and not to sacrifice his immortal 
substance to the devouring idol in his soul’.71
Art, in this intellectual sense, has rules according to which it operates. Like the 
other virtues of the practical intellect, it works in conjunction with the will. A 
good will, or ‘straight appetite’, in art is a conformity of the will to these rules. 
This notion involves no neo-classical imposition of extrinsic rules upon art: 
Maritain dismisses this phase of literary history as a perversion both of art and of
Aristotle. The rules of art in Maritain’s scholastic sense are internal and
descriptive. Maritain writes that they are ‘not conventional imperatives imposed 
upon Art from without, but the...concealed ways by which Art itself, the 
working reason, goes to work’.72 The rules of art are to the artist what his tools 
are to the workman. They are discovered by the intellect in the process of 
making. In the useful arts, Maritain writes, the initial rule is the will to satisfy a
69 Art and Scholasticism p. 13.
70 Ibid. pp. 15-16.
71 Ibid. p. 15.
72 Ibid. p. 39.
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certain need, for example the need to cross a river. When the intellect conforms 
to this rule with the idea of a raft, and a man fashions one, a second rule, for 
making a raft, is discovered. When both rules are followed, it becomes clear that 
the raft can be improved in design, and a third rule according to which it can be 
improved is also gene^i^<it<^(j^.® With each new design improvement, the intellect 
conceives a new rule according to which it can best be made. The rules of art 
Maritain thus describes as ‘vital ways of operating discovered by the creative 
eyes of the intellect in its very labour of invention’.Cr 74
The predominant rule, according to Maritain, is always the need to be satisfied. 
The primary need in the case of the fine arts, he writes, is ‘the release of the pure 
creativity of the spirit, in its longing for beauty’.75 It is in the nature of the 
intellect, he writes, to ‘engender in beauty’, to make a work in which it delights.
He writes that this need to make a beautiful work is the first rule of fine art to
which the will must conform if the work is to be good. All the subsequent rules, 
however, are far more contingent and particular than in the case of the useful 
arts. Beauty, like being, is infinite, and there is an infinite number of ways in 
which a work can participate in it. The rules of fine art are thus ‘perpetually 
newborn’, as each new participation in beauty requires new rules of making.76 In 
this they resemble the rules of prudence, which also have to deal with a unique 
situation each time they are used. Maritain argues that in making an art-work, the 
artist’s will must be ordered towards beauty. He writes that people judge 
concerning their ends according to what kind of person they are. ‘As a man is, so
73
74
75
76
Creative Intuition p. 53.
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does the end appear to him’.77 If I am a chaste man, I will want chastity. If I am 
to produce a work of beauty, I must want beauty. According to the Scholastic 
concept of connaturality, what I want, what my appetite tends towards, is also 
the kind of person that I am. The rule of fine art, for Maritain, is that a person 
must love beauty so that his or her intellect becomes co-natured with it. He 
writes that this is because in art, as in contemplation, ‘intellectuality...goes 
beyond concepts...and is achieved through a...connaturality with the object, 
which love alone can bring about’78 This connaturality occurs and a work of 
beauty is achieved through what Maritain will call ‘creative intuition’.
Maritain understands beauty in a Thomistic sense, as id quod visum placet, that 
which pleases on being seen. Beauty is the quality in a thing which delights the
intellect as it knows it. Of the three Thomistic criteria of the beautiful, Maritain 
privileges clarity, writing that beauty is the ‘splendour of the form’ of a thing, or 
‘the splendour of the secrets of being radiating into intelligence’.79 He says this 
because form, in the scholastic sense, does not refer to external form but to ‘the 
inner ontological principle’ which determines a thing as what it is.80 This 
principle is intelligible in itself, but not necessarily to us. Beauty can thus also be 
described as the splendour of the ‘mystery’ of a thing. As we saw in the fourth 
chapter, St. Thomas holds that beauty is an analogous concept, which means that 
different things are beautiful in different ways.81 Maritain writes that God, the 
first cause, is its ‘supreme analogate’, which means that He is Beauty itself, in 
which the beauty of created things dimly participates insofar as each thing can.
77 Art and Scholasticism p. 48.
78 Ibid. p. 58.
79 Creative Intuition p. 161.
80 Ibid.
i
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God's pure intellection perceives transcendental beauty, that is, the beauty of 
being, and all that exists is beautiful to Him. We, on the other hand, perceiving 
through our senses, perceive what Maritain calls ‘aesthetic beauty’, that is, 
transcendental beauty perceived through the combination of sense and intellect, 
‘intelligence-permeated sense’, employed by man.81 2 83 84
This is the nature of the beauty that Maritain writes is the essence of the art­
work, which is brought into being because of the intellect's desire for a work in 
which it delights. He writes, ‘The creator in art is he who discovers a new type- 
analogy of the beautiful, a new way in which the brilliance of form can be made 
to shine upon matter’® A new type-analogy of the beautiful is a new way for a 
thing to be beautiful in its own way, whilst remaining a participation in the ultra­
beautiful Beauty of God. This is done by creating a new form, the art-work. The 
faculty of art is thus profoundly related to God’s creativity. Maritain writes that 
it is ‘the faculty of producing, not of course ex nihilo, but out of a pre-existing 
matter, a new creature, an original being’.®4 The artist as he bestows a new form 
upon matter, is imitating and continuing the activity of God. A further principle 
derives from this, in Maritain’s thought, that in order to create a new form, the 
artist must be profoundly aware of the forms in nature, which is a kind of 
awareness of God, who brought them into being. Nature is the divine art-work, 
and the artist learns the principle of forming in beauty through it from God.
81 Maritain’s position on the question of whether beauty is a transcendental, to which I referred in 
tlie previous chapter, is that it is ‘the splendour of all the transcendentals together’ {Art and 
Scholasticism pp. 172-173).
8 Creative Intuition p. 164.
83 Art and Scholasticism p. 46.
84 Ibid. p. 63.
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Maritain writes that ‘whether he knows it or not, [the artist] is consulting God 
when he looks at things’.85
Maritain addresses the question of the relation between an artist’s perception of 
the divine beauty in the forms of nature and the beauty of the new form of the 
art-work with the notion of creative intuition. Following Aristotle, he discerns a 
function of the reason that does not simply connect and infer but which sees, or 
grasps first principles. He calls this the ‘intuitive reason’, and asserts that it is the 
primary act of the intellect. It is at work even in speculative knowledge, for ‘any 
discovery which really reveals a new aspect of being is bom in a flash of 
intuitivity before being discursively tested and justified’.86 In the making of a 
work of art the part played by the intuitive reason is predominant, and from it the 
non-conceptual quality of art derives. This primary activity of the intellect occurs 
in an area of the mind Maritain calls the ‘spiritual unconscious’. This is not 
related to the Freudian unconscious, which is an entirely material entity. Both are 
at work at the same time, according to Maritain, and the former does not operate 
without the interference of the latter except in rare instances. Nevertheless they 
are different in nature. The existence of a spiritual unconscious, according to 
Maritain, can be deduced from reflection on the normal way in which ideas arise 
in the mind or in which decisions come to be made. He writes, ‘The universe of 
concepts, logical connections...and rational deliberation...is preceded by the 
hidden workings of an immense and primal preconscious life’.87 Beneath the 
clarity of conscious concepts and judgements lie the non-rational sources of 
knowledge, love and creativity from which those conscious mental activities take 
shape. Although we know what we are thinking, we do not know how we are
85 Ibid. p. 64.
86 Ibid. p. 76.
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thinking it. Maritain calls this preconscious mental activity the spiritual
unconscious.
He argues that in the spiritual unconscious all the soul's faculties are loosely 
engaged in common. Here Maritain locates the source of artistic and literary 
creation, which he describes as a certain free activity of the intellect, which is 
neither engaged in the production of concepts or decisions nor bound by the 
necessity of conforming to objective reality. This activity is a kind of knowledge, 
but, being preconscious, it is engaged in by all the powers of the soul together, 
and is thus not conceptual knowledge but intuitive knowledge. It simply grasps 
rather than discursively knowing its object. Maritain calls it ‘poetic intuition’, 
because it is an intuitive knowledge that tends to formation. It does not tend 
towards the production of a concept but towards the production of a work. 
Because it is a ‘free’ activity, not bound by the laws of objectivity, it tends 
towards the freedom of the work of fine art from a particular end.87 8 It is a kind of 
knowledge, in short, that is not formed by an object but is formative of one.
It is thus an analogy of the ‘creative Idea' of God, which, for Maritain, is an 
essentially formative intellectual act. He writes that God's creation through an 
intellection which is His essence is the ‘supreme analogate' of poetiy?9 He 
continues that in the poet’s creativity, as in God's, this intellective act manifests 
in the work produced the subjectivity of the creator. A person's subjectivity, in 
the ‘deepest ontological sense' that Maritain has in mind, is inconceptualisable, 
since so much of it is unconscious.90 A person does not know his own essence, 
but perceives himself only through knowledge of the world of things and
87 Ibid p. 94.
88 Ibid. pp. 108 ff.
89 Ibid p. 112.
90 Ibid p. 113.
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reflection on his acts therein. The poet’s obscure grasping of his subjectivity 
occurs through his intuitive grasp of things. Maritain calls this simultaneous 
knowledge of self and things ‘poetic knowledge’. He writes that in the poet, ‘at a 
single wakening, [things] and he come forth together out of sleep’.91 Poetic 
intuition is ‘an obscure grasping of his own self and of things in a knowledge 
through union or through connaturality which is bom in the spiritual 
unconscious’.92
Maritain is thinking of a kind of non-conceptual and preconscious knowledge 
of a thing and of oneself, in which the thing is not perceived as something other 
than the self, as in conscious and speculative knowledge, but as identified with 
oneself. This is what he means by knowledge through connaturality or affective 
union. Connaturality is the Scholastic concept according to which one makes a 
judgement pertaining to a moral virtue insofar as one possesses that virtue. 
Knowing nothing about chastity, I may nevertheless be a chaste man, and 
therefore act chastely in a given situation.93 This is called judgement by 
connaturality, because when a person has acquired a virtue as a habit, it becomes 
a part of his or her nature. The knowledge on which such judgements are based 
is not rational or conceptual knowledge, but it is, Maritain writes, ‘really and 
genuinely knowledge, though obscure and perhaps incapable of giving account 
of itself.94 He calls it knowledge through ‘affective connaturality’, by which he 
means that the poet’s subjectivity and the objects he or she perceives are united
91 Ibid. p. 114.
92 Ibid. p. 115.
93 See Summa Theologiae Ia 1, 6 ad 3 and IIa-IIae, 45, 2.
94 Ibid. p. 117. In Art and Prudence: Studies in the Thought of Jacques Maritain (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) chs. 10-11, Ralph McInerney argues tliat Aquinas’ 
thought prevents one speaking of creative intuition as an instance of judgement by affective 
connaturality. He describes Maritain’s use of the notion as ‘creative Thomism’ (ibid, p.158).
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by means of emotion.95 The kind of emotion Maritain has in mind is raised to the 
level of the intellect, and performs for the intellect the function otherwise 
fulfilled by the concept, that of the instrument through which reality is grasped. 
In poetic intuition, one as it were suffers reality more than one knows it, 
experiencing things through their affect on oneself rather than knowing them as 
objects external to oneself. Maritain writes, ‘Poetic intuition is directed toward 
concrete existence as connatural to the soul pierced by a given emotion’.96 It 
grasps the ‘total unicity’ of a moment in time, in which oneself and a thing are 
known inseparably, in a non-conceptual knowledge through the connaturality of 
the affected soul and the affecting thing.97
Maritain writes that poetic intuition can be considered with respect to its 
cognitive function and with respect to its creative function. In terms of its 
cognitive function, he writes that it grasps an existent thing at the same time as 
‘all the other realities which echo in this existent, and which it conveys in the 
manner of a sign’.98 It obscurely divines the infinite amount of reality engaged in 
any given thing, the hidden properties of its being and all the beings to which it 
is related. This is because ‘things are not only what they are’, for Maritain, but 
stand in an infinity of relations or ‘communication’ with one another.99 The 
cognitive aspect of poetic intuition with respect to the thing grasped is this 
ontological participation in an infinite network of relations and sympathies. Its 
creative aspect is that it has as its goal not knowledge but creation. Maritain 
writes that poetic intuition is ‘an incitation to create’.100 It tends of its essence
95 Ibid. p. 118.
96 Ibid. p. 126.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid. p. 127.
100 Ibid. p. 134.
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towards operation. The work is the conscious expression of the poetic intuition,
the end result towards which it tends, just as the concept or decision is the end of
the activity of the int^Ucct/01
Maritain focuses on the role of the author, but his theory of creative intuition
also includes the role of the reader. He emphasises that a literary work is an end 
in itself, a ‘new creature engendered in beauty’, rather than a vehicle of 
commi^nrcai^init®t The element of communication in a work is accidental insofar 
as creative intuition is concerned, but it is crucial to the poet with respect to his 
or her humanity. With regard to the reader, Maritain writes, ‘What the work 
tends finally to convey to the soul of others is the same poetic intuition which 
was in the soul of the poet’.1® The beauty of the work for the reader is the 
‘radiance of the ontologie mystery grasped by the intuition of the poet’.1® 
Maritain calls the reader’s a receptive, rather than a creative, intuition. He does 
not suggest that all receptions of a work are the same, and he writes that a poetic 
intuition is of its nature inexhaustible and larger than the work in which it is 
expressed. One reader, in one place and time, may perceive one aspect of it; 
another in different circumstances may perceive others. Maritain writes, ‘It is our 
good fortune if the smallest bit of it is really conveyed to us’.1® For Maritain, a 
reader’s perception amounts to the reception of an ‘intellectual gift’, which is a 
participation in the mystery of things that the author intuited. 106 He discusses in
101 Ibid. p. 118.
102 Ibid. p. 306.
103 Ibid. p. 307.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid- p. 308.
106 Ibid. p. 309.
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some detail the rhetorical means by which the immediate signifieds of the work 
can lead back to this original intuition.107
What can we make of Maritain’s Scholastic aesthetics today? Critics are 
divided on the significance of his thought for contemporary theory. Paul J. 
Marcotte, in his article, ‘Maritain’s Concepts of “Creative Intuition” and “The 
Spiritual Unconscious of the Soul’” (1981), asserts that Maritain’s work would 
transform the state of critical theory, ‘if only those people who are responsible 
for...English studies were disposed to approach him...with an open mind’.108 He 
makes this assertion, however, in the context of a dismissal of post-structuralist 
thought, and so gives no indication how Maritain’s ideas might be brought into 
dialogue with such thought. Neal Oxenhandler, in his article, ‘Maritain and 
Recent Critical Thought’ (1982), is more judicious, as he writes that whilst 
Maritain’s presuppositions and language are no longer available to the 
contemporary critic, his ideas may well prove fruitful when literary theory has 
become dissatisfied with its present presuppositions.109 In the meantime one can 
maintain that ‘those convictions that [one retains] from [Maritain] are...more 
important than the...language in which he expressed them’.110 This is a fair 
judgement. In my view, we could express those convictions as follows. We can 
accept Maritain’s Scholastic understanding of art as the faculty of making or 
production in general. We can agree that literary production is a kind of labour, 
in which certain materials are transformed with respect to a certain end or ends. 
We can follow Maritain’s assertion that beauty is an end of fictional production
107 Ibid. pp. 310-333.
108 Paul J. Marcotte. ‘Maritain’s Concepts of ‘The Creative Intuition’ and ‘The Spiritual 
Unconscious of the Soul’: Their Importance to. and their Neglect by, Professors and Students of 
English Studies’, Journal of Canadian Poetry 3 (1981) p. 31.
109 Neal Oxenhandler, ‘Maritain and Recent Critical Thought’, Renascence: Essays on Value in
Literature 34 (1982) pp. 260-270.
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insofar as he means by beauty that in which the intellect takes pleasure. Whilst 
there are moral and intellectual goods to reading, we can take from Maritain the 
principle that one of its goods is the pleasure which derives from the temporary 
freedom of the mind from intellectual or practical concerns. We cannot assert 
with him that beauty is the primary good of a work, however, since this would 
imply a lack of ethical concern with the context of its production and receptions, 
nor need we accept his prescriptions for the psychology of the artist that follow 
from it. With respect to his doctrine of the spiritual unconscious, whilst it is 
plausible, we need not commit ourselves to Maritain’s Thomistic psychology in 
order to think of literary production in terms of Christian theology. We can take 
from the doctrine the principle that writing fictional texts can be a way in which 
an author comes to an increased understanding of the world of his or her 
existence, and makes himself or herself more at home there, but we have no
reason to follow Maritain’s assertion that literary production is stimulated by a 
connatural knowledge of things. We can abstract from his theory of 
connaturality, however, the principle that the knowledge that can be gained from 
reading fiction can be of a more integral kind than purely intellectual knowledge, 
and we can add that it is one of the specific goods of such reading. We can also 
derive a standard of value from Maritain’s aesthetics, namely the degree to 
which a text enables a given reader or readers to recognise in it some aspect of 
their existence previously obscure or unknown to them. We can assert with 
Maritain that such increased knowledge of created existence is, however 
consciously, an increased knowledge of its creator.
110 Ibid. p. 270.
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2. Eric Giil
Maritain’s aesthetics are given a political context in the work of Eric Gill 
(1882-1940), artist and Dominican tertiary, who was influential in the distributist 
movement in England in the first half of the century. The distributists, influenced 
by the thought of Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton, attacked the 
dehumanisation brought about by monopoly capitalism and industrialism, and 
called for a return to small-scale agrarian h^c^^sst^.y. With printer Hilary Pepler, 
Gill founded the Guild of St. Joseph and St. Dominic at Ditchling, Sussex, in 
1912, a community of craftsmen committed to hand-produced works, living 
under the rule of the Dominican third order. Gill was influenced by Maritain’s 
aesthetics, and he published the first English translation of Art and 
Scholasticism, under the title ‘The Philosophy of Ant’, at Ditchling in 1923.
Gill found in Thomist aesthetics a corrective for the abuses perpetrated by 
industrial society. In his essay ‘Art and Industrialism’ (1933), he writes, 
following Maritain, that ‘art is deliberate skill used for the good of something to 
be made’.ttt It is the use of skill by a person with free will and thus responsible 
for the use he or she makes of it. An artist, therefore. Gill defines as a 
‘responsible workman’. 111 112 13 He writes that the responsibility of the workman is to 
be ‘concerned for the rightness and goodness of his work’, that is, to make the 
work as it ought to be made.Ht It will be beautiful insofar as it is good and true, 
that is, insofar as it is the thing it is supposed to be and as it fulfils the use for 
which it is made. Gill writes that art is tantamount to charity, since the making of
111 R.P. Walsh, ‘Distributism’, The New Catholic Encyclopaedia (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1967) Vol. IV p. 912.
112 Eric Gill, Beauty Looks After Herself (Londc^n: Sheed and Ward, 1933) p. 180.
1,3 Ibid. p. 184.
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a thing as well as it can be made is done for no other reason (such as profit) than 
‘for the glory of God and the love of [one's] neighbour'. 114 15 He asserts that the 
artist has the dignity of human responsibility and of participation in the creative 
work of God.116
Until the Industrial Revolution, according to Gill, all workmen were artists.
With the development of machinery for mass-production in factories, however,
most workmen have ceased to be responsible for the goodness of works, since
they neither conceive nor make them. Machines make products, and the
workman simply operates or minds the machines. Gill writes:
The craftsman is finally degraded - he ceases to be a person who in any 
way designs what he makes...He is no longer even a hand: he has 
become... a sentient part of the machine.117
The owner of the factory is not concerned with making a product well, but only 
with making one that will sell. A factory hand's work demands only skilful 
obedience, or even obedience without skill. He is expected simply to do what he 
is told, which Gill calls ‘slavery'.118 Udder industrial capitalism, most workmen 
have thus ceased to become responsible for the good of the work they make. Gill 
calls this ‘a subhuman condition of intellectual irresponsibility'?.9 While the 
designer of a car, for example, is an artist, the men who make it are simply his 
‘hands'. Insofar as they exercise no responsibility in their role in production, 
they are ‘not men' but slaves or ‘puppets'.120 The result of industrialism, Gill 
writes, has thus been not only to concentrate wealth and power in the hands of 
the few but also ‘to concentrate intellectual responsibility in the minds of the
114 Eric Glil, Art Nonsense and Other Essays (London: Cassell and Co., 1929) p. 71.
115 Eric Gill, Christianity and the Machine Age (London: Hie Sheldon Press, 1940) p. 27
116 Beauty Looks after Herself pp. 246-253.
117 Christianity and the Machine Age p. 39.
118 Art Nonsense p. 132.
119 Ibid.
120 Beauty Looks After Herself p. 188.
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few’.121 The mass of the population is dependent not only for its wages but also
for its opinions on the owners of industry, who supply what it is profitable for
them to supply, namely Trash for books and lies for news’.122 Gill writes that ‘no
slavery has been so absolute as that of our own time’, since it is intellectual as
well as economic.123
The intellectual standard of industrialist culture thus becomes very low. In 
Thomistic psychology, the intellect and the will are trained and strengthened in 
respect of their objects, the true and the good, as they are used. Giil writes, ‘We 
are all trained by what we do’.124 In his essay ‘Art and the People’ (1932), he 
asserts that since the responsible use of the will and a concern for the good are a 
not part of industrial working life, it is only to be expected that they will not be a 
part of a workman’s leisure time either. Since art is not required of most at work, 
it comes to be seen as the province of a few eccentrics, the ‘fine’ artists, who 
remain responsible for their works, although on the fringe of society. It can be 
appreciated in people’s leisure time, but their work gives them no inclination for 
such appreciation. Gill writes, Tt is absurd to foist high aesthetics on people 
whose working life does not develop in them any intellectual responsibility’.125 
He argues that beauty, the end of fine art, is apprehended by the intellect and the 
will together. Because these powers are not demanded in industrial working life, 
they decline and there is little inclination to use them in leisure time. Gill writes 
that, as a result, a work of beauty ceases to attract, since the less the intelligence 
seeks truth and the will seeks goodness, the less beauty will please both. The 
workman seeks entertainment rather than art in his spare time, which, whilst it
121 Ibid. p. 201.
122 Ibid. p. 202. j
123 Ibid. p. 144.
124 Ibid. i
ii
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can be good in its kind, lacks the sanctifying power Gill discerns in the latter,
which puts the mind in touch with a transcendental and so with its divine 
analogate.
Whilst we need not commit ourselves to Gill's Thomistic metaphysical 
framework, we can nevertheless accept some of his aesthetic principles. We need
not follow his view that workmen primarily pursued the good of their work 
before the Industrial Revolution, but we can accept the principle that the working 
conditions of industrial and technological capitalism discourage the majority of 
people from the valuable experience of increased knowledge in reading fiction. 
We can follow Gill in asserting that whilst this experience is not that of the 
majority of readers, this is not an index of the conservatism of the idea but a 
result of the conditions in which it is profitable for them to work in a capitalist
economy.
3. David Jones
An anthropological version of neo-Thomist literary theory can be found in the 
work of Gill's friend David Jones (1895-1974), poet, painter, engraver and
sometime member of the Ditchling Guild. In his essay ‘Art and Sacrament’
(1955), Jones addresses the relation between art and Catholicism, to which he 
had converted in 1921. He writes that man is by definition an artist, ‘a prudential 
animal whose nature is to practise an intransitive activity to which adheres a 
gratuitous quality'. 125 26 By the term ‘prudential animal', he means that human 
beings are alone among primates in acting according to various doctrinal and
125 Ibid. p. 149.
126 David Jones, Epoch and Artist (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), p. 154.
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moral codes. This presupposes a freedom of action, which can be considered 
man’s distinctive characteristic in the animal kingdom. This freedom also 
distinguishes his art from all other animal making, since he is alone in making 
works as the result of a free choice rather than by instinct. Jones finds this 
anthropology corroborated by zoology’s classification of man as sapiens, or 
‘wise’, as well by Thomistic psychology.
Jones writes that a further distinguishing mark of man’s art is that the works 
we produce have the character of signs. He writes, ‘For about fifty milleniums, 
[man has]...handled material in a fashion that can only be described as having 
the nature of a sign’.127 Not only the paintings at Lascaux but the most primitive 
markings on ancient stones indicate that man has always been a sign-making 
animal. The nature of these signs Jones calls ‘sacramental’, because, like 
sacraments, their purpose is the recalling or re-presentation of something sacred. 
He writes, ‘On account of this anthropic sign-making...we first suspect that 
anthropos has some part in a without-endness’.128 The nature of the man-made 
sign, Jones writes, has something sacred about it. Since, in Thomistic 
metaphysics the good is conceived of as a transcendental, then a sign that 
signifies something that exists also signifies something good. A thing’s being 
and goodness are analogous to the being and goodness of God. Insofar as these 
qualities are comported by a sign, Jones writes, ‘the notion of sign implies the 
sacred’.129 He continues, following Maritain, that art is a religious activity, that 
is, it binds man to God, insofar as the artist participates in the divine act of
127 Ibid. p. 155.
128 Ibid. p. 156.
129 Ibid. p. 157.
300
bringing into being a new form.130 The new form, Jones adds, is a sign of God's
creative activity.
Jones addresses the question of the relation between the sacramental character 
of art-works and the sacraments of the church. From its earliest days, he writes, 
the Church has ‘demanded as a condition of membership the acceptance of a 
belief involving certain of the arts'. 131 The material signs that are the church's 
sacraments have always been regarded as integral to Christian belief, because 
Christ himself commanded that they should be used. Regardless of differences of 
theology, almost all Christians believe to one degree or another that at the Last 
Supper Christ initiated a sign that he meant to be repeated. Whether at a 
Protestant Breaking of Bread or at a Catholic High Mass, Jones writes, ‘you 
would... witness... an art-work'. 132 Something, that is, is shown forth or recalled 
by means of a sign. Christ said ‘Do this for an anamnesis of me'. This 
anamnesis, or recalling to mind, is the essence both of art and of sacrament, for 
Jones. Indeed, he writes, Christianity is ‘committed to Ars in the most explicit, 
compelling and integral manner', because the crucifixion of Christ, its central 
article of faith, is also a sign. 133 Jones writes that it ‘presupposes the sign-world 
and looks back to foreshadowing rites... stretching back for tens of thousands of 
years'.134 He means that Christ's crucifixion takes on its meaning in various 
semiotic codes, such as the pagan rites of death and resurrection, and the 
Christian theology of man's fall and redemption. Whatever the denominational 
theology of the relation of the crucifixion to the Eucharist, Jones writes, the latter 
is held to recall or to show forth the former in an ‘unbloody' manner, which is to
130 Ibid. p. 158.
131 Ibid. p. 162.
132 Ibid. p. 163.
133 Ibid. p. 167.
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say that it represents the crucifixion in an artistic fashion. Ibi 135 Jones writes, ‘All art 
re-presents’, that is, it is a sign of a certain reality that the work makes present 
again?36 This reality is ‘too complicated to posit with any precision’, he writes, 
but it is present in the sign of the work. Whatever the complex inter-relation of 
external objects and psychological states that are the causes of a work of art, the 
work is ‘a signum of that reality, under the species of [for example] paint’. 137 
The eucharist is a sacramental sign in the way that all art-works are, according to 
Jones, in that both recall some kind of sacred reality too complex to be known by
the intellect alone.
Jones’ essay is a series of suggestions rather than a sustained argument, but 
there are certain principles we can accept from it nevertheless. We can follow his 
comparison of a literary text to a sacrament in the sense that the latter is a sign of 
a divine reality, although in no other sense. Insofar as the experience of reading a 
fictional text can provide a reader with increased knowledge of created world of 
his or her existence, we can assert that it can provide him or her with an 
increased knowledge, however small, of its creator. In this sense we can agree 
with Jones that the literary text is analogous to a sacrament, since it can function 
as a sign of a reality whose ground is the relation of the world to God.
134
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(iii) Religion and Literature
Neo-Thomism began as a philosophical movement, and its has remained 
current primarily in philosophical rather than in literary-critical circles. I will 
conclude this chapter with an examination of some of the ways in which literary 
critics have attempted to understand their field in terms of Christian theology, 
and I will assess the degree to which these attempts can be pursued in Christian 
literary theory today.
1. T.S. Eliot and the New Criticism
A seminal essay in modern Christian criticism is T.S. Eliot’s ‘Religion and 
Literature’ (1935). This work advocated a method of criticism whose criteria 
were derived from Christian doctrine. Eliot’s thesis in the essay is that ‘literary 
criticism should be completed by criticism from a definite ethical and theological 
standpoint’.138 He writes that literary criticism is effective in society insofar as 
there is a common world-view from which the standards implied by criticism 
derive. Given that Christianity plays a negligible role in the spirit of the age, it is 
particularly necessary for Christian readers consciously to use Christian 
standards of judgement rather than a kind of bricolage of principles derived, 
though it may not be immediately apparent, from world-views incompatible with 
their own. Christian criticism, Eliot stresses, is not concerned primarily with 
‘religious literature’, that is with the literary qualities of religious texts, with 
devotional literature or with propagandist literature, but with ‘the application of
138 Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1975) 
p. 97.
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our religion to the criticism of any literature’.139 This is particularly important, in 
Eliot’s view, with regard to modem literature, since it is written largely by 
people without a belief in the supernatural, and who, on the whole, regard such a 
belief as an antiquated relic of a bygone age.
There are several principles in this essay which we need no longer accept. We 
cannot follow Eliot’s distinction between a work’s ‘greatness’, which is to be 
determined by ethical and theological standards, and ‘whether it is literature’, 
which is to be determined by literary standards, since there are no criteria of 
critical judgement that are not already ethical and theological, in the sense that 
they derive from moral and intellectual first principles. In an essay entitled 
‘Criticism and Theological Standards’ (1959), Vincent Buckley points out that 
‘an ethical and theological criticism of literature which completes literary 
criticism is very difficult to conceive, and...the people who have attempted 
it...have fallen into the pit of divided attention’.140 Nor need we share Eliot’s 
sense of urgency at the secular beliefs expressed in modem literature, since 
secularism is on the whole axiomatic in the post-modem age. Nevertheless, we 
can accept from him the principle that Christian criticism will consist in the 
interpretation of literary works in terms of the faith of the Christian community. 
We can follow him further in asserting that, since all discourse implies some 
system of beliefs about the world, one task of such criticism, where appropriate, 
might be an engagement in dialogue with these beliefs that the critic finds 
expressed in the text.
A critic of Eliot’s generation who pursued his concept of Christian criticism 
was Dorothy Sayers (1893-1957). In her essay ‘Towards a Christian Aesthetic’
139 Ibid. p. 98.
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(1944), she notes that whilst the church has articulated no systematic thought on 
the arts, nevertheless ‘if we commit ourselves to saying that the Christian 
revelation discovers to us the nature of all truth, then it must discover to us the 
nature of the truth about art’.140 41 She sets out to derive a Christian aesthetic from 
a theology of creation, which she calls ‘the one important contribution that 
Christianity has made to aesthetics’.142 *In the Christian theology of creation, the 
First Person of the Trinity creates the world through the Second, who is His 
consubstantial image, and through whom He is known. Sayers paraphrases: ‘The 
Unimaginable and the Image are one and the same’.m She argues that the same 
relation inheres between the experience of which a literary work is the 
expression and its expression in the work. She writes, ‘The poet did not know 
what his experience was until he created the poem which revealed his own 
experience to himself. 144 The poem and the experience are one, that is, just as 
the Son and the Father are one. Sayers argues that the mediating factor between 
the work and the experience is that of recognition, insofar as the work reveals the 
experience that was unknowable without it. She writes that there are thus three 
elements in one indivisible act of literary creation, in an analogous relation to the 
three hypostases in the one substance of the divine creator. Furthermore, in order 
to communicate with a reader, Sayers writes, the author incarnates the 
expression of his experience in a material form, and in this material image the 
reader may recognise the image of some hitherto inexpressible experience of his 
own. This process Sayers likens to the Incarnation, insofar as ‘the third person of
140 Nathan A. Scott, Jr., ed., The New Orpheus: Essays Towards A Christian Poetic (New York:
Sheed and Ward 1964) p. 181.
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the poet’s trinity brings us, through the incarnate image, into direct knowledge of 
the in itself unknowable and unimaginable reality’.145
We cannot accept Sayers’ first principle that the literary work perfectly 
embodies the meaning of an experience which could not otherwise be expressed 
without implying that it is impervious to the kind of rational analysis which is a 
precondition of ethical criticism. Nevertheless, we can follow her argument that 
the recognition of previously inexpressible experience in reading is one principle 
by which the value of a work to a reader can be judged. It is a relatively 
uncommon experience, she writes, and not what most people experience when 
they read. Most people do so simply for the sake of entertainment, for which 
they need the kind of art that ‘does not reveal us to ourselves, [but] merely 
projects onto a mental screen a picture of ourselves as we already fancy 
ourselves to be - only bigger and brighter’.146 Sayers calls this ‘pseudo-art’, and 
writes that it is to genuinely creative art ‘as the idol is to the image’.147 We can 
follow Sayers in asserting that the recognition in a text of some aspect of 
existence previously obscure to a given reader is one index of its value to that 
reader. We can follow her further in understanding the experience of wish- 
fulfilment, as opposed to that of increased knowledge, in reading a text as a 
negative index of its value.
The final voice in what we could call the first generation of modern Christian 
criticism was that of the New Critics. Although they avoided the use of theology
in criticism, many of them were Christians, and they occasionally reflected on 
the relation of their faith to their critical practice. In the epilogue to Literary 
Criticism: A Short History (1957), William K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks
145 Ibid. p. 16.
146 Ibid. p. 17.
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write that they ‘have not been concerned to implicate literary theory with any 
kind of religious doctrine’.147 48 Nevertheless, their history has led them to the 
conclusion that the most plausible context for literary theory is neither idealism 
nor dualism, but ‘the vision of suffering, the optimism, the mystery which are 
embraced in the religious dogma of the Incarnation’.149 They argue that poetry, 
which they see as a conflict of opposing meanings held together in tension, is 
representative of the ethical conflict of Christian life. They write, ‘The theatre of 
poetic conflict is human substance itself... the conflict is of man with himself or 
of good and evil in man’.150 151 152In ‘Horses of Wrath’ (1962), Wimsatt writes that 
facing up to the conflict between flesh and spirit or good and evil is, in a 
Christian world-view, ‘a desirable and mature state of soul’, and also ‘the right 
model and course of a mature poetic art’.m Although the conflict is not in itself 
valuable, according to Wimsatt, it nevertheless constitutes the nature of moral 
life. The art that embodies this conflict, therefore, with ‘the concreteness of 
recognition and inclusion’, is the most genuinely representative kind of art/n
In his essay ‘Poetry and Christian Thinking’ (1951), Wimsatt remains 
undecided as to the theological value of poetry as discordia concors, although he 
hints that it may have an existential superiority to more abstract doctrinal 
formulations. 153 He also avoids judgement on the question of the revelatory 
quality of literary form in Scriptural and theological texts, although he insists
147 Ibid. p. 19.
148 William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957) p. 746.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid. p. 745.
151 William K. Wimsatt, Jr., Hateful Contraries: Studies in Literature and Criticism (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1965) p. 32
152 Ibid.
153 William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning 
of Poetry (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954) pp. 274-275.
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that the question is an important one;.154 In his essay ‘Religion and Literature’ 
(1974), Cleanth Brooks argues that the commitment demanded by religion 
renders it functionally distinct from literature. Only if the two are seen as clearly 
different, he writes, in contrast to the thought of Matthew Arnold and Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, can literature play its genuinely moral role. It can function as a 
criticism of a given social situation, for Brooks, but it cannot remedy the 
situation it criticises. That is the function of religion, and if literary works are
r
elevated to the position of religious texts, neither will play their proper roles in 
society.155
We need not accept the characteristic New Critical principle that criticism 
should be concerned only with the formal qualities of texts, but we can 
nevertheless use some of these reflections on literature and religion in Christian 
theory today. We can follow Wimsatt in asserting that the contradictory forces of 
meaning which can be discerned in fictional texts can in part be determined by 
the internal conflicts of human desire explained by the Christian theology of the 
fall. Where appropriate, Christian criticism might interpret such contradictions in 
the terms of this theology. We can follow Brooks in asserting that one of the 
goods of fiction is its potential for ethical critique of the social situation of its 
production and of its receptions. We can take it as one task of Christian criticism 
to describe, where appropriate, the ethical function of a text in a given historical
situation.
154 Ibid. pp. 276-279.
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2. Nathan Scott and Existential Theology
In the 1950s, several American universities began to offer courses in Religion 
and Literature. These courses were run by theologians and critics such as Preston 
Roberts at Chicago, Stanley Hopper at Syracuse and Amos N. Wilder at 
Harvard. Most influential among them was Nathan A. Scott, Jr. (b. 1925), of 
Howard University (1948-1955), Chicago Divinity School (1955-1977) and the 
University of Virginia, where he is Professor Emeritus in Religious Studies and 
English.155 56 Scott found in the theology of culture of Paul Tillich (1886-1965) the 
rationale for a Christian study of contemporary literature. Tillich argued that the 
religious situation of ultimate concern was expressed in literary texts and other 
cultural phenomena. In his book Negative Capability (1969), Scott writes, ‘The 
Christian enterprise, as it seeks to make contact with the living reality of its 
human environment, may find in literary art a most helpful resource’.157 The 
study of the literary forms and concerns of an age can function, Scott argues, as 
an index of the spirit of the age to which the Christian message is to be
addressed.
Scott argued against the formalist isolation of the text from the beliefs, values 
and commitments that were a part of the situation in which it was produced. In 
his article ‘The Relation of Theology to Literary Criticism’ (1953), he writes that 
‘to accord such autonomy to the mode of existence of a poem or a novel is...to
155 Cleanth Brooks, ‘Religion and Literature’, Sewanee Review LXXXII (1974) pp. 93-95, 103-
106.
156 See Anthony C. Yu, ‘Nathan A. Scott, Jr., At Appreciation’, to. Morphologies of Faith:
Essays in Religion and Culture in Honour of Nathan A. Scott, Jr., ed. Mary Gerhart and Anthony 
C. Yu (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990).
157 Nathan A. Scott, Jr., Negative Capability: Studies in the New Literature and the Religious 
Situation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) p. 163.
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assume that it was produced by an agent not fully human’.158 A person’s 
creativity cannot be distinguished from his or her social, philosophical and 
religious attitudes, for Scott. He argues that in practice criticism always involves 
a judgement on a writer’s insight into the human condition against the standard 
of the critic’s own insights. Those who think themselves neutral or disinterested 
are in fact swayed by the beliefs they have acquired by being members of a 
given society at a given time and place. Since moral and doctrinal neutrality is 
out of the question, Scott writes, ‘a theological criticism of the arts...is...a 
legitimate and necessary enterprise of the Christian intelligence’.159 He argues 
that this should constitute the kind of ‘theonomous analysis of culture’ described 
by Tillich in The Protestant Era (1951). Such analysis is based on the principle 
that ‘the law of life transcends man, although it is, at the same time, his own’.160 
Man is neither the bearer of universal reason nor to be subjected to a law
external to him, for the divine law is also his own innermost law. This means 
that, as Tillich writes, ‘in the depth of every autonomous culture, an ultimate 
concern, something unconditional and holy, is implied’.161 Tillich describes 
cultural analyses that pertain only to man as ‘autonomous’, and those which 
impose heterogeneous laws upon cultural objects as ‘heteronomous’.162 A 
‘theonomous’ analysis, he writes, is one which finds the hidden religious 
significance of cultural forms, since it is based on the belief that the divine law is 
their ground. It finds that ‘in all of them there is an ultimate, unconditional and 
all-determining concern, something absolutely serious and therefore holy, even if
158 Nathan A. Scott, Jr., ‘The Relation of Theology to Literary Criticism’, Journal of Religion 
XXXIII (1953) p. 268.
159 Ibid. p. 276.
160 Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, tr. James Luther Adams (London: Nisbet. 1951) p. 63.
161 Ibid. p. 64.
162 Ibid, p 65.
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expressed in secular terms’.®3 It is by this ‘way of theonomy’ that Scott asserts 
that Christian criticism should proceed. ®3 As he puts it in ‘Theology and the 
Literary Imagination’ (1968), the word of God can be heard ‘not only in the 
scripture...but also in all those intellectual and cultural forms which...arise...out 
of man’s deep encounter with his world and his own humanity’.®5
In his article ‘Prolegomenon to a Christian Poetic’ (1955), Scott uses Martin 
Buber’s distinction between an I-It and an I-Thou relationship as a criterion for 
Christian criticism. In Buber’s thought, an individual becomes truly a person 
only in the meeting with a Thou, in which he no longer uses or exploits things 
for his own purposes but enters into a vital relationship with them. One can enter 
into an I-Thou relationship with anything, and in Buber’s thought the universe 
invites such relationship. Scott calls this understanding of life ‘proximately 
Christian’, and a ‘truly sacramental conception of life’. ®6 Christian criticism, he 
writes, should be concerned with a text as an expression of an author’s 
contemplation of the created world in an I-Thou relationship?®7 Scott calls this 
the ‘vocation’ of the poet, ‘to stare, to look at the created world, and to lure the 
rest of us into a similar act of contemplation’?68 In The Wild Prayer of Longing 
(1971) he calls this the ‘sacramental vision’, which sees in the ordinary objects 
and actions of life ‘something “numinous”...something holy and gracious’?®® 
Such a vision, in Scott’s view, involves an existential acceptance of fmitude, a 
source for which he finds in existentialist theology, in which ‘[serenity] in the
163 Ibid.
164 Scott, ‘The Relation of Theology to Literary Criticism’ p. 276.
165 Natlian A. Scott, Jr., ed., Adversity and Grace: Studies in Recent American Literature 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968) p. 4.
166 Nathan A. Scott, Jr., ‘Prolegomenon to a Christian Poetic’, Journal of Religion XXXV (1955) 
p. 194.
167 Ibid. p. 195.
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presence of the finite is rooted in a sense of participation in the ultimate power of 
Being’. In this theological tradition, Scott writes, the experience of finitude is 
overcome by courage rather than by a process of inference. According to Tillich, 
distress at one’s finitude contains in itself an obscure awareness of the infinity of 
Being for which such distress is a desire. By accepting this principle, Scott 
writes, the Christian critic can find of the contemporary author that ‘in the very 
depth of his ontological confusion there is expressed a sense of the ultimate 
meaning of existence upon the basis of which he still lives’.
Scott’s critical concerns were shared by the poet, minister and scholar Amos 
N. Wilder (1895-1993), who taught at Chicago Theological Seminary (1943- 
1954) and then at Harvard Divinity School (1954-1963), where he remained 
Professor Emeritus until his death. In his essay ‘Art and Theological Meaning’ 
(1962), he writes that in modem society the holy cannot be considered to 
transcend the world of human experience, but is only accessible through that 
world. Borrowing a phrase from Jean Cocteau, he calls this the ‘secular 
mystery’. Wilder writes, ‘If we are to have any transcendence today, even 
Christian, it must be in and through the secular’.169 170 71 Art is important for this view 
because it deals with the concrete realities of existence where transcendence is to
be found. Wilder writes ‘The believer and the artist are dealing with the same 
single reality’.172 He writes that art can correct theology where it tends to 
abstract formulations, and remind it of the thereness of the world though which 
the holy is to be experienced. Citing Romans 10:19, ‘With a foolish nation I will 
make you angry’, Wilder defends the possibility that ‘God is using the
169 Nathan A. Scott. Jr., The Wild Prayer of Longing: Poetry and the Sacred (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press. 1971) p. 49.
170 Ibid. p. 205.
171 Scott, The New Orpheus p. 407.
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essentially pagan reality of art...to provoke the Church,... to introduce a ferment 
into it’.* 173
We need not commit ourselves to Tillich’s view that the contents of Christian 
faith are to be explained as theological answers to existential questions in order 
to accept some of the insights of his literary-critical disciples. 1/4 We can follow 
Scott in asserting that the situation of ultimate concern in which religious beliefs 
are formed can also be found expressed in fictional texts. We can understand the 
writing of such a text as a means of negotiating this situation. We can accept 
from Scott the principle that one task of Christian criticism might be to describe 
its expression in a text, and to analyse the relations between the author’s and the 
Christian responses to it. We need not follow Scott’s assertion that there is a 
connection between literary production and the perception of a transcendent 
quality in the world of human existence, but we can accept that such perception 
is a possibility of the experience of reading. We can take it as a task of Christian 
criticism to describe the ways in which the critic judges that the immanence of 
God in the world is expressed in the text. We need not follow Wilder’s assertion 
that in modern society God can only be known through secular cultural forms, 
but we can accept from him the principle that fictional texts can function as a 
critique of the faith and practice of the Christian community. Whilst such 
critique is primarily ethical, we can accept Wilder’s view that it may also 
constitute a reminder to the church of the goodness and value of the world, 
which Christian thought should not efface in its emphasis on God’s
transcendence.
1/2 Ibid. p. 408.
173 Ibid. p. 413.
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3. Contemporary Christian Theories
The study of literature and religion has been widely promoted in Britain by 
David Jasper (b. 1951), of the universities of Durham (1979-1991) and Glasgow, 
where he is director of the Centre for the Study of Literature, Theology and the 
Arts. In The Study of Literature and Religion (1989), Jasper defends the 
‘irreducible importance’ of engaged theology for Christian criticism, rather than 
a ‘trivial notion of‘religion’...[derived] from literary standards claiming to be 
the arbiters of what constitutes true knowledge’.174 75 He looks for a dialectical 
relationship of theology with contemporary literary theory, in which both will 
grow through the mutual encounter, and he sketches a series of ways in which 
that relationship might progress. Most significant of these, in Jasper’s thought, is 
the encounter of theology with deconstruction. In ‘The Study of Literature and 
Theology: Five Years On’ (1992), he writes of the ‘profound theological 
possibilities, through art, of the Derridean critique of ontology’.176 He sees 
deconstruction as a ‘radical purifying strategy’ of discourse, of particular 
relevance to theodicy, the justification of God. If theology abandons the 
logocentrism by which it is conceived as a discourse with God as its sole given, 
in Jasper’s view, a more valuable theodicy may arise. Deconstruction suggests 
that theodicy, which is, like all else, a text, should not begin its reflections at a 
pure starting-point, nor should it attempt to ascribe any kind of intention to God,
since deconstruction shows that an author’s intentions are not available from his
work. A deconstructive theory of textuality, Jasper writes, can free theodicy from
174 See Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. I (London: Nisbet. 1953) pp. 67-76.
175 David Jasper, The Study of Literature and Religion: An Introduction (London: Macmillan, 
1989) pp. 1, 5.
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the constraints of ‘theological absolutism’ into ‘a new discernment of the 
mystery’ of existence. 176 77 Theodicy ceases to be a system demanding an 
impossible solution and becomes a textual enactment of the inexhaustible 
multiplicity of divine creation. It recognises that the solution to the theodical 
problem will be given in ‘God’s good time’, but that here and now it is, like all 
propositions, in a process of deferral. 178 The textuality of theodicy, Jasper writes, 
leads theology from a commitment to the closure of a text towards a 
commitment to the deferral of meaning, 179 In this way, ‘beyond the fictions 
of...understanding’, it can lead us to recognise something of the ‘mystery of 
divine creativity’.180
We need not share Jasper’s conviction that Derridean thought defers the ethical 
problem of theodicy, however much the latter is susceptible of deconstruction, 
since it seems to imply a quietism on the part of Christian ethics with respect to 
injustice. Nevertheless, we can follow Jasper in asserting that Christian literary 
theory will not constitute genuinely relevant contemporary discourses unless it 
has fully engaged with contemporary literary theory.
One of the most original examples of a Christian theory to have assimilated the 
insights of post-structuralism is Michael Edwards’ Towards a Christian Poetics 
(1984). In this book, Edwards derives a literary theory from the Christian 
anthropology of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). For Pascal, human grandeur, or
‘greatness’ - the goodness, truth and beauty of human life - derives from our
176 David Jasper, ‘The Study of Literature and Theology: Five Years On', Literature and 
Theology 6 (1992) p. 6.
177 Ibid. p. 124.
178 Ibid. p. 128.
179 Ibid. p. 130.
l80Ibid. p. 131.
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‘first’ created nature.1*'1 Our misere, or ‘wretchedness', derives from our
‘second' concupiscent nature. A person is alienated from himself, for Pascal, in a 
double condition of greatness and wretchedness, in which to perceive one is also 
to perceive the other. These two principles are synthesised in Christ, who 
assumes all the grandeur and all the misery of humanity. Divine, and thus 
supremely great, by the excess of his wretchedness at the crucifixion, he initiates 
a new greatness, that of redeemed and glorified humanity. 181 82 Edwards describes 
this as ‘a ternary process, in which a positive is reversed by a negative, which is 
then reversed by a new positive far more powerful than the original’. This 
dialectic governs the Biblical view not only of man, in Edwards’ view, but also 
of the world and its history. Biblical cosmology sees the universe progressing 
through the dialectic of creation, fall and re-creation. Biblical history charts the 
development from Eden through the fallen world to Paradise, and from Israel 
through its scattering to the Church. The fundamental process is life, death and 
resurrection, based on ‘two instants of contradiction’, the first between the 
greatness and wretchedness of the human world, and the second between their 
wretchedness and hints of a new splendour to come. Edwards writes that this 
dialectic can be understood to govern all experience. We live in the first 
contradiction, he argues, with glimpses and hints of the second.183
Edwards writes that language and literature progress through the same 
dialectic. He asserts that the grandeur of language consists in a correlation of 
names with things and their speaker, which he sees represented in the Biblical 
account of Adam's names. Its misere he finds in its ambiguity and lack of 
reference, represented by the Biblical account of the serpent’s contradiction of
181 Blaise Pascal. Pensees 149, tr. A.J. KraUsheimer (London; Penguin, 1966) pp. 76-80.
182 Michael Edwards. Towards A Christian Poetics (London: Macmillan, 1984) pp. 2-4.
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the divine economy with his words, ‘You will not surely die’.184 After the Fall, 
Edwards argues, language remains characterised by both these elements. We 
have on the one hand a sense of language ‘fulfilling our desires as speakers and 
writers’, genuinely naming things and communicating our ideas to others. On the 
other hand, it seems that it is precisely language which prevents these things. 
This is the situation in which we find ourselves, Edwards asserts, between the 
second and the third stages of the Christian dialectic. In this dialectic, as the 
extremity of misere leads to a greater grandeur than the first, the very 
incongruity of language with the world furnishes us with hints of a new world. 
Edwards writes, ‘Explored, language becomes a domain of suggestions, 
fragments of a novel reality emerging with fragments of a novel speech’. 1 5 The 
fragmentary nature of language adumbrates ‘no less than the renewal of reality’, 
according to Edwards.186 As it bears the trace both of the creation and the Fall, 
so it bears the trace of the re-creation to which the two opposites dialectically
lead.
Fictional texts, Edward argues, both articulate and enact the Christian dialectic. 
He writes that the latter can be traced in the genres of tragedy and comedy. 
Tragedy deals in greatness. Its hero is usually extremely great, ‘the best of 
mortals’, like Sophocles’ Oedipus, or ‘the foremost man of all this world’, like 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Edwards suggests that Adam is the ‘shadowy 
presence’ behind such figures, who often aspire to his role of government of the 
world, and who also take on his representative function. 187 Tragedy is equally 
concerned with wretchedness. The extremely great hero is usually brought to an
183 7.
10.
11.
12.
Ibid. p.
184 Ibid. p.
185Ibid. p.
186 Ibid. p.
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extremely base action, often the murder of a family member. Edwards notes that 
the misery of the world after the tragic catastrophe is the misery of a fallen 
world, where suffering is not related to personal guilt, but is simply the way of 
the world. The catastrophe is analogous to the fall, Edwards writes. He notes that 
in the story of Oedipus, the dynamic of original sin, whereby the cause of one's 
unhappiness is ultimately oneself, is especially clear. Edwards writes, ‘Tragedy 
is the confrontation... of these radical extremes of human existence', that is, the 
exceptional greatness and wretchedness of the hero and his family. 187 88 189The third 
term of the dialectic emerges in the worth of the dead hero, who, through the 
extremity of his misery, attains in the minds of the survivors a greatness that 
surpasses even his previous stature. Tragedy usually ends with a prophecy of the 
renewal of a dynasty or a society, often purified from the ills that previously 
beset it. When it does so, Edwards writes, ‘it travels the whole dialectic', hinting
that from the dual condition of man and the world a new creation of both shall
189emerge.
Whereas the plot of tragedy articulates the Christian dialectic, in Edwards' 
view, he finds narrative to be ‘dialectical in itself .190 Whether or not Eden 
existed, in which being was undivided and the present was presence, it is clear 
that we are not there now. In such a state, Edwards writes, there would be no
need for fiction, since the real would be fully satisfying. ‘We tell stories in a 
fallen world,' he writes, meaning that the satisfying, meaningful and beautiful 
world of which we can conceive, but in which do not live, is projected into the 
narrated world of a story. Whether the narrated world appears more or less fallen
187 Ibid. pp. 14-16.
188 Ibid. p. 21.
189 Ibid. p. 32.
w Ibid, p. 72.
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than the one we inhabit daily, Edwards writes, it nevertheless represents a 
‘desirable otherness,’ insofar as it at least has a story.191 He asserts, ‘We tell 
stories because we desire a world with a story’. 92 A story’s beginning provides 
the reader with a new beginning to a new world. Its end offers an indefinitely 
lasting future of hope, in a dimension of the story-world so secure that it does not 
need to be told. 193 Edwards writes that fictional characters are transformed by the 
narrative in which they subsist. However amorphous, they live ‘charmed lives’, 
of guaranteed significance, in comparison to our own lives whose significance is 
merely desired. They inhabit what Edwards calls ‘the glory of form’. He 
describes the activity of narration as ‘the fiction of a fallen world remade’.194
To what extent should we accept Edwards’ theories as valid theses of Christian 
literary theory? We have no reason to dissent from his anthropological first 
principles, but it seems to me that his assertion that the dialectical structure that 
he extrapolates from them governs all aspects of human experience is too strong. 
There is no necessary relation between the polysemy and contradictory forces of 
meaning at work in a text, for example, and the resurrection and the new creation 
of the world. There are similarities between the two concepts, but no reason to 
believe that the former is a sign of the latter. In the same way, Edwards’ reading 
of tragedy draws convincing parallels between the structure of the genre and that 
of the dialectic in which he casts Christian theology, but there is only a 
contingent relation between the content of the two discourses. Nevertheless, the 
reading serves as a good example of a critical principle I have advocated, that 
one of the tasks of Christian criticism might consist in bringing the world-view
191
192
193
194
Ibid. p. 73.
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Ibid. pp. 75, 90.
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of the critic and that he or she discerns in the text into dialogue. We can accept 
from Edwards’ theory of fiction the principle that one the pleasures of reading 
literary texts can be the experience of a world that is meaningful and secure in a 
way that the reader’s own world is not. We can follow Edwards in asserting that 
the practice of producing and reading fiction is in part an expression of the desire 
for a more blessed life than the author’s or reader’s own, which we can
understand as a desire, however conscious, for the God in whom Christian faith
believes that such a life is to be found.
A very different theistic response to post-structuralism is found in George 
Steiner’s Real Presences (1989). The book begins with the premise that a belief 
in the communicative function of language is ultimately founded on a belief in 
the presence of God to the world. Aesthetic meaning in particular, Steiner writes, 
implies the ‘necessary possibility’ of this presence. 195 * 197He asserts that 
communication in language, particularly in the form of great literary works, 
occurs as result of a ‘wager on transcendence’, that is, on a real otherness made 
present in language, whose presence ultimately derives from that of God?96 
Steiner argues in favour of making this wager in the name of a responsible 
experience of art.
In the first section, Steiner denigrates the prevalence of secondary discourse in 
contemporary culture, the proliferation of texts about texts, which he describes 
as a deliberate avoidance of confrontation with the mystery of creation embodied 
in a work of art??? In the second section, he traces the history of the ‘broken 
contract’ between language and the world characteristic of modernity, which he
195 George Steiner, Real Presences: Is There Anything In What we Say? (London and Boston: 
Faber and Faber, 1989) p. 3.
l9<5 Ibid. p. 4
197 Ibid. p. 49.
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plots from Mallarme and Rimbaud through to post-structuralism. Steiner calls 
this period the ‘after-Word’ or ‘epilogue’, since it supersedes a belief in the 
sayability of being.198 Deconstruction, the most radical of the denials of 
presence, Steiner finds irrefutable ‘on its own terms and planes of argument’.199 
Neither linguistics nor literary theory, he argues, can offer counter-arguments 
that deconstruction cannot compromise. Nevertheless, it is ‘manifestly false to 
human experience’.200 What is necessary if one is to maintain a belief in the 
reality of those things expressed in language, Steiner writes, is to envisage 
‘foundations beyond the empirical’.201 In the final section of the book, he offers 
a phenomenological account of art, based on the assertion that the experience of 
art is fundamentally an experience of otherness, whose paradigm is the 
Annunciation, “‘a terrible beauty”...breaking into the small house of 
our...being’.202 Steiner writes that this encounter is necessarily moral, and brings 
with it a call to change. It can be described by a ‘phenomenology of courtesy’, 
which traces a silent and responsive welcome of the other in a work of art as a 
guest into the house of the critic’s being.203 Steiner calls this critical receptivity 
‘philology’, and asserts that it is based on ‘an axiom of dialogue’204. With 
respect to the production of art-works, Steiner writes, ‘There is aesthetic creation 
because there is creation'™5 In an agonistic relation with the inexplicable 
thereness of created beings, an artist works a ‘counter-creation’, motivated by a 
pious rage that he comes after the original mystery of form.206 The otherness
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experienced in a work of art is, for Steiner, a correlate of the otherness of 
creation which stimulates the artist.207 He writes that the gravity of art is ‘finally, 
religious’, enacting the impulse of the human spirit to explore the unknown and 
our closeness to it.208 The various forms of art, he asserts, ‘relate us most directly 
to that in being which is not ours’.209
Steiner does not write Christian literary theory in our sense of the term, but 
there are several points in his argument that we can use in such a theory. We can 
accept his assertion that reading a fictional work can provide an experience of 
certain aspects of human existence that cannot be articulated in empirically 
verifiable discourse. We can take this as one of the specific goods of fiction. 
Whilst we need not follow his assertion that literary production is a response to 
the mystery of existence, we can accept that such production can in part consist 
of an exploration of those aspects of human existence that cannot be articulated 
in logical propositions. We need not assert with Steiner that the expression of 
that which cannot be contained in such propositions but which the reader 
nevertheless feels to be true is necessarily related to the existence of God of or 
his creation of the world, but we can accept the principle that Christian criticism 
might seek to relate the expression of the transcendent qualities in human
existence that the critic discerns in a text to his or belief in the divine creation of
that existence.
I will conclude this section with an examination of some of the essays in 
Christian literary theory that have appeared in journals devoted to literature and 
religion in recent years. Some of these essays reject the apparent nihilism of 
contemporary theory, in the name of Romantic and formalist ideas, and others
207 Ibid. p. 210.
208 Ibid. p. 225.
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look towards an assimilation of post-modern thought. The most articulate 
statement of the former position is the evangelical critic Leland Ryken’s essay, 
‘The Contours of Christian Criticism in 1987’ (1987). There he argues for a 
distinctively Christian method of literary criticism, which will add a distinctively 
Christian voice to the plurality of conceptual schemes from which critical 
discourse is now derived?10 He writes that this should consist of a return to 
Eliot’s two-tier criticism, to the traditional Western canon and to a non- 
politicised criteriology. Clarence P. Walhout, prominent among those Christian 
critics who seek to assimilate the insights of contemporary theory, argues in 
response to these assertions that the modem re-assessment of the canon and the 
politicisation of critical discourse are motivated by a concern for social justice, 
of which Christian critics should be at the forrffont. For Walhout, a 
distinctively Christian critical discourse will evolve not through rejection of 
modern revaluations, however secular, but through engagement with them. If 
such discourse is to be relevant in contemporary society, we must agree with 
Walhout on this point. Whilst we can accept with Ryken that, since all critical 
discourse derives from some system of first principles, Christian criticism should 
derive from principles of or compatible with Christian theology, we cannot agree 
that such a discourse will be constituted by a simple rejection of the last thirty 
years’ developments in literary theory, however hostile they have been to
Christian faith.
In his essays ‘Literary Criticism in the Christian Community’ (1979) and ‘A 
New Direction For Christian Literary Theory’ (1981), Walhout argues that
2°i Ibid. p. 226.
210 Leland Ryken, ‘The Contours of Cliristian Criticism in 1987’, Christianity and Literature 37 
(1987) pp. 23-36.
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Romantic theory is at odds with the element of community in Christian theology. 
He writes that the emphasis on the autonomy of the individual consciousness, 
which he discerns in the criticism of Eliot and phenomenological criticism, is in 
conflict with a Christian view of community.211 12 Although Romantic theories 
have dominated Christian literary thought, Walhout looks for a more historical 
hermeneutics that takes account of the construction of meaning in community as 
the model for Christian criticism. 213 Mark Walhout takes a similar position in his 
article ‘Aesthetic Experience and Social Justice’ (1987). He cites the conclusions 
of various ecumenical bodies in support of his contention that Christian 
criticism, like all criticism, is of itself politically significant. What counts, for 
Walhout, is that its politics should express ‘the biblical vision of social justice’, 
affirmed by such organisations as the World Council of Churches.214 He 
describes the period 1840-1870 in America as one of‘Romantic Christianity’, in 
which aesthetic experience was accorded the status of a near-religious 
epiihany.215 He writes that this tradition is still active today. Its religious 
aestheticism, Walhout asserts, involves a ‘failure to think through the contingent 
and situated nature of aesthetic experience’, which ‘obstructs inquiry into the 
historical conditions and effects of works of art’?1. The description of aesthetic 
experience in the terms of religious experience in this tradition, Walhout writes, 
tends to obscure the historical situation of an art-work and of its reception, with
211 Clarence Walhout. ‘A Response to Leland Ryken’s Proposals For Christian Literary Critics’, 
Christianity and Literature 37 (1987) p. 42.
212 Clarence P. Walhout, ‘Literary Criticism in the Christian Community’, Christian Scholar’s 
Review 8 (1979) pp. 298-304.
213 Patriicia A. Ward also argues for an attention to the situation in which tlie meaning of a work 
is constructed by the reader by Christian critics. See her articles ‘Worldly Readers and Writerly 
Texts’, Christian Scholar’s Review 17 (1988) pp. 433-435, and ‘Ethics and Recent Literary 
Theory: The Reader as Moral Agent’, Religion and Literature 22 (1990) pp. 21-31.
214 Mark Walhout, ‘Aesthetic Experience and Social Justice: Historical Reflections on Christian 
Criticism’, Christian Scholar's Review 16 (1987) p. 250.
215 Ibid. p. 252.
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which Christian criticism should be concerned. In his opinion, such criticism 
should temper its attention to the epiphanic and sacramental qualities of art with 
an attention to the social situation in which works are produced.
We can take from these essays the principle that Christian criticism has an 
ethical commitment to analysing the relations of a text to the social and political 
situations in which it was produced and in which it is read. We can follow 
Clarence Walhout in asserting that, since meaning is a communal event, the 
meanings of a text cannot be determined outside these situations. We can follow 
Mark Walhout in asserting that one task of Christian criticism might consist of 
an analysis of these situations, insofar as they can be shown to determine a text,
in the terms of Christian social ethics.
In his essay ‘The Problem of Moral Criticism in Christian Literary Theory’ 
(1994), Clarence Walhout argues that this principle should be applied to the 
Christian critic’s own discourse, in particular to the moral norms that he or she 
uses in it. He cites Alisdair MacIntyre’s argument in After Virtue (1981) that 
moral principles take on meaning in the context of developing social practices, 
and argues that the principles used -as -norms -by -Christian criticism should be 
examined in their relation to such practices rather than as trans-historical or as 
absolute. As these practices evolve, so do the moral principles which derive from
them. As a result, Walhout writes, ‘Moral criticism of literature demands 
reflection on moral principles as well as...on literary texts’.216 17 Citing Gadamer, 
he asserts that the values of the text and of the critic are to be understood in the 
light of one another.218 This makes criticism a process in which ‘we learn to
216 Ibid.
217 Clarence P. Walhout. ‘Tlie Problem of Moral Criticism in Christian Literary Theory’,
Christian Scholar's Review 24 (1994) p. 40.
218 Ibid. p. 43.
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develop and modify our own beliefs and values by interaction with the beliefs 
and values of others’219 Walhout makes a significant •point in • this essay on the 
nature of the ethical principles in whose terms I have argued that Christian 
criticism should analyse texts -and their-contexts, with which we can agree. Since 
these principles are not universal but constitute the current historical state of the 
practice of Christian ethics, Christian literary theory should recognise tire 
historical specificity of its own interpretative standards. We can accept from 
Walhout that-this means that onetaskof Christian-criticism might consist in an 
examination of the critic’s own ethical principles in the terms of those he or she 
finds expressed-in - the texts • and -its -receptions as well verm.
This concludes my examination of modem Christian literary theories. I have 
argued that Gadamer’shermeneutics legiti-mates the concept of Christian literary 
theory, and I have analysed the contributions to such a theory of this 
hermeneutics, of neo-Thomism and of modem Christian -teiticism. I have 
assessed which elements of these discourses could be used in a contemporary 
Christian literary -theory, -t-have been-accr-eting a series of principles• throughout 
this thesis which I have argued should constitute elements of such a theory. In 
the following conclusion, J will synthesise these principles into a systematic 
presentation of the Christian literary theory towards which I have been working.
219 Ibid. p. 44.
6. Conclusion
In the last .two chapters, I have argued that there is a tradition of Christian 
thought that pertains to what we now call literary theory. This tradition is diverse
and fragmentary. The philosophers, theologians and -critics -I have -examined have 
been concerned with a variety of subjects, for a variety of reasons, and have 
argued with reference to a variety of first principles. None has claimed that his 
her thought, insofar as it pertains to literary theory, is systematic. In this 
conclusion, I will use some of these diverse insights to sketch a literary theory 
which is both derived from Christian faith or from principles consistent with it, 
and which takes account of the objections to such a concept posed by the 
fundamental discourses of contemporary theory, deconstruction, Marxism and 
psychoanalysis.
After deconstruction, we need to emphasise the provisional nature of the
propositions which constitute the intelligible content of the Christian faith, and
from which Christian literary theory, as I have defined it, will derive. This is not
a new caveat in theology. In his essay ‘What is a Dogmatic Statement?’ (1962),
Wolfhart Pannenberg argues from an eschatological perspective that the final
truth of Christian dogmas is deferred until the promised end of history:
The church’s dogma, which is still on the way, cannot itself be the 
eschatological form of revealed truth. It always remains under the... sign 
of the ‘not yet’, which characterises all Christian life and thought.
or
’ Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology Vol. 1, tr. George H. Kehm (Lc>ndon: SCM 
Press, 1970) p. 210.
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Pannenberg sees in the church’s revision of its confessional formulations an
example of their provisional quality, which he calls their ‘not yet’. In ‘The
Development of Dogma’ (1954), Karl Rahner argues a similar point from a
Catholic perspective. He writes that doctrinal development is a consequence of
the limited scope of human statements, itself a consequence of the limited scope
of human knowledge in comparison to God’s ‘simple and exhaustive knowledge
of himself and of all that takes its origin from him’.* 2 Rahner writes:
All human statements, even those in which faith expresses God’s saving 
truths, are finite.. .They never declare the whole of a reality'?
In Rahner’s view, every reality is related to every other reality, so that even the 
simplest empirical observation is essentially limited. It is all the more certain, on 
this account, that doctrinal statements concerning divine realities ‘can never 
express them once and for all in an entirely adequate form’." Any such 
formulation is in principle open to hitherto unforeseen possibilities of meaning. 
Deconstruction tells us that the language of Christian doctrine subverts the 
metaphysical system on which it is based. The meaning of a doctrinal statement, 
that is, is never final or absolute. On the contrary, its meaning is provisional, and 
believed within the community of faith as the best expression currently possible 
of a reality that can never be fully or adequately expressed in the metaphysical 
structure of language. This view is not without support from deconstruction. On 
the one hand Derrida points out that a non-metaphysical language does not exist 
and that it is therefore necessary to use the existing language whilst pointing out 
the limits of its apparent structure of reference. In theological terms, this is to say 
that negative theology tells us most about God. On the other hand, Derrida
2 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations Volume 1: God, Christ, Mary and Grace, tr. Cornelius 
Ernst (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1961) p. 44.
2 Ibid. p. 43.
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suggests that commitment to a reality outside discourse towards which the latter 
inadequately gestures is possible despite its deconstruction, when he speaks of 
his commitment to political action in the face of the deconstruction of political 
language. As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, deconstruction does not account 
for the hermeneutic dimension of language, that is, for the community which is 
its precondition. Christian doctrines are formulated, believed, reflected upon and 
reformulated in the community of faith, not as encryptions of a fixed quantity of 
meaning but in dialogue with the church and with the God who reveals himself 
in it. By their ‘provisional’ quality, I mean that, whilst structurally inadequate, 
Christian doctrines are nevertheless understood in the community of faith as the 
best possible expression of God’s saving will at the current stage of the dialogue 
by which that community is constituted.
There is much in the social ethics of Marxist literary theory which Christian 
literary theory can and should adopt. Marx’s atheism does not make this 
proposition inconsistent since, like Feuerbach’s projection-theory from which it 
derives, that atheism is founded ultimately on an unproved hypothesis. The 
indisputable influence of social and economic factors in religious ideas does not 
imply either the existence or the non-existence of a reality corresponding to 
those ideas. Hans Kung calls the Marxist process of arguing from the idea of 
God to his non-existence ‘a kind of ontological argument in reverse’, which has 
the same flaws as its positive counterpart.5 Marx’s critique of the systematic 
economic exploitation by a powerful minority, which controls and influences the 
legislature, of the majority of wage-earning labourers and his call for an end to 
this exploitation are strongly anticipated and affirmed by the Bible, and must be
4 Ibid. p. 44.
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a fundamental concern of Christian ethics. Insofar as Marxist literary theory 
provides methods for an ethical analysis of the social and economic situations in 
which literary texts are produced and received, Christian literary theory should 
endorse them. It is not committed to Marxism as the truth distorted by the class- 
interests it may discern in this way, however. As I argued in the second chapter, 
the criteria for the distinction between Marxist representation and bourgeois 
misrepresentation of historical reality are not consistently maintained, but 
ultimately devolve onto an appeal to the authority of Marxist texts. Furthermore, 
Christian anthropology is fundamentally different to that of Marxism, in that it 
does not subordinate the humanity, dignity or capacity for self-transcendence of 
the individual to the social formation as a whole. Whilst Christian literary theory 
can and should use the socio-economic perspectives on literary texts described 
by Marxist literary theories, it will also maintain that these perspectives do not 
exhaust the meaning of such texts.
Psychoanalytic literary theory is of less consequence for Christian literary 
theory, primarily because psychoanalysis is essentially untestable. As I argued in 
the third chapter, there is in principle no way of checking Freud’s theories of 
unconscious mental processes. He does not allow that his preferred method of 
reconstructing an analysand’s unconscious history from dream-interpretation, 
free-association and similar techniques is susceptible of conscious judgement by 
the analysand. As for empirical investigation, we saw that, despite a rhetoric of 
observation, Freud in practice asserts that for several reasons psychoanalytic 
hypotheses are not susceptible of confirmation by such investigation. These 
hypotheses are in the end simply assertions, whose truth-value is undecidable.
5 Hans Kiing, Does God Exist? An Answer for Today, tr. Edward Quinn (London: Collins, 1980) 
p. 245.
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There is no reason in principle why Christian literary critics should not use 
psychoanalytic critical methods, since Freud’s atheism, like Marx’s, is based on 
Feuerbach’s fallacious projection theory. Indeed, psychoanalytic accounts of the 
tension between opposing forces in the psyche are not incompatible with a 
Christian anthropology of sin and grace. Nevertheless, there is no reason to 
believe that psychoanalytic criticism describes any reality with respect to literary 
texts, and hence no reason for Christian literary critics to use its methods. This is 
particularly so in view of the inadequacy of psychoanalytic accounts of 
femininity. Even if psychoanalysis is taken as a system of cultural hermeneutics 
rather than as an empirical science, its use in explaining issues pertaining to 
femininity in critical analysis will be limited.
We can now go on to describe some of the positive content of the Christian 
literary theory whose contemporary conditions we have determined. A Christian 
theory of language could only be a second-order reflection on contemporary 
philosophy of language, as we have seen from Augustine’s use of Stoic and 
Neoplatonic metaphysics and Aquinas’ use of Aristotle’s. This is also the case 
with modem theological theories of language such as John Macquarrie’s God- 
Talk (1967), based on existentialism, and Nicholas WolterstorfTs Divine 
Discourse (1995), based on speech-act theory. Nevertheless, we can set out some 
basic principles concerning language, insofar as it is an object of literary theory, 
which are compatible with the deposit of Christian faith. Firstly, we can take the 
Biblical text in which Adam names the animals brought to him by Yahweh to 
indicate that, considered as a structure, language is a means of appropriating and 
ordering a world which human beings have not created, but in which they find
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themselves. We open up, order and incorporate the otherwise alien and 
incomprehensible world into our experience by means of lexical and 
grammatical structures. Secondly, as Augustine and Aquinas among others point 
out, men and women are social animals, and they organise their lives together by 
means of discourse. A shared understanding of some aspect of existence is 
almost always the goal of utterance. As John Macquarrie writes, ‘Some aspect of 
the shared world is lit up, and made accessible to both parties in the discourse’.? 
This is not to say that statements convey a fixed quantity of meaning which is 
decoded by a receiver. On the contrary, communication presupposes a 
community of interpretation, in which the rules of signification and the context 
in which signs are to be understood is developed. The meaning of a sign is 
always interpreted within a community. As Augustine points out, anticipating 
certain post-structuralist ideas, the meaning of a written text, with whose author 
a reader cannot engage in dialogue, cannot be determined in terms of the 
quantum of meaning the author intended to encode in the text. On the contrary it 
is always interpreted from within the historical situation of the reader. Finally, 
the communal nature of discourse makes it a vehicle of the power-relations by 
which communities are structured. The story of the tower of Babel tells us that 
discourse can be used for force in society, to consolidate interests and to 
maintain unjust social organisations, and that such discourse, which we can call 
ideological, is against God’s will for society. When we analyse literary texts and 
their interpretations from a Christian perspective, we must include an ethical 
analysis of their social effects as communications.
® John Macquarrie. God-Talk: An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology (London; 
SCM Press, 1967) p. 74.
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A Christian theory of literary production can begin with the analogy of 
literary production and the divine act of creation. As Thomas Aquinas says, in 
the sense that divine creation can be understood by analogy with the human 
faculty of making things as our intellect determines that they should be, it can be 
said that the universe was produced by the divine art, and is God’s work of art. 
God’s creation by his Word can be understood, in Jacques Maritain’s phrase, as 
the ‘supreme analogate’ of literary production. The process of writing a fictional 
work, like all acts of making, is an analogous imitation and repetition of the 
divine making. Such writing is not a creation ex nihilo, however. As St. Thomas 
says, it is ‘a kind of labour’, whose raw materials are the structure of language 
and the discourses or fields of language-use available to the author in his or her 
historical situation.7 Aquinas’ definition of a liberal art as analogous to physical 
work reminds us of the essential role of the body in literary production. The 
practice of silent reading can disguise the essentially physical nature of the 
language that is worked into a text. The literary product is a new being in 
language, a new ‘form’ in the Thomistic sense, which is to say that writing a 
fictional text is not only an imitation and repetition of the divine creativity but 
also a continuation of it. The production of language and discourses into a text 
furthers the process by which God brought all the material of language and 
discourses into being. This is what Aquinas means when he calls art an 
‘imitation of nature in its operation’.8
The Bible tells us, at Ex. 31:1-6 and 36:1, that the capacity for artistic 
production in general is a divine charism, a gift of the Holy Spirit, which we can 
take to be true of literary production in particular. The Biblical doctrine of
7 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia-IIae 57, 3.
8 Ibid. Ia 117, 1.
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spiritual gifts situates them within the baptismal community of the church, but 
we can think of literary production as a kind of natural analogue of these gifts, in 
accordance with the assertion of the Catechism of the Catholic Church that ‘the 
human person participates in the light and power of the divine Spirit’.9 As 
Vatican II describes cultural production, in Gaudhtm et Spes (1965), ‘The 
triumphs of the human race are...the flowering of [God’s] own mysterious 
design’.10 We can add that, as Jacques Maritain argues, the production of a new 
linguistic form or entity presupposes a certain degree of awareness of the forms 
and natural processes of the world brought to light in the languages and 
discourses of which the text is a production. However consciously, this is 
tantamount to an awareness of the God who brought these forms and natural 
processes into being.
A Christian theory of literary reception will understand reading a literary text 
as an engagement in dialogue with the author, as an interpretation within a given 
community of those aspects of existence of which the reader understands the text 
to be a communication. Literary texts make a ‘claim’, in Gadamer’s phrase, on 
the reader; that is, they speak to him or her in a way that demands a response. 
Reading is a process of engaging with this claim in the ways determined by the 
historical situation of the reader’s community. By accepting and rejecting the 
insights and views he or she understands the text to express or to imply, the 
reader’s understanding of these aspects of existence changes. Fictional texts can 
provide readers with ways in which to interpret their experience, and even with a
9 Catechism of the Catholic Church. English translation (London: Geoffrev Chapman, 1994) no. 
1704.
10 Gaudium et Spes no. 34, in Waiter Abbott and Joseph Gallagher, tr. and ed., The Documents of 
Vatican II (New York: Association Press, 1966) p. 232. Cp. Pope Paul Vi’s sermon. ‘The 
Friendship of Artists and the Church’. The Pope Speaks 9 (1964), where he speaks of ‘the 
charism of art’ (p. 393).
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recognition of certain aspects of this experience of which they were previously
unaware. These interpretations and recognitions can call a reader to change his
or her life.
We can take the degree to which a text allows a reader this kind of insight into 
some previously hidden aspect of existence as an index of its value. As Maritain 
argues, a greater knowledge of things is tantamount to a greater knowledge of 
the God who brought them into being. These insights can be ethical, that is, they 
can concern the injustice or misery of things, and, by implication a knowledge of 
God’s will against them. As St. Augustine says, the experience of beauty in 
reading is the experience of being put in mind of a happier, more blessed and 
more profoundly satisfying life than one’s own. At 1 Cor. 12:7, St Paul tells us 
that the gifts of the Spirit are given ‘for the common good’. We can take this 
index of value as one way in which literary texts function for the good of their 
readers, and we can add that, as Thomas Aquinas says, one of the goods of 
fiction in general is recreation for the mind, which, in taking pleasure in fictional 
products, rests from the tasks and anxieties of working life. Whilst the good of 
fiction is pleasure, that is, the most valuable of its pleasures is that for some 
readers some texts teach them something about their existence. As Eric Gill 
argues, this experience is kept from or discouraged in most people by the 
working conditions of industrial and technological capitalism.
As modem literary theory has made clear, all critical practice implies a theory. 
There is no literary criticism or cultural study that does not refer to a more or less 
consciously articulated system of beliefs and norms. As Nathan Scott wrote, a 
critical practice that derives its judgements from Christian theology is ‘a
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legitimate and necessary enterprise of the Christian intelligence’.11 Whilst a 
Christian critical practice will vary according to the social and historical 
situation in which it is practised, it seems to me that at present a Christian critic 
could employ some of the following methods. He or she could analyse the ways 
in which the text presents itself as an interpretation of the world and of how to 
act in it. To the degree that a text does so, we can say that it fulfils the religious 
role once played by myth, in the sense in which that term can be understood to 
denote a story expressing or symbolising fundamental aspects of human 
existence and its limits. The Christian critic could analyse and judge the relation 
of this kind of story as he or she understands it in the text to the Christian 
narratives. Many literary genres, particularly dramatic forms such as tragedy and 
comedy, appear to have their origins in ritual, and the critic could discuss the 
traces of religious significance he or she can still discern in such texts. In this 
dialogue with the world-view he or she discerns in the text, the Christian critic 
should remain open to the possibility of an ethical critique of the historical 
church or of individual Christian practice.
A Christian critic could analyse the social and political context in which a text 
was produced, insofar as the text can be seen to be determined by this context, in
terms of Christian social ethics. We can take as a basic formulation of such
ethics Vatican Il’s assertion:
The political community exists for that common good in which the 
community finds its full justification and meaning, and from which it 
derives its...proper right. The common good embraces the sum of those 
conditions of social life by which individual, families, and groups can 
achieve their own fulfilment in a relatively thorough and ready way.12
11 Nathan A. Scott, ‘The Relation of Theology to Literary Criticism’, Journal of Religion XXIII 
(1953) p. 268.
12 Gaudium etSpes no. 74.
336
As Timothy J. Gomnge argues, in Capital and the Kingdom (1994), ‘The 
concern of Christian ethics is fuilness of life, and this means that economics is at 
the heart of ethical concern, for...the control of the production of wealth is the 
control of human life itself ?3 Insofar as the Christian critic can discern in a text 
the effects of the socio-economic and political conditions in which it was 
produced, he or she could analyse the degree to which these conditions 
prevented or allowed individuals or groups to realise their own fulfilment. He or 
she could examine the history of receptions of a text in the same terms. Jose 
Miranda and other liberation theologians have shown that this is a profoundly 
Biblical concern, and so that the relations of a text to social injustice and to 
desires and forces for its redress in general are a necessary field of Christian 
criticism. In this way, such criticism would represent a transposition of 
Augustine's principle of interpretation according to charity into literary
hermeneutics. 13
13 Timothy J. Gorringe, Capital and the Kingdom: Theological Ethics and Economic Order 
(London; SPCK, 1994) p. 159.
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